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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Actors and victims: Understanding the trends and the use of indiscriminate 
violence in conflicts 
 
Research Question: Does the embedding of actors in a conflict cause an escalation in 
indiscriminate violence against civilians? 
By 
Andrew Edward Tchie 
 
Advisor: Professor Ismene Gizelis 
 
In this thesis, I explore the different strategic positions, which actor(s) adopted during 
the decade-long Nepalese conflict (1996-2006). Firstly, I demonstrate who the actors 
of the conflict are, and establish why it is important to rethink the way actor(s) in a 
conflict are categorised. Secondly, I establish how the identified actors, are not static, 
but uncover how actors can adopt three strategic positions (i.e., embeddedness, fixed, 
and temporarily-deployed). I then present the theoretical framework; I developed for 
this thesis, entitled the Concept of Embeddedness. The Concept of Embeddedness 
addresses the conditions in which civilians experience indiscriminate violence during 
conflicts. I show how the strategic movement and positioning of actors within conflict 
zones renders civilians “piggies-in-the-middle,” as they are wedged between 
embedded actors who control a zone and actors who are sent on temporary 
deployment to the zone. I attempt to demonstrate how the position of embeddedness 
triggers temporarily-deployed and fixed actors to use indiscriminate violence against 
civilians in different zones. I propose that the use of indiscriminate violence against 
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civilians through the practice of embeddedness (i.e., actors becoming embedded in a 
zone) occurs under two conditions: First, when an embedded actor resorts to the use 
of indiscriminate violence to gain control over the civilian population. Second, when 
fixed, but largely temporarily-deployed, actors use indiscriminate violence against 
civilians because they are unable to differentiate between embedded actors and 
civilians. The key distinction here is between embedded actors and the targets of 
indiscriminate violence. Using an original survey collected from 517 respondents in 
Nepal, across 16 districts, with combined datasets from a local human rights group, an 
international dataset, and interviews with 38 Nepalese elite civil society members. I 
show that embeddedness can lead actors to use indiscriminate violence on civilians. I 
focus exclusively on the Nepalese conflict and extracting examples from the second 
Sudanese conflict (1983 to 2005), the Peruvian conflict (1980-2000) and the current 
South Sudanese conflict (2013 to present day). I demonstrate how indiscriminate 
violence was distributed and how the Concept of Embeddedness can account for some 
incidents of indiscriminate violence used on civilians. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Across the globe, conflicts are devastating the lives of people and communities.1 As I 
write this thesis, the conflict in Syria has entered its eighth year, with no end in sight. 
The conflict in South Sudan, which started in 2013, has become more prolonged in 
nature, and more warring actors (i.e., agents, combatants, defectors, rebels, army, 
police, and perpetrators) are involved in the conflict today than at the start of the 
conflict. Civilians are routinely killed in selective and indiscriminate attacks. This 
violence undermines not only community cohesion in the short term, but existing 
structures that help strengthen and foster peaceful co-existence between societies in 
the long term. In 2016, more than 31 million new internal displacements occurred due 
to conflict, violence, and disasters.2 Faced with such violence, millions of civilians are 
compelled to either stay or flee their homes in search of safety.  
 
This has prompted many researchers, policy makers, and practitioners (in conflict 
resolution, peacekeeping, and humanitarian aid) to try to understand why 
governments and rebels use violence against their own populations in conflict. This 
interest has produced a range of literature on the subject. Previous work distinguishes 
between violence based on selective targeting and violence based on indiscriminate 
practices against civilians (Kalyvas, 2006, Hultman 2012). In this thesis, I examine 
the conceptualisation of the role of actor(s) and try to move beyond static models of 
                                                 
1 https://www.unocha.org/story/humanitarian-appeal-2017-climbs-235-billion-record-141-million-people-need-
assistance (accessed on 10/9/2017) 
2 http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2017/ (accessed on 10/9/2017) 
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actors' positions (rebel verses government forces definition of actors), by redefining 
the mechanisms that underpin the use of indiscriminate violence.  
The term actor is developed in Chapter three, but for introductory purposes, I extend 
this to include military personnel, policy, armed police, hired state militia, secret 
service forces, rebels, splinter groups, absorbed groups and ethnic or local groups. 
The term “actors” as Galtung points out, goes beyond more than two parties to a 
conflict (Galtung 1994) and refers here to the various groups, people, or institutional 
state mechanisms involved in any conflict. The term is expanded to include state 
authorities (e.g., the police, military, security services, and paid militia groups) and 
rebel groups seeking to remove the state, to include defected groups, smaller rebel 
groups, and local ethnic groups with a role in the conflict. The definition is restricted 
to all potential actors within an intrastate conflict context or setting. This incorporates 
individuals who have obtained at least some measure of political power through an 
identified group and/or authority within certain location(s) in a country or conflict 
setting. These actors may also engage in activities that can have a significant 
influence on decisions, policies, and outcomes of a conflict, which may alter the 
dynamics and decision of key actors and shape the overall patterns of violence in a 
conflict by actors. Actors are key influencers who can change the strategic situation or 
location of a group fighting within a conflict, resulting in the use of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians. 
 
To date, most theories and empirical studies have concluded that the state's use of 
indiscriminate violence incites insurgent attacks (Lyall, 2009). Such violence is 
highly counterproductive because it creates new grievances, while forcing victims to 
seek security, if not safety, among rebels. While existing literature does explore 
 15 
aspects of whether the use of indiscriminate violence may be the result of the strategic 
position an actor assumes, not all researchers have explored the mechanisms which 
impact the strategic positions actors undertake to determine if this influences the use 
of indiscriminate violence. A subcategory of this question is: Would certain strategic 
positions employed by actors increase in the use of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians?’  
In this thesis, I define indiscriminate violence as significant political or non-political 
violence within an intrastate conflict which results in acts of violence and the killing 
of civilians. Indiscriminate violence can be physical (Riches, 1986) or structural 
(Uvin 1998), and takes place within a conflict setting and is used alongside structural 
institutions like state actors. Indiscriminate violence includes any action in support of 
defeating actors or civilians seen to be linked to an opposing side. I focus on 
collective and random acts of violence and killings, abuse of human rights restricted 
to the physical abuse of civilians (torture, rape, and abduction), by actors within an 
intrastate conflict. I believe that most indiscriminate violence occurs around strategic 
military operations and is a consequence of the strategic positions that actors can 
undertake during periods of fighting within a conflict. I will later show in this thesis 
that indiscriminate violence is not induced merely because of a lack of information. 
While I acknowledge the role of information to the use of indiscriminate violence 
(Kalyvas, 2006), even when information was at hand, police forces during the 
Nepalese conflict (1996-2006) still used violence against civilians indiscriminately. 
The manifestation of indiscriminate violence in this thesis I believe will take place 
when actors' party to a conflict assume a strategic position which poses a risk to the 
opposing warring actor. This results in the opposing actor adjusting their tactic and 
 16 
strategic positions and assuming a different tactical position to respond to the new 
strategic position of their enemies. The new anticipated position may be intended to 
counter the new measures placed on the actors and the disadvantage this readjustment 
creates if a battle were to occur. Adjustments in strategic positions may also occur 
because the new position from the opposing actor becomes a threat to the actors 
overall strategic aim of winning. This causes the opposing warring actors to readjust 
their current position to respond to a potential attack by the actor who has changed 
their strategic position. This I suggest, means in any conflict, indiscriminate violence 
is used by, and moves with, actors who can access this form of violence through their 
strategic positions.  
 
I propose in this thesis that actors assume different strategic positions over the course 
of a conflict and these positions are not stationary throughout the conflict. The 
fluctuation of actors’ positions can change over time and space and this contributes to 
the continuous alteration of zones throughout a conflict. This means indiscriminate 
violence will continue to move with the altering zones and with the actors that access 
it as a resource. I discuss this argument in Chapter Two and Three, where I show how 
this argument differs from earlier theories that discuss information asymmetry as one 
of the core causes of indiscriminate violence. Indiscriminate violence is likely to 
coincide, partially, with an actor’s inability to restrain themselves in response to 
external conditions shaped by other actors positioning or repositioning themselves 
during a conflict. Indiscriminate violence includes circumstances in which actors 
impose pain on the nearest person within their reach. Bystanders may refer to the 
violent behaviour as ‘irrational’, ‘wild’, and ‘random’ but at the centre of its action is 
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a strategic purpose. While the targets of the violence are random, the behaviour is 
intentionally designed to gain compliance and control, cause damage, scare, and hurt 
the civilian populations. I argue that, in most cases, indiscriminate violence may occur 
near embedded actors or in areas to which temporarily-deployed actors are sent or 
located. The use of indiscriminate violence is not location restricted but is instead 
fluid, and moves with the actors that assume different strategic positions and use 
indiscriminate violence at any point to defeat their enemies or control civilian 
populations. However, the outcome of indiscriminate violence is underpinned by the 
actor adopting a strategic position. In some situations, actors will not move because 
they are not challenged by their enemy but still use indiscriminate violence to control 
civilian populations which they intend to govern. Other actors may examine their 
circumstances and decide it is best continue to move to avoid the prospects of defeat. 
Therefore, the use of indiscriminate violence revolves around an actor’s desire and 
access to frequently be reassessing their strategic position and taking on new tactical 
positions to reach their overall objective of winning or avoiding defeat. 
 
To further the concept of strategic positions, I examine in Chapter Three, the different 
strategic positions that I believe actors undertake during conflicts. This is done by 
examining how the strategic positions contribute to the use of indiscriminate violence 
against civilians. I suggest that the different strategic positions actors assume within a 
conflict contribute to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. So, it is 
important to understand the different strategic positions that actors adopt to fully 
comprehend the use and movement of indiscriminate violence. In this thesis, I 
identify three strategic positions (i.e., embedded, temporarily-deployed and fixed) that 
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I argue contribute to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. This is done 
by exploring the nature of each position, how each position is assumed, and how this 
leads to indiscriminate violence against civilians. As previously noted, there are some 
actors in a conflict that are more likely to remain in a position for extended periods 
than others. These actors may also be likely to live amongst civilian populations for 
extended periods while launching several attacks against their enemies. This was a 
strategy used by the Shining Path (SP) leader Manuel Rubén Abimael Guzmán during 
the two-decade conflict in Peru (1980-2000) (Yaworsky, 2009). The Shining Path’s 
strategies involved living with and recruiting civilian populations. Their strategy 
orbited around adopting different strategic positions within different zones and 
causing a certain level of confusion for the state actors (state actors whom the SP was 
fighting). The SP strategy was to highlight the rural revolution, establish liberated 
zones, and encircle cities (Kent, 1993; 441). The strategy also involved living and 
embedding actors amongst civilian populations and then triggering a reaction by 
hiding amongst civilians during battle periods.  
 
This offers my first strategic position derived from the strategic element of living 
amongst civilians for extended periods, the establishment of liberated zones and the 
encirclement of cities, which I define in this thesis as embeddedness. Embeddedness 
is defined as the position and time in which an actor is deeply rooted and concealed in 
a surrounding population of civilians during a conflict. The term ‘surrounding 
population’ means when actors encircle civilian populations in a specific location 
within a zone or liberated zone which is controlled by embedded actors. 
Embeddedness can occur when an actor goes from being temporarily-deployed or 
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fixed3 (holding battle positions) to staying in a zone for extended periods of time. This 
period can be months up to years. The nature of embeddedness involves living and 
camouflaging amongst a civilian population, establishing liberated zones, launching 
attacks that may involve using civilians as a shield for cover and controlling 
geographical locations which leads to the establishment of controlled zones. 
Embeddedness involves an actor being sent to a stationary positioned (holding battle 
positions) for extended periods of time. Embeddedness does not include short periods 
(i.e., a few days amongst civilians) since this setup suggests that actors are not 
committed and will move on or be required to adjust their strategic position because 
of a potential attack. Thus, an actor may go from being temporarily-deployed to fixed 
and then embedded or start from being fixed (deployed for a length of time or 
recruited from the zone) and then embedded. Embeddedness can involve an actor 
being permanently embedded amongst civilians from the moment of deployment. 
Thus, to be embedded actors either have to: have their movement restricted outside of 
a zone or a liberated area which they control; or have to be within a contested zone 
(where no one party has full control) or uncontested zone (e.g., controlled by the 
military). 
 
The second strategic position is defined as fixed position and is the position and time 
when an actor is either recruited for battle from a zone or stays in the zone from the 
start of being fixed in the zone. An example of this position is taken from the 
Peruvian conflict. At the beginning of the mid-1960s, the Shining Path set up a vast 
network of supporters and followers in the rural areas of the southern Andean 
departments of Ayacucho and Apurimac. This was done primarily through the control 
                                                 
3 I will come to the two remaining positions (temporarily deployed to fixed) in the next two paragraphs. 
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of areas and faculty at the Universidad Nacional San Cristbal de Huamanga in 
Ayacucho (Degregori 1990). Controlling areas, faculty and curriculum provided 
adherents for the Shining Path, with a mechanism for recruiting revolutionary cadres 
from the population of provincial youths who accounted for many of the students at 
the university. This gave the Shining Path with invaluable opportunities, including the 
use of teaching positions, to diffuse its revolutionary message, the creation of a 
widespread network of local sympathizers who would join and support the SP in the 
countryside. It created a geographical basis for the creation of territorial strongholds 
and eventually of so-called liberated zones, once the armed struggle was initiated. The 
nature of fixed position is cantered on the recruitment process of locals to a group of 
actors who have just started their strategic foothold in a liberated or controlled zone. 
This position will require actors to be recruited and stationed in zones for longer 
periods of time than their temporarily-deployed counterparts. Fixed actors tend to 
hold defensive positions during a conflict. Occasionally, they may be required to 
deflect warring parties who try to attack uncontested or contested territory. Fixed 
actors are familiar with their zones of control because they are either recruited from 
these zones or have remained there for intermediate to extended periods. As such, 
they can disguise themselves naturally amongst civilians.  
The position includes the effective control of geographically based zones which lead 
to the establishment of a controlled area. The strategy of a fixed actor is about the 
recruitment and creation of full-fledged, territorial-based zones or areas for the fixed 
actors. This strategy is characterized by an actor’s ability to compete openly with the 
forces of the established state and administratively by imposing territorial units and 
structure of governance on the civilian populations, as in the case with embedded 
actors. Depending on the nature and duration of a conflict, fixed actors may be 
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deployed to a different zone within their current zone for several days or weeks to 
reinforce their zones of control. This makes the differentiation between the fixed 
actors (who can later become embedded) and the civilian population difficult. In some 
situations, fixed actors may be asked to move through to another side of the zone to 
provide reinforcements, defend zones, and assist fellow actors. Fixed actors have 
much more fluidity than embedded actors, as fixed actors can still move within a 
liberated or controlled zone while an embedded actor will remain fixed within a zone 
of control.  
 
The final position I define as temporarily-deployed, is the position and time when 
actors from all sides of the conflict are sent or deployed to a zone for short periods of 
time. This is often done to identify the enemy or capture the opposition’s zone that 
may have been attacked by another actor’s zone. Often this position may involve 
trying to counteract ‘hide and seek’ tactics that are used against a strong or weak side. 
Actors using this positioning strategy will often try to siege liberated zones controlled 
by opposing actors. The nature of this position may revolve around counterinsurgency 
measures (e.g., acted out by state forces) or hit and run tactics (e.g., acted out by 
rebels) prompted by opposing actors. The nature of this position may encompass a 
strategy of prevention by actors on all sides and may be a forward front to dealing 
with an opposing actor. For example, the state of Peru’s counterinsurgency campaign 
in 1983 prevented the creation of a permanent territorial base in the departments of 
Ayacucho and Apurimac, which later led to the expansion of insurgent operations 
northward in the central Andes. In the mid-1980s, the insurgents advanced into the 
rainforest region of the upper Huallaga Valley and onto the Altiplano in the Southern 
Andes. Lima and its surrounding shantytowns were included in insurgent activities by 
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the late 1980s. In response to this, the state temporarily-deployed various militia, 
police, and military groups to deal with the implanting of SP actors amongst civilians 
(Kent, 1993).  
The temporary deployment of actors is not simply restricted to battling the opposing 
side. It can also be done to oppose a strategic move or position intended to be 
implemented by an opposing side, with the aim of apprehending key actors or groups 
in contested and uncontested zones. On the rebel’s side the strategy can often 
resemble the actors’ conducting a form of mobile warfare without a home. While on 
the state side, activities carried out by the police, army or armed police will differ in 
characteristics, since it encompasses short-term deployment to zones where embedded 
or fixed actors may or may not be based. Nonetheless, the counterinsurgent measures 
are designed to deal with embedded and fixed actors. This strategic position is 
characterised by the ephemeral nature of a rebel actor’s activities and the rebel’s 
tentative confrontation of the state. For example, in Peru, the strategy and tactics of 
the Shining Path included important geographical elements to overthrow the 
successive democratic government through hit-and-run tactics which caused pain for 
the civilian populations and the state. The position involved temporarily-deployed 
actors being sent to zones for strategic motives (e.g., to commit violence or havoc, or 
for defensive and offensive purposes) (Olson, 1993).  
 
Actors who are temporarily-deployed to a zone, depending on their strategic 
assignment, are normally sent to either assist their allies or to combat warring actors 
who may be embedded or fixed in these zones. Temporarily-deployed actors, in many 
cases, are required to enter civilian populations to reach their assigned zones. They 
are unlikely to live with civilians for extended periods but may have some 
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associations with certain civilian groups along the way. Along the route to their 
assigned zones, temporarily-deployed actors may be ordered to seek out warring 
groups (often for offensive or defensive reasons) that pose a threat to their deployed 
zones or their overall strategy. In other cases, temporarily-deployed actors may arrive 
at their assigned location without the occurrence of fighting between the warring 
actors’, but they may later be attacked or ambushed by other actors in these zones.  
 
As part of my main contribution, I propose that the use of indiscriminate violence 
against civilians through the practice of embeddedness (i.e., actors becoming 
embedded in a zone) occurs under two conditions: First, when an embedded actor 
resorts to the use of indiscriminate violence to gain control over the civilian 
population; second, when fixed, but largely temporarily-deployed, actors use 
indiscriminate violence against civilians because they are unable to differentiate 
between embedded actors and civilians. The key distinction here is between 
embedded actors and the targets of indiscriminate violence. In the proceeding 
chapters, I argue that these three strategic positions interact with one another, 
triggering the use of indiscriminate violence during the Nepalese conflict. I will show 
that these three-strategic positions are constantly interacting with each other and as a 
result, conflicts are likely see dynamic changes in zones of control because of these 
positions. I then go on to argue, that these the interaction of these positions are what 
causes the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Because of the strategic 
positioning and movement of actors, I expect indiscriminate violence to be largely 
triggered by the behaviour of actors that are often embedded among civilians. 
Indiscriminate violence will also be used by temporarily-deployed and embedded 
actors to gain control and spread compliance among civilians, by actors who view 
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civilians as a threat to their existence (White, 1989, p. 328). In other words, the use of 
indiscriminate violence is more likely to be observed in zones where either embedded 
or temporarily-deployed actors are present. Civilians living within these zones are 
more likely to experience intractable behaviour and become “piggies in the middle” 
wedged between the different actors of the conflict within the zone they inhabit.  
 
I will then demonstrate through encounters, strategic deployment, and movement of 
actors and key events that embeddedness can help to determine when and where 
civilians experience indiscriminate violence during a conflict. To understand how to 
better protect civilians in conflict, this thesis will examine the decade-long conflict in 
Nepal and explore issues surrounding the use of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians during this conflict. The aim is not only to understand how indiscriminate 
violence is used and moves during this conflict, but to also contribute to a growing 
body of literature aiming to strengthen the protection of civilian mechanisms in armed 
conflict. This thesis aims to further provide insight into the use of indiscriminate 
violence in armed conflict and to demonstrate that the indiscriminate violence in Syria 
and South Sudan is preventable. This is achieved by focusing in-depth on the 
Nepalese conflict and extracting examples of embeddedness and other strategic 
positions, from the second Sudanese conflict (1983 to 2005), the Peruvian conflict 
(1980 to 2000), and the current South Sudanese conflict (2013 to present). It is 
important to note that the nature of embeddedness and its causality is what this thesis 
sets out to explore and to an extent, examines how the duration of embeddedness 
impacts the use of indiscriminate violence. Since the systematic data required to 
understand this duration element is not fully available, it becomes difficult to focus on 
the time aspect on embeddedness entirely. I will show that indiscriminate violence 
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during the Nepalese decade-long conflict occurred because the actors’ party to the 
conflict assumed strategic positions which had a tactical element attached to it. As 
argued above, actors can assume three strategic positions (embedded, fixed, or 
temporarily-deployed) that facilitate the use of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians.  
 
 
Diverse methodological approaches were employed in this thesis, including an 
original survey with 517 respondents across 16 districts in Nepal, combined datasets 
from local human-rights’ activists with an international dataset, and interviews with 
38 elites across Nepal. Nepal was selected for two main reasons: first, interesting 
trends pertaining to battle-related deaths and one-sided violence against civilians 
appear in the existing data on the conflict (UCDP, 2014). The patterns that emerged in 
the Nepalese conflict led me to question whether the observed use of indiscriminate 
violence was a consequence of embeddedness; second, I found in the existing data an 
opportunity to test the concept of embeddedness and conduct an in-depth examination 
of the phenomenon within a real-life context. Thus, my primary results focus on the 
impact of the strategic positions of warring actors and their use of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians. I focus on understanding the strategic positions actors 
assume in a conflict, and how these positions influence indiscriminate violence used 
against civilians. I describe the types of indiscriminate violence respondents 
experienced, beyond human rights’ violations, to provide a better understanding of the 
use of indiscriminate violence during the conflict. However, the effects of 
indiscriminate violence on the civilian population are not the focus of this thesis.  
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To understand how indiscriminate violence is used, I first explore the different actors 
in a conflict, and how these actors can assume different strategic positions during a 
conflict. If an actor’s position during a conflict can fluctuate, from being fixed in one 
area to non-fixed in another area, this suggests during a conflict that the actors 
position never is static and that actors have access to different positions which can 
alter over the course of the conflict. It also suggests that depending on the position 
assumed by an actor; an actor maybe (depending on the strategic position) able to 
control the degrees of violence used on civilians. This implies that it is not 
indiscriminate violence that moves or due to a lack of information about a zone; it is, 
in fact, the actor who assumes a different strategic position within a conflict zone that 
enables the movement of indiscriminate violence and its use in the zone where actors 
are located. It is this issue that this thesis explores throughout the following chapters, 
by focusing on the strategic position of embeddedness. To do this, there is a need to 
examine different actors at a lower threshold. For example, instead of examining the 
collective actions of a state, I will need to go further and assess the action of state 
actors like the police and military. This helps examine the actions of actors at the 
micro level to observe the behaviour tied to the strategies and positions employed by 
actors. This way of examining actors through an extended version of the state verse 
rebel model enhances understanding of how actors move and use indiscriminate 
violence in the conflicts selected.  
However, as I later contend, this was one of the shortcomings and difficulties of 
trying to study the concept of embeddedness. While I use a dissimilar approach to 
understand the use of indiscriminate violence, there are still weaknesses in the 
method. The mixed method approach did not enable me to examine the exact year and 
times when each respondent experienced indiscriminate violence. This added 
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information would have proven vital to further understanding when attacks were 
carried out, and how and why this was conducted at a micro level. This has 
implications for this research project, since I was unable to fully reflect the structure 
of embeddedness for many victims, as I had initially intended. Nevertheless, this 
would have also brought into the equation bias that often cannot be eliminated or 
controlled. This means while I do demonstrate documented patterns of behaviour and 
violence, this is still not statistically significant to infer that the Maoist’s overall 
position was one of continuous embeddedness.  
Although I offer a framework that will need to be further tested, the scope of the 
research design does not enable me to capture other potential hybrid positions that 
actors may have adopted throughout the conflict.  
The data collected helped to shape my understanding of how indiscriminate violence 
transpired during the Nepalese conflict and how different actors can undertake 
different strategic positions to support their core remit. With every research piece, 
there are limitations which are inherently subjected to the types of methods a 
researcher chooses to adopt. The data collected in this thesis is limited but unique to 
the case of Nepal because it sheds added information on how the strategic positioning 
of actors created an environment for civilians to experience indiscriminate violence. 
However, while the data collection methods can be adopted in other countries, it is 
highly unlikely that a similar conflict with similar trends would provide researchers 
with the opportunity to see comparable qualities detected in this project. This is 
because of the time difference between the end of the conflict in 2006 and when the 
field research was conducted in 2014, bringing with it biases that a researcher can 
only mitigate but not eliminate.  
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Having said that, the generalisability of actor strategic position and how this led to the 
use of indiscriminate violence against civilians is something that I believe was 
witnessed and continues to be witnessed in previous and current conflicts. While the 
results may not hold validity across cases (owing to the nature of post-conflict 
assessment, the mixed method approach adopted, and the time lapsed), this thesis 
does demonstrate that the mechanisms underlining the use of indiscriminate violence - 
the strategic positions adopted by actors - in conflicts, are generalizable across 
previous conflicts as the Peruvian and the current South Sudanese conflicts. However, 
future research will need to find enhanced approaches and indicators to empirically 
measure the strategic positions - embedded, fixed, temporarily-deployed and other 
hybrid positions - that facilitate the use of indiscriminate violence. While I have 
achieved this to an extent, further research should be conducted to better understand 
how the strategic positions adopted by actor's impacts the use of indiscriminate 
violence during dynamic periods of conflict. This would help to further advance the 
theory in this thesis and increase researchers’ understanding of how indiscriminate 
violence is used, due to the strategic positions adopted by actors. 
The findings from this thesis also allow the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
to be better informed about when, where, and whether to deploy peacekeepers to 
protect civilians during conflict. This knowledge could prove important for the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Missions and UNSC, especially in or when providing 
peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions with tougher mandates that have the 
protection of civilians at their centre. 
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1.2 Outline of the Thesis 
Following Chapter One, this thesis is divided into seven chapters. In Chapter Two, I 
review the literature that has contributed to understanding the use of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians in conflict. I provide a critique of previous literature as well 
as recent studies that inform my own theory-building efforts in Chapter Three. In this 
chapter, I shed light on two main areas: first, the theoretical identification of the 
potential actors in a conflict (e.g., agents, combatants, defectors, rebels, army, police, 
and perpetrators); and second, how identified actors who assume a strategic positon 
use violence against civilians through their movement. I suggest that the opportunity 
for and use of indiscriminate violence against civilians occurs when actors assume 
distinct strategic positions within a conflict. I move beyond static models of actors' 
position, to show that the struggle of temporarily-deployed actors to differentiate 
between embedded actors and civilians contributes to the practice of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians.  
 
In Chapter Three, I build on the discussions in Chapter Two and present the concept I 
developed for this thesis, entitled ‘The Concept of Embeddedness’. The concept of 
embeddedness accounts for some of the use of indiscriminate violence through the 
strategic position of embeddedness during the Nepalese conflict. The process of 
embeddedness occurs when actors are deeply rooted in the civilian population and 
struggle to differentiate between embedded actors and the civilian populations. I 
argue that embeddedness occurs because civilians are wedged between embedded 
actors who control a zone and actors who are sent on temporary deployment and 
cannot differentiate between actors and civilians. This generates an environment 
where the zones inhabited by the different actors continuously change due to the 
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dissimilar positions, strategy, and movement of actors within these zones. I 
hypothesize that the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in altered, 
contested, and controlled zones through the practice of assuming a strategic position 
of embeddedness occurs under two conditions: first, when an embedded actor resorts 
to using indiscriminate violence to gain control over the civilian population; and  
second, when fixed, but largely temporarily-deployed, actors use indiscriminate 
violence against civilians because they are unable to differentiate between embedded 
actors and civilians. In Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, I test this hypothesis using the 
results of this study. 
 
In Chapter Four, I introduce the data collection, analysis methods and methodological 
approaches used in this study. I demonstrate how the methodological approaches 
employed contributed to understanding why and under what conditions actors 
resorted to using indiscriminate violence against civilians during the decade-long 
conflict in Nepal. I describe the method of “process tracing” used in the analysis of 
data collected from various sources (see Chapter Five); the methods used to conduct a 
survey with 517 respondents in Nepal and to examine the data (see Chapter Six); and 
the methods used to interview 38 elite members of Nepalese civil-society and to study 
the data (see Chapter Seven). In addition, I examine some ethical challenges that 
confronted me as a field researcher working in a post-conflict zone (Nepal) and on-
going conflict zone (South Sudan). After briefly summarizing the purpose and general 
method of my research, I discuss in detail the research procedures I followed to 
implement a “do no harm” approach during field research. I then discuss the 
procedures designed to ensure that my interviews took place with the participants 
fully informed consent, including defining what this means and explaining how I 
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implemented it. I then turn to the procedures whereby the anonymity of those 
interviewed and the confidentiality of the data gathered were ensured to the best 
possible extent. Finally, I examine the method used to assess all three methods in this 
thesis, using a method called triangulation. Triangulation in this thesis helps to 
facilitate validation of data through cross verification from two or more sources. It 
refers to the application and combination of several research methods in the study of 
the same phenomenon. Finally, I discuss potential risks, such as social desirability 
bias in respondents’ choices and when I conducted the survey and interviews. 
 
In Chapter Five, I focus on the case study of the Nepalese conflict. I uncover who the 
actors in this conflict were and show how the actors who participated in the conflict 
assumed different strategic positions. I identify four types of actors involved: the 
Maoist rebels, State Police, the Armed Police Force, and the Royal Nepalese Army. 
By employing “process tracing,” I show how embeddedness transpired during the 
conflict. I analysed three distinct datasets,4 in conjunction with an in-depth analysis of 
data from various sources, including newspapers, journal articles, official reports, UN 
documents, and institutional documentation. Process tracing supported the analysis to 
understand: a. how indiscriminate violence was used against civilians by actors who 
assumed different strategic positions throughout the conflict; b. what triggered 
indiscriminate violence and why it was used against the civilians. Results show that 
state actors and Maoist rebels used indiscriminate violence against civilians during 
different periods. I found that embedded actors on the rebel’s side often used 
indiscriminate violence when they were losing control of their zone but also when 
state actors increased their efforts. Overall, the results show that the embedding of 
                                                 
4 Please see Chapter Four for a detailed description of the datasets used for this analysis. 
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actors triggered temporarily-deployed actors to use indiscriminate violence. I also 
found that state actors collectively used indiscriminate violence against civilians more 
often than their Maoist counterparts.  
 
In Chapter Six, I present the analysis results of the data collected from the surveys I 
conducted with 517 respondents in Nepal. In this chapter, I examine the use of 
indiscriminate violence by the identified actors. In the analysis, I conducted numerous 
cross-tabulation trials using the data collected from the 517 surveys. The findings 
from the cross tabulation demonstrate that actors were more likely to be embedded 
during the first six months of the respondents’ interaction with the conflict. However, 
after this period (<6 months), the results show a reduction in embeddedness, which 
later increases. Maoist actors were more likely to be embedded as a strategy, and state 
actors were more likely to be temporarily-deployed. I then conducted logistic 
regression analysis which is a form of predictive modelling technique which 
investigates the relationship between a dependent (target) and independent variable(s) 
(predictor), using the same data collected from the 517 respondents. This allowed me 
to further test the hypothesis presented in Chapter Three and examined in Chapter 
Five. This technique is used to understand the strength of the causal mechanisms to 
the outcomes being observed and the relationship between the variables selected. 
Results from the logistic regression analysis does not show any support for the overall 
hypotheses.  
 
In Chapter Seven, I use the same hypotheses to examine the interviews conducted 
with 38 prominent elites from diverse professional backgrounds across Nepalese 
civil-society. Results of the analysis show support for the concept of embeddedness, 
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and that the process of embeddedness helped contribute to temporarily-deployed state 
actors’ use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. A meaningful number of the 
interviewees believed this occurred because state actors were unable to distinguish 
between embedded actors and civilians. Results revealed that when the state 
authorities were attacked or under siege by the Maoist actors, they would often 
assume that certain civilians were linked to Maoist actors or were informants. This led 
State authorities to use indiscriminate violence or kill individuals or groups of 
civilians. The results offer minor support for hypothesis two. According to 
interviewee's accounts, actors used indiscriminate violence to gain control over zones 
or for retaliation purposes. Results show that the use of indiscriminate violence by 
embedded actors was associated with trying to gain control of civilian populations, 
often after an attack. Chapter Seven complements the analysis presented in Chapters 
Five and–partially in– Six and contributes to strengthening the concept of 
embeddedness and the hypothesis presented in Chapter Three.  
 
In Chapter Eight, the final chapter, I triangulate the results from Chapters Five, Six, 
and Seven to reinforce the findings. I briefly touch on the method of triangulation and 
how it was used, then re-examine the results from each chapter to present a unified 
conclusion for the thesis. I then extend the discussion to the implications of this thesis 
for policy. I explore avenues for further research, the limitations of my own work and 
what the shortcomings in theory and research design were; I also touch on the overall 
implications for the thesis. Finally, using the insights gathered from this research I 
suggest ways that the international community can solve the current protection crisis 
that affects millions of civilians in current and emerging conflicts.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 The Dilemma 
In contemporary armed conflicts, innocent civilians often constitute the majority of 
victims and have at times been deliberately targeted.5 The most vulnerable 
populations at risk are often tortured, raped, and killed. This crisis has resulted in a 
surge of interest by international bodies and the international community to push the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for mandates that protect civilians during 
conflicts.6 The protection of civilians has emerged as a central purpose of many 
contemporary peace operations around the globe.7 Both civilian and military 
peacekeepers increasingly recognise the moral duty and operational importance of 
protecting threatened civilians during conflicts and during peacekeeping operations. 
As peacekeeping missions have grown in number, frequency, size, and mandate, the 
United Nations (UN) has made concentrated efforts to put civilian protection at the 
centre of these operations. This has stimulated academic interest in understanding 
why civilians experience violence during conflicts (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006, 
2008; Hultman, 2008, 2013; Kalyvas, 2006; Wood, 2010). 
 
The question of why warring parties use violence against civilians, especially when 
they depend on civilians for information, food, and security, continues to perplex 
scholars (Arreguin-Toft, 2001; Kalyvas, 2006; Mason, 1996). Much of the literature 
to date has concentrated on the interactions between rebels and civilians within a 
conflict, and violence has been viewed as a means of governing a population during 
                                                 
5 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_6917_res_1.pdf 
6 http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.da 
7 http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/missing-peace/ BGR_Increasing%20Operational 
%20Effectiveness%20in% 20UN%20Peacekeeping.pdf 
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war (Kalyvas, 2006; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2009; Wood, 2010). Quantitative studies 
have largely focused on the consequences of country (or conflict) level factors or 
features that characterise the relations between the warring parties and governments, 
or state use of one-sided violence against civilians (Downes, 2006; Hultman, 2007, 
2008; Lilja & Hultman, 2011; Valentino et al., 2004; Wood, 2010). Researchers, who 
study group structure and resources, have investigated the impact of the desires of a 
group and their incentives on the use of violence against civilians. Their findings 
suggest that the structure of a state and the strength of the groups fighting in the 
conflict can provide rebels with opportunistic incentives, such as looting, to use 
violence (Weinstein & Humphreys, 2008). These studies and others have expanded 
our understanding of why violence against civilians occurs during conflicts, and what 
takes place within a conflict environment. However, as I argue later in this chapter, I 
move beyond current models to discuss the diversity of actors involved in a conflict, 
and the impact of actors’ strategic positions on the use and movement of violence 
against civilians. 
 
2.2 Chapter Overview 
In this chapter, I review the literature that has contributed to understanding the use of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians in conflicts. By exploring competing theories 
and debates on the use of violence against civilians, I attempt to understand how and 
why indiscriminate violence is used against civilians. I provide a critique of previous 
and current literature in the areas that inform my own theory-building efforts that 
appear in Chapter Three. In Section 2.3, I give a summary of the main contemporary 
and contending theories that explore why violence against civilians occurs as a 
strategy. In Sections 2.4 and 2.5, I explore theories that examine how violence is used 
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to control the civilian populations within contested and uncontested zones, and how 
these theories differ from the theories that view violence as a strategy.  
In Section 2.6, I explore the group defection and structure argument, largely revived 
by Humphreys (2003) and Weinstein (2005; 2007). I examine how the desires of a 
group and their incentives can also lead to violence against civilians. In Section 2.7, I 
examine the relevance of the four models and identify their constraints in accounting 
for the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. I show that while these 
theories have advanced our understanding, there are still gaps in our understanding of 
how indiscriminate violence originates moves and under what conditions it transpires. 
In the final section (Section 2.8), I move beyond current models and briefly present 
the theoretical contribution of this thesis (the focus of Chapter 3), which is founded on 
Kalyvas’s (2006) theory on the use of indiscriminate violence in altered, contested, 
and controlled zones, and aims to further our current understanding of indiscriminate 
violence. In this chapter, and in Chapter Three, I attempt to show that embedding 
actors amongst civilians can account for some use of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians, because actors take up different strategic positions which means opposing 
actors need to modify their strategy and positions. Therefore, new zones are created 
and actors are left having to adjust their strategic positions to defend themselves 
against rival actors. Because of fluctuations in zones, civilians will experience 
indiscriminate violence from actors responding to changes in their positions that 
impact their zones of control and their overall strategy. In the next section, I explore 
how violence is used as a strategy against the civilian population.  
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2.3 Violence as a Strategy  
In this section, I outline the framework used to identify how actors who become party 
to a conflict, use indiscriminate violence as a strategy and examine various studies 
that support this framework. Valentino et al. (2004) contend that the state may engage 
in mass killing in conflicts, where the population supports a guerrilla movement, as a 
means of reducing their strength. Azam and Hoeffler (2002) further suggest that 
violence against civilians diminishes the population density in an area, both through 
killing and successive migration, which in turn makes it harder for rebels to hide 
among the civilian populations. If Azam and Hoeffler (2002) are correct in their 
analysis that fighting zones will always see the killing and migration of civilians, then 
how does this account for situations where civilians are not killed or the population 
density in an area does not reduce, or civilians do not migrate? As demonstrated 
earlier, the SP held control over several civilian liberated zones, but civilians did not 
rush to migrate, notwithstanding the extraordinary levels of violence. During the 
Nepalese and Peruvian conflicts, civilians did not migrate in their tens of thousands, 
neither did the density of these populations drastically reduce because the strategy 
used by both the CPN-Maoist in Nepal and the SP in Peru. While Azam and Hoeffler 
(2002) view violence as a way of preventing embeddedness from occurring, this 
argument does not account for circumstances under which rebels are embedded 
amongst civilians but cause confusion for security forces; resulting in high levels of 
violence against civilians with no civilian migration. This occurred during the 
Vietnam conflict (Kalyvas, 2009), where strategies like hide and seek were used to 
overcome US forces.  
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Valentino et al. (2004) understand the use of violence as a strategy to prevent civilians 
from supporting the rebels. They argue that indiscriminate violence will be an 
instrument of last resort since actors may see no other alternative. While I do suspect, 
my findings will be similar, I verge away from how this moment of last resort 
transpires. Where I differ from Valentino et al., (2004), is on their conceptualization 
and timing of this moment of last resort. How can I know when an actor in a battle 
arrives at this moment or ceiling of last resort? Does an actor's moment of last resort 
depend on whether the actor is well trained or not? Does the type of battle mean some 
actors are more susceptible to moments of last resort over others? Or does it revolve 
around the dynamics of the conflict? If I add another layer of dynamics to the 
equation, like the strategic position an actor assumes, how will this interact with the 
actor’s moment of last resort? For example, the timing of an actor passing through a 
zone (on short deployment) and their use of indiscriminate violence as a last resort 
will be different to an actor living with civilians who uses indiscriminate violence as a 
last resort. Both actors’ interaction with “a moment of last resort” will depend on their 
interactions with the conflict, their strategy and the position these actors assume, 
which impacts on their rival’s overall position. Each position an actor takes offers this 
actor with a different level of interaction with opposing actors, civilians and dynamics 
of the conflict.  
Valentino et al., (2004), perspective suggests that actors operate within motionless, 
unlimited time and alteration free zones, which do not influence the use of violence. If 
this were to hold, then we could expect arbitrary use of violence which would be 
mimicked throughout all conflicts. Also, where I differ from Valentino et al., (2004), 
is in the concept that actor’s dynamics and their use of violence is influenced by an 
actor’s strategic position and how these positions interact with other actors. These 
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mechanisms are what I believe triggers the use of indiscriminate violence which I 
explore later in the chapter. 
 
While Azam and Hoeffler (2002) acknowledge that rebels can hide amongst civilians, 
the authors assume that actors are fixed in certain areas. Azam and Hoeffler do not 
recognise that even when a population moves because of the violence, the rebels can 
follow and re-embed themselves amongst migrating civilians. Evidence of this was 
found after the Rwandan genocide, when the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
allowed Rwandan forces to enter DRC territory to participate in joint military 
operations against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).8,9 
The joint military operations and the violence used by the Rwandan forces against the 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), shows how the actors 
change different strategic positions and how Rwandan forces responded by assuming 
different strategic positions (one that involved being deployed) to deal with the 
FDLR. It suggests that while actors can use violence to move civilians on as a tool, it 
does not deter actors from embedding themselves amongst civilians at different points 
in time. However, a larger question is how in the case of Rwanda, positions of the 
FDLR and the Rwandan forces interacted. 
 
Raleigh (Raleigh, 2013, p. 462), in her examination of the Africa continent, 
conversely concludes that civilians are targeted because they are accessible, and 
rebels kill more civilians often to create new frontlines for the conflict.10 Eck, 
Kristine, and Hultman, (2007) and Hultman (2007) contend that by targeting civilians, 
                                                 
8 https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/12/13/you-will-be-punished/attacks-civilians-eastern-congo (accessed on 20 
December 2014) 
9 The FDLR is a rebel group composed of Rwandan Hutus, many of whom were survivors of the genocide, who 
fled to refugee camps and concealed themselves among refugees in 1994. 
https://web.stanford.edu/~sstedman/2001.readings/Zaire.htm (accessed on 20 December 2014) 
10 http://www.crisis.acleddata.com/author/clionadh/page/2/ (accessed on 20 December 2014) 
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insurgents are trying to distract the government and change its current policy to suit 
their own agenda. Hultman (2007) concludes that the high levels of violence 
witnessed in conflicts are perpetrated predominately by rebels during their resistance 
to the state. According to Hultman, violence is used to show the population that the 
government is unable to protect them, uphold the law, and provide the necessary 
security. This, Hultman (2007) argues, makes the government appear incompetent and 
incapable of functioning as a coherent state that can provide stability for all its 
civilians. Hultman and Lilja (2011) add another piece to this model asserting that 
ethnic, demographic structures influence the way rebels treat co-ethnics in the early 
phase of war, before they establish territorial control (Hultman and Lilja, 2011, p. 
172). Ethnic groups tend to cluster geographically, particularly in Africa where 
African minorities often inhabit contiguous territories (Scarritt & McMillan, 1995). 
This geographical concentration facilitates recruitment to armed groups (Gates, 2002; 
Melander, 2009; Weidmann, 2009) and helps rebels carry out their struggle more 
effectively (Toft, 2003).  
 
This suggests co-ethnic targets can be divided into two main categories: civilians and 
rivals. Rebels target civilian zones to ensure their cooperation in the war against the 
government forces, and rebels target rivals to eliminate competition and establish 
dominance over their ethnic community. Hultman and Lilja (2011) conclude that the 
killing of civilians is causally linked to a rebel group’s overall act of trying to damage 
the government, displaying its incompetency and lack of legitimacy to protect 
civilians. These studies argue that mass violence is employed to show “the power to 
hurt,” and when rebels resort to violence against civilians it is often because all other 
means of damaging the government have been exhausted (Hultman, 2009, p. 822). 
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Thus, by targeting civilians, rebels compensate for their inability to cause damage to 
the government on the frontline.  
Hultman and Fjelde, (2014) add that ethnicity affects conflict patterns of civilian 
cruelty, but it is more likely in ethnically homogenous areas. Both governments and 
rebels target more civilians in zones where the opponent’s co-ethnic groups live, 
compared to zones where their own co-ethnic groups reside. Hultman and Fjelde, 
(2014) also found that states are more likely to target civilians in areas inhabited by 
the rebels or areas close to the rebel bases.  
However, Hultman’s (2007) explanation does not clarify why the SP continued to use 
significant amounts of indiscriminate violence levels throughout the conflict, despite 
having control over most liberated zones.11 Violence towards civilians in controlled 
SP liberated zones continued to increase over the years, despite the significant 
amounts of control that the SP had over liberated zones under their control. In fact, 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s own findings indicated that the levels of 
violence against civilians in SP areas increased during operations that were carried 
out by the state.12 Similarly, the early years of the Nepalese conflict, witnessed state 
police using violence towards civilian despite having information on the civilian 
populations.13 Despite the similar tactics used by both rebels, in both conflicts, the 
outcome of violence by rebel actors is inverted. Hultman and Lilja’s (2011), 
contribution allows researchers to observe whether the use of indiscriminate violence 
might be ethnically aligned but does this suggest that if an actor is not ethnically 
aligned to civilians from the start, that the actor will not be aligned to this group once 
control is established. Do actors have agency to change ethnic sides? In South 
                                                 
11 The Truth Commission found the SP were indicated with having significant levels of indiscriminate violence 
then the state. 
12 https://www.usip.org/publications/2001/07/truth-commission-peru-01(accessed on 20 July 2018) 
13 https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Nepal-StateofConflictandViolence.pdf 
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Sudan’s current conflict, ethnic groups have been known to change sides during the 
conflict. This includes the Shilluk ethnic group defecting from the Dinka ethnic group 
and joining their historic rivals the Nuer ethnic group, linked to the former Vice 
President.14 During both the Nepalese and the Peruvian conflicts, recruits were taken 
from ethnic differences hegemonic areas, but those running the SP and Maoist CPN-
M were not from the same caste. In Nepal, upper castes Maoists were joined in 
solidarity to lower caste ethnic groups. This suggests that ethnicity may not be as 
strong an influencing mechanism as previously thought outside of the African 
context. 
The literature reviewed in this section helps to understand how actors can not only use 
violence as a strategy but can selectively distribute violence towards civilians. This 
understanding enables me to explore other causal activities that could potentially 
explain why violence is used and, in turn, why certain acts of violence continue to be 
used during a conflict. However, the theory that the targeting of civilians is a strategy 
is puzzling, especially as it appears to be a counterproductive measure. Such measures 
could potentially create distance between the actors and the surrounding populations, 
reducing their legitimacy and alienating the very people they claim to represent and 
be fighting for. The theory does well to assist research to understand why there is a 
need for actors and civilians to co-exist and survive during a conflict (Nagel et al. 
(2008) and Dixon (2009). While this body of research gives indications about the 
behaviour of actors while living amongst civilians, it does not fully explore how 
different strategic positions may impact and influence actors to use violence. How 
does the opposing actor’s position and strategy impinge on an actor’s ability to use or 
not to use violence against civilians? If violence is used as a strategy, at what point 
                                                 
14 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10402659.2017.1344533 
 43 
does this strategy become unproductive? How do we explain violence when this does 
not appear apparent through ethnic clusters in some conflicts? While the models put 
forward do well to explore the use of indiscriminate violence, questions remain as to 
how different strategic positions influence the use of violence, if at all it does. In the 
next section, I examine the framework that explores how indiscriminate violence is 
used to gain control. 
 
2.4 The Need for Control 
In this section, I explore how actors use indiscriminate violence to control the civilian 
population during conflicts. The theoretical perspectives I review contend that the use 
of indiscriminate violence is essential to controlling information, civilians, resources, 
and the movement of actors in a conflict. Based on his study of patterns and 
distribution of violence, Kalyvas (2006, p. 175) argues that violence is used to 
influence the civilian population and control their behaviour. Kalyvas’s work 
concentrates on the interactions between the rebels and civilians within a conflict and 
suggests that violence is a means of governing civilian populations (Kalyvas, 2006; 
Kalyvas & Kocher, 2009; Wood, 2010). Kalyvas views violence against civilians as a 
tool to harass and pressure civilians into obedience and discourage unwanted 
behaviour. Other scholars contend that violent acts are used to secure future positions 
and are likely to be deployed again to suppress rebels and gain control (Boulding, 
1962; Gurr, 1968; Gurr & Lichbach, 1986; Kalyvas, 2006; Poe & Tate, 1994; Zanger, 
2000, p. 229). 
 
Kalyvas, and others cited above, differ from Hultman in their view that violence is not 
simply a way to accomplish strategic goals, but is dependent on the circumstances in 
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which it is carried out. Kalyvas identifies two types of violence, selective and 
indiscriminate, which depend on the levels of territorial zones of control, fluctuations 
in informational irregularities, and balance of power within these zones (Balcells, 
2010; Kalyvas, 2004, 2006). Kalyvas argues that these factors shape insurgents’ 
behaviour and violence against civilians. In the Serbian conflict, once control was 
achieved on the battlefield, local non-Serbs “met their fates.” Many were 
instantaneously killed, while others were incarcerated or harassed and tortured 
(Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005, p. 13). Similarly, during the Vietnam conflict 
discriminating violence perpetrated by the Vietcong was a common theme within the 
“hamlets” (zones) that were predominantly, but not fully, controlled by the Vietcong. 
These “hamlets” were often contested territory between the warring zones that were 
fully controlled by the state (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2009, p. 335). 
 
According to Kalyvas (2006), control offers crucial access to information for either 
warring party and is a prior condition for targeting rebellious civilians. He contends 
that if rebels are not in control, they are likely to target civilians indiscriminately, due 
to the absence of specific information about defectors and offenders. By targeting 
civilians, rebels can create and implant fear amongst civilians, making it harder for 
the state to control the population or a territory (Vinci, 2005; Ziemke, 2008). 
According to this theoretical framework, violence eventually keeps the balance of 
power within these zones. Balcell (2010) argues that the need for control shapes 
insurgents’ behaviour and their use of violence (Balcell, 2010, p. 291). Rebels resort 
to violence because it is cheaper than either selective repression or the provision of 
significant positive incentives (Kalyvas, 2006, p.165) and will modify civilians’ 
expectations of returns for remaining impartial (Lichbach, 1995, p. 58; Kalyvas, 
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1999). Hultman, on the other hand, believes that rebels implement terror tactics to 
counter strategic setbacks (Hultman, 2007a), acquire resources (Hoffman, 2004), 
encourage ethnic harmony, inspire enlistment, and improve their negotiating situation 
with the government.  
 
Kalyvas (2006) is right to suggest that control offers access to crucial information but 
as I will later argue, if actors use violence, then those actors do not have control over 
the civilian populations. For example, democracies like the United Kingdom, France, 
and Germany, with different forms of legislative and political systems demonstrate 
control over their civilian populations without using indiscriminate violence. These 
states exercise control through laws and institutional systems and yet, control is 
maintained without civilians experiencing indiscriminate violence. Kalyvas (2006) 
assumes when violence is used it is because of a lack of information or to control. 
However, how do we explain violence that occurs when actors respond to a strategic 
attack or when violence occurs in circumstances when actors have both control and 
information? During the Nepalese conflict, the police in Rolpha and Rukum were 
known to use violence against civilians where they were stationed, despite having the 
necessary information and controlling civilians in the communities they inhabited.15  
 
I believe if indiscriminate violence is used, it insinuates that a certain level of control 
does not exist, but that actors may also be using violence for other reasons. If actors 
must use violence, then it suggests actors never had control in the first instance. By 
continually punishing civilians, actors run the risk of triggering civilians to deter or 
flee. Thus, violence to control because of access to information becomes a 
                                                 
15 https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/file1137793491.pdf (accessed: 16/09/2017). 
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counterproductive measure. While having access to information is important, it is not 
necessarily the only significant factor. If information on the location of opposing 
actors is not backed by a strategy, then it just becomes information that is 
unserviceable because it does not support the actors’ decisive goal of victory. 
Consequently, information just becomes information without an outcome. For 
example, the recent U.S. military mission in Afghanistan was partly to train, 
advice and assist the Afghanistan forces to defeat their enemy, the Taliban. 
Nonetheless, the US government intentionally chooses not to engage with the Taliban 
despite the wealth of military information that it has, but why? Put simply, it does not 
serve their strategic interest to do so; information without a clear strategy of how to 
attack and defeat your enemy is solely information. What is crucial is a strategy 
designed and implemented to defeat the opposing actor. It is this strategic element 
which encompasses actor’s positions that I will later argue can influence 
indiscriminate violence against civilians. 
 
Therefore, to control a civilian population through indiscriminate violence, actors 
must rely on a counter strategy and its execution through the strategic positioning of 
actors to support their overall goal. Information helps actors to understand and know 
their enemy, but it will not enable actors to defeat their enemy and control civilians 
unless a clear strategy is in place. Where I detach from Kalyvas (2006), argument is 
on the notion that if rebels are not in control they are likely to target civilians 
indiscriminately, due to the absence of specific information about defectors and 
offenders. This suggests if rebels are in control, they are not likely to target civilians. 
However, the opposite was found to be true in the case of Peru. In early 1983, the 
Peruvian army set up "fortified hamlets” within the emergency zones. The strategy 
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was to create new communities of "protected hamlets" by physically separating the 
rural communities from SP. This involved deploying actors and embedding them 
amongst the civilians to separate the two groups. The intention was to eventually 
allow the ties and loyalty of the civilians to the Peruvian government to be 
strengthened. However, this strategy failed because the deployed units had previously 
used indiscriminate violence against civilians whom they were unable to differentiate 
from SP actors; creating tensions between the two groups. By late 1983, the Peruvian 
army’s counterinsurgency efforts seemed to be gaining in effectiveness, forcing SP 
operations northward into the Andes and the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) in search 
of a new support base, but this came at the price of a high number of civilian deaths. 
By May 1984, the army had established approximately fifty counter-guerrilla bases, 
each with one hundred men, in the emergency zone (Switzer, 2007). These actors 
conducted aggressive patrols, and maintained a presence in the villages to control and 
have access to the information within these zones. As a result, many civilians changed 
sides and supported SP because of the army’s use of indiscriminate violence.  
What this shows is that even if control offers crucial access to information for either 
warring party and is a prior condition for targeting rebellious civilians, it does not 
mean that civilians will continue to support the actor using the violence to control. 
The Peruvian example demonstrates that once the army’s counter measures were in 
place, it only made the civilian population revert away from the army, to the SP 
despite the level of information that they had access to. The army strategy failed and 
caused many of the civilians to flee, despite their access to an abundance of 
information. Later in the chapter, I further develop the mechanism of strategic 
positions to show how this can influence the use of indiscriminate violence.  
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Since rebel’s desire and seek support from the local populace to reach their 
objectives, civilians can possess some degree of control to determine their 
relationship with the rebels (Kalyvas, 2004; Schafer, 2001, p. 231; Zahar, 2000, 
p.117). Previous research has also found that indiscriminate violence perpetrated by 
the government assists rebels to overcome their dilemma around collective action, as 
it galvanises the populace and security can be used as a selective incentive (De Nardo, 
1985; Kalyvas, 2006, p. 156; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007). However, as Moore (1995, p. 
434) points out, this argument suggests that only government violence makes civilians 
indifferent to supporting the rebels or the government. Frisch (2006) argues that the 
capacity of the insurgents is more influential in their ability to carry out violent 
attacks. 
 
The studies reviewed in this section show that control over the civilian population is a 
central objective for both rebels and states and all actors party to a conflict. They 
suggest that by securing civilian support, actors are better able to determine and 
change the conflict’s outcomes. Thus, support is strongly linked with the ability to 
demonstrate the capabilities of the group to potential recruits or civilians. It also 
means that control is a central factor in actors’ use of indiscriminate violence.  
The theories on why violence is used as a strategy and why violence is used to gain 
control over civilians contribute to our understanding of the use of violence against 
civilians in conflicts; However, while these models do exceptionally well to explain 
the need for information to control civilian populations, they undervalue the strategic 
positioning of actors during the different periods of a conflict and how this can 
influence violence against civilians but also limits the access to information. They 
could consider why certain actors may remain in a zone for several weeks or months, 
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but do not use violence. The model should also consider whether there is more of an 
incentive for actors who move freely within zones to use more violence over actors 
who are positioned amongst civilians for extended periods. The model cannot explain 
why information received is not always acted upon but violence occurs and whether 
information, in combination with an active strategy, influences violence against 
civilians. Furthermore, the theory does not fully account for situations during the 
Peruvian conflict where violence was used to control civilians by the SP, but used by 
the state to attempt to separate the SP and civilians. While violence was used, the 
strategic position that each actor assumed interacted with each other causing clashes 
between the different actors and their positions. The literature explored minimises the 
effect that strategic positions such as the embedding of actors can have on the choices 
of either side to use indiscriminate violence. It discounts the strategy and tactical 
positions which the opposing side may assume to deal with embedded actors. It 
ignores that even without information, zones change, and civilians experience 
indiscriminate violence, since actors must assume a position to respond to one 
another. Kalyvas’s (2006) view implies that there is a need for actors to be embedded 
among civilians to control populations, gain information, and control the territory. 
Nevertheless, this model should also consider whether the strategy of embedding 
actors increases or decreases the likelihood of civilians experiencing indiscriminate 
violence, either by actors being present in the zone or actors assuming a temporary 
deployed position to this same zone. 
 
2.5 Conflict Zones: Duration and Outcomes of Conflict Violence 
In this section, I review research that examines the control of conflict zones and how 
this control impacts the outcomes of conflict violence. Understanding how different 
 50 
zones are controlled by actors can allow researchers to understand the strategic 
positions that actors assume, which helps to create the various conflict zones. 
Understanding the strategic positions that actors assume helps me to understand how 
zones are created, liberated, and controlled. As I argued earlier in the chapter, having 
access to relevant information as noted by Kalyvas (2006) is important, but unless this 
information is acted upon, it plays a limited role for actors to use violence. By 
understanding how zones are created and maintained, I can understand the strategic 
positions which actors take up to control these zones and how violence is used within 
these zones. I believe this supports me to understand how strategic positions foster the 
use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in zones. Scholars who focus on 
conflict zones argue that the degree of territorial control generally forms civilians’ 
motivations to collaborate with various actors (e.g., Kalyvas, 2006, p. 88). For groups, 
not to resort to violence, the warring parties must maintain control within a conflict 
area. Control influences their abilities and incentives to restrain from using violence 
(Kalyvas, 2006; Metelits, 2010; Wood, 2010). This can also be counterproductive 
when the conditions may motivate violence, especially when expected support grows 
unsuccessfully or when civilians within these zones resist recruitment (Branch, 2005; 
Mkandawire, 2002). The issue of control raises important questions about the impact 
of the conditions on the use of violence against civilians. Is there a potential for 
violence if actors lose control or are unable to gain or regain control? How will these 
populations be treated if they feel forced? Will lack of control cause actors to use 
violence against civilians that resist? Above all, does the positions assumed by 
different actors help to control zones.  
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Research shows that indiscriminate violence is greater in zones of support for the 
opposition (Balcells, 2010; Hultman, 2009; Sullivan, 2012). Wood (2003), claims that 
within conflict zones there are robust recursive associations between rebels’ military 
abilities and their capacity to garner general support. As such, the state uses violence 
to drive civilians away from the territory and even conduct mass deportations to 
secure an area (Downes, 2008; Kalyvas, 2006; Wood, 2003). Downes (2008) argues 
that targeting civilians is a tool to frighten the support-base of the losing group and 
replicates the desire to anticipate a potential encounter with the enemy (Burg & 
Shoup, 1999; Wood, 2006, pp. 310–313). Kalyvas and Kocher’s (2009) study on the 
Vietnam War found that selective violence was used to gain control over the 
populations that were either under control of the state or in contested zones (Kalyvas, 
2006; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2009, p. 335). Other studies found that indiscriminate 
violence is used to deny territorial control by the enemy (Boyle, 2009; Vinci, 2005).  
 
Kalyvas (2006) contends that in areas effectively controlled by either the rebels or the 
government there is less violence from both, as the zone is redundant, and the 
opposing party cannot access it. Frontline areas where no one has full control, 
according to Kalyvas, will experience lower levels of violence against civilians 
(Kalyvas, 1999, 2006; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2009). I agree that zones with full control 
by either actor will experience less violence because there is no incentive to continue 
using violence. However, the argument that actors in frontline areas with no control 
have lower levels of violence is incomplete, as it implies that these zones are static 
and do not have the occasional need to strategically take control. It also suggests that 
the conflict dynamics have little influence on the use of violence.  
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For example, the SPLA/M initially deployed similar (Maoist) tactics to those used in 
Nepal and Peru (Sendero Path), using “hide and seek” and “hit and run” strategies on 
government infrastructures and posts to gain attention and create momentum. During 
the second Sudanese conflict, the SPLA's strategy revolved around operating in cities 
and urban areas. In these cities and urban areas these attacks took the form of popular 
uprisings (1985), while in the marginalised areas as Southern Kordofan, and Southern 
Blue Nile, it took the form of a popular and patriotic armed struggle (1955-1973 and 
1983-2005) (Lesch, op. cit. in 57 Hale, Sondra, op. cit., 191-192). As a response to 
the SPLA/M attacks, the Sudanese Government and SAF launched vicious attacks 
against the SPLA/M in civilian areas but were unsuccessful in deterring the SPLA/M 
in these zones. As a result, the government would later use local rival clans as a form 
of cheap counterinsurgency operations (De Waal 1994, Salih and Harir 1994). These 
measures led to grave human rights violations and indiscriminate violence against 
women, children, and ethnic groups. In Darfur, the government used the same 
strategy and funded groups such as the Janjaweed, Masalit, Fur and Zaghawa to deal 
with the civilians, later leading to the formation of new local counter forces such as 
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation 
Army/Movement (SLA) and the outbreak of conflict in Darfur in 2003 (Abdel Salam, 
2000).16 In the case of the Sudan conflict, there was a need to control the zone and 
this influenced the outcome of conflict violence against civilians. Local actors were 
deployed to counter the SPLA as a means of state control but without full success. 
Local militia were used because they were not only familiar with the zones but were 
better tactically positioned than the state to deal with the SPLA and recruit locals. 
This thesis explores these perspectives in the coming chapters by attempting to 
                                                 
16 http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/darfur/#sthash.7uET5Fbs.dpuf accessed on 03/08/2014). 
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outline where previous research has missed opportunities to further understand how 
the strategic position adopted by actors in a conflict can contribute to the use of 
violence against civilians.  
 
Previous studies have demonstrated that the balance of coercive power largely 
determines the outcome and duration of domestic conflicts (Cunningham et al., 2009). 
It similarly shapes insurgents’ choice of war strategies, in terms of whether they 
pursue revolutionary or more limited secessionist goals (Buhaug, 2006), as well as 
whether the conflict occurs in peripheral zones or nearer to the centre of a regimes 
power (Buhaug, 2010). Morrow (2007) offers evidence that noncompliance with the 
“Laws of War” has been met throughout the 20th century “with some major violations 
by the side that suffers the consequences of that noncompliance” (Morrow, 2007, p. 
570). These findings generally concur with Clausewitz’s (1827; 1984, p. 283) 
observation that capacity constraints impose limitations on actors’ political goals. The 
distribution of capabilities may similarly influence the style of warfare that insurgents 
adopt (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010; Vinci, 2009). Clausewitz’s (1827) work suggests 
that these capabilities have the power to not only change but also divert the path of 
any conflict. The advantage of the model conflict zones demonstrated and examined 
by Kalyvas, (2006), is the consideration that zones can go from being contested to 
uncontested. This perspective can contribute to understanding the use and movement 
of indiscriminate violence against civilians within these zones. The model provides 
insight into how indiscriminate violence is used and suggests that indiscriminate 
violence is by no means static as the previously explored models suggest.  
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However, for zones to be controlled actors must be based there and live amongst 
civilians to control both the zone, and the civilians in these zones. Controlling zones 
remotely will not be a way of governing a zone, since it opens the zone to the 
possibility of being captured by an opposing actor. A zone cannot be controlled by 
simply dropping bombs since it still requires actors to be present within the zone or 
risk the zone being taken back. During the Peruvian conflict, the SP’s central 
strategies were to capture liberated zones and to continue to increase these liberated 
zones, through recruitment and deploying actors with the purpose of increasing the 
zones. The SP would open "fighting zones" in which their combatants could operate, 
driving government forces out of these zones and creating "liberated zones". These 
zones were to be used to support new SP zones until the entire country was essentially 
one big "liberated zone". To defeat the SP, the state applied an offensive eradication 
strategy in line with the counterterrorist strategy recommended by the United States 
Armed Forces (Portugal, 2008, p. 25). This involved deploying actors to the area and 
making sure they could defeat the SP through strategic military operations. The threat 
grew in late 1981, and the government introduced emergency laws in affected areas in 
1982 to support their efforts to control the area (McClintock, 1998; Fielding & 
Shortland, 2010).  
The Peruvian example is important for two reasons. First, it shows that the movement 
of actors was important for creating liberated zones by strategically positioning SP 
actors in certain zones which could later be expand into liberated zones. Without this 
strategy, further liberated zones could not be created; this appears to have been done 
by embedding actors within these zones and controlling these zones from within. The 
expansion of zones was also achieved through the recruitment of locals that helped 
support the increase in liberated zones. The SLPA/M in Sudan deployed similar 
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actions, as detailed above. Second, this example helps to understand how actors 
within a zone take up certain positions to defeat or counteract their enemies during 
fighting. The Peruvian example demonstrates an offensive eradication strategy that 
was in line with the counterterrorist strategy recommended by the United States 
Armed Forces to defeat the SP. This would suggest that having a clear strategy to 
counter the SP was crucial to defeating the SP. This strategy could not have been 
possible without tactically positioning actors within zones to hold the control. To 
control zones remotely would have been impossible. What appears to be clear from 
the example is that counter measures need a clear strategy, which can and cannot be 
based upon information. Thus, the key component is the strategic positioning of these 
actors to counter those already embedded in zones. Information tells us who is 
present, resources the actor has etc., but it does not inform actors how to defeat their 
enemies. This can only be done through the strategic deployment of actors (with 
support of a strategy) into a conflict zone which can be influenced by information, 
actor's resources and other elements which form part of the overall strategy and 
strategic placement of actors.  
 
Viewing the use of indiscriminate violence through the lens of strategic positions may 
allow researchers to understand why certain civilians may experience significant 
levels of violence while others experience very low levels. Exploring the strategic 
positions that actors assume departs from Kalyvas (2006) argument of information 
asymmetry because as demonstrated in section 2.4, having access to information can 
inform actors on the ground about what is occurring, but information alone will not 
explain why violence is used against civilians. For any strategy in a conflict setting to 
work, actors must assume a strategic position (whether they are temporarily-deployed, 
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fixed or embedded) to defeat opposing actors. Information offers awareness, but it 
does not decide what strategies will be used and how this strategy through strategic 
positions reacts with dissimilar strategic positions within zones. Even without 
information, actors can still have a clear strategy which is informed by the actors 
assuming strategic positions. This was shown earlier in the Peruvian government’s 
plan. Despite being unaware of what was taking place within certain liberated zones, 
the government still put in place counter measures to deal with the SP. Information 
may have influenced this process. Nonetheless, what is crucial is how the policy of 
strategically placing actors interacts with opposing actors assuming similar or 
different strategic positions.  
As such, it is important to understand and account for not only actors’ choices but the 
strategic positions that actors can assume and their movements because this can help 
us better understand how violence is used and moves across zones, throughout a 
conflict. In the next section, I explore the use of distributed violence through theories 
of group structure and examine whether this model can better explain the use of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians instead of the conflict zones argument 
developed above. 
 
2.6 Group Defection and Structure 
In this section, I examine the group structure framework to determine whether the use 
of indiscriminate violence is linked to group dynamics or identity and, if so, whether 
these dynamics are influenced by the fluctuation of conflict zones. I distinguish 
between groups with membership based on material incentives and groups based on 
shared identities. I also examine the implications of the nature of organisational 
structure for the behaviour of a group during a conflict.  
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Group structure theory maintains that group organisation causes violence; and that 
violence is a function of internal group structures, values, and the group’s recruitment 
process (Humphreys, 2003; Lichbach, 1987; Petersen, 2002; Mason & Krane, 1989; 
Sambanis & Zinn, 2005; Weinstein 2005, 2007, p. 78; Weinstein & Humphreys 
2008). In other words, some insurgent groups use indiscriminate violence on the 
civilian population, while others selectively punish those who cooperate with their 
rivals and have a more collaborative relationship with the population. Kaufmann 
(1996) and Posen (1993) contend that ethnic recruits are likely to join rebel groups 
out of concern for their safety, especially if the relationship is negative (see Tullock, 
1971). Goodwin (2001) and Kalyvas & Kocher (2007) claim that some civilians join 
groups for protection because they may have experienced violence. Other scholars 
argue that combatant or rebel groups’ access to resources will determine recruits’ 
decision. According to this argument, well-resourced groups entice recruits with 
material rewards and are likely to embark on a path of indiscriminate violence, whilst 
poorly-resourced groups recruit based on ideology. This allows recruited members to 
use violence selectively whilst maintaining some civilian support (Kalyvas & Kocher, 
2007, pp. 177-216; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006, p. 432; 2008, p. 444; Weinstein, 
2007, p. 7; Wood, 2003; Zahar, 2000, pp. 107-128). In addition, some scholars 
examine the role of defections in group structure and the use of violence against 
civilians (Weinstein, 2007).  
 
Groups suffer from what is named, the “resource curse.” They are flooded with 
opportunistic joiners who exhibit little commitment to the long-term goals of the 
organisation; although the selective incentives that leaders allocate can contribute 
towards actors either remaining in or defecting from a group (Lichbach, 1994; 
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Popkin, 1979; Weinstein, 2005, p. 598). Weinstein’s (2006) alternative explanation: 
namely that the initial conditions –particularly the availability of natural resources - a 
prospective insurgent group faces, shape its propensity for violence against the 
civilian population. Insurgent groups with access to resources can create selective 
incentives to motivate people to join the insurgency; those without access to 
substantial resources must make uncertain promises about future gains. Resource-rich 
environments tend to favour opportunistic insurgencies, populated by less committed 
individuals driven mainly by the desire for profit. Resource-poor environments tend 
to favour activist insurgencies, populated by highly committed participants who are 
willing to wait for their rewards, even if it takes years. Thus, the initial conditions 
produce different kinds of insurgencies with varying propensities for violence. 
Opportunistic insurgencies tend to be more indiscriminate in the use of violence 
against civilians, while activist insurgencies tend to be more careful to minimize 
brutality and protect civilians. 
 
Building on this perspective are “looting” theories that claim that revenues from the 
extraction and export of natural resources are used to finance the start-up costs of 
rebellions, resulting in the desire for rebel groups to prolong the conflict to gain more 
natural resources (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; Fearon, 2008, p. 5; Keen, 1998; Ross, 
2004). Other structural issues, such as defections, can be destructive to a group’s 
capacity for command and control, especially groups that rely on privacy for survival. 
Defections can contribute to a group’s fragmentation, particularly amongst insurgent 
groups and terrorist organisations (Berman 2009; Pokempner et al. 1995, p. 47). 
Defection can also occur when a group of rebel’s exhibits too much repression, 
producing counterproductive consequences. This counterproductive behaviour may 
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also occur when, due to the duration of the conflict or when actors are temporarily 
deployed or fixed in zones (embedded) amongst the civilian population and a leader 
changes their aims. An example, of this occurred when the Front de Libération 
Nationale (FLN) in Algeria caused many civilians to defect to the government side, 
because of the repression of civilians (Hamoumou, 1993, p.157; Gutiérrez Sanín 
2008, p.14, as cited by Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006, p. 430). This was also 
witnessed in the example above during the Peruvian conflict. According to Weinstein 
(2005), the strategic use of targeted violence primarily requires effective organisation, 
making violence an active strategy and successfully raising the cost of defection 
(Weinstein 2005, p. 598; 2007). Beyond this, the theory suggests that actors operating 
within certain conditions will also remain fixed and are less likely to use 
indiscriminate violence if they are a part of a campaign or ‘activism.’ What about 
areas that are well resourced but do experience significant levels of violence, what 
can explain this phenomenon? 
 
 
While the opportunistic theory raises some important points, the model assumes that 
the path of an insurgent group is determined because of rational choice and that an 
actor’s decisions are rational at all times. In other words, if an actor is in a high-
resource area they are more likely to be rational because they are always thinking 
about what is in their interest that this linked to the resources, which means the actor 
is constantly rethinking their position. However, if an actor is in a low-resource area, 
their rational choice barely exists because they are not ‘in it to win it’ and their 
ideology remains constant throughout. The model does not account for actors who 
defect from a group to other groups, regardless of whether in well-resourced or low-
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resourced areas, as this scenario is certainly possible. Specifically, the model does not 
account for situations where there are multiple actors changing zones of control 
forcing other actors to move on. It overlooks evidence that some groups with long-
term goals and strong disciplinary structures nevertheless commit large-scale selective 
violence. Furthermore, the model assumes that the existence of local resources 
determines that rebels inevitably become violent predators. It disregards the power of 
leadership and the role that a leader can have in avoiding this problem. Additionally, 
the model assumes that resources remain fixed and does not account for changes in 
actors’ access to resources due to the fluctuation of zones from being contested to 
uncontested. Group structure and defection can also be affected by the conditions 
actors are placed in or the opportunities they see outside of their current group 
structure, which will increase when the group moves to different zones during the 
conflict. If the incentives within the group are not strong enough to satisfy the actors, 
they may resort to using violence or choose to defect. Defection can also occur when 
actors (temporarily-deployed or fixed) see an opportunity to separate from their 
existing group structure because of a lack of incentives in a prolonged conflict. There 
are three more general concerns with this model. First, the model does not offer 
careful conceptualisation of how insurgent groups differ from one another, which 
makes it difficult to study groups comparatively or over time. Second, key existing 
theories are only loosely related to pre-war political life: in this literature, insurgent 
groups seem to come out of nowhere once war begins. There needs to be a better 
understanding of how these groups emerge over time and how this past can link to 
their futures acts and positions. Third, there is little explanation of change over time 
within war. For example, the model claims that resources available in a conflict zone 
are often static. There is not an explantion as to whether these resources are exist 
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before the conflict or are new resourced discovered during the conflict. Thus, the 
model cannot fully account for the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians.  
 
2.7 Theoretical Gaps 
The theories outlined above (Sections 2.3–2.6) attempt to understand the use of 
violence against civilians in conflict. Kalyvas (2003; 2006; 2009) argues that by 
targeting civilians, insurgents seek to discourage unwanted actions, such as defection 
to the enemy’s camp. Violence differs depending on the amount of territorial control 
and can be divided into selective and indiscriminate categories. Hultman’s (2007a; 
2009; 2013) work accounts for significant changes in the number of civilians killed 
between different periods of violence during a conflict. Weinstein and Humphreys 
(2008), further explain how incentives provided by internal group structure play a 
large role in how actors use violence against civilians. The literature explored 
recognises that violence can be and is used for multiple purposes and varies not only 
based on conflict intensity, but on relations between civilians and actors. These key 
theories diverge in their explanation of the variance of violence, both in terms of 
magnitude and patterns. However, as I have previously argued, they do not entirely 
account for the use of indiscriminate violence in the case examples demonstrated 
above. The examples drawn from Peru show that the geographical positions of actors 
are important to the strategy which informs the strategic positions of the actor and 
could influence the use of indiscriminate violence. 
 
While Hultman (2007) argues that violence occurs for strategic purposes, Lyall 
(2009) claims it is used to show to the populace that the rebels cannot protect them as 
the state can. Kalyvas (2006), however, claims it occurs because of fluctuations in 
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contested or uncontested zones and information asymmetry. However, while these 
arguments have advanced our thinking, there are still segments that are yet to be 
discussed. These questions include: Does having information act as the key to 
understanding how violence is distributed or is violence delivered through the 
positions that actors assume?; Do the actors involved in a conflict assume different 
strategic positions and if so, what positions are these?; Do the different strategic 
positions adopted by actors influence indiscriminate violence against civilians?; What 
impact does this have on violence against civilians through military strategies, and is 
information the causal mechanism to understand violence against civilian or does 
strategy and the strategic position of actors matter more?; What is the impact of the 
duration of a conflict and the different encounters that occur within it?; What is the 
impact of the duration of the conflict on actors on either side (e.g., government 
combatants, armed police units, rebels, militants) who are embedded within and 
around civilian’s zones?; And does the strategic positioning of actors contribute to the 
overall use of violence against civilians? The answers to these queries will provide 
further insight into why indiscriminate violence is used against civilians.  
 
The examples drawn from South Sudan, Nepal, and Peru conflicts, suggest that there 
are other mechanisms at hand that contribute to the use of violence against civilians. 
While information played a role, the strategy which is linked to the strategic positions 
that actors assume, may have played a larger role in the use of violence against 
civilians. Despite having information, what appears to be influential was the strategic 
position used to deal with the opposing rebel actors. In Peru, the government’s tactics 
of deploying the Army and Navy using US counterinsurgency measures caused the 
Peruvian state to react in a manner that led to the use of violence against civilians. 
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While in Nepal the strategy of embedding actors amongst civilians appears to have 
contributed to indiscriminate violence being used against civilians by the state. While 
the discussed models do well to answer why indiscriminate violence is used, the 
approaches have little to say about the specific ways indiscriminate violence occurred 
in Nepal, which is the focus of this thesis. Many of those attacked during the Nepalese 
conflict were attacked or experienced attacks in public. Indiscriminate violence was 
often used after an actor experienced an attack by an opposing rebel group and 
commonly in broad daylight. These attacks were isolated, sporadic, and surreptitious 
but the killings were in public.  
 
To analyse indiscriminate violence, scholars rely on a standard set of categories to 
sort actors and the messy reality they inhabit. When analysing indiscriminate 
violence, analysis generally relies on the categories “perpetrator” “victims” 
“bystanders” and rescuers.” Membership in these categories is assumed to be 
exclusive and stable. In this scheme, a perpetrator cannot also be a rescuer; and once a 
perpetrator, always a perpetrator. The problems with this system of categorising, 
however is that it fixes people in a way that is not derived from the realities of 
indiscriminate violence and the flow of indiscriminate violence, particularly because 
as previously demonstrated, there is an element of strategy and positioning of actors 
involved. Violence is dynamic, while categories are static. In dynamic settings, 
contexts and conditions change, sometimes in an instant. These changes, in turn, can 
shift actors’ relations, strategy, positions and perspectives. Static categories cannot 
capture these shifts. Neither can they capture endogenous sources of transformation 
that occurs through the unfolding of processes. Another problem with standard 
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categories is that they smooth over tensions that exist both within and between 
categories.  
In the Peruvian example, actors did not confine their activities to one category; rather, 
they often moved back and forth between categories, in this case strategic positions, 
or straddled multiple positions at the same time. In some zones, actors were 
embedded, while others were fixed and supporting liberated zones of expansion. In 
the South Sudan example, the Sudanese state hovered in the margins, through the 
recruitment of militia and payed them to go in their place. These actors did not 
participate in the killings directly but nevertheless played a part in them. How should 
we categorise them? As victims, bystanders, or perpetrators with an asterisk? 
What we need is a way to engage these complexities directly. By ignoring them, we 
risk building theories around skewed understandings of the phenomena we are trying 
to explain. If the same person was capable of being embedded and temporarily-
deployed, for example, then explanations based on motive would be indeterminate, 
since the motives for one set of actions would not prevent or subsume motives for the 
other. Analysing the full range of actors’ strategies is also crucial for theorising the 
agency of these actors. If we were to base theories of agency on only one set of 
actions - the set that most easily fits an existing analytic category - our theories would 
be at best, partial and at worst, wrong. The answer is to take special care to ensure 
that the categories do not speak for the data, rather, that the data speaks for itself, no 
matter where that leaves them on the grid.  
Exploring the use of violence through the strategic positions assumed by actors is 
important for two reasons. First, it allows researchers to understand how the various 
 65 
strategic positions –influenced by strategies–may impact the use and fluctuation of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians. This aids understanding as to whether the 
distribution of violence lies with the strategic objectives and the positions actors 
assume. Second, by understanding how the strategic positions influence the use of 
violence, it is possible to better understand how indiscriminate violence may be 
distributed across conflict zones by actors.  
 
Excluding Kalyvas’s (2006) model, the models discussed in this chapter are restricted 
in their consideration of actors involved in a conflict and how these actors can use 
violence against civilians. These models do not capture the potential associations 
between the state and hired militants and the rebel and splinter groups. Beyond this 
the models do not explain the incidents of violence which took place during the 
Peruvian and Nepalese conflicts which I believe are uniquely linked to the strategies 
adopted by actors during the conflict. This, I suggest, confines any analysis to a one-
dimensional lens (e.g., state versus rebels in established positions) and limits the 
ability to account for differences in patterns, such as the movement of actors, and 
their use of indiscriminate violence and the impact of their strategic positions.  
 
2.8 Embeddedness 
The literature reviewed in this chapter has contributed to understanding the use of 
indiscriminate violence in a conflict. The theories reviewed stem from two main 
theoretical perspectives: organisational theories and strategic frameworks. This 
chapter examined two organisational theories: the group structure framework (Section 
2.6); and three strategic frameworks –the relative strengths of a rebel group (Section 
2.3), the need for control and contesting and uncontested zones (Sections 2.4 and 2.5), 
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and suppression of the opposition (2.3).While the models in their various ways 
account for the use of violence, they are incomplete when explaining why actors use 
indiscriminate violence against civilians and how indiscriminate violence moves 
throughout a conflict by the strategic positions adopted by actors. Following 
Kalyvas’s (2006) argument around the control and fluctuation in contested and 
uncontested zones, this thesis aims to better understand: a. who the actors in a conflict 
are in the case of the Nepalese conflict; b. what strategic positions actors can assume 
during a conflict and whether these positions contribute to the use of indiscriminate 
violence; c. how indiscriminate violence is distributed through the different identified 
strategic positions; and, d. how the interactions of strategic positions from various 
sides influence the use of indiscriminate violence.  
 
To move beyond the limitations of standard approaches, I propose an alternative lens; 
one that can take moving pictures, rather than just static snapshots. This lens is trained 
on the dynamism of actors and their actions shifting or transforming through the 
unfolding of violence across time and space. This alternative lens begins by viewing 
indiscriminate violence and the strategic positioning of actors as a process, not a 
clearly bounded event. As a process, indiscriminate violence and strategic positioning 
of actors ceases to be a clearly demarcated temporal period of violence; instead, it 
becomes a messy agglomeration of actions taken and not taken, through strategies that 
are linked to strategic positions and decisions, made and unmade. Indiscriminate 
violence and the strategic positioning of actors as a process becomes a temporal and 
partial unfolding of strategic actions, shifting context, and includes actors with 
multiple motives. This process, moreover, need not be linear, for indiscriminate 
violence can speed up, slow down, claim new targets, and abandon the old. Viewing 
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the indiscriminate violence and strategic positioning of actors as a process, generates 
different expectations to viewing it as a discrete event. If indiscriminate violence is a 
process, then we would expect actors to move between categories or for a group of 
actors to occupy multiple categories at the same time. Viewing actors dynamically 
allows me to: probe a broad range of people’s behaviour during conflicts; and 
examine whether the strategic positioning that actors assume links back to the use of 
indiscriminate violence, but there may be a need to do this to simply understand what 
actors are doing. Indeed, one of the aims of this study is to understand the ways in 
which these actors do not fit these categories neatly. To this end, I have developed a 
theoretical concept, entitled embeddedness, which I discuss in detail in Chapter 3.  
 
The theoretical contribution of this thesis, embeddedness, is based on the need for 
control through strategically placing actors in position—controlling of zones 
contesting and uncontested zones (Kalyvas, 2006). Embeddedness is divided into two 
main areas: actors in a conflict, which accounts for the need to understand who the 
actors are in a conflict; and movement and use of indiscriminate violence by actors, 
which accounts for the use of indiscriminate violence through the strategic position of 
actors through the process of embeddedness. The first area, actors in a conflict, 
acknowledges that several actors can be involved in any conflict. By understanding 
who actors are, researchers can understand who can use indiscriminate violence 
against civilians. For example, in a conflict where a rebel group is fighting the state, 
we must recognise that rebels can also splinter off into smaller groups, be associated 
with other rebel groups, or engulf other rebel groups through fighting or incentives. 
The number of actors involved in a conflict can grow from state versus rebel actors to 
include actors from smaller, associated, or defected rebel groups. Equally, states have 
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the power to employ new actors, as demonstrated in the Sudanese government’s 
attempts to defeat the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) by employing the 
Janjaweed to conduct attacks against the SLA and innocent civilians in Darfur.17 This 
shows how the dimensions of any conflict can expand and the need to consider the 
relevance of more disaggregated actors.  
 
The second area is the movement of indiscriminate violence by actors through their 
adopted strategic positions. Exploring the strategies deployed by actors and potential 
strategic positions that actors can assume in any conflict (temporarily-deployed, fixed, 
and embedded) can help us better understand how violence is used and moves across 
zones, throughout a conflict. This perspective will allow observations to account for 
changes in indiscriminate violence that is perpetrated by actors who assume certain 
strategic positions in a conflict. However, building on Kalyvas’s (2006) main 
argument about the control of zones in contested and uncontested territory, if zones 
go from being contested to uncontested, actors have the potential to move within 
these contested and uncontested zones. This presents a challenge to our understanding 
of who the actors using violence against civilians are and why. An example of this 
challenge is illustrated in Figure 2.0.  
 
                                                 
17 http://news.trust.org//spotlight/Darfur-conflict (accessed on 31/07/2014) 
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Figure 2.0: An example of the movement of actors 
 
In this example, Actor A (the state) controls the Red Zone; Actor B (the rebels) 
controls the Green Zone; Actor C (the rebels) controls the Yellow Zone; and Actor D 
(the rebels) controls the Blue Zone. To have consistent control over the Red, Green, 
Yellow, and Blue zones, actors A, B, C, and D must be embedded in their respective 
zones. If they leave their zone at any point, they risk losing control to their enemies. 
At one point, the state decides to seize the Green Zone, and deploys actors from its 
base and from the Red Zone to commence an offensive against the rebels. Actor A 
once embedded in the Red Zone, then moves to the Green Zone (Move A). After two 
weeks of fighting, the rebels in the Green Zone recognise that they are losing and 
bring reinforcements from the Yellow and Blue Zones. Actor C once embedded in the 
Yellow Zone, and Actor D, once embedded in the Blue Zone then moves to the Green 
Zone to reinforce it (Moves B and C). This scenario suggests that within a short 
period of fighting, actors potentially move back and forth within and outside of 
different (contested and uncontested) zones. As the fighting continues, actors move to 
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different areas but also remain in some zones for short to long-term periods. It is in 
this manner that actors assume different strategic positions (temporarily-deployed, 
fixed, and embedded). If we add more actors to this example, then the conflict will 
expand further. Fighting will no longer be just between Actors A and B, but also 
between Actors A, B, C, D, E, etc., all of whom want a stake in the Green Zone. This 
example highlights the complexities of understanding the use and movement of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians. However, it is through this complexity, I 
believe, and through the exploration of the strategic positioning of actors that this 
thesis can account for and explain the use of indiscriminate violence in a conflict. 
This example shows that actors within a conflict are not static. Actors have the 
potential to continue to move and assume different positions during a conflict. 
However, this movement depends on the strategic positions that they assume due to 
the dynamics, changing situation, and objectives of the actors fighting in the conflict. 
Understanding the movement and strategic positions of actors can help to understand 
the use of indiscriminate violence. 
 
Understanding the actors involved and their movements, positions this research to 
gain an understanding of how indiscriminate violence is distributed and who the 
actors distributing this violence are likely to be. This raises further questions, such as 
how long are actors likely to live among civilians? While actors live among civilians, 
does the likelihood of other actors using indiscriminate violence against civilian's 
increase? Do lengthy (embedded) periods among civilians, in conjunction with tactics 
such as “hit and run,” cause actors to become violent? Correspondingly, how do 
embedded periods impact temporarily-deployed actors on short-term missions? Do 
embedded periods help form positive or negative relations with the civilian 
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population? Applying these insights to the question of how indiscriminate violence is 
used during conflict through the strategic positions assumed by actors (e.g. 
embeddedness) is useful for several reasons. First, it invites the analysis to 
disaggregate and identify key actors. Second, it invites the analysis to investigate the 
various acts and activities key actors undertake in different context. Third, it leads the 
analyst to explore the structure and content of the relations that tie these actors to one 
another. Strategies and actors’ movements over time and space provide the immediate 
context in which civilians and actors interact for, against, and towards others. Actors’ 
movement through strategies over time and space thus offers the basis for locating the 
use of indiscriminate violence.  
 
In Chapter Three, I explore who the potential actors in a conflict are and how the 
actors’ strategic positioning and movement can lead to extended periods of 
embeddedness amongst civilians. I extend Kalyvas’ (2006) argument and consider the 
questions posed above. I develop a theoretical perspective to help understand the 
strategic positions of actors and the use and movement of indiscriminate violence 
against civilians. I argue that the three strategic positions that actors adopt in a 
conflict (temporarily-deployed, fixed, and embedded) contribute to the use of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians. I argue that the condition of embeddedness 
may account for some use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Embeddedness 
allows any actor to not only control the civilian population but to be camouflaged 
among civilians. This causes confusion among temporarily-deployed actors who are 
unable to identify the opposing actors when attacked. They then resort to using 
indiscriminate violence against anyone within the vicinity. As such, I suggest, it is the 
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presence of embedded actors that causes other actors to use indiscriminate violence 
against civilians within zones.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 73 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE “PIGGY-IN-THE-MIDDLE”18 DILEMMA 
 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
In this chapter, I build on the theories and research reviewed in Chapter Two and 
present the theoretical framework I developed for this thesis, entitled the Concept of 
Embeddedness. This concept addresses the conditions in which civilians experience 
indiscriminate violence during conflicts through strategic positions which actors can 
assume during conflicts. I demonstrate how the strategic movement and positioning of 
actors within conflict zones renders civilians “piggies-in-the-middle,” as they are 
wedged between embedded actors who control a zone and actors who are sent on 
temporary deployment to the zone.  
 
The study follows the recent micro political turn in the study of conflict violence 
(King, 2004, p. 432). Its findings are not necessarily unique to Nepal, the main case 
study examined in this thesis. In fact, the findings are quite consistent with the 
multitude of ethnographic and micro historical accounts of civil war violence that 
Kalyvas (2006, p. 9-10) argues is a universal process formed by recurrent elements 
and organised in systems with regular structural features. Thus, while context may 
differ, mechanisms recur.” Beyond Kalyvas (2006), I argue that mechanisms 
underpinning the strategic positioning of actors understood in depth, in one setting, 
such as Nepal, are of theoretical importance for three reasons. First, they can help to 
confirm or disconfirm hypotheses derived from more general theories of violence. 
                                                 
18 The phrase “piggy in the middle” is defined as “A person who is placed in an awkward situation between two 
others.” Oxford Living Dictionaries. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/piggy_(also pig) _in_the_middle 
(accessed January 12, 2018). 
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Second, they help to identify unspecific assumptions or logic that underlines existing 
theories. Third, they suggest the micro mechanisms that are at work during the use of 
indiscriminate violence, due to the strategic positioning of actors, may or may not be 
like civil war violence or other forms of organised violence. In short, findings from 
the case of Nepal are both validating and additive. This thesis thus, tries to contribute 
to an emerging literature that seeks to understand and explain indiscriminate violence 
from multiple dimensions but more specifically through the strategic positioning and 
movement of actors in conflict.  
 
The study contributes to this literature in three additional ways. First, it revisits 
questions about the nature of indiscriminate violence but through the strategic 
positions adopted by actors. While previous theories have explored the use of 
indiscriminate violence to control or because of resources etc., I explore 
indiscriminate violence through the strategic positions that actors can assume to 
understand how violence moves with the actors using this form of violence. Second, 
this thesis highlights the importance of analysing the strategic movement of actors to 
understand the dimensions of indiscriminate violence. This helps to gain further 
insights into the complexities and ambiguities during the use of indiscriminate 
violence, shedding light on the nature of indiscriminate violence, the mechanisms 
triggering its use and how actors commit to it. It should be of interest to scholars who 
seek to better understand why actors kill civilians during certain moments in conflicts 
through particular strategic positions, often when these strategies are not designed to 
harm the civilian populations. Third, since the world’s population is predicted to flock 
to urban areas,19 and megacities in large numbers, with 70 per cent of the world's 
                                                 
19 http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/population/world-urbanization-prospects-2014.html 
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population expected to live in cities by 2045, it is also predicted that these cities will 
house up to 10 million people across Africa and Asia. Poorly governed with high 
unemployment and criminality makes it fertile territory for violent extremism. The 
predicted fluctuation of civilians to urban areas suggests the nature of future conflicts 
may need to be fought differently. When states go to war, the enemies they encounter 
are irregular actors - not troops organised into armies but often freedom fighters, 
guerrillas, splinter groups and terrorists (actors). What this demonstrates is that the 
concept of embeddedness through the strategic positions, irregular fighting forces and 
urban warfare will all impact on a state’s ability to differentiate between civilians and 
the enemy during conflicts. It is also likely that much of the fighting in future 
conflicts are likely to take place in and around urban cities. This will further impact 
conflict dynamics and the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Above all, 
it will influence, and certainly alter, the way the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (UNDPKO), Western States, the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and the African Union respond and intervene to protect civilians 
through peacekeeping missions. To understand this potential change, it is important to 
examine how previous conflicts were fought and how the strategic positions adopted 
by actors in a conflict helped contribute to the use of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians. 
 
In this thesis, I propose that the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians 
through the practice of embeddedness (i.e., actors becoming embedded in a zone) 
occurs under two conditions: first, when an embedded actor resorts to the use of 
indiscriminate violence to gain control over the civilian population; and second, when 
fixed, but largely temporarily-deployed, actors use indiscriminate violence against 
 76 
civilians because they are unable to differentiate between embedded actors and 
civilians. The key distinction here is between embedded actors and the targets of 
indiscriminate violence. The use of indiscriminate violence will occur during different 
times and under different conditions, depending on the strategy deployed by actors 
during the conflict.  
 
Chapter Three is divided into three core sections that demonstrate how indiscriminate 
violence against civilians occurs through the process of embeddedness. The first 
section (Section 3.2) offers a summary of how indiscriminate violence is viewed by 
Kalyvas (2006) and other researchers. This section provides the basis for the 
categorisation of indiscriminate violence employed in this thesis and outlines what 
indiscriminate violence is and what it is not. In Section 3.3, I develop a theoretical 
description of actors and then further conceptualise the potential actors in a conflict. 
This section shows that rethinking and regrouping conflict actors allows for an 
improved understanding of who can trigger and use indiscriminate violence. I present 
three strategic positions that the identified actors can assume: embedded, temporarily-
deployed, and fixed. I later develop the three-strategic positions in section 3.4. 
However, for the purposes of the reader, I briefly provide the following introductory 
reminder of each parameter, which I develop later in the chapter: embedded actors are 
deeply rooted in a surrounding population of civilians during the conflict; 
temporarily-deployed actors are actors sent to a zone to either assist their allies or to 
combat warring actors who may be embedded or fixed in these zones (depending on 
the strategic assignment); and fixed actors can be recruited locally or stationed in 
zones for intermediate or extended periods of time and tend to hold defensive 
positions during a conflict. They are also familiar with the zones of control because 
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they are local or have remained there for long periods. In this section, I define each 
strategic position with examples from previous conflicts and demonstrate how these 
positions trigger and allow actors to use indiscriminate violence. In Section 3.5, I 
focus on the strategic position of embeddedness, which underlies the concept of 
embeddedness that guides this thesis. I argue that actors embed themselves amongst 
civilians not only to camouflage themselves but to control the civilian population. I 
demonstrate how embeddedness triggers the use of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians by fixed actors, but predominately by temporarily-deployed actors who are 
not embedded. I then present key theoretical propositions and the expected outcomes 
of this investigation.  
 
3.2 Understanding Indiscriminate Violence  
In this section, I briefly explore what indiscriminate violence is. Indiscriminate 
violence differs from other forms of violence, such as selective violence or genocide. 
It is often defined as significant political or non-political violence within a conflict 
that leads to the killing of civilians. Psychological theories of decision-making, 
explain indiscriminate violence through decision-making under conditions of risk 
while considering the possible losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, McDermott, 
2008; p. 69). In this theory, an initial editing phase concerns exactly how choices are 
presented, while a second phase concerns how choices are made (McDermott, 2008, 
p. 69). The theory uses the concept of “framing” to describe choices people make. 
Framing refers to how options are presented, which is significant since choices can be 
affected by their “method, order or manner of presentation” (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; McDermott, 2008, p. 70). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) established that 
people exhibit a natural aversion to extreme situations or options. Thus, by creating a 
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more extreme option Kahneman and Tversky could motivate a decision-maker to 
select a middle route that had appeared unacceptable without the contrast effect of 
more extreme additional option (McDermott, 2008, p. 70; Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). The second phase, or evaluation, involves a value purpose and a weighing 
function. Prospect theories have been applied to a variety of political science theories 
such as loss aversion, the status quo bias, framing issues, deterrence, and bargaining 
negotiations. An approach originated by Fathali M. Moghaddam (2006) focuses on 
the social and psychological procedures that lead to terrorist actions. This theory 
provides an alternative interpretation of the idea that choices are framed as the 
circumstances progress; where the choices, or in this case doors, seem to close for an 
individual. Moghaddam (2006, p. 70) envisions a narrowing stairway leading to a 
terrorist action at the top of a building. The stairway leads to higher floors and 
whether people remain on a floor depends on the doors and spaces people perceive 
available to them on that floor (Moghaddam 2006, p. 70-75). The further one climbs, 
the fewer choices one sees until “the only possible outcome is the destruction of 
others, oneself, or both” and where the perception of deprivation can be 
individualistic or communal (Moghaddam 2006, p. 70). These models are helpful 
when trying to understand why combatants are susceptible to using indiscriminate 
violence in conflicts. Resorting to indiscriminate violence may have been manipulated 
through framing, as choices appear to be limited. If the choices presented to people 
seem limited, then we can begin to understand why actors may have interpreted their 
situations as grim and acted upon their perceptions and feelings of dissonance. 
However, these models are not helpful when trying to understand the use of 
indiscriminate violence by actors through the different strategic positions that actors 
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adopt. The theory also misses an opportunity to assist the thesis to understand how 
indiscriminate violence is distributed during different strategic periods of a conflict.  
 
According to Kalyvas’s (2006) framework, which offers the basis for the perspective 
developed in this thesis, the definition of indiscriminate violence excludes petty 
crimes or relatively low-level outbreaks of violence that occur within the domestic 
sphere. However, Kalyvas (2006) does not specifically explore the way this thesis 
intends to capture how the strategic positioning of actors influences the use of 
indiscriminate violence. Previous literature argues that due to its persistence, 
indiscriminate violence has given rise to speculation that it is an irrational reflection 
of ideologies (Loizides, 2002, p. 429). Some scholars believe that actors’ irrational 
behaviour is linked to the experience of heightened adrenaline in the war zone 
(Loizos, 1988, p. 642). Grossman and Krueger (1995) argue that the use of 
indiscriminate violence is linked to the environmental conditions created during 
conflicts, which impinge on actors’ emotional status. They contend that the recent 
loss of friends or a beloved leader in combat can also enable violence on the 
battlefield. In many circumstances, soldiers react with anger, which is one of the 
recognised steps of coping with death. According to Grossman and Krueger (1995, p. 
179), this emotional state can lead actors to believe that killing is the only way. This 
perspective provides some understanding of how actors can use violence in a reactive 
manner in response to attacks from the opposing side. 
 
Kalyvas (2006) and other scholars view the use of indiscriminate violence from the 
perspective of control and as a way of pressuring civilians to comply. Indiscriminate 
violence may be used to achieve a variety of goals, such as eliminating certain groups, 
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displacing people, plundering goods, or establishing a group’s power and 
demonstrating the ability to hurt another group (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 147; Andeson & 
Dill, 1995, p. 435). For Kalyvas (2006, p. 142), there is a distinction between what he 
defines as “selective” and “indiscriminate” violence. Selective violence entails 
tailored targeting, while indiscriminate violence entails collective targeting. He argues 
that combatants20 seek control of the population (regardless of their preferences) by 
creating credible benefits for collaborators and, more importantly, assured sanctions 
for civilian defectors. According to Kalyvas (2006), indiscriminate violence is the 
only way of achieving this kind of control. White (1989) similarly found that 
indiscriminate violence is routinely used to increase submission and gain compliance 
with the authority of those who feel they may be threatened (White, 1989, p. 328). 
However, if indiscriminate violence is used at first, it quickly becomes counter-
productive and selective violence eventually becomes the only sustained way to 
achieve control (Kalyvas, 2006). The authors above do well to separate and define 
selective and indiscriminate violence. This helps me to understand how it has been 
previously understood and described during previous analysis but raises further 
questions when tied to this thesis' framework. For example, how will the use of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians operate during the strategic movement and 
positioning of actors in a conflict? Will indiscriminate violence be used differently 
with dissimilar actors who adopt different strategic positions? Will different actors on 
opposing sides use similar or different forms of indiscriminate violence if they inhabit 
similar strategic positions or will there be notable differences? Will this contrast 
depend on the actor's position or will it be influenced by whether actors are in 
contested or uncontested zones? How will embedded actors respond to different 
                                                 
20 The term combatant is used to reflect Kalyvas’ (2006) views; but throughout this thesis, I refer to combatants as 
actors in a conflict. 
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strategies that are intended to separate them from civilians, and will this activate the 
use of indiscriminate violence by actors on temporarily-deployed missions? Will this 
alter the nature, pattern and technique through which civilians’ experience violence? 
Does indiscriminate violence look different between actors whose strategic objective 
is to search for actors amongst civilians, verses those who's tactic is to live amongst 
civilians for extended periods?  
 
According to Kalyvas (2006, p. 150), indiscriminate violence often aims to deter 
people from collaborating with rival actors by collectively sanctioning suspected 
collaborators and those related to them. Cairns (1997) claims the use of indiscriminate 
violence reflects the tendency of many overseers to designate various types of 
extrajudicial killings, including instances of selective violence, indiscriminately 
(Carlton, 1997, p. 10). Downes (2004) and Valentino (2004) argue that indiscriminate 
violence is much more visible than its selective counterpart and, as such, is thought to 
be more prevalent. Kalyvas (2006) argues that indiscriminate violence usually takes 
place in the context of military operations, known as “mopping-up,” “search and 
destroy,” or “scorched-earth” manoeuvres that confine and kill rebels and weaken 
insurgents’ headquarters and habitats. It is also used when there is a lack of 
information in areas where the presence of actors on the opposing side is limited, such 
as urban centres and in villages that openly support the opposition (Clutterbuck, 1966, 
p. 63; Kalyvas, 1999; 2006, p. 149). According to Kalyvas (2006, p. 150), 
indiscriminate violence aims to deter people from collaborating with rival actors by 
collectively sanctioning suspected collaborators and those related to them. This may 
lead state actors to perform violent operations against the civilian population to 
separate civilians from the rebel actors. Kalyvas acknowledges the potential for the 
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embedding of actors in a conflict zone and recognises that state authorities have 
trouble differentiating between embedded actors and civilians, leading to the need for 
operations that separate actors and civilians. Indiscriminate violence is used to deter 
civilians from collaborating with rival actors by unravelling shared relations, which 
can become stronger over time.  
 
Kalyvas (2006) and others are right to explore the use of violence in the context of 
military operations. An operation can often have a strategic objective but does this 
account for whether the military operations which are strategic can facilitate the use 
of indiscriminate violence against civilians. It is my belief the use of indiscriminate 
violence is a causal outcome of operations (i.e. strategic positions interacting with 
each other and actors need to control civilians) that have strategic elements revealed 
through actors’ strategic position. In other words, military operations are strategic in 
nature but require actors to assume strategic positions for these operations to be 
functional, successful, and largely tactical. As argued in Chapter Two, having access 
to information is important, but it is not the crucial element to indiscriminate violence 
for the author. Military operations need information which supports a plan or a 
strategy. However, for a plan to defeat a rival actor to be credible, actors must adopt a 
strategy which is accompanied with the actor adopting a strategic position which 
assists the actors achieve their goals. Even if information is provided, the level of 
information is comparative and not all information goes toward supporting operations 
or controlling civilians. Information can be weak, strong, fabricated, inaccurate and 
accurate, but information only is not crucial to defeating an actor’s opponent; 
information only tells actors what is occurring within a zone. Actors will be faced 
with a choice to either act upon this information with a strategy, which involves the 
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deployment of actors to counter those who are embedded, or ignore, or do nothing by 
choosing to ‘sit on it.’ Whether the strategy is to hold and control a zone or attack 
remotely with weapons, a strategy will be essential to encompass actors taking up a 
position to defend this zone. Thus, the use of indiscriminate violence is part of a tactic 
and is used as a response to the strategic positions that interact with one another. I will 
revisit this point, later in the chapter.  
 
3.3.2 Addressing Civilian Agency 
Civilians who are “piggies in the middle” amongst the different actors do have 
variations of agency depending on the strategic positions which they interact with. For 
example, the level of agency between civilians and embedded actors will not be 
clearly established during the earlier periods of embeddedness. Once the embedding 
of actor has begun, I expect the level of agency and dependency on civilians to be 
strengthened and increase as the process of embeddedness continues.  
In situations where actors are fixed, the agency between civilians and this group of 
fixed actors will be highest amongst all the strategic positions. However, this can 
fluctuate and typically depends on the actors’ overall approach when fixed with 
locals. Since this position hinges on the recruitment of locals, civilians will have 
higher levels of agency from the start of when fixed actors and civilians interact with 
one another. This is partially because those recruiting locals may have once or 
continue to be locals themselves. However, the levels of agency may vary depending 
on the relationship between actors and civilians. During the second Sudanese conflict, 
the Sudanese state recruited the Janjaweed militia groups to recruit locals and deal 
with the SPLA/M. Civilians in this situation had higher levels of agency because they 
were recruited to form and be a part of local militia groups to fight the SPLA/M.  
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I expect the agency between civilians and temporarily-deployed actors to be little to 
non-existent. This is largely because this actor's strategic position requires actors to 
pass through civilian populations for limited time; unless this actor’s strategic position 
changes. Since this actor is continuously moving, the dependency on civilian 
populations is limited and will not involve large amounts of interaction like actors 
who are fixed or embedded. However, the level of indiscriminate violence, i.e., target 
and sources distinction, I expect to be much higher because of the weak association 
between this position and civilian populations. For the purposes of thesis, I focus on 
the impact of civilians as “piggies in the middle” from the perspective of embedded 
actors.  
 
3.3 Defining Indiscriminate Violence in this Thesis 
Kalyvas’ (2006) model is a stepping stone for this thesis, with well-defined 
conditions, manifestations, and parameters to detect indiscriminate violence. Key to 
his perspective is the acknowledgement that indiscriminate violence is likely to 
transpire during periods of military operations, such as “search and destroy” or 
“scorched earth” manoeuvers. While the scholars presented above shed light on what 
indiscriminate violence is and how it can be used, the current understanding of the 
conditions under which indiscriminate violence occurs is constrained. The concern 
with the scholars’ perspectives is the focus on actors who tend to assume an 
embedded or fixed position. The literature seems to ignore actors who have short-term 
goals and objectives, such as temporarily-deployed actors whose time amongst the 
civilian population is limited. If I adopt the thesis theoretical framework of strategic 
positions, it will require a new thinking and understanding of how indiscriminate 
violence is defined and revealed. I believe control can be gained through military 
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strategies (Kalyvas, 2006) and once control is gained, the incentives to continue using 
indiscriminate violence are significantly reduced, especially when embedded actors 
use indiscriminate violence. If at any point indiscriminate is used against civilians, it 
suggests that actors do not have control over the civilian populations. I believe 
indiscriminate violence by actors who are temporarily-deployed will be used for 
different reasons than actors who are fixed and embedded. In other words, the use 
indiscriminate violence through strategic positions is demonstrated differently 
through each strategic position. Some actors’ positions may require indiscriminate 
violence to be used to control; while others strategic positions involve actors using 
indiscriminate violence to respond to an opposing actor's strategic position that 
tactically becomes a threat to their overall position and objective. In other words, the 
levels of indiscriminate violence are linked to the different strategic positions. 
 
This dual role of indiscriminate violence was observed during the Peruvian conflict. 
In January 1984, President Terry placed General Adrian Huaman Centero in 
command of the emergency zone in Ayacucho Peru, where the SP had control over 
the zone. Centero’s focus was a broader counterinsurgency effort that caused the 
population to slowly begin to switch sides and support the military (Ocasio, 1995, p. 
4). As the 1985 elections grew closer, President Terry decided to increase the military 
presence in the emergency zone, sending between 5,000 and 7,000 soldiers into the 
southern highlands and deploying an additional 2,500-3,000 soldiers' into the northern 
highlands and UHV. Over 10 per cent of the army participated in active operations 
against SP, with many maintaining positions to defend key infrastructure. By Election 
Day, the army had deployed nearly 40,000 additional troops in approximately 4,000 
polling stations to defeat SL and their hit-and-run tactics (McClintock, 2005, p. 89; 
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Central Intelligence Agency, Terrorism Review, 1985, p. 20). As a response, the SP 
launched attacks on civilian populations whom they had once been embedded 
amongst to counter the militaries position. The strategy involved the SP actors being 
on temporary deployment and using indiscriminate violence against civilians and state 
actors.  
 
The Peruvian example shows that the deployment of actors to SP zones triggered two 
outcomes. Initially, the SP changed its strategic position to respond to the states’ 
deployment of military actors by temporarily deploying SP actors. Next, as a response 
to the states deployment, the SP used violence against civilians to regain control over 
previously held zones, to demonstrate that the state could not protect civilians. This 
example establishes the diminished dominance the SP had over the zone and civilians. 
This was largely due to the new strategic position which involved deploying an 
increasing number of military personnel to SP zones, creating a counteractive 
response from the SP who resorted to using violence against civilians. This was not 
done through access to information as suggested by some researchers. In fact, while 
information may have been important, it was not crucial to countering the SP during 
this period. General Adrian Huaman Centero military strategy of drying the waters, 
involved deploying military actors to civilian zones for extended periods (later 
becoming embedded) and increasing troop numbers in these zones. This would later 
lead to Centero assuming further control over the zone. By strategically positioning 
state military to SP zones which interacted with SP embedded positions; this 
obstructed the SP’s overall significance and position with civilians. The SP was left 
with no choice but to counter the army's new strategy by assuming a new strategic 
position with countermeasures. These countermeasures required SP actors to be 
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strategically repositioned and use indiscriminate violence as a strategy, to change 
civilians support back to the SP. 
 
While the earlier models help to understand indiscriminate violence, they do not 
explain how the different strategic positions assumed by actors interact with one 
another and create complex processes for indiscriminate violence to flourish. While I 
agree with previous researcher in their analysis that indiscriminate violence is used to 
control, I argue that indiscriminate violence can also be used to respond to strategic 
positions that an actor assumes, which poses as a threat to their overall objective and 
the zones they control. This can result in counter measures that lead to violence 
against civilians as a way of controlling civilian populations and the zone civilians 
inhabit. As the Peruvian example shows, the changes in strategic positions later 
altered the relationship between embedded SP and the civilians whom the SP were 
once embedded amongst. Thus, the manifestation of indiscriminate violence through 
each strategic position is shown and used differently depending on the actor and their 
strategic position.  
 
I suspect indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors will be used to 
create an immediate impact on civilians and the zone inhabited by actors. I do not 
believe these actors can create sustainable change or control, unless they transform 
their position. For there to be long-term control over a zone and civilians, 
temporarily-deployed actors will need to be amongst civilians for prolonged periods. 
This will require this actor to change their tactic and strategic position, from one that 
attempts to separate and attack civilians, to one that embeds lives amongst civilian 
populations in zones. To establish control over civilians and zones, indiscriminate 
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violence must be used over a certain period by actors that are embedded with 
civilians, over time. This eventually gives actors full control over the civilian 
populations within these zones.  
Therefore, the use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors is not 
about controlling civilian populations for extended periods, since this is not 
something the strategic position allows temporarily-deployed actors to be able to do 
on the ground, nor remotely. Control by temporarily-deployed actors cannot be gained 
by airstrikes; airstrikes only cause the population to disperse, which later allows other 
actors to re-embed themselves amongst civilians in new zones.  
I expect temporarily-deployed actors’ use of indiscriminate violence to be fiercer in 
nature because their objective during their interactions with civilians is only designed 
to pass through civilian zones and deal with opposing embedded actors. If temporarily 
deployed actors, after using indiscriminate violence, decide to change their strategic 
positions to a position which is embedded, then we can expect a change in tactic that 
involves some form of a heart and minds campaign. This means the use of 
indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors is less about control, and 
instead associated with inflicting harm, creating havoc and countering the enemy. 
Thus, the targeting of civilians and source distinction will vary depending on the 
strategic position assumed by each actor. I will later come back to this point when I 
discuss the definitions of each strategic position. 
 
Therefore, I define indiscriminate violence as: collective and random acts of violence 
and killings, and abuse of human rights which is restricted to the physical abuse of 
civilians (torture, rape, and abduction) by actors who assume different strategic 
positions within the context of intra-state conflicts. I expand on Kalyvas’ (2006), 
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classification and theoretical framework to define indiscriminate violence as 
significant political or non-political violence within a conflict that leads to acts of 
violence and the killing of civilians. I believe that most indiscriminate violence occurs 
around the military operations and is linked, largely, to temporarily-deployed actors. I 
argue that, in most cases, indiscriminate violence occurs near embedded actors or in 
areas to which temporarily-deployed actors are sent. I expect indiscriminate violence 
to be largely triggered by the behaviour of actors that are often embedded among 
civilians to control the civilian populations when first embedded. For embedded 
actors, it will also be used to gain control and spread compliance among civilians they 
view as a threat to their existence (White, 1989, p. 328). Indiscriminate violence is 
likely to be frequently used by temporarily-deployed actors as a response to the 
strategic position of embeddedness or when actors are on route to fight the opposition. 
The use of indiscriminate violence is likely to be observed in zones where embedded, 
temporarily-deployed and fixed actors are present and interact with each other. 
Civilians living within these zones are more likely to experience intractable 
behaviour. Civilians become “piggies in the middle” wedged between the different 
actors of the conflict within the zone they inhabit.  
The purpose of indiscriminate violence is to try and gain control during or after 
operations or to retaliate for recent attacks, depending on the actor's strategic position. 
I believe that indiscriminate violence is likely to coincide, partially, with an actor’s 
inability to restrain themselves in response to external conditions shaped by other 
actors who assume different strategic positions. The use of indiscriminate violence 
includes circumstances in which actors impose pain on the nearest person within their 
reach. Bystanders may refer to the initial violent behaviour as irrational, wild, and 
random; but at the centre of its action is a strategic purpose. While the targets of the 
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violence are random, the behaviour is intentionally designed to gain compliance and 
control, cause damage, and scare and hurt the civilian populations. Indiscriminate 
violence can be physical (Riches, 1986) or structural (Uvin 1998), and used alongside 
structural institutions like the state, rebel groups and local militia groups who assume 
any of the three positions described above. Indiscriminate violence includes any 
action in support of defeating actors or civilians seen to be linked to an opposing side. 
In the next section, I outline in Section 3.4 and 3.5, who the potential actors of a 
conflict are.  
 
 
3.4 Actors of Conflict  
In this section, I develop a refined understanding of who the actors of a conflict are to 
provide the study with a framework to understand who can use indiscriminate 
violence through the strategic positioning of actors. To do this, I first provide a 
nuance definition of actors. Since I have established that different actors can assume 
diverse strategic positions and actors are not fixed to a position, actors have the 
capability of adopting both singular and multiple positions throughout the conflict. 
This understanding helps me to appreciate how indiscriminate violence parades itself 
against civilians through actors’ anticipated strategic positions.  
 
In this thesis, I define the term actor(s) as a state or non-state formally organised 
groups. This includes the armed-forces of the government and an opposing civil 
organised group, within the state borders. I restrict the use of the term actors to 
internal actors in an intra-state conflict. On the state side, actors can include military, 
police, armed police, hired state-militants, and secret-service forces fighting the 
opposition. On the opposing side/s, this can include rebels, splinter groups, absorbed 
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groups, and ethnic/local groups (See Table 3.0). The term “actors” as Galtung points 
out, goes beyond more than two parties to a conflict (Galtung 1994) and refers here to 
the various groups, people, or institutional state mechanisms involved in any conflict. 
Actors include individuals who have obtained at least some measure of political 
power and/or authority in a society engaged in activities that can have a significant 
influence on decisions, policies, and outcomes associated with a given conflict. In 
democratic countries, this would include all elected leaders, candidates who are 
running for elections and relatively high-level policy makers who have a significant 
impact on the formation and execution of policies that have an impact on society 
during a conflict. This definition includes all those in power who have been elected to 
these positions, including government ministers, and those members of the legislative 
branch who are in the opposition. It also includes individuals who oversee 
government institutions (e.g. the foreign Ministry) that are considered important. 
Given the context in which this thesis examines actors i.e. conflict setting, I restrict 
actors to include actors in non-democratic settings or semi-democratic settings who 
may carry out similar functions but are not elected, or at least not elected in free and 
fair elections. This may be because there are no elections or because elections have 
occurred in circumstances not considered to be free and fair. Members of the political 
opposition may not be permitted to serve in the legislature or in any other formal 
capacity. Those opposed to the government or the state may be leading extra-
parliamentary groups, militia groups or rebel group at a national or local level. These 
actors may even find themselves in exile within the state and not outside as is 
normally the case when the word exile is used. In other words, actors are or can be 
state or non-state individuals or groups who are formally or informally organised.  
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Contested, Uncontested Zones and Strategic Positions 
A crucial question which needs to be discussed is whether the strategic positioning of 
actors determines whether a zone is contested or uncontested. A zone is not static; 
rather a zone can alternate from being contested to uncontested, within a short or 
extended period. However, this is dependent on the dynamics of fighting between 
actors who are strategically positioned within this zone. For a zone to be contested or 
uncontested, I argue this is dependent on who controls the zones through the strategic 
placement of actors in each zone. To this end, a zone can be contested because 
various actors adopted different strategic positions which alter over a period and 
interact with one another. This means a contested territory is any zone where an actor 
enters a zone of control and poses an immediate threat to the actors controlling that 
zone upon entry. Thus, if an actor is attacked by another actor from the opposing side 
while within the zone they control, this may lead to the zone becoming contested or 
remaining uncontested. Consequently, the strategic positioning of an actor in a zone 
can also help researchers and this thesis to understand whether a zone is contested or 
uncontested. For the zone to be contested, several actors must be strategically placed 
in this zone. Some contested territories are faction-affiliated (e.g., some zones will 
have alliance in these zones, while other zones that are uncontested might have the 
similar alliance). 
This means in a contested zone, an actor on the state’s side can be embedded, fixed 
and temporarily-deployed, while actors on the opposing side(s) can also be embedded, 
fixed and temporarily-deployed. This is largely because the zone is contested, and no 
one group of actors’ holds ultimate control; hence why the zone is contested. The 
strategic placement of actors in contested and uncontested zones can impact the 
 93 
overall dynamics within a zone. This means no one zone is ever fully controlled until 
one actor completely controls that zone. In a contested zone, no one actor can 
continually dominate the zone, unless the opposing actor retreats or strategically 
withdraws or repositions their actors. Strategically placing actors in this zone will 
continue to mean that no one actor will control the zone unless one side is defeated, a 
peace agreement is agreed upon, or ceasefire occurs.  
For a zone to be uncontested and remain uncontested, actors must be on the same side 
and have the capacity to adopt several strategic positions in the same or neighbouring 
zone, with no opposing actors within their occupied zone. Uncontested zones are 
zones where one party, or a group of actors on the same side, control a zone without 
there being any resistance. Actors may encounter opposing actors but for the zone to 
remain uncontested, this would suggest this zone has not changed sides. Actors in 
uncontested zones can adopt any of the three strategic positions depending on the 
dynamics taking place within that zone that may pose a threat to the actors’ overall 
strategic aim. Uncontested zones differ from contested zones because the strategic 
placement of actors in uncontested zones suggests actors have full control, while 
contested zones will have the potential to host various actors, with varying degrees of 
active fighting taking place within these zones. As a result, I contend actors’ strategic 
positions can also help determine whether a zone is contested or uncontested because 
of the geographical control the strategic positions gives actors within these zones (See 
Kalyvas, 2006). Therefore, it is important to understand the different strategic 
positions that actors adopt to fully comprehend the use and movement of 
indiscriminate violence. To do this, I will first build upon the traditional state versus 
the rebel dichotomy framework of understanding indiscriminate violence. By 
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expanding this model, I can better understand how indiscriminate violence is 
triggered and distributed through the strategic positioning of actors in a conflict.  
 
Much of the literature on the use of indiscriminate violence touches on how actors use 
indiscriminate violence towards civilians. The literature provides a dyadic 
conceptualization on the use of indiscriminate violence in a conflict (state versus the 
rebels). Previous research has viewed the distribution of violence during conflicts 
through the lens of these two actors (See Figure 3.0). While recent scholars (Lyall, 
2009; Kalyvas, 2006) do distinguish between the diverse types of state actors at the 
disaggregate level, i.e., opposition or rebel actors. Previous frameworks constrain our 
understanding of the ways indiscriminate violence occurs between the different actors 
and civilians, who can all move through space and time by adopting different strategic 
positions.  
When conducting the initial analysis of the actors involved in the Nepalese conflict 
and in other conflicts that I summarise in this thesis, I found the traditional framework 
to be limiting and unsupportive of the explanation of violence I was witnessing. The 
traditional model (state versus rebels) does not help this thesis to understand how 
actors’ strategic positions and movement can be disaggregated at a micro-level. Later 
in this chapter, I build on this traditional model to demonstrate how previous 
examinations may have missed this disaggregated level of analysis. I later argue that 
this disaggregated level of analysis is essential if researchers want to understand how 
indiscriminate violence is triggered by the strategic positions adopted by actors.  
 
Since I am interested in how the strategic positions trigger the use of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians, there is a need to conceptualise how actors are 
 95 
disaggregated in conflicts. Therefore, identifying the diverse potential actors of a 
conflict allows this study to track where all actors move to, how indiscriminate 
violence is distributed, and why certain civilians may experience indiscriminate 
violence while others do not. By identifying who the different actors of a conflict are, 
I can provide an enhanced understanding of how, when, and why these actors may use 
indiscriminate violence against civilians across their assumed strategic positions. This 
helps me to understand how indiscriminate violence operates within zones that actors 
inhabit.  
 
In Table 3.0, I outline the diversity of actors on the state and rebel side. In this thesis, 
these actors have been identified as the actors who can use indiscriminate violence 
and adopt different strategic positions, as conceptualized in this chapter and the 
previous chapters. I disaggregate the different actors using an expanded state versus 
rebel framework to understand how actors on either side can adopt and expand upon 
each strategic position. This is necessary as earlier research does not use the 
theoretical framework adopted in this thesis (i.e., actors adopting different strategic 
positions) to understand how this leads to indiscriminate violence. While traditional 
spectrums of viewing conflict actors are limited. The developed framework in this 
thesis provides an opportunity to expand on previous research that may have used this 
traditional framework to understand the use of indiscriminate violence.  
 
Since no one actor in a contested zone has full control, the potential number of actors 
adopting strategic positions in a contested zone can be high. Using figure 3.0 as an 
example, the number of potential actors in a contested zone could potentially rise to 
six. However, If I expand this notion to include the disaggregated actors from table 
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3.0, then the number of potential actors rises to 27, with different actors from both 
sides adopting a strategic position (as seen in figure 3.5 and 3.6 combined). In a 
situation where one side controls an uncontested zone, with no opposing actor, the 
number of actors in this position will be less because it is dominated by one main 
actor, or an alliance of actors who may or may not adopt all three strategic positions 
within this zone. In table 3.0, I adopt the understanding that on the state side, there 
can be the potential to have the military, police, armed police, hired state militant and 
secret services forces. While on the rebel's side, actors can include rebels, splinter 
groups, absorbed groups and ethnic/local groups.  
 
 
Table 3.0: Table of identified actors on the state and rebel side. 
State Actors Rebel Actors 
Military Rebels 
Police Splinter groups 
Armed police Absorbed groups 
Hired state militants Ethnic/ local groups 
Secret service forces  
 
 
Figure 3.0, illustrates the way previous research views actors and their use of 
indiscriminate violence. This perspective does not consider other potential actors who 
can move within fighting spaces (zones) by adopting different strategic positions and 
using indiscriminate violence throughout a conflict. 
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Figure 3.0: Contemporary thinking of who the actors of a conflict are. 
 
 
The current model is restrictive because not only does it not allow for the diversity of 
actors involved in a conflict, but it does not disaggregate and account for different 
actors’ strategic positions and the geographical control over conflict zones that actors 
may adopt. Above all, the model cannot explain how actors can operate in a zone, 
particularly zones that can be contested and uncontested as discussed above. In the 
next sections, I expand the parameters of each strategic position and provide examples 
from previous and existing conflicts to help us understand the nature of each strategic 
position. I then expand upon the traditional (state versus rebel) model to provide a 
better understanding of the strategic positions these actors can assume in a conflict. 
 
 
3.5 Parameters and Positions of Actors 
In this section, I reinforce my proposition by demonstrating that actors tend to occupy 
three strategic positions, embedded, temporarily-deployed, and fixed. I establish how 
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these strategic positions differ and allow different actors to exercise indiscriminate 
violence against civilians. Crucial to understanding the parameters of each strategic 
position, it is equally vital to comprehend the nature of each position and how each 
position can transpire. The times in table 3.1 are used in this thesis as an outline in 
relation to the Nepalese conflict. These times are based upon archived accounts, 
interviews and examples drawn from the strategy of the Mao’s revolution, Peruvian 
and second Sudanese conflicts. Mao’s red book details how actors should respond 
during temporary deployment. 
 
“When we encamp, if there is a presumption that the enemy may 
be near, we should send every day a guerrilla company—or at 
least a platoon—toward the enemy's defences to carry out 
reconnaissance at a distance (from 20 to 30i) for several days or 
to join up with the local forces and carry out propaganda among 
the masses, in order to inspire them to resist the enemy. If this 
unit discovers the enemy, it should, on the one hand, resist him 
and, on the other hand, report to us so that we can prepare to meet 
the foe or to retreat without being drawn into an unnecessary 
battle.”21 
 
 
Mao claims if the enemy is near, the response should be the deployment of a guerrilla 
company or a platoon, which can be anything between 8-24 men.22 Mao refers to the 
deployment of actors for several days, not weeks. He goes on to argue that actors 
should try and resist the enemy, but if this is not possible then they should report back 
for reinforcements. As a result, I will partially use some of Mao’s red book to help 
determine each strategic position. The time frames for temporarily-deployed actors in 
                                                 
21 http://www.marx2mao.com/PDFs/QCM66.pdf [access on 08/10/2018] 
22 https://www.thebalancecareers.com/u-s-army-military-organization-from-squad-to-corps-4053660 [access on 
08/10/2018] 
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table 3.1 also originate from my pre-interviews conducted with experts of the 
Nepalese conflict. During phase two of my field research, I met with senior military, 
police generals and Maoist strategists who provided me with estimated times of when 
their actors were deployed to zones on temporary deployment. Based on this and 
accounts from victims. I provide an outline of time frames for the other strategic 
positions which can enable me to better assess the nature of each position during the 
Nepalese conflict.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, embeddedness is defined as the position and time in 
which an actor is deeply rooted in a surrounding population of civilians during a 
conflict. The term surrounding population of civilians means when actors encircle 
civilian populations in a specific location which makes up a zone or liberated zone 
controlled by embedded actors. Embeddedness can occur when an actor goes from 
being temporarily-deployed or fixed23 (holding battle positions) to staying in a zone 
for extended periods of time. This period can be months to years. The nature of 
embeddedness is the element of living and camouflaging amongst civilian 
populations. It includes the establishment of liberated zones, launching attacks that 
may involve using the civilians as a shield for cover and controlling geographical 
locations, which leads to the establishment of controlled zones and new governance 
systems within the zone. Embeddedness involves an actor being sent on deployment 
to a stationary position (holding battle positions) for extended periods of time. 
Embedded actors are not a part of the local population but can later live amongst 
locals as if they were civilians themselves. Embeddedness does not include shorter 
periods, i.e., a few days amongst civilians because this scenario suggests actors are 
                                                 
23 I will come to the two remaining positions (temporarily deployed to fixed) in the next two paragraphs. 
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not committed and will move on or be required to adjust their strategic position 
because of a potential threat or attack. Thus, an actor may go from being temporarily-
deployed to fixed and then embedded or start from being fixed (deployed for a length 
of time or recruited from the zone) and then embedded. Embeddedness can also 
involve an actor being permanently embedded amongst civilians from the moment of 
deployment. Thus, to be embedded actors must have restrictions on their movement 
outside of a zone or a liberated area which they control or within a contested zone 
(where no one party has full control) or uncontested zone (e.g., controlled by the 
military). The restriction means once an actor moves outside of their position within a 
zone or outside a controlled zone, then the actor has changed their position and the 
former position of embeddedness ceases to exist. 
  
A more recent example is taken from the battle of Mosul in 2016, where US coalition 
forces supported Iraq forces to tackle jihadists in the area. The Northern Iraqi city of 
Mosul –where the offensive against the jihadists had lasted more than six weeks, and 
where Baghdad forces were trying to flush out the terrorists embedded 
amongst civilians in the eastern districts where Iraqi troops had not yet been able 
to penetrate – is where the jihadist actors in this case where deeply embedded 
amongst civilians for several weeks before the offensive took place in the area. This 
involved Iraqi forces, with support from the U.S. and coalition forces, being deployed 
to this area to sift out the actors.  
 
A similar example is observed during the second Sudanese conflict where actors were 
embedded and fixed and were used to expand the zones of control for the SPLA/M. In 
1984-85, the SPLA/M began operations in new areas, attracting young men from 
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north of Bar Al-Ghazal (Collins, 2008, p. 143). Their strategy at the time was to 
deploy actors to the Lakes province who later became embedded amongst the 
civilians; this was especially the case around Yirol, which fell to the SPLA/M in 
December 1985, as did Rumbek in 1989. During these operations, the SPLA/M would 
embed themselves amongst civilians for periods of time to convince new recruits and 
locals to join the group as they pushed north. The SPLA/M then advanced on Wau, a 
government stronghold, and continued this strategy until 1987, moving as far as the 
Rumbek district in 1987. The SPLA/M also started re-entering northern Bar al-Ghazal 
from its bases to the south in the Lakes province in early 1986 but did not confront 
government and militia forces until 1987.  
The example from South Sudan shows that embeddedness can involve an actor being 
temporarily-deployed or fixed (holding battle positions), but for them to be 
embedded, they must remain in a zone for extended periods. The second Sudanese 
conflict involved embedding actors amongst civilians for extended periods and slowly 
extending these zones of control, by capturing neighbouring zones through fixed actor 
and re-embedding actors into these new zones. The example also demonstrates how 
capturing a zone worked with fixed and embedded actors through a local recruitment 
process. Embeddedness also included the SPLA/M actors living amongst civilians for 
extended periods of time with local village families. The process of embeddedness 
appears to be used by actors on the rebel side. State actors seem to not embed 
themselves but stay in a military barracks on the outskirts of a village or zones.  
 
During the Nepalese conflict, embeddedness occurred when Maoist embedded their 
actors with civilians and then conducted events with locals in Rolpha and Rukum 
districts before the emergence of the conflict. Before the conflict, the Maoists 
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organised several community events and launched several campaigns to embed 
themselves amongst the civilian population (Dhakal and Pyakuryal, 2007, p. 77). 
Campaigns such as “Sija” helped organise a centralized Maoist force which was then 
deployed in small groups to civilian zones. These groups were mostly composed of 
party members, insurgents, and leaders. They organised the masses, propagated the 
party line and held studies in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (Thapa, 2003:155). This 
helped to embed actors and spread the Maoist philosophy. Actors were initially 
formed into fighting groups of 3-4 members. During the second plan (1998) the 
Maoists increased the size of their deployed units to 7-9 combatants, and during the 
third plan, squad numbers increased to 32 (Thapa, 2003; by Li Onesto 2003:157). The 
strategies of the Maoist, like that of the Sudanese conflict, demonstrate the steps taken 
to embed their actors before the conflict, amongst the civilian populations.  
 
I suggest that the actors who challenge the state (i.e., rebels, splinter groups, absorbed 
groups, and ethnic/local groups) are most likely to assume this position. I believe 
embeddedness occurs because most actors fighting the state will need to have some 
form of a base that is not located where the state actors are based. This increases their 
chance of support from civilians. Finally, I believe rebel actors will use this position 
more than state actors because state actors will often have barracks in or around 
civilians’ zones.  
An actor may go from being temporarily-deployed to fixed, and then embedded, or 
start from being fixed (deployed for a length of time or recruited from the zone) and 
then embedded. An actor can also be permanently embedded amongst civilians from 
the moment of deployment. Embeddedness also includes the restriction of actors’ 
movements within a contested zone (e.g., where no one party has full control) or 
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uncontested zone (e.g., controlled by the military or a rebels). Therefore, measuring 
embeddedness beyond a two-week period provides a reasonable amount of time to 
examine an actor’s activities and determine whether they are significantly more likely 
to use indiscriminate violence and then move on.  
 
 
Temporarily-deployed actors are sent to zones for strategic motives and have an 
incentive to maximize short-run plunder by stealing and harming civilians (e.g., to 
commit violence or havoc, or for defensive and offensive purposes) (Olson, 1993). 
Actors who are temporarily-deployed to a zone, depending on the strategic 
assignment, are normally sent to either assist their allies or to combat warring actors 
who may be embedded or fixed in these zones. This is often done to identify the 
enemy or capture the opposition who may have attacked this actor’s base. This 
position will often involve trying to counteract ‘hide and seek’ tactics that are used 
against an opposing side. Actors using this strategy will often try to siege liberated 
zones controlled by opposing actors. On the state side, the nature of this position may 
revolve around counterinsurgency measures (e.g., acted out by state forces) or hit and 
run tactics (e.g., acted out by rebels) conducted by opposing actors. The nature of this 
position may encompass a strategy of prevention by actors on all sides and may be 
seen more as a forward front to dealing with an opposing actor.  
 
I draw an example from the second Sudanese conflict to demonstrate this 
transformation: the second Sudanese civil war that lasted over twenty years from 
1983 to 2005, until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Young, 
2012, p. 28). This period witnessed clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces 
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(SAF) and the SPLA/M along the Ethiopian border (Akol, 2009, p. 21, 33). It was 
also used as a training camp for the newly-recruited SPLA/M combatants who 
initiated “hit and run” and “hide and seek” tactics against the SAF and would later 
flee into the jungle. The SPLA/M operated through small underground cells, 
infiltrating popular associations, attacking SAF units, and seizing their equipment. In 
response, the government launched counterinsurgency operations in these zones along 
the North-South border. The SAF deployed actors and while on deployment to 
SPLA/M zones, the SPLA attacked the SAF with counter measures. The SAF’s lack 
of ability to deal with the situation resulted in the government of the north initiating 
Operation “Scorched Earth.” This operation involved advancing through civilian-
inhabited land and destroying anything that might be useful to the enemy. The 
strategy involved targeting food sources, transportation, communications, industrial 
resources, and even civilians. The SAF deployed air raids on civilians, and mobilised 
and armed local Arabs living near to advanced SPLA/M zones, as a quick-fix method. 
This increased indiscriminate violence against civilians who were located amongst or 
on the route to the SPLA/M zones, while ethnic groups who were aligned to the 
SPLA/M were also targeted. 
 
The temporary deployment of actors here is not simply restricted to battling the 
opposing side but was also to oppose a strategic move or position intended to be 
implemented by an opposing side, with the aim of apprehending key actors or groups 
in contested and uncontested zones. On the rebel’s side, the strategy can often 
resemble the actors conducting a form of mobile warfare without a home. While on 
the state side, actions carried out by the police, army, armed police, etc., will appear 
differently in nature because it encompasses short-term deployment to zones where 
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civilians may or may not be based. The counterinsurgent measures are designed to 
deal with embedded and fixed actors. This strategic position is characterised by the 
ephemeral nature of rebel actors’ activities and the rebels’ tentative confrontation of 
state and the state’s response. 
Temporarily-deployed actors, in many cases, are required to enter civilian populations 
to reach their assigned zones. They are unlikely to live with these civilians because of 
trust issues but may have some associations with certain civilian groups along the 
way. Along the route to their assigned zones, temporarily-deployed actors may be 
ordered to seek out warring groups (often for offensive or defensive reasons) that pose 
a threat to their deployed unit or zones. In other cases, temporarily-deployed actors 
may arrive at their assigned location without the occurrence of fighting between the 
warring actors; but they may later be attacked or ambushed by other actors in these 
zones. In other situations, temporarily-deployed actors may encounter fighting 
between smaller splinter or rebel groups when they seek out the enemy. An actor may 
also be sent on temporary-deployment to reinforce a zone where there is no fighting.  
 
An example of the nature of temporarily-deployed actors is taken from the decade-
long Nepalese conflict. In 1998, the government launched Operation Kilo Sierra II, 
which lasted for two months from mid-June to August 1998. This involved the use of 
police forces from Kathmandu and neighbouring districts being deployed into the 
heart of the Maoist zones. Kilo Sierra II caused an estimated 200 deaths: 15 in Rolpa, 
20 in Rukum and over 50 in Jajarkot with the rest in areas surrounding the Maoist 
zones (Li Onesto, 2006, p. 159). The Maoists would also retaliate with “hit and run” 
and “hide and seek” attacks in smaller units with civilians at the front line and then 
return amongst the civilian populations as if nothing had happened. This made it 
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extremely hard for the police to distinguish between Maoists and civilians and often 
left the police frustrated, later leading to the use of indiscriminate violence as a way 
of gaining control (Karki and Seddon 2003, p. 429). The police also used techniques 
such as “search marches” in Maoist zones, which often led to extreme force and 
torture against the local populations and led to the death of more civilians (Karki and 
Seddon 2003, p. 430). The example demonstrates that both the state and rebel actors 
were sent to different zones to counter the efforts of each actor. 
Temporarily-deployed actors will be able to operate in both contested and uncontested 
situations where an actor is deployed to. In the example above, temporarily-deployed 
actors on the state side were used to filter embedded actors amongst civilians. These 
actors were sent on a mission to search for the actors that were embedded amongst 
civilians. While on the Maoist rebel side, the nature of temporarily-deployed actors 
involved sending actors on hit-and-run missions designed to attack the state’s actors 
and provoke them into a response. For measurement purposes, temporarily-deployed 
actors are only present in zones for a few days up to a maximum period of a week. 
Anything beyond this period would lead these actors to become fixed, and anything 
beyond a fixed actor means this actor becomes embedded. I suggest all identified 
actors can assume this position. State actors may use this strategic position because of 
the need to demonstrate state power and their presence to the larger civilian 
population during conflicts.  
 
Finally, fixed actors are normally recruited or stationed in zones for longer periods of 
time than their temporarily-deployed counterparts. Fixed actors tend to hold defensive 
positions and are often used to expand in or to new liberated zones. Occasionally, 
they may be required to deflect warring parties who try to attack uncontested or 
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contested territory. Fixed actors are also familiar with the zones of control and the 
civilian populations they inhabit because they are either recruited from these zones or 
have remained there for intermediate to extended periods. As such, they can disguise 
themselves effortlessly amongst civilians. Depending on the nature and duration of a 
conflict, fixed actors may be deployed to a different zone outside their current zone 
for several days or weeks to reinforce their zones of control. This makes the 
differentiation between the fixed actors (who can become embedded) and the civilian 
population difficult. In some situations, fixed actors may be asked to move through to 
another side of the zone, with which they are familiar, to provide reinforcements, 
defend zones, and assist fellow actors. I suggest that all identified actors can assume 
this position. 
Their strategy is centred on the recruitment and creation of full-fledged, territorial-
based zones or areas. Fixed actor’s strategy is characterised by an actor’s ability to 
compete openly with the forces of the established state, and administratively by 
imposing territorial units and structure of governance on the same group of civilian 
populations where fixed actors are recruited from.  
During the Peruvian conflict, the fixed positioning of actors was witnessed by the 
recruitment of local actors by President Gracia. By 1987, it was clear that SL was 
regaining control of the Valley, with a successful attack by SL on a police station in 
Uchiza in the state of San Martín, and the subsequent occupation of the town on 31 
May 1987. García re-established the State of Emergency to include San Martín, 
Huánuco, and Ucayali. In addition, internal disputes between the police and the army 
meant that the brutal “Sinchis” were re-deployed and embedded amongst civilians. 
General Alberto Arciniega later assumed control over this emergency zone in April 
1989, commanding a force of 4,000 troops (Dreyfus, 1998, p. 103). Like Carbajal in 
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1985, General Arciniega rapidly realised that the civilians were the power base of the 
SP. Noticing this, he switched his strategy to reflect the interest of the civilians and 
gave them a choice between SP and the army. As a result, SP stepped up its attacks 
and moved their operations to urban areas, particularly towards the capital, Lima. 
During this period SP, still chose to use “hit-and-run” tactics and embedded 
combatants further amongst civilians. By 1989, SP was permanently operating and 
embedded amongst Lima civilians (CVR 2003, 2.8.3, 246). Beginning in the mid-
1960s the SP established a vast network of supporters and sympathizers in the rural 
areas of the southern Andean departments of Ayacucho and Apurimac, primarily 
through control of the education faculty at the Universidad Nacional San Cristbal de 
Huamanga in Ayacucho (Degregori, 1990). The control of areas, faculty and 
curriculum provided adherents for the SP with a mechanism for recruiting 
revolutionary cadres from the population of provincial youths who accounted for 
many of the students at the university. This provided the SP with invaluable 
opportunities, including the use of teaching positions to diffuse its revolutionary 
message, the establishment of a widespread network of adherents and sympathizers in 
the countryside. It created a geographical basis for the creation of territorial 
strongholds and eventually of so-called liberated zones, once the armed struggle was 
initiated.  
As a response, the García government decided to support the creation of numerous 
local indigenous militias who collectively became known as “Rondas Campesinas” 
(Fumerton, 2001; Nuñez-Palomino, 1996). The Rondas came into existence in 
Southern Peru in the province of Huaychao on 21 January 1983, when villagers killed 
seven SP members as a response to SP abuses in the area (Mitchell & Hancock, 
2007). The Rondas had minimal training by the army but were used as a first line of 
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defence against SP (Starn, 1996, p. 232; Theidon, 2000; Fumerton, 2002). Over the 
years, the number of Rondas rapidly multiplied from 700 in 1989 to 1,200 in 1991, 
and finally to 2,400 in 1997 with a membership of almost 236,000 (Fumerton, 2001; 
CVR, 2003). The nature of fixed position was centred on the recruitment process of 
locals to counter the SP actions. The Rondas was a group of actors who already had a 
strategic foothold in a liberated or controlled zone.  
 
 
In Table 3.1, I define what the expected periods are for each position. The times in 
table 3.1, are used to help me categorise and capture each strategic position only. 
These periods are used in Chapter 6 to assess the durations of each strategic position 
assumed by an actor during the Nepalese conflict.  
 
Table 3.1 Strategic positions of actors and periods amongst civilian populations. 
Length of Time/ 
Actors 
0–1 Week 1–2 Weeks 2 Weeks– 
End of Conflict 
Embedded Actors   X 
Temporarily- 
deployed Actors 
X   
Fixed Actors  X  
 
 
As Table 3.1 shows, I classify fixed actors as present amongst civilians in a zone from 
1-2 weeks, while embedded actors are present from 2 weeks to several months or 
years in a zone. Temporarily-deployed actors are present in a zone from the moment 
of deployment up to the first week. After the first week, any actor present in this zone 
becomes fixed. It is important to note that each strategic position can occur during any 
period of the conflict. I later divide the Nepalese conflict into four periods to better 
examine the activities of the different actors involved in the conflict (Chapter 5). This 
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enables me to examine the influence and effect of each strategic position on the use of 
indiscriminate violence. This means I can better assess some of the moves and 
strategic positions during the conflict. This can support me in understanding how 
indiscriminate violence occurred because of the strategic positions that actors adopt. 
The setting of these different periods enables this study to focus on the events, 
positions, and strategies, and how different actors distributed indiscriminate violence 
throughout the conflict. In my initial field research conducted in 2012, many of the 
experts that I spoke to recounted that actors who lived embedded amongst civilians 
often did so over a 3-4-week period. Those interviewed included: a Maoist strategist 
(C7RN007), who planned a large majority of Maoist campaigns across the country; a 
military expert (C7RN0035); a serving senior Armed Police Force Inspector General 
(C7RN014); and a senior Royal Nepalese Army General (C7RN012). The Maoist 
overall strategy was to deploy actors to a zone and capture the zone fully with the aid 
of Maoist rebels within a 72-hour window. If the Maoists were not successful in doing 
so within the 72-hour window, then the Maoist actors would move on to a different 
zone.24 
During my field research, a respondent recounts the Maoist strategy of attacking 
zones. The respondent claims that if the Maoist could not respond and capture the 
police post within 45 minutes, they were instructed to kill the police. 
 
“We (Maoist) would often attack the police post by splitting 
into two groups. The first group would lay the bombs down 
and the second group would enter the compound and 
demand weapons… if the police did not surrender then we 
would kill them…we were also instructed to capture these 
                                                 
24 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700160701740488?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=r
san20 
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posts within 45 minutes…the hope was the zone could be 
fully liberated within 72 hours.” C7RN004   
 
The extracted interview details the pace at which the Maoist operated in Nepal to 
capture posts and position their actors. It shows the Maoist strategy involved 
deploying actors and rapidly using “hit-and-run” tactics designed to shock and cripple 
the state’s police. If the zone was not captured within the assigned time frame then 
Maoist temporarily-deployed actors would leave the area, resulting in the actor not 
becoming embedded. This I expect will later lead to violence on civilians by the state. 
The accounts of the Peruvian and second Sudanese conflict demonstrate that actors 
often took several weeks to be fully embedded in a zone and control an area. In these 
same accounts, actors who were temporarily-deployed often spent a few days in a 
zone and were often sent on very short missions; when this mission was over, these 
actors would return to their barracks or to civilian areas. As a result, in Table 3.1, I 
have given the time frame as 0-1 weeks with the understanding that most deployed 
actors will return to their base that very same day or will mount an offensive that will 
take a few days but not with the intention of staying within a civilian area. Since this 
strategic position assumed by the actor is intended to be used to hit-and-run, to cause 
as much damage as possible or quickly separate actors. The strategy of separating 
embedded actors from civilians will involve strategically sending actors in a zone that 
may later become embedded.  
 
The fixed actors' time frame is about recruitment and holding zones. Any period 
longer than two weeks means that an actor is embedded. The examples of recruitment 
from the second Sudanese conflict demonstrate recruitment was done in stages and 
often involved actors being sent, fixed, and then embedded. Actors continued to 
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control neighbouring areas by recruiting locals who then became fixed, and increasing 
the number of liberated zones for the SPLA/M. Therefore, I provide a framework of 
one to two weeks as a time frame for fixed actors. As I mentioned earlier, the periods 
are used here to measure the nature of all three strategic positions, but this will of 
course vary in different conflicts. Thus, any future research will need to understand 
how the periods in each conflict should be examined if research intends to use this 
theoretical framework to understand each strategic position and their links to 
indiscriminate violence. The periods provide me with an opportunity to identify 
changes in actors’ strategic positions and the use of indiscriminate violence. This 
helps to determine whether embedded actors trigger indiscriminate violence, but I do 
not use this as a positive confirmation of the overall strategy; rather, as a way of 
estimating what occurred. Therefore, in the next chapter I detail how I used a mixed 
method approach to help me understand the nature of the strategic positions actors 
assume. In the next section, the strategic positions actors can assume and the 
influence of these positions on the use of indiscriminate violence are discussed. 
 
 
3.6 Strategic Position of Actors 
To better understand the strategic positions actors can assume, I first re-examine the 
identified actors in relation to the use of indiscriminate violence. In Figure 3.1, I 
outline the rebel actors as: rebels, splinter groups, absorbed groups, and local/ethnic 
groups, who are mutually exclusive actors; while the state actors are: police/armed 
police, military, secret service, and militant groups, who are also mutually exclusive 
actors. All identified actors can use indiscriminate violence.  
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Figure 3.1: Condensed version of actors’ groups  
 
 
Although Figure 3.1 helps to understand who the probable actors in a conflict are, the 
model is restrictive because it presumes actors hold static positions during the 
conflict. The model also does not account for the strategic positions and movement of 
actors within different zones, which is the main contribution of this thesis and may 
contribute to some use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. However, what if 
the model accounted for the use of indiscriminate violence by factoring actors who 
move by taking up a strategic position in a conflict, as briefly illustrated in the 
previous sections? Kalyvas’ (2006) theoretical position on the fluctuation of zones 
suggests that actors move and are in no way static as Figure 3.1 suggests. It is 
important to note that I refer here to situations in which actors are fighting during an 
active conflict and move through zones, but civilians remain fixed. 
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As previously mentioned zones can go from being contested to uncontested and back 
again, as actors adopt different strategic positions. Therefore, it is important to 
understand the potential movement of actors in a conflict to understand the strategic 
positions they can assume. While Kalyvas (2006) contends that zones change, I 
further argue, that zones change because actors (i.e., those identified in Table 3.0) 
assume different strategic positions which interact with one another during a conflict, 
and these strategic positions result in the use of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians.25 Any additional model must consider all identified actors and account for 
the fluctuation in conflict zones and the changes in zones over time due to shifts in 
actors’ strategic positions. In the next section, I move beyond current models and 
present a complementary model: the concept of embeddedness that focuses on one of 
the strategic positions that actors can assume in a conflict, embeddedness. I explore 
how embedded actors are central to the experience of indiscriminate violence by 
civilians in conflicts, and how this strategic position may contribute to higher levels 
of indiscriminate violence against civilians. 
 
3.7 The Concept of Embeddedness  
In this section, I argue that the strategic position of embeddedness is one of the central 
triggers of indiscriminate violence against civilians in conflicts. I continue to draw on 
accounts from past conflicts, to show how embeddedness transpires and how it can 
lead actors to use indiscriminate violence. I demonstrate how actors embed 
themselves amongst civilians to control the civilian populations and hide from their 
enemies, rendering civilians, with no vested interest, “piggies in the middle.” I show 
the impact of embeddedness on temporarily-deployed actors in their use of 
                                                 
25 The influence of actors’ strategic positions on the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians is explained in 
the next sections (3.7 and 3.8). 
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indiscriminate violence. Finally, I present a hypothesis on the conditions under which 
embeddedness can contribute to the use of indiscriminate violence.  
 
During the Peruvian conflict (1980-2000) with the Sendero Luminoso (SL), General 
Luis Cisneros in 1983 described the Peruvian government’s strategy as follows: 
  
The police forces do not know who Sendero Luminoso [SL] 
is, nor how many there are, nor when they are going to 
attack. For the police to have any success they would have 
to begin to kill Sendero Luminoso [Senderistas] and non-
Senderistas [civilians] because this is the only way they can 
ensure success (as cited by Taylor, 1983, p. 43). 
  
This example shows the complexities of differentiating between civilians and the SL 
and how effective the strategy of embedding actors (SL) with civilians was. It shows 
how issues of differentiating between actors and civilians led to the strategic use of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians. However, while differentiating between the 
two groups was difficult, using indiscriminate violence was viewed as the only 
alternative.  
 
Embeddedness is also demonstrated in the testimony of a victim of the decade-long 
conflict in Nepal (1996–2006), who was interviewed during my initial field research 
in 2012 and is part of the data I collected (517 surveys and 38 interviews) in Nepal. 
G1—the name of the interviewee has been anonymised—the interviewee, described 
the act of rebels embedded amongst civilians to disguise themselves from the military, 
and how civilians were used as instruments for attacking the military. The following 
is an excerpt from her account:  
 116 
 
They came at night, when it was dark and when no one 
could see them and warned us not to tell anyone. They 
stormed into our homes and took our food and water and 
demanded that we cook food for them. The rebels would 
stay with locals for several days, weeks, and months. They 
served the elderly, women, and the community well, and 
almost every other day we were forced to have culture 
evenings and events, where we were told about the rebels’ 
struggle and what it meant for Nepal’s future…One evening 
after a culture show, the rebels gathered locals, and we 
marched towards the army barracks. Suddenly, there was a 
loud bang, white light, and lots of smoke and shouting; these 
exchanges lasted for over an hour. After the attack, the 
rebels fled, leaving us the civilians to pick up the pieces. 
The following morning, the army came in and swept the 
village for rebels. They were very angry and accused many 
of us of supporting and hiding the rebels. The army then 
took my husband and son and accused them of being 
Maoists. I pleaded with them and told them we had been 
forced to provide food and shelter. I begged them to let them 
go, but they would not listen and pushed me to the ground; 
and that was the last time I saw my husband and son.26  
 
 
G1's account demonstrates two aspects of embeddedness. First, rebel actors lived 
(embedded) with the civilian population for weeks and several months. According to 
G1’s account, rebel actors served the local community and, arguably, became like the 
civilian population. They went to great lengths to serve and help the elderly and 
women in the community. Second, because rebel actors were embedded, civilians 
                                                 
26 An extract from an interview conducted by Andrew Edward Tchie (the author) with a female victim and 
respondent in Jumla, Nepal (Respondent no: 025, on 23rd September 2012). 
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were used to attack the military-base. This resulted in the short deployment of 
military to G1’s village and the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians; 
because the state-actors could not differentiate between civilians and embedded rebel-
actors.  
These accounts demonstrate that actors (rebels in both instances) routinely embed 
themselves amongst civilians to gain control over the civilian populations and to 
confuse the enemy actors. The accounts establish that the process of embeddedness 
produces two main outcomes: first, the use of indiscriminate violence to gain control 
over the civilian population by actors who become embedded amongst civilians; and 
second, the use indiscriminate violence against civilians by temporarily-deployed 
actors, who are unable to differentiate between, embedded actors and civilians (often 
after an attack).  
 
3.8 How Embeddedness Transpires  
In Figure 3.2, I present when, according to my concept, indiscriminate violence is 
likely to transpire through the process of embeddedness. I suggest that in the initial 
periods of a conflict, the fighting primarily occurs between the identified actors.27 The 
first peak in a conflict is in the number of battle-related deaths between fighting 
actors. This later shift’s during in the second peak to increases in the number of 
indiscriminate violence cases against civilians. As the number of battle-related deaths 
begins to decline, embeddedness begins, and the onset of indiscriminate violence 
against civilians begins. It should be noted that I do not designate a specific time-
frame for the decline in battle-related deaths, and the shift to an increase in 
indiscriminate violence. 
                                                 
27 In this section, I refer to the state and the rebels as the opposing parties solely for ease of reference. This does 
not exclude the different actors identified earlier. 
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Figure 3.2: When indiscriminate violence occurs through embeddedness. 
 
 
I argue that the fighting shifts from actor against actor violence (battle-related deaths) 
to actor against civilian violence (indiscriminate violence) due to the process of 
embeddedness and its interactions with other strategic positions. I suggest that during 
the commencement of embeddedness, actors who become embedded are likely to use 
indiscriminate violence to control the civilian populations and gain control over the 
zone they are now embedded in. Once control is achieved, I believe, indiscriminate 
violence will no longer be used by the embedded actor unless another actor challenges 
the strategic position. This will look different depending on the actor being examined 
and the strategic positions that each actor takes on during the conflict. The cultural 
event rebel actors forced civilians to take part in, as per G1’s account of the Nepalese 
conflict, is an example of the way rebel actors control civilians and the zone by 
building trust.  
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Similarly, temporarily-deployed actors are likely to use indiscriminate violence in 
their attempt to take control of the zone they are deployed to and defeat the actors that 
exist in this zone. Temporarily-deployed actors are also likely to use indiscriminate 
violence on civilians directly after an attack, as was the case in G1’s testimony. Since 
temporarily-deployed actors are normally sent on short missions, they are vulnerable 
to attacks by embedded and fixed actors. As they are not from these zones, 
temporarily-deployed actors often seek the enemy (embedded actors) amongst the 
civilian populations and struggle to differentiate between embedded, fixed actors, and 
civilians, as the Peruvian and Nepalese accounts above demonstrate. I suggest that all 
temporarily-deployed actors are likely to use more indiscriminate violence at the 
initial stages of their deployment because they struggle to differentiate between 
embedded actors and civilians. This I believe will occur because of the complex 
environments that these actors are confronted with when they are sent to a zone which 
interacts with other actors’ strategic positions. This was demonstrated during the 
Peruvian conflict by the SP’s strategy against state actors.  
 
In Figure 3.3, I present a depiction of when, I believe, indiscriminate violence is 
likely to be observed in a conflict more so by embedded and temporarily-deployed-
actors. I believe an actor who is embedded (e.g., rebels) uses high levels of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians to gain control of the zone during the initial 
stages of being embedded. Once control is achieved, the use of indiscriminate 
violence declines. When the indiscriminate violence used by embedded actors begins 
to decline, temporarily-deployed actors begin to use indiscriminate violence to gain 
control of the zone and in response to attacks by embedded actors, who are difficult to 
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differentiate from civilians. Consequently, civilians become “piggies in the middle” 
of the conflict. This switch in the sources of indiscriminate violence occurs because 
different strategic positons interact with one another. There is no incentive for 
embedded actors to continue to use indiscriminate violence once control has been 
achieved (this might change if embedded actors are engaged in battle with 
temporarily-deployed actors). When temporarily-deployed actors engage with 
embedded actors from opposing sides, I expect indiscriminate violence to rise because 
temporarily-deployed actors have been sent to embedded actors’ zones to tactically 
deal with embedded actors.  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Timing of indiscriminate violence by embedded and temporarily-deployed actors. 
 
 
Thus, high levels of indiscriminate violence will be used because of the tactical 
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civilian population, as occurred during the Peruvian conflict. As such, embedded 
rebel-actors can become targets of indiscriminate violence (among the many innocent 
civilians) when state-actors attempt to separate embedded actors from civilians. Since 
temporarily-deployed actors are unfamiliar with the zone they have been deployed to 
and have no association with the civilian populations, any attacks they receive before 
or after deployment, results in a harsh response towards the civilians whom the 
embedded actors are hidden amongst. It is important to note that all actors can assume 
any of the three-strategic positions (embedded, temporarily-deployed, and fixed), and 
all actors can go from being temporary-deployed, to fixed, to embedded, regardless of 
whether they are on the side of the state or the rebels. 
 
I suggest that the level of indiscriminate violence used by temporarily-deployed actors 
is likely to be higher but observed over shorter periods of time than the embedded 
actors. Furthermore, since temporarily-deployed actors have no ties to civilians they 
are sent to (opposition actors), the incentive to stop using indiscriminate violence 
against civilians as a tactical response is absent. This means that use of indiscriminate 
violence will move to different zones. I expect to see fewer categories of 
indiscriminate violence used by temporarily-deployed actors on civilians than by their 
embedded counterparts.  
On the other hand, indiscriminate violence used by embedded actors is likely to occur 
over longer periods but with less intensity than that of temporarily-deployed actors. I 
believe that the motivation of embedded actors to continue using indiscriminate 
violence on the same civilians will diminish for one main reason: embedded actors 
will not continue to use indiscriminate violence because they become dependent on 
the civilian populations over extended periods. This dependency helps to nourish 
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relationships between civilians and embedded actors. This dependency or 
interrelationship between actors and civilians is dependent on conditions where 
embedded actors continue to be entrenched amongst civilians for long periods. This 
can create a situation for civilians who are with embedded actors to establish and 
sustain agency between civilians embedded actors. After extended periods of 
interrelationship, the continuation of indiscriminate violence against civilians will 
only act as a counteractive measure. This was witnessed by the SP when the Peruvian 
states military pulled its troops back into barracks and allowed the SP to continue to 
use indiscriminate violence against locals. This directed many of the locals to switch 
sides and support the state. In Nepal, the same observation was made on the Maoist 
side due to the collective violence used by the state against civilians in Rolpha. 
Civilians would later switch to supporting the Maoist because of the continuous use of 
indiscriminate violence that they received under operation "Romeo." 
 
To fully understand how the process of embeddedness triggers actors to use 
indiscriminate violence, it is important to understand what the process of 
embeddedness does to actors who are embedded and to actors who assume a 
temporary-deployed position. To this end, I focus on the embedded actor and 
demonstrate how the strategic positioning of an embedded actor in a conflict is used 
to control the civilian population. I then illustrate how the embedding of actors can 
trigger temporarily-deployed actors on short missions to use indiscriminate violence 
against civilians. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, to establish control and sustain 
control, actors must be embedded in these zones. To exercise control, it cannot be 
done by, or through airstrikes on civilian populations because this causes civilians and 
actors to disperse away from the zone. If airstrikes must be continuously used, it 
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suggests that the actors using the airstrikes do not have control and do so to gain 
control.  
An example, of this can be drawn from the current Syrian conflict in Aleppo where 
the Assad regime used airstrikes to bomb rebel held areas to push the rebels out of 
areas that the rebel controlled. The regime did not have control of the area but through 
bombing, the strategy was to try and push embedded rebels away from civilian 
inhabited zones or captured rebel zones. Airstrikes did not provide the state with 
control over civilians and rebel support bases but caused rebels and civilians to flee 
the zone with no control over the civilians or rebels in the area. In fact, this led to 
civilians fleeing to Idlib and rebels embedding themselves in Idlib amongst civilian 
populations.28 Similarly, the US airstrikes on Assad’s chemical weapon plants, as a 
response to the chemical attacks on civilians (in Damascus), did not mean the U.S. 
state had control over the bombed zones. In fact, once the airstrikes were over, the 
Assad regime responded by firing 40 defensive missiles at thin air in a failed attempt 
to save the three Syrian chemical weapons sites destroyed by allied air strikes. A total 
of 105 missiles rained down on a research centre in Damascus as well as a storage site 
and bunker 15 miles west of Homs at 4am Syrian time. Britain launched eight Storm 
Shadow cruise missiles from the sky as the US and France provided support from the 
sea and jets. France fired 12 cruise missiles, three from a frigate and nine from 
aircraft, while the US provided the bulk of the firepower with 85 missiles in total.29 
This did not deter the Assad regime or give them full control over sites. If any of the 
coalition countries wanted to show control over Syria, it would require the western 
                                                 
28 https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/russian-warplanes-strike-idlib-syrian-rebels-brace-assault-1499968381 
(access 
on 31/09/2018) 
29 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/04/14/russia-claims-ally-syria-shot-71-103-missiles-launched-us-
britain/ 
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states to put “boots on the ground” which is something that was observed in northern 
Syria (Raqqa) where US forces backed by Kurdish forces defeated the Islamic State 
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). As mentioned earlier, for any actor to control a zone, 
they must be rooted in that zone. This helps to deflect the enemy but also ensures that 
no other actor can take control of this zone. 
 
In Figure 3.4, I show how the three strategic positions assumed by actors are affected 
by the process of embeddedness.  
 
Figure 3.4: The two conditions of indiscriminate violence through the process of 
embeddedness. 
 
 
All actors can go through the process of embeddedness and through this process two 
outcomes are produced. Figure 3.4 shows how the strategic position of an embedded 
actor, through the process of embeddedness, results in the use of indiscriminate 
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violence against civilians to control the civilians in this zone, as similarly occurred 
during the Nepalese conflict, in G1’s account. The impact of embeddedness on fixed 
and temporarily-deployed actors, resembles what occurred during the Peruvian 
conflict, in General Luis Cisneros account. Temporarily-deployed actors largely use 
indiscriminate violence because they cannot differentiate between civilians and 
embedded actors. This, I argue, leads to the dilemma General Luis Cisneros 
described, and leads to the first part of my hypothesis on the conditions under which 
embeddedness triggers indiscriminate violence:  
 
Hypothesis One: 
H1: Is there a relationship between embeddedness and the 
manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of 
temporarily-deployed actors? 
 
As stated previously, it is the strategic movement and positioning of actors from 
different sides that renders civilians “piggies in the middle,” wedged between 
embedded actors who control a zone and actors who are sent on temporary 
deployment. The three strategic positions, I argue, are crucial for studies seeking to 
understand how to protect civilians in a conflict. It is undeniably important to 
understand these strategic positions if researchers want to further understand the 
distribution of indiscriminate violence over the course of any conflict, and to 
understand how different actors may access and use indiscriminate violence in the 
first instance. Such understanding will better place conflict researchers and 
peacekeepers to understand how indiscriminate violence can be used against civilians 
and to curtail its use through enhanced protection awareness.  
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Figures 3.5 and 3.6 transform the traditional state-rebel dichotomy illustrated in figure 
3.0. The model expands the traditional government-rebel dichotomy by increasing the 
number of actors and demonstrating how actors can access indiscriminate violence 
through the strategic positions. Figure 3.5 and 3.6 illustrate how the strategic positions 
actors undertake can interact with one another and lead to the use of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians. Figure 3.5, illustrates the concept of actors assuming one of 
the three strategic positions (embedded, temporarily-deployed, and fixed) through the 
movement of rebel actors and Figure 3.6 illustrates the concept through the movement 
of state actors. It must be noted that the figures in no way suggest that actors are 
static. The actors depicted are fluid within zones that they inhabit, and actors have the 
potential to interact with one another over the course of a conflict wherever they are 
positioned. The figures refer to a situation where actors are fighting during an active 
conflict and move throughout different zones, but civilians can remain fixed.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Rebel actors, their strategic positions, and links to the use of indiscriminate 
violence. 
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As mapping all identified actors with their potential strategic positions in one figure 
would be confusing, Figure 3.5 displays a consolidated version of rebel actors only, 
while Figure 3.6 displays a consolidated version of the state actors only. Figure 3.5 
shows that rebel actors can adopt any of the three strategic positions. While splinter 
groups, absorbed groups, and ethnic/local group actors are often not as established as 
some rebel groups and tend to be a smaller unit of fighters, they can also assume the 
three strategic positions and use indiscriminate violence.  
 
 
Figure 3.6: State actors, their strategic positions, and links to the use of indiscriminate 
violence. 
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employs actors, such as the police/armed police, military, and the secret service that 
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STATE-
EMPLOYEDMILITANTS
ACTORS
STATE	ACTORS
(THIS	INCLUDES:	
POLICE,	ARMED	
POLICE,	MILITARY	
AND	SECRET	
SERVICE)	
INDISCRIMINATE	
VIOLENCE
FIXED	STATE	
ACTORS
TEMPORARILY	
DEPLOYED	
STATE	ACTORS
FIXED	STATE	EMPLOYED	
MILITANTS
ACTORS
TEMPORARILY-DEPLOYED	
STATE	EMPLOYED	
MILITANTS
ACTORS
EMBEDDED	
STATE	ACTORS
EMBEDDED	STATE	
EMPLOYED	MILITANT	
ACTORS
 128 
For arguments sake, I have placed the state-employed militant groups under the secret 
services because most states avoid having direct control over employed militant-
groups. Military and police groups would also prefer not to have any associations 
with uncontrollable and ill-disciplined actors. State-employed militant actors can also 
assume any of the three strategic positions and use indiscriminate violence.  
 
Kalyvas (2006) found that it was necessary for actors to use a certain level of violence 
to not only control the civilian populations but also to maintain information and avoid 
defection. According to G1’s account of the Nepalese conflict, when rebel actors first 
came to G1’s area, they surprised the civilian population and forced many to be a part 
of cultural shows and provide them with food. G1’s testimony also indicated that 
embedded rebel actors lived with civilians and even helped the elderly population. 
This shows that a certain level of force and trust was needed to control the zone and 
civilian populations at the beginning of embedding actors. Similarly, General Luis 
Cisneros’ account shows that even the police working at the local level struggled to 
differentiate between the SL and civilians, because the SL were deeply embedded. 
Researchers also found that before the Peruvian conflict had commenced, as early as 
1970, the SL leader, Abimael Guzmán, embedded and recruited local actors when he 
was a University professor.30 Thus, I expect embedded actors are likely to use 
indiscriminate violence to gain control over the civilian population. This leads to the 
second part of my hypothesis on the conditions under which embeddedness triggers 
indiscriminate violence: 
 
                                                 
15 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141114.pdf (accessed on 23 March 2016)  
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Hypothesis Two: 
H2: Is there a relationship between embedded actors using 
indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of a conflict to 
gain control over civilian populations? 
 
In the next chapter, I provide an overview of the methods and methodological 
approaches used in this thesis to examine the concept of embeddedness and the 
hypothesis presented above. In Chapter Four, I examine how the methods of process 
tracing, survey distribution, and interviews were designed, distributed, and analysed. I 
explore the sampling methods used for recruiting respondents for the survey and 
interviews. I also discuss the ethical issues that arose, and how I dealt with these 
issues. By means of existing data and the data collected from the selected case study 
in the field, in later chapters I demonstrate how embeddedness occurred in the case of 
Nepalese conflict and resulted in the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.1 Chapter Overview  
This chapter introduces the research methods and methodological approaches used in 
this thesis to understand why and under what conditions actors resorted to the use of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians during the Nepalese conflict (1996–2006). 
Four methods were used in this study: process tracing of relevant sources and data 
(see Chapter 5); a field survey with 517 respondents (see Chapter 6); interviews with 
38 Nepalese elite interviewees (see Chapter 7); and triangulation of sources from the 
different data collection methods (see Chapter 8). Results of the analyses of the data 
collected are reviewed throughout the chapters and triangulation analysis is conducted 
in the final chapter (Chapter 8), to provide a holistic understanding of the findings.  
 
This chapter is composed of four sections. In the first section (Section 4.2), I present 
the conflict in Nepal as a single case study. Nepal was selected for two main reasons: 
first, interesting trends pertaining to battle-related deaths and one-sided violence 
against civilians appear in the existing data on the conflict (UCDP, 2014). The 
patterns that emerged in the Nepalese conflict led me to question whether the 
observed use of indiscriminate violence was a consequence of embeddedness; and 
second, I found in the existing data an opportunity to test the concept of 
embeddedness and conduct an in-depth examination of the phenomenon within a real-
life context. In the second section (Section 4.3), I discuss the three datasets31 selected 
to provide an in-depth understanding of the context of Nepal. I then explain how the 
                                                 
31 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) battle related deaths; Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) one-
sided violence; and Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) human right observational group in Nepal. 
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method of process tracing was used with the combined datasets to understand the 
trends in the conflict and examine the use of indiscriminate violence through the 
process of embeddedness. In the third section (Section 4.4), I describe the fieldwork I 
conduced in Nepal. In 2014, I surveyed 517 respondents, from 16 of Nepal’s 75 
districts, retrieving and documenting accounts from victims, rebel members, military, 
and police officers. I present the survey design analysis conducted, its distribution and 
administration; and discuss how I navigated ethical issues, and sampling. Throughout 
this chapter I discuss ethical dilemmas that I was confronted with, including: issues of 
presentation when delivering the field research, and how I navigated through the 
selection of actors who were party to the conflict and this research; how I dealt with 
potential bias and misunderstandings of the key definitions; how my interpretation 
and respondents may have differed; and how I address these differences. I also touch 
on some of the challenges of field work in difficult settings and the concerns and 
limitations regarding a researcher’s role. Finally, I discuss the predicaments that 
arouse in the diffusion of research findings and data. In the final section (Section 4.5), 
I discuss the methods used to interview elite Nepalese, including senior government 
officials, civil society leaders, district and regional rebel leaders, military generals, 
and senior CPN-Maoist party members. I introduce the methods employed to sample 
the interviewees, the design and implementation of the open-ended interviews, and 
how I addressed bias. I explain how pre-coding and codes were formed and used to 
analyse the data from the interviews using the qualitative software MAXQDA.32 I 
also describe the method of triangulation and its use to examine the study’s results 
further. I discuss the benefits of using triangulation in this study and why this enabled 
                                                 
32 https://www.maxqda.com/what-does-maxqda-do (accessed 23/02/2017). 
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me to provide a holistic understanding of what occurred during the Nepalese conflict, 
as outlined in Chapter 8.  
 
4.2 The Case of Nepal 
The decade-long conflict in Nepal (1996–2006) involved two main actors: The 
Government of Nepal (divided into the police, Armed Police Force, and the Royal 
Nepalese Army); and the rebels’ Communist Party of Nepal Maoist (CPN/CPN-M). 
These individual actors will be further examined in later chapters. I have selected this 
conflict as a case study for two reasons. The first motivation pertains to the length of 
the conflict and the thought-provoking trends observed in the datasets from the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)33 on Nepal and the international Informal 
Sector Service Centre (INSEC)34 on the use of violence during the conflict. The data 
indicates that high levels of battle-related deaths occurred during the conflict. In the 
early years of the conflict, violence levels were relatively low but significantly 
increased during the middle period. State forces appeared to engage in higher levels 
of violence against civilians than the rebels and were also known to be deployed 
mostly to the rebel strongholds. I suggest that the high levels of battle-related deaths 
were associated with the high levels of violence used by the state against the civilian 
population. In other words, actor against actor violence preceded actor against civilian 
violence. According to the data, there were alternate periods of battle-related deaths 
and indiscriminate violence against civilians. Figure 4.0 presents the number of battle 
related deaths (UCDP dataset), cases of one-sided violence against civilians (UCDP 
dataset), and human rights abuses (INSEC dataset) during the conflict.  
 
                                                 
33 Battle related deaths (UCDP) http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/brd/ucdp-brd-codebook.pdf, one-side violence 
(UCDP), http://www.ucdp.uu.se/downloads/old/ns/ucdp-nonstate-11_2006.pdf (accessed on 25 December 201) 
34 http://www.insec.org.np/ (accessed on 20 December 2017) 
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Figure 4.0: Battle-related death and one-sided killing during the Nepalese conflict 1996-
2006.35 
 
As Figure 4.0 illustrates, battle-related deaths associated with the Maoist rebel actors 
commenced in 1996, but were relatively low at the beginning of the conflict. This 
number rose slightly in 1998 and decreased the following year. However, from 2000 
to 2001, there was a slow increase in battle-related deaths and the numbers 
significantly rose in 2002. The numbers decreased in 2003 and rose again in 2004. 
Data on violence against civilians began in 1997 and shows an increase in violence a 
year after the start of the conflict, later peaking in 2002. The data shows that the 
levels of violence Maoists used against civilians were highest in 2002, but are 
                                                 
35 Sources: UCDP: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP; Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC): Violence 
against civilians: http://www.inseconline.org 
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relatively lower than the state.36 I suggest that the early periods of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians relate to the state’s policy of dislocating civilians and 
Maoist rebels who were embedded amongst the civilian population. The data reveals 
that from 2001 to 2005, there is an increase in the use of violence against civilians by 
the state, which may be linked to the efforts of the armed police force and the Royal 
Nepalese Army (state army) to separate the rebels from the civilian population. I 
suggest that during this period civilians were targeted as well, which would explain 
the spike in violence observed in the data. This suggests that the use of indiscriminate 
violence may be linked to certain strategies or operations used by different state 
actors. The increase in the use of violence against civilians by the Maoist rebel actors 
may be linked to the group’s potential loss of control as the Royal Nepalese Army 
entered the conflict and used firmer tactics than the police.  
 
The second motivation for selecting the Nepalese conflict as a single case study is the 
opportunity it offers to test the theoretical framework and hypothesis I presented in 
Chapter Three. Yin (2009, p. 14) defines the use of a single case studies as, an 
empirical investigation that examines phenomenon in-depth and within its real-life 
setting, particularly when the margins between phenomenon and setting are not clear 
(Landman, 2003). Gerring (2004, p. 342) argues that a case study should be a rigorous 
analysis of a single unit…a spatially bounded phenomenon witnessed at a specific 
point in time or over some delimited period. Yin (2009, p. 47-52; Landman, 2003) 
adds that single case studies allow examinations to apply, test, and build theories 
through the application of multiple qualitative and/or quantitative research methods 
and provide an empirically-rich but holistic account of specific phenomena. The 
                                                 
36 Please note the state’s use of indiscriminate violence involved three actors: the state police, the armed police 
force, and the Royal Nepalese Army. 
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Nepalese conflict provides me with an opportunity to observe, test, and verify the 
phenomenon of embeddedness and its links to indiscriminate violence, to test the 
concept and hypothesis presented in Chapter Three.  
 
4.3 Process Tracing  
In this section, I discuss how process-tracing of various qualitative sources with the 
combined datasets (from three sources) was used to understand the emergence and 
operation of embeddedness in the Nepalese conflict and its link to indiscriminate 
violence. I examine how combining the datasets and exploring key events (using 
interviews, newspaper sources, articles, among other sources) contribute to a rich 
understanding of embeddedness.  
 
Process tracing is a fundamental tool of qualitative analysis that systematically 
examines evidence by taking into consideration the research questions and hypotheses 
posed by the investigator (Bennett, 2008, 2010; Fenno, 1998; George & Bennett, 
2005). Process tracing requires finding diagnostic evidence that provides the basis for 
descriptive and causal inference. Process tracing can contribute to diverse research 
objectives (Campbell, 1975, p. 181-82), including:  
• Identifying novel, political, and social occurrences and analytically 
describing them.  
• Evaluating prior explanatory hypotheses, discovering new hypotheses, and 
assessing these claims. 
• Gaining insight into causal mechanisms. 
• Providing an alternative means to conventional regression analysis.  
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The combination of the datasets and process tracing enhances the analysis and helps 
the study to focus, test, and observe the causal inferences (See: Yin, 1984, 2008; 
Sewell, 1996, p. 261). 
 
4.3.1 Process Tracing Analysis 
The process tracing analysis in this thesis employs historical information from UNDP 
documentation, interview accounts from leading military generals, police, civil 
society groups and human rights activists, books from leading Nepalese authors. It 
also includes reports from government and United Nation Interagency Rehabilitation 
Programme (UNIRP) documentation, newspapers like the Nepali Times and 
Himalayan Times, and other sources on the Nepalese conflict to understand the 
process of embeddedness and its links to indiscriminate violence. It provides this 
study with a means to understand how actors become embedded amongst civilians 
and resort to using indiscriminate violence through the strategic positions; how 
indiscriminate violence moves and is triggered during the conflict; and how and under 
what circumstances embeddedness causes other actors to use indiscriminate violence.  
 
To focus the analysis, I divided the conflict into four-time periods that are not time 
constrained. I do this in Chapter Five to be able to further investigate in other chapters 
the nature of the strategic positions and the use of indiscriminate violence at a micro-
level. Dividing the conflict into four periods in Chapter Five allowed me to survey the 
events, strategies, and tactics used during each period and make micro discoveries 
about the nature of the conflict, especially around major and minor events. It also 
allowed me to consider whether these events influenced the use of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians, and to assess the behaviours of actors and the impact of 
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their strategic positions on the use of indiscriminate violence. Furthermore, dividing 
the conflict into discrete periods increased the opportunity to detect embeddedness, 
specify its timing, and understand changes in its use by the different actors. The four 
periods under examination are as follows: 
• Period 1: The onset and initial phase of the conflict. 
• Period 2: The halfway mark in the number of battle-related deaths, changes in 
leadership, or the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. 
• Period 3: The peak in the number of battle-related deaths until the decline of 
the conflict. This may include the onset of indiscriminate violence. 
• Period 4: The decline in the number of deaths, a peace agreement, and the end 
of the conflict. 
 
4.3.2 Data Selection  
This study relies on rich and diverse data to understand the trends in the use of 
indiscriminate violence and its links to the strategic positions like embeddedness. To 
understand what occurred during the different periods of the Nepalese conflict, in 
terms of the number of battle-related deaths and instances of violence against 
civilians, I used the following datasets: the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme 
(UCDP) Armed Conflict Dataset37 on battle-related deaths; the UCDP one-sided 
violence dataset,38 on violence against civilians; and the Informal Sector Service 
Centre (INSEC) dataset,39 on human rights abuses across the districts of Nepal.  
 
                                                 
37 http://ucdp.uu.se/ (accessed on 02/02/2017) 
38 http://ucdp.uu.se/ (accessed on 02/02/2017) 
39http://econ.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/extdec/extresearch/0,,contentmdk:23155659~menupk:64214916~page
pk:64214825~pipk:64214943~thesitepk:469382,00.html (accessed on 13/06/2015) 
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4.3.2.1 Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) Armed Conflict Dataset 
The first major dataset on conflict emerged from the Peace Research Institute Oslo 
(PRIO) and the Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research.40 
The Armed Conflict Dataset examines the internal and external conditions of conflict 
from 1946 to the present day (Gleditsch et al., 2002).41 The advantage of this dataset 
is the low threshold of 25 annual battle-deaths.42 The dataset aims to provide data for 
battle-related fatalities (civilian as well as actors) for all state-based43 conflicts with 
more than 25 battle deaths in a single year. This threshold allows for the analysis and 
comparison of the data with the violence count dataset obtained from INSEC dataset. 
The dataset was designed to match the UCDP One-sided Violence dataset, from 1989 
to 2016, and is annually updated by UCDP project. The Armed Conflict Dataset 
differentiates between three types of conflicts: war, intermediate armed-conflict, and 
minor armed-conflict; and it is grounded in quantitative and qualitative assessments.44 
The UCDP dataset offers an opportunity to explore macro-level trends and factors 
using quantitative analysis tools.45 According to Suhrke, et al. (2005) this perspective 
contributes to understanding actors’ behaviour during conflicts.  
 
4.3.2.2 Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) One-sided Violence Dataset 
The UCDP’s one-sided violence dataset is an actor-year dataset that covers the period 
from 1989–2017.46 The dataset includes information on instances of one-sided 
violence against civilians perpetrated by governments and formally organised armed 
                                                 
40 https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/ (accessed on 20 December 2017) 
41 http://ucdp.uu.se/ (accessed on 20 December 2017) 
42 http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/15/a_15928-f_UCDP_paper1.pdf (accessed on 20 December 2017) 
43 State-based conflicts are conflicts between two organised parties, at least one of which is a government, and 
include interstate conflicts, extra systemic conflicts, intrastate conflicts, and internationalized intrastate conflicts. 
44 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0112_state_capacity_conflict_cardenas.pdf (accessed 
on 20 March 2016) 
45 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/245491176_Armed_Conflict_1946-2001_A_New_Dataset (accessed 
on 20 December 2015) 
46 http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/nsos/ucdp-onesided-14-2016.pdf (accessed on 20 December 2014) 
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groups.47 One-sided violence against civilians must result in at least 25 deaths to be 
included in the dataset. The one-sided violence category has received much attention 
and is used as the central data for several studies of modern-day warfare. The data 
captures insurgency strategies and tactics that are of a different kind from those 
pursued in normal combat.48 The data collected by UCDP is better disaggregated to 
understand the types of actors which function at lower thresholds of society and 
conflicts. The dataset collects information on indiscriminate violence using 
geographic coordinates. This allows for a micro understanding of what is transpiring 
and captures the actors conducting violence beyond just the state and the rebel actors. 
While earlier datasets collect information solely on the state and rebel actor’s use of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians, the UCDP data goes steps further by 
recording the number of violent acts by all actors. This is done by collecting data on 
several smaller groups of actors who commit indiscriminate violence at a lower 
threshold of 25 battle-related deaths. This means every noteworthy act of violence 
related to the conflict is documented, pin-pointed to an actor, and geocoded located. 
The dataset also allow dataset like the UCDP Non-state actors to be integrated into 
the dataset. This allows me to track the actors involved over the course of the conflict 
and their use of indiscriminate violence. The one-sided UCDP dataset helps shed 
further light on the causes, dynamics, and effects of organised violence in conflicts.  
 
4.3.2.3 Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC) Dataset 
The INSEC dataset includes individual-level data on the victims of the Nepalese 
conflict (1996-2006). The INSEC dataset is a census and not a sample of the known 
population of victims for which information could be collected. The unit of data 
                                                 
47 http://www.estepanova.net/SIPRIYB0902.pdf (accessed on September 2017) 
48 http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/stockholm/Fjelde_Hultman_OSVgeo.pdf (accessed on 20 
December 2017) 
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collection is the individual victim; and the dataset provides information on: whether 
the victim was killed, injured, or disappeared; the districts and villages where the 
victim was targeted; the permanent home address of the victim; the circumstances of 
the attack (e.g., combat, extra judicial); socio-economic information; whether the 
victim had any affiliation to rebel groups or other political parties; identification of 
the perpetrator; and whether the victim was considered to be a government or Maoist 
informant.  
 
INSEC collected village-level data on every actor present and involved in the conflict. 
This was then linked to the number of associated killings, rapes, and tortures 
identified by field staff during the conflict. For example, when INSEC field staff 
heard reports of a Maoist killing in a district or village, they went to the victims or the 
victims’ families and asked them about their experience. Thus, the observations in 
this dataset are important to this study. However, the dataset does not collect 
information on the geo-cordinates of violent incidents at the village level which 
restricts evaluations with other datasets. The dataset was published by Subodh Raj 
Pyakurel,49 and used in articles, including Education and Civil Conflict in Nepal 
(Valente, 2013)50 and More Inequality, More Killings: The Maoist Insurgency in 
Nepal (Nepal, Bohara, & Gawande, 2011).51 
 
As Figure 4.0 demonstrates, the combination of the datasets allows this study to 
observe and analyse the trends in indiscriminate violence in the conflict and establish 
                                                 
49 Individual-Level Data on the Victims of Nepal’s Civil War, 1996–2006: A New Data Set.(accessed on 
13/08/2016). 
50 Christine Valente (2014). World Bank Econ Rev (2014) 28 (2): 354-383; https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lht014 
published: 03 June 2013 (accessed on 10/02/2014). 
51 Mani Nepal, Alok K. Bohara, Kishore Gawande (2011). More Inequality, More Killings: The Maoist Insurgency 
in Nepal; http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00529.x/abstract (accessed on 01/11/2014). 
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when actors resorted to its use. By understanding these patterns, I can align the results 
with the process tracing analysis and enhance the initial findings. This provides the 
opportunity to understand how embeddedness is linked to the use of indiscriminate 
violence.  
 
4.4 Field Research 
In this section, I outline the methodological approaches I used to design, distribute, 
and conduct the survey in Nepal. I describe the challenges I encountered, and the 
adjustments made to conduct the survey with civilians from different parts of Nepal in 
2014. In this survey, I employed a comprehensive approach to study the process of 
embeddedness, movement of actors, and their use of indiscriminate violence during 
the conflict.  
 
The field research in Nepal was conducted over a one-year period in 2014 and 
included three phases from 2012 to 2014. The first phase involved an initial field 
examination of Nepal in the summer of 2012. This phase allowed me to investigate 
the context of the Nepalese conflict and to evaluate the nature of indiscriminate 
violence and it consequences for civilians. In the second phase, in 2013, I conducted 
in-depth interviews via Skype with 18 civil society leaders, non-governmental 
organisations leaders, and national human rights activists. Each interview lasted 90 
minutes and allowed me to understand the context of the Nepalese conflict and 
identify the districts that were impacted by the conflict and match this with the 
existing data. The first two phases allowed me to connect with various victims’ 
groups, civilian society members, and elites associated with the conflict. This helped 
me to get established before the third phase (the main field research) was conducted 
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in 2014. The first two phases also allowed me to make informed decisions about the 
selection of districts to be sampled for the study to explore the distribution of 
indiscriminate violence across the various districts. The third phase comprised of 
surveying the 517 respondents in 16 districts of Nepal. The method of selection I 
chose was used by the Maoist CPN-M (the political wing of the Maoist insurgent 
group) to identify underdeveloped districts. These districts were used as Maoist bases 
and were often the rebels’ strongest zones against the government. The Maoist also 
used these districts to mobilise civilians and launch attacks against the states actors.52  
 
Field research in conflict zones is challenging for both methodological and ethical 
reasons. In conflict zones, the usual imperatives of empirical research (to gather and 
analyse accurate data to address a relevant theoretical question) are intensified by the 
absence of unbiased data from sources such as newspapers. The biased nature of data 
compiled by administrations operating during the conflict zone, leads to problems 
establishing what a representative sample is or should be, and examining that very 
same sample, while trying to deal with logistical issues particularly in a mountainous 
area like Nepal. Similarly, the ethical imperative of research (“do no harm”) is 
intensified in conflict zones by the various parties in a conflict, the general 
unpredictability of events, and the traumatization through violence of combatants and 
civilians alike, but also in a country in a post-conflict setting where the evidence of 
conflict is still raw. One of the concerns during the field research was memory loss of 
those participating in the field research. Eight years had lapsed, and I was concerned 
about how people would respond to the questions being posed. This creates an 
opportunity for bias to slip in. One way of discussing this concern was to use a mixed 
                                                 
52 Crisis group report http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-
asia/nepal/104_nepal_s_maoists_their_aims_structure_and_strategy.ashx (accessed on 15 July 2016) 
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method approach to collect information on the various areas of discussion. This 
provided me with an opportunity to explore answers to the research questions from 
different sources and triangulate this together at the end. A second way around 
memory loss risk was to ask similar questions within the survey that I can later select 
on to draw inferences about the results. The final method was to open the survey 
collection methods to different types of people. This does not eliminate the bias that 
existed, but it provides me with an opportunity to reduce bias within the results.  
Asking similar questions within the survey and during the face-to-face interviews 
allows me to check whether the respondents fully understood the question and 
understand how the strategic positions were used, if used at all. This was achieved by 
explaining to respondents before the interview what the different strategic positions 
were, how indiscriminate violence was conceptualized, and what indiscriminate 
violence looked like and how it might have been demonstrated during the conflict. 
The reason for doing this is to be able to give the respondent examples that were 
accessible but comprehensible. This allows the respondents to reflect on their 
experiences and link this experience to the questions being asked of them during the 
survey. This of course can introduce bias and mislead respondents to answer the 
survey in a certain way. A solution to this bias is to clearly label each section of the 
survey that focused on indiscriminate violence as “indiscriminate violence” or 
“violence by embedded actors.” This was also applied in sections of the survey where 
respondents were asked to examine the use of violence by fixed and temporarily-
deployed actors.  
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4.4.1 Survey Design  
The survey was composed of 95 questions and designed to capture the incidents and 
duration of indiscriminate violence during the conflict.53 It was designed to collect, 
capture, and examine the embedding of actors, the use of indiscriminate violence, and 
the trends and movement of indiscriminate violence. The survey distinguished 
between actors who were temporarily deployed or sent on deployment to civilian 
zones and actors who remained amongst civilians and if so, for how long. The survey 
considered how the embedding of actors may have led to the use of indiscriminate 
violence by embedded, temporarily-deployed, and fixed actors. To capture the 
respondents’ geographical awareness of indiscriminate violence, the survey attempted 
to create scenarios that connected respondents’ answers to events of indiscriminate 
violence they experienced. This allowed me to understand the use and distribution of 
indiscriminate violence.  
 
Most survey questions were closed-ended, with supplementary sub-sections for 
respondents to add comments where needed. Some questions were open-ended and 
provided respondents the opportunity to expand on their answers, while others were 
restricted. This was necessary to capture the respondents’ unique experiences and 
understanding of the conflict, while accounting for similar traits in the occurrence of 
indiscriminate violence. The survey considered the behaviour of actors on all sides, 
from the perspective of the respondents, allowing for an understanding of 
embeddedness through the eyes of the respondents. While I cannot measure 
respondent’s ability to misinterpret the definition of the strategic positions, 
(embeddedness, temporarily-deployed, and fixed) and the use of indiscriminate 
                                                 
53 Please see Appendix A for a list of 95 survey questions used to survey 517 respondents, elites, in 16 districts for 
this investigation. Please see Appendix D for the Nepalese translated version. 
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violence, one way of addressing possible misinterpretation which can lead to bias 
during the survey and interview process was to discuss the definitions of each major 
position. This was done by explaining the thesis framework with respondents who 
were participating in the survey. I did not read the definition out in full, but I 
explained to the respondents before the interview started what I was seeking to 
understand, how I understood it (i.e. measurement of embeddedness conceptually and 
empirically), and how it could potentially be identified to the respondent. Each 
respondent was given examples of what each position looked like and what forms 
indiscriminate violence encapsulated until they felt fully satisfied with the concepts of 
the thesis and were ready to complete the survey. This helped respondents to assess in 
their own manner what occurred. The process was put in place to help align the 
respondents’ experiences within the theoretical framework that I was examining, 
without dismissing their own experiences. This I believe helps to reduce a 
respondent’s ability to misinterpret or lie about what took place. While I cannot say 
that this eliminated the incentives to lie about what occurred or misinterpret the 
different positions, I believe there was no noteworthy incentive for civilians to lie 
about their accounts; mostly since there has been no compensation system put in place 
apart from the UN reintegration policy, which only rebels were entitled to. The one 
incentive for respondents was to be a part of a research project where the researcher (a 
foreigner) would listen to and document all respondents’ experiences as a part of this 
PhD thesis.  
 
The survey was designed in the United Kingdom (UK) and tested on a small sample 
of conflict victims, who were students studying in the UK at postgraduate level. Most 
participants were human rights or political science students in their second year of 
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studies and had originally come from Nepal. I also tested the survey in Nepal for 
translation and dialect alterations as required. By communicating with Nepalese 
organisations in Nepal that I had engaged with in 2012, I was able to conduct a pilot 
of the survey as well. Two Nepalese organisations participated in the pilot: the Nepali 
Times, a national newspaper in English run by Mr Kunda Dixit;54 and Didibahini, an 
organisation focussed on gender equality and social justice issues founded by Ms. 
Saloni Singh.55In addition, three people from the Nepalese diaspora in the UK, who 
were impacted by the conflict, were also recruited through social media. These 
sources were used to pilot the survey and make the necessary adjustments needed for 
the field.  
 
For the survey to be operational in Nepal, it was translated and revised several times. 
A Nepalese-born research assistant (Mr Keshab Giri),56 based in the UK at the time, 
conducted the original translation from English to Nepalese. Two Nepalese 
journalists, based in Nepal and educated in the UK, then revised the survey. Based on 
their feedback, Mr Keshab Giri amended the survey, and I sent the amended version 
to two independent translators who reviewed the survey and refined it. Once this was 
completed, a Nepalese-English newspaper editor made the final amendments. 
Bilingual (Nepalese and English-speaking) respondents completed the questionnaire 
in an average of one hour. Respondents requiring translation support completed the 
survey with a research assistant in one hour and thirty minutes, on average. 
 
                                                 
54 http://nepalitimes.com/ (accessed on 10 Mach 2016). This newspaper was one of the few national papers in 
English and reported comprehensively about conflict 
55 http://www.didibahini.org/ (accessed on 10 Mach 2016). Didibahini was one of the few organisations in Nepal 
working on gender equality and social justice issues during the conflict. Saloni Singh, the current Executive Chair 
has worked with women in Asia and Africa and consulted for the United Nations and UN women. 
56 http://sydney.edu.au/arts/staff/profiles/keshab.giri.140.php (accessed on 25/12/2017) 
 147 
4.4.2 Survey Distribution 
Distributed to over 1,200 people in 16 districts in the field, I conducted the survey 
with two research assistants (alternating) over a period of 10 months. However, only 
517 completed surveys were collected. This was the result of the withdrawal of a 
Nepalese organisation from the study due to funding issues. Survey respondents were 
victims, child soldiers, rebel combatants, army, armed forces police, regular police, 
and members of civil society. Districts sampled included: Banke, Bardiya, Bajhang, 
Doti, Dadeldhura, Dang, Dolpa, Jumla, Kailali, Kailkot, Kanchanpur, Kathmandu, 
Panchihar, Rolpa, Rukum, and Rupenidehi. In each district, I sampled an average of 
25-60 respondents. The survey was a traditional paper and pen questionnaire 
distributed amongst individual civilians with face-to-face contact or conducted in 
groups of 10–15 people.  
 
4.4.3 Respondents  
The respondents varied in age, caste, education, socio-economic status, and 
geographic location. In two hilly districts (Jumla and Dolpa) based in the far-western 
regions of Nepal, the education levels were extremely low and civilians tended to 
speak the root dialect of Nepalese. In these districts, I was accompanied by a research 
assistant who translated the surveys for locals. In a few instances, when the research 
assistants were not familiar with the local dialect and the geographic location, the 
survey was conducted with the aid of a local person and the research assistant. In 
most cases, I was present; but in a limited number of cases (four), because of the 
sensitivity of the issues discussed (e.g., rape), I observed from a distance. This created 
a friendly and relaxed environment for the respondents, so they were not 
overwhelmed by the number of researchers present.  
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4.4.4 Survey Administration 
My inquiries were met with the enthusiastic collaboration from many residents, 
irrespective of class, occupation, or political affiliation. Residents acted on a 
willingness (perhaps even a need in some sense) to discuss with an outside researcher 
their own history and that of their family’s and community. Perhaps this willingness 
is a measure of the trauma and change brought by the conflict. I also suspect much of 
this derived from the fact that many of the victims in rural areas had never been fully 
surveyed since the United Nation Mission in Nepal started and ended in 2010. Those 
surveyed often expressed a desire for their story to be told, and some account be made 
of the local history of the civil war. This willingness of many residents of contested 
areas to talk about their personal and community histories at length with a researcher 
is common to other ethnographies of civil wars, however in the case of Nepal there 
was an abundance of this willingness, to share talk and discuss the conflict. I regretted 
not being able to talk to as many of the people who were willing to talk to me during 
the interview process as I would have liked to. 
 
The administration of the survey differed depending on the location and the 
characteristics of the respondents. The first and most commonly used method was the 
self-administered format, which often involved the presence of the researcher sitting 
with an individual or a group of respondents and assisting them with the survey as 
needed. This was the preferred method and tended to occur in both accessible and 
hard to reach areas of Nepal. It involved staying in a location for 1.5 weeks and 
interacting with respondents from diverse backgrounds and experiences. This method 
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helped reduce selection and social desirability bias to a certain degree, but it did not 
eliminate or exclude it because civilians were self-selected. 
 
The second method was the group-administered format, which was conducted through 
human rights organisations, civil society groups, and victim groups. This approach 
enabled me to interact with conflict victims and build personal connections to 
understand their experiences and testimonies. This format also allowed me to recruit a 
wide array of respondents. This method opened the investigation to additional insights 
into embeddedness, the use of indiscriminate violence, and how embedded actors 
triggered temporarily-deployed and fixed actors to use indiscriminate violence. In 
Kailali and Banke districts, respondents were selected in collaboration with NGOs, 
civil society groups, or community-based groups. This presented the investigation 
with sampling bias issues, because respondents were not selected randomly from their 
communities. However, a list of potential respondents was obtained from a diverse 
range of civilians. I elaborate on how I addressed the issue of sampling bias in the 
next sub-section.  
 
The third method was the household drop-in /off system and was used the least 
because it was time consuming and location restricted. This format was largely used 
with victims who were bed-bound, wounded, or sick. It was also often used for the 
elderly, who gave in-depth accounts of their experiences of the conflict. The elderly 
often overheard conversations between actors when they stayed overnight and could 
provide information on embeddedness, strategies of actors, and their use of 
indiscriminate violence. 
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4.4.5 Addressing Bias  
Eight years had passed since the end of Nepalese conflict when the survey was 
conducted. While the memory of the respondents is always uncertain as time passes, I 
purposely relied on the survey as a way of assessing respondents’ understanding, and 
to critically engage the respondents to think about the answers they were providing. 
While time lapse will lead to issues of verification and sharpness of account etc., the 
best way I could reduce this risk was by asking similar questions within the areas 
being explore. For example, if there was a section on the use of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians, then sections of the survey where this question was located 
would ask similar questions, aimed at the respondent answering the question again, 
but worded differently. This does not eliminate all levels of bias during the field 
research, which is something I could not fully avoid but tried to account for. 
There have also been significant studies on the conflict, which meant that social 
desirability bias could pose a problem. Social desirability bias can undermine a 
study’s attempt to obtain valid measures of public attitudes or behaviours. It can also 
impact the broader social environment when the results of the study are revealed, as 
the social influences that helped shape the responses can have a ripple effect. To 
avoid these issues, I employed four mechanisms: first, I asked respondents similar 
questions towards the latter parts of the survey. This allowed for an array of optimal 
answers and to check the respondents’ answers; second, the survey relied primarily on 
the self-completion approach. Respondents were encouraged to complete the surveys 
on their own and freely ask questions as required; third, the research assistants and I 
avoided referring explicitly to the subject matter from the outset. This helped to avoid 
priming respondents to answer questions in socially acceptable ways; and created 
scope to explore their values and priorities unfettered, before focusing on the main 
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topic of interest; and fourth, I reassured respondents that “there were no right or 
wrong answers,” to reduce any concerns about being judged for their responses. 
 
In retrospect, I am aware of many mistakes I made during my field research, of which 
two deserve mentioning. First, I wish I had better recorded the comments made before 
the interview formally started; this pertains to the pre-interviews conducted with 
respondents. Many of these pre-interview sessions provided me with a wealth of 
understanding of how actors moved strategically, what actors were thinking, and the 
positions they adopted. However, given the nature of these pre- and post-interviews 
this would have meant many of the respondents pulling out of the research project 
because of the fear I was immediately documenting their account upon arrival. I was 
slow to understand the value of those interactions as I initially had an overly simple 
understanding of what the conversations represented. Only later did I come to 
understand those interactions as a way of demonstrating the frustration with the 
conflict and the government’s inability to address many of the grievances, much of 
which was covered during the survey and was the actual cause of the conflict, but was 
omitted from this research project. Second, I came to wish that I had interviewed 
more residents from the 16-selected district who did not support the insurgency, as the 
material I gathered from this group was generally less rich than from supporters. In 
addition, I wish I had interviewed more residents instead of only surveying 
respondents. This is not to say there was no value in surveying local residents. In fact, 
surveys meant that definitions of the strategic positions of actors, time frames for 
adopting these positions, and the moving and indiscriminate violence was better 
understood because respondents were often required to think carefully about their 
interactions with the different actors during the conflict, and how indiscriminate 
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violence moved. Giving residents the opportunity to be part of the interview process 
would have given me more nuances into violence, which would have added a further 
layer of understanding. That different level of understanding, I believe, could have 
further solidified some of the claims and findings I could have made throughout this 
research project. This is not to say that the surveys do not provide a rich 
understanding, but extended interviews in this situation would have provided further 
understanding, and strengthened the causal claims made in this thesis.  
 
4.4.6 Ethical Issues  
For field research to be ethical, research respondents must consent to their 
participation in full and demonstrate an understanding of the potential risks and 
benefits (Kelman, 1972; Belmont Report, 1979). In the context of my field research, 
this norm of informed consent meant that those I interviewed should understand the 
purpose of my research and the potential risks that they could run into talking with me 
(as well as any potential benefits), so that they could make a fully-informed decision 
as to whether they wanted to speak with me. The challenges of implementing this 
norm were numerous: what were the risks and benefits of participation? And would 
illiterate and marginally-literate rural residents understand the informed consent 
process, or would it alienate potential participants?  
This study involved civilians and actors who had experienced indiscriminate violence 
and whose cases had not been heard in court or by any formal Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). As such, the safety of the respondents was 
paramount. This meant that consent forms had to be signed on a separate sheet and 
then coded with a unique field number to prevent links between the respondents’ 
survey responses and the consent forms. When respondents were referred to the study, 
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I used the premises of the organisation or went to a location recommended by the 
organisation to meet the individual or community members. If the individual did not 
speak English, I travelled with a research assistant who provided translation 
assistance. Before the survey was conducted, I presented the aims of the research 
project and explained that consent was needed before the survey could be completed. 
I also explained that the survey results would be stored on a secure cloud server. 
Some respondents in remote parts of Nepal required an explanation of what a cloud 
server was. Respondents were then provided with information sheets, available in 
both English and Nepalese. They were asked if they understood the content of the 
information sheet and were given the opportunity to ask questions before signing the 
consent form and commencing with the survey. Respondents could provide their 
signature through finger printing, electronically (via an Apple iPad), or by hand. 
These were later scanned and uploaded onto the cloud server. I conducted the survey 
verbally, one-on-one, with respondents who were illiterate or unable to read or write. 
Each respondent was given a unique field number after they completed the survey.57 
This unique number was used to conceal the respondents’ identities.  
 
In the Kailali and Banke districts, respondents were selected through collaboration 
with NGOs and civil society groups, as well as community-based groups. In Kailali, I 
worked with Searching for Common Ground Nepal58 and the United Nations 
Development Programme, Conflict Prevention Programme (CPP).59 The CPP has 
since been decommissioned. In Banke, I worked with the National Women’s 
                                                 
57 Please refer to the codebook in Appendix C, IndRespDistrCode 
58 http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/nepal/ (accessed on 10th April 2016) 
59 http://www.np.undp.org/content/nepal/en/home/operations/projects/closed-projects/peacebuilding-and-
recovery/cpp/home.html (accessed on 10th April 2017) 
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Commission.60 Since the selection of respondents in these districts was neither 
independent nor random, to reduce selection bias, I selected respondents 
systematically from an extensive list that the organisations had gathered over a 
decade. I determined the sampling size required (between 25–60 respondents from 
each district) and selected every Nth record from the list. Although not optimal, this 
method moderately reduced the opportunity for bias in these districts.  
 
4.4.7 Survey Sampling Methods  
Survey distribution captured a wide range of civilians and was not limited to 
respondents from the capital Kathmandu. Many of the conflict victims were women 
who had experienced deep suffering and the loss of loved ones, and who were now 
acting as the head of their households. In some districts, young men who were former 
combatants or rebel members were surveyed.61 The sample-included districts located 
in the far western, western, central, and eastern regions of Nepal.62 In many cases, the 
respondents were conflict victims, police official, and rebels. Figure 4.1 is a map of 
Nepal with its 75 districts, 16 of which were included in this investigation.63 
 
                                                 
60 http://www.nwc.gov.np/ (accessed on 10th April 2016) 
61 Some were rehabilitated under the United Nation Interagency Rehabilitation Programme. 
http://www.unirp.org.np/Home.aspx (accessed on: 12/03/2016) 
62 http://www.np.undp.org/content/nepal/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/successstories/an-improved-
madrasa--a-peace-dividend-for-a-religious-minority.html (accessed on 10/3/2017) 
63 Districts survey were Banke, Bardiya, Bajhang, Doti, Dadeldhura, Dang, Dolpa, Jumla, Kailali, Kailkot, 
Kanchanpur, Kathmandu, Panchihar, Rolpa, Rukum, and Rupenidehi, 
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Figure 4.1: The 75 Districts of Nepal.64 
 
 
The average time I spent in each zone varied depending on the amount of time 
available and the landscape of the district. In some districts, the overall time I spent 
was 1.5 weeks.  
 
4.5 Interviews with Elites 
In this section, I outline the methodological approach, sampling methods, and 
techniques employed to interview 38 Nepalese elites.65 To triangulate the results from 
the process tracing, and the surveys with the result of the interviews, I used questions 
from the survey in the interviews. However, the interview questions were open-ended, 
unlike the survey questions that were mainly fixed, with few open-ended questions. 
In-depth interviews in peace research are usually used in combination with other 
                                                 
64 Sources: http://ncthakur.itgo.com/map04.htm (accessed on 10/3/2017) 
65 Please see Appendix B for a list of elite respondents. Please note due to safety concerns names of elite 
respondents, contact details, gender and interview dates have been anonymized. 
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methods for collecting data; they are rarely used as the sole source of data (Johnson, 
2002, p. 104). A single in-depth interview study conducted at one point in time cannot 
in, and by itself, explain or make generalisations for other cases. However, when 
firmly based on, and compared with earlier research, that is when it is put into the 
realm of the ‘collective enterprise’ of science (King et al, 2004, p. 186). An in-depth 
interview study can suggest valid descriptive or causal inferences. In-depth 
interviewing can be used inductively, to generate new hypotheses or theory by 
studying an issue in a conflict or post-conflict setting.  
Alternatively, in-depth interviewing can be used deductively, to investigate whether a 
theory based on findings from studies at the societal or national level is applicable at 
the grassroots, individual level. By combining research methods to gather both 
quantitative and qualitative data, the analyses in research can at the same time be 
made broad and rich.  
Across the 16 districts where interviews were conducted, I interviewed 50 people: 
seven Maoist insurgent commanders; five police inspector generals or police 
inspectors; four Senior Army Generals; three academics; two journalists; two judges; 
12 NGOs or civil society group members; nine UN or UN agency staff; and six 
members of parliament. For reasons that will be further explained later, I dropped 12 
interviewees from the analysis conducted in Chapter Seven because a few 
interviewees decided not to be a part of the project. In addition, a few respondents, 
after further probing during the interview process, showed an inability to understand 
specific questions that were posed. Others also had issues with language and could 
not understand the translated version of the questions.  
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Through interviews and observations during meetings, I documented the history of 
the conflict in some local communities, the political trajectories of conflict as it 
escalated over the course of the years, the relations between civilians and the armed 
actors, and the patterns and some tactics of Maoist rebels.  
While I could gather several primary documents and databases to observe many 
meetings of different organisations, my principal research method was that of the 
semi-structured interview, where I asked open-ended questions from a prepared list 
and pursued topics in depth, as seemed appropriate and relevant. Many respondents 
were essential to the quality of information eventually gathered. It was important for 
the research to gather perceptions on these issues from social groups across the 
political spectrum (including the armed actors). I assured all those I interviewed that 
their identity would be kept confidential (in many cases, their participation was 
anonymous). 
 
My initial entry to my first interview was facilitated by a non-governmental 
organisation who was working on truth and reconciliation issues. The local 
organisations I contacted in 2014 introduced me to residents and gave me the 
opportunity to have people come in throughout the day to conduct interviews with. 
Various contacts in Nepal (through my initial field research visit in 2012) introduced 
me to members of non-governmental organisations working in the other field sites, 
who then facilitated my entry to other interviewees in other districts. In the rural 
areas, I was assessed by the Maoist local leaders who were present in each area. This 
meant having to be cross-examined by state authorities as well. After listening to my 
explanation of the project, authorities on all sides would check with political leaders 
in Kathmandu to confirm my identity. Given that I used the snowballing method of 
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interviewing elites on the government side, I assume a similar process took place 
among government officials. Thus, prospective interviewees were identified through 
the construction of several parallel and evolving networks of contacts (urban and 
rural, insurgent-affiliated and government supporting, and rural residents who 
supported neither side). In the circumstances of political violence and divergence, like 
in the Terrai regions (due to violent protest against the state in 2014), the dynamics 
were a little different when speaking to respondents. I did not attempt to construct 
representative samples of local respondents but did my best to interview members of a 
wide variety of organizations, both those affiliated with the government and those 
affiliated with the opposition.  
Locals Maoist and state authorities introduced me to a variety of residents, including 
people who supported neither side (otherwise not easily identified). I did carry out 
research in areas that where controlled by the Maoist (e.g. Rolpha, Rukum, etc.) that 
were contested over the period of the conflict and areas that were solely controlled by 
the state (e.g., Kathmandu). However, key to understanding violence was to survey 
and interview areas where the Maoist were present or areas that switched the hands of 
control over the course of the conflict. I did not attempt to conduct field research in 
areas where insurgent activities were entirely absent (which would have been the 
ideal research design, as it would have added a clearly contrasting case). Field 
research in the conditions of the Nepalese conflict during the times of my research 
was generally safe. The risk was often due to the altitude of the district or the 
unregulated planes that I often had to take to get to a community on foot. However, I 
fully enjoyed this experience and would not trade it in. 
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The interview questions aimed to capture the interviewees’ perspectives of events 
pertaining to embeddedness, indiscriminate violence and who used it, and the triggers 
of indiscriminate violence. The interviewee’s responses contributed to understanding 
the use, changes, and movement of indiscriminate violence during the Nepalese 
conflict. The questions were occasionally adjusted to account for respondents’ range 
of understanding of the conflict, as not all elite interviewees’ experience of the 
conflict was the same and each person had a different level of understanding. To 
choose the questions for the interviews, I conducted in-depth research on the 
interviewees beforehand. This helped to focus the questions and provided the option 
to ask follow-up questions. 
 
Questions, such as “How long did the indiscriminate violence continue?” were often 
difficult for elites to answer because their knowledge depended on where they were 
based and their position within society at the time. For example, if the former Home 
Secretary reported that indiscriminate violence was not systematically used during the 
conflict, this depended on the sources of information he/she was exposed to during 
the conflict. A frontline police officer that witnessed indiscriminate violence used by 
colleagues would have a different perspective. Therefore, one’s critical perspective 
depends on the environment, the type of information acquired, and the sources of this 
information. To discuss such constraints, I asked further questions to clarify and 
gather more information from interviewees.  
 
4.5.1 Sampling Methods  
In-depth interviews are used to gain a deeper understanding of processes of the 
conflict both among elites and among different groups of the population. At the elite 
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level, in-depth interviews are often used to follow a process (for further reading see, 
for example, Berry, 2002 and Richards, 1996). At the grassroots level, in-depth 
interviews are used to learn from different subgroups of the population to better 
understand the challenges, possibilities and risks of peace.  
 
Although Nepal is now a federal state, a dominant caste system remains ingrained in 
society and continues to control much of society and the state. The sampling criterion 
for the interviews was not designed to reflect this reality, but to engage a variety of 
civilians who reflect high levels of experience, conflict knowledge, and 
understanding. This required the inclusion of knowledgeable and credible Nepalese 
thinkers, who understand the issues explored in this study.  
 
Considering the issue of access is essential for designing ethically-sound field 
research. Potential dangers and security concerns must be considered when reflecting 
upon when the time is right, and for what? What information do I need? What do I 
have the right to ask? Who is it possible to approach? More than merely whether 
information can be ‘accessed’ there is the question of ethics and sensitivity in 
determining what information should be gathered. Despite the guidelines, rules and 
regulations, the field research process ultimately rested on my critical judgment and a 
decision that I felt was right for the research project during the time of conducting the 
field research. Considering the access, I had to carefully consider who I was selecting, 
who was willing to be interviewed, and why? Do those who are willing to share 
information differ from others in some way? The reliability of the information in an 
interview and the underlying interests that may steer the interviewee’s response need 
to be considered. Post-conflict areas can become over-researched, bringing ‘research 
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fatigue’ in its wake, which may in turn lead an interviewee to provide the answer 
he/she has learnt researchers want, just to get the interview over with. There may be 
incentives other than wanting their story to be known, driving the interviewee to share 
information, for example, the hope of financial compensation. There is no easy 
answer or solution as to whether one should compensate interviewees; it is an area of 
much debate (see Dunn and Gordon, 2005; McNeill, 1997; Wilkinson and Moore, 
1997). However, for this research project I did not compensate people with money but 
made clear the project was an opportunity to set the record straight and to explore the 
use of indiscriminate violence during the Nepalese conflict in a different way. Some 
argue that if interviewees are taking time off from work and thereby lose income to 
participate in a study, they should be compensated for this loss. To avoid this concern, 
I travelled to all the interviews locations, where they felt comfortable, safe and willing 
to share their account. For example, some interviewees (those omitted from Chapter 
Seven’s analysis) were more interested in hurrying through the questions and saying 
anything that comes to mind, rather than taking the time to genuinely and carefully 
respond to the questions. Others did not have the capacity to answer the questions 
after further probing their accounts. This was something I confronted on two 
occasions and a situation which I felt would diminish the validity of the inferences 
made from the study. As a result, I dropped both interviews, and others, from the 
analysis to reduce bias. The justification for taking this decision was to avoid certain, 
inescapable selection biases, which were important for this study. 
 
Actors self-selection 
In this thesis, the actor selection process was dealt with by contacting numerous 
individuals who were known to either be party to the conflict or operated in a senior 
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capacity during the conflict (this varied from government positions, to rebel leaders 
rebel generals in the field to members of a civil society organisation). As mentioned 
previously, the list of selected respondents came from an extensive list of civilians 
composed by myself, in collaboration with two research assistants, and with support 
from a newspaper editor. This process was put together to bring a collection of elites 
who operated at different levels but played a critical role, or understood how actors 
used and moved with violence during the conflict. Inherently, there will always be 
biases from the selection of respondents, especially from the views selected 
respondents will hold. Thus, my two research assistants and newspaper editor helped 
to provide some balance by providing me with a different perspective, which helped 
me to support the reduction of my own biases but not eliminate this bias. This was 
done by mainly countering my western perceptions I derived from my desk research. 
This enabled us to produce a detailed list of interviewees which I felt (with collective 
effort): a) helped me to understand the various concepts, i.e., the three strategic 
positions, the nature of these positions, and describe how the positions manifested and 
interacted with the use of indiscriminate violence; and, b) explore through 
respondents’ eyes which actors played a critical role during the conflict, at both the 
local and senior levels of the conflict. This meant the list of elites were not only 
selected from research assistants’ knowledge but also acquired by me researching 
achieved records, official documentation, military and police reports, public speech 
records, etc. This supported the compilation of an extensive list of respondents whom 
I felt could, and would, have an extensive understanding about the strategic positions 
of actors and their use of indiscriminate violence.  
Some respondents’ roles were more significant than others during the conflict. For 
example, my list of interviewees included two Maoist strategic planners, and NGO 
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observers of human rights violations. However, the accounts interviewees provided 
were diverse; the Maoist strategic planner could give me extensive information about 
the movement and position of actors, while the NGO observers’ accounts were 
orientated towards the use of indiscriminate violence and patterns of violence. 
Whether it was the Home Secretary, the head of Parliament, a Maoist strategist, or 
head of the military or Armed Police Force during certain operations, all respondents 
were a piece of a larger puzzle and provided information on the conflict from 
different viewpoints. Several of the elites were willing to share their knowledge and 
experience of the conflict and there were occasions were some interviewees were 
deceitful or refused to continue after I had probed them on a matter. This later 
required me to drop them from the analysis, hence, why the number of interviewees 
dropped from 50 interviewed to 38.  
To discuss the concept of indiscriminate violence and the strategic positions that an 
actor can adopt, I would talk to the interviewee before the interview and explain what 
was meant by indiscriminate violence; namely, by giving examples of violence used 
against civilians which fitted my conceptualisation of indiscriminate violence in this 
thesis. When it came to the strategic positions that actors could adopt, I would often 
describe the example taken from G1’s testimony regarding actors who were 
embedded and deployed. This was accompanied with the thesis’ own framework of 
indiscriminate violence and examples from newspapers or incidents documented by 
Amnesty international.66 
One criteria that I did not use for selecting people was ethnicity and caste; the main 
reason being that the government’s policy at the time of the conflict was heavily 
focused on specific ethnic and caste groups of civilians whom they deemed a threat. 
                                                 
66 https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/09/11/waiting-justice/unpunished-crimes-nepals-armed-conflict [accessed 
12/06/2018] 
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While I surveyed civilians and selected people to be interviewed from these ethnic 
areas, I did not interview many of these civilians because I felt this would have 
heavily biased the research. For interviews with elites, I only interviewed those who 
were more balanced and honest about their reflections of the conflict. The other 
reason for not using caste and ethnicity as a selection criterion was methodological. I 
was interested in understanding the strategic positions and its links to indiscriminate 
violence, so my priority was to gain the widest representation of responses possible 
(regardless of the actors’ ethnicity, not knowing people’s ethnicity also had its 
advantages). It forced me to ask questions I would not otherwise have asked; the fact 
that no-one told me upfront what their caste and ethnicity was did not mean that I did 
not make assumptions about people’s ethnic identity. In fact, I made assumptions 
daily. It was through asking a person about a topic other than ethnicity that I would 
discover my assumptions were wrong; not knowing helped me to unmask mistaken 
assumptions. This process of unmasking, in turn, gave rise to richer forms of data than 
those I would have collected had I simply known the person’s ethnicity beforehand.  
 
Two key methods were used to recruit elite interviewees for the interviews, 
systematic sampling and the snowball approach. The systematic method involved the 
support of the two main research assistants - master’s students in history and political 
science. The research assistants and I produced an extensive list of potential 
interviewees who, we felt, could make a strong contribution to the investigation. Once 
compiled, the research assistants, a well-respected international Nepalese newspaper 
editor, and I carefully selected 100 potential interviewees from the list, based on their 
background and ability to contribute to the study. We also aimed to ensure that the 
voices of senior level women were heard. The newspaper editor brought a different 
 165 
understanding of who the key government stakeholders were during the conflict and 
could identify who among the warring actors controlled which areas.  
 
The second method, the snowball approach, relies on referrals from the initial 
interviewees to generate additional interviewees. Due to the level that the elites 
operate in, I largely relied on this method. The snowball approach also allowed me to 
gain access to additional interviewees who were either on our comprehensive list or 
were not considered at all. When asked whether they knew someone that I could 
benefit from cross-examining, interviewees often provided names that were on our 
list, but interviewees had direct contact with them.  
 
4.5.2 Face-to-face Interviews  
Prior to the interviews, I read from the information and consent sheets in English 
and/or Nepalese and explained the aims of the study. Interviewees were then given 
the opportunity to ask questions and clarify any uncertainties about the research 
project. Consent forms were signed electronically (Apple iPad) or by hand, and later 
scanned and uploaded to a cloud server. Each interviewee was given a unique field 
number after the interview.67 These unique numbers helped to conceal the 
interviewees’ identities.  
 
Face-to-face interviews largely involved the interviewee and me, and on a few 
occasions, a research assistant was also present to support the interview process when 
translation and interpretation was needed. I always ensured that the research assistants 
and interviewees were seated together and interacted face-to-face with me. This body 
                                                 
67 Please refer to the codebook in Appendix C, IndRespDistrCode. 
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position ensured interviewees were comfortable and created a safe environment to 
discuss the different topics. Initial interviewees included: politicians, the former 
Home Secretary, the Defence Minister, serving and retired military generals, police 
chiefs, a conflict negotiator, a former house of parliament leader, and journalists.68 
Over a nine-month period, the range of interviewees expanded to activists, civil 
society leaders, politicians, victims, rebels, and combatants. Most interviews were 
conducted in English, in locations chosen by the interviewees. I conducted interviews 
in peoples’ homes, offices, or in the home of a centrally-located resident where people 
felt comfortable. No matter the location, I always asked anyone within earshot 
(including household members) to leave - a request people always honoured. 
Everyone seemed to understand our need for privacy; my high social status may also 
have made it difficult for people to refuse. 
 
The interviews with the elites generally involved a pre-interview or relationship-
building session in which interviewees were given the chance to ask questions about 
the research objectives. This helped to build trust, which was important to the success 
of the interviews, and helped me understand the interviewees’ ability and limitations. 
The advantage of the face-to-face interviews was that they allowed interviewees to 
respond to questions in-depth and choose their words carefully. This increased their 
confidence in the study and provided clarification on certain topics. The interviews 
helped me to develop a deeper understanding of embeddedness, the movement of 
actors, and the use of indiscriminate violence in the conflict. The disadvantage of the 
interviews was that they were often time-consuming, and many of the interviewees 
tended to digress and required redirection.  
                                                 
68 Please see Appendix B for a list of interviewees 
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Interviewees were asked selected questions but were given the option of not 
responding to any of the questions. Interviewees were asked to answer all questions, 
but their ability to answer them depended on their knowledge and experience of the 
conflict. Interviewees were permitted to focus their responses on their past 
experiences, or those of others, in connection to the questions. Relatively few 
interviewees chose to focus on one period over another, and often covered the course 
of the conflict and the events that took place in their responses. Interviewees that 
digressed from the question were not interrupted; however, once they had finished 
their line of thought, I would return to the question or ask a different question to 
clarify their answers. The interviews lasted 55 to 90 minutes, on average.  
 
4.5.3 Addressing Bias and Ethics of the Elite Sample 
To avoid bias in the elite interviews, I employed four mechanisms. The first was to 
repeat similar questions to help probe the interviewees’ memory. The second was to 
encourage interviewees to rely on their own experience and judgements and not the 
views or opinions of others. This involved encouraging interviewees to complete their 
answers and freely ask questions when needed. The third was to avoid referring 
explicitly to the subject matter from the outset. The fourth was to reassure 
interviewees that ‘there were no right or wrong answers,’ to reduce any concerns 
about being judged for their responses. 
 
Any field of investigation has its limitations, and one of the central limitations in this 
study was funding. The research project could not rely on paid staff to assist in the 
analysis of the interviews, and I conducted the analysis alone. This inherently 
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provides opportunity for bias. To address this issue, I implemented three methods to 
assess the analysis. The first was to check the interpretations I developed thus far with 
the interviewees during and after each interview. The second was to code while I was 
transcribing the interview recordings, creating pre-codes to categorise interviewees’ 
answers. The third was to maintain a reflective journal in which I recorded numerous 
analytic memos (see: Bernard, 2006, p. 512–15; Boyatzis, 1998, p. 144–59; Hruschka, 
et al., 2004). These three mechanisms helped reduce bias in the results, but do not 
fully eliminate all biases. 
 
I became quickly aware of how my own subjectivity shaped the kinds of questions I 
could ask and the kind of access I was able to gain with certain people. By 
subjectivity, I mean my own background and status vis-à-vis the people I was 
interviewing and interacting with at elite level. The facts that I was British-Ghanaian 
and a black man, but many people still saw me as African, which sometimes produced 
moments where people would make remarks such as “the conflict in Nepal, was not 
the same type of conflict you see on the African continent.” Being an outsider allowed 
me to ask questions that might have seemed too obvious, and thus suspicious, if posed 
by a Nepali. In the aftermath of the conflict, talking about the past was a very open 
act. As an outsider, I believe people did not expect me to know as many things as an 
insider. This assumed ignorance allowed me to ask the most basic kinds of questions, 
which enabled me to probe the foundational logics underlying people’s understanding 
of the world and how things were and what people’s true experience of the conflict 
was like. 
Owing to the vagaries of memory, the passage of time, and incentives to deviate from 
or adhere to certain narratives, I cannot judge the quality of the data by the truth or 
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accuracies contained within them. Instead, I treat the data as repositories of collective 
meaning and understanding about how the world works according to the respondent. 
Interpreting data from interviews involves identifying patterns of meaning and 
understanding within people’s statements about the conflict, as well as daily life and 
how indiscriminate violence was displayed. How a person talks about the world, 
whether true or false, gives clues as to how they make sense of that world. This helps 
to form understanding about the causal inferences they may make even when they are 
lying. Thus, even within the bounds of the data, it is possible to identify and analyse 
the system of meaning that people used to navigate daily life as well as the 
extraordinary events of the decade-long conflict.  
 
4.5.4 Pre-Coding 
Pre-coding is a tool used to understand and clarify the responses of interviewees 
during any research process. Pre-coding also helps the researcher to identify the key 
areas of focus and what can be eliminated from the analysis. While it is important to 
use words and short phrases to code, it is equally important to pre-code interviews to 
gain a better understanding of the phenomenon (Layder, 1998). In this study, pre-
coding involved transcribing interviewees’ recorded interviews and simply circling, 
highlighting, bolding, or underlining significant quotes that appeared critical for the 
analysis. I reviewed the raw data two to three times before creating a pre-code. To 
avoid bias, as I analysed this data alone, it was important to use this method (See: 
Boyatzis, 1998). Due to the geographic distance between the interviewees, and the 
time that transpired between interviews, I had time to reflect on each interview and 
commence pre-coding using a field book (See: Creswell, 2007, p. 168-9). The pre-
codes were tentative but provided me with direction for further analysis and reduced 
my reliance on memory when examining the data.  
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Several pre-codes were later used as codes in the analysis. New codes were created to 
clarify interviewees’ responses when needed. Table 4.0 below illustrates an example 
of the pre-coding process. This process provides a transitional link between the raw 
data or interview transcripts and initial pre-codes, and the final pre-codes used for 
creating the initial codes.  
 
 
Table 4.0 Example of Pre-coding 
COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3 
Raw Data Initial Pre-codes Final Pre-Codes 
After the ambush on our 
vehicle…immediately after, five 
people were approaching the 
ambush site, and my people 
(APF) were about to kill them, 
and I stopped them. I said to them 
“No,” because those people who 
ambushed us have already left. 
These people are unknown 
civilians; they are not the 
insurgents, and they did not lay 
the ambush on us. 
 
 
An attack on APF 
 
Potential loss of 
control 
 
Accountability  
 
Bystander  
 
Confusion  
 
 
 
 
 
Indiscriminate violence  
 
 
Temporarily-deployed 
actors 
 
 
4.5.5 Designing and Using Codes 
A code can summarise or condense data, not simply reduce it. This depends on its 
meaning and relevance to the analysis. Ultimately, it depends on theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks of the study. When codes are applied, and reapplied to 
qualitative data, the process of coding allows the data to be “segregated, grouped, 
regrouped, and relinked to consolidate meaning and explanation” (Grbich, 2007, p. 
21). In this study, I used the process of coding to understand the narratives discussed 
in the interviews. The process of coding involved three cycles where I reviewed the 
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interview transcripts and considered the pre-codes. The codes used were often words 
or short phrases; however, several of the codes were originally pre-codes. The pre-
codes were not fixed and not all were transformed into codes, but some were changed 
during the coding stage to fit the analyses and provide further clarity. The codes 
created during the primary cycle of coding ranged from a single word to a full 
sentence or an entire page of text and depended on its focus. During the second 
coding cycle, I reconfigured and refined codes; and by the third cycle, I clarified and 
finalised the codes used to analyse the interviews and identify themes. Table 4.1 
illustrates an example of the process of coding in this study.  
 
 
Table 4.1 Example of coding, final codes, and thematic area selection 
COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3 COLUMN 4 
Raw Data Initial Pre-code Final Code Thematic Area 
After the ambush on our 
vehicle…immediately after, 
five people were 
approaching the ambush 
site, and my people (APF) 
were about to kill them, and 
I stopped them. I said to 
them “No,” because those 
people who ambushed us 
have already left. These 
people are unknown 
civilians; they are not the 
insurgents, and they did not 
lay the ambush on us. 
An attack on APF 
 
Civilians 
 
Potential loss of 
control 
 
Accountability  
 
Confusion,  
Revenge  
 
Frustration by 
actors  
 
 
Indiscriminate 
violence 
 
 
Temporarily- 
deployed actors 
 
Frustration by 
temporarily- 
deployed combatants 
 
 
Combatants groups 
and attacks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.25 Categorising and Coding Filter  
To avoid bias, I ensured that the coding conducted remained linked to the questions 
that aid in testing and exploring the study hypothesis. When interviewing the elites, I 
used questions from the survey and follow-up questions, which tended to be more 
open-ended and were systematically linked to the study aims. This helped to prompt 
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the interviewees, clarify their statements, and add clarity to the inquiry. Using the 
theoretical framework helped place the pre-codes and codes in the relevant thematic 
area.  
 
4.6 Triangulation Methods 
In social sciences research, the use of triangulation can be traced to Campbell and 
Fiskel (1959). The method involved mixing of data or methods so that diverse 
viewpoints or standpoints cast light upon a topic. The mixing of data types, known as 
data triangulation, is often thought to help in confirming the claims that might arise 
from an initial pilot study. The mixing of methodologies, e.g. mixing the use of 
survey data with interviews, is a more profound form of triangulation. 
The method was later developed by Web (1966) and elaborated on by Denzin (1970). 
Web (1966), Campbell (1966), Denzin (1978), and Smith and Kleine (1986), have 
argued that triangulation increases the accuracy of a study and the validity of its 
measures, using different sources and methods in the study. O’Donoghue and Punch 
(2003), argue that triangulation is a “method of cross-checking data from multiple 
sources” to search for regularities within a research project. For some researchers 
(Altrichter, et al., 2008), triangulation is a way to balance the various sources used 
within a research project, whether qualitative or quantitative, and to give “a more 
detailed and balanced picture of the situation.” According to Olsen (2004) 
triangulation provides a broader and deeper understanding of a study’s phenomenon. 
Cohen and Manion (2000) define triangulation as an attempt to map out, or clarify 
more fully, the fruitfulness and complexity of human conduct by examining it from 
more than one viewpoint.  
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The perspectives on triangulation presented above demonstrate the ways in which 
triangulation can assist me in bringing together the study results and provide a broader 
and deeper understanding of indiscriminate violence and the impact of embeddedness. 
Triangulation allows me to cross-reference the results and solidify my answers to the 
study hypothesis. Using the method of triangulation, I combine the results from the 
process tracing analysis, the survey cross tabulations, and the content and narrative 
analysis of the interviews. Triangulation reduces the limitations of single-method 
research and provides a richer and more comprehensive understanding. Triangulation 
is not only a method of combining multiple observations and empirical analyses; it 
can also be used as a mechanism to bring together the investigations undertaken in 
this study, to provide a coherent narrative and robust answers to the questions raised. 
Triangulation can help address inherent biases, scrutinise the study results, and 
provide an overall picture derived from the different sources. Triangulation further 
allows me to interpret causal mechanisms in the use of indiscriminate violence to 
provide a robust and collective understanding of embeddedness.  
 
Figure 8.0 illustrates the process of triangulation used in this study and highlights the 
different methods used throughout this project, including process tracing analysis of 
datasets and relevant materials (Chapter Five); a survey conducted with 517 civilian 
respondents in Nepal, analysed using cross-tabulation (Chapter Six); and interviews 
with the 38 elites, analysed using content and narrative analysis (Chapter Seven). All 
the study results are included in the triangulation process, which provides the 
combined findings of this study.  
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Figure 4.2: The process of triangulation and the sources used  
 
In the triangulation process conducted in this study, I examined all study results 
collectively to determine whether they correspond with the study hypothesis. Table 
8.0 shows a simplified version of the triangulation of findings in this study. The 
results show strong evidence for hypotheses one, but not for hypothesis two; results 
for hypothesis two were varied. Since the findings presented in each chapter may not 
be sufficiently strong to stand-alone, I consider the results collectively.  
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Table 4.2: Simplified triangulation of study results 
 Chapter 
Five 
Chapter Six Chapter Seven Overall Result 
Hypothesis 
One 
Y Y Y Y 
Hypothesis 
Two 
Y/N Y/N Y/N N 
Note: Y=confirmation of the hypothesis; N=no confirmation; Y/N=partial confirmation 
 
Rather than viewing triangulation solely as a method to validate or verify the study 
results, I use triangulation to ensure that the interpretations of the results presented in 
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven are rigorous; and I can provide conclusive answers to 
the study questions. I used different methods to collect and analyse the study data to 
explore and assess the same hypothesis. Triangulation helps to increase the validity of 
the study results, by collectively examining the results presented in each chapter. This 
process furthers the understanding of the impact of indiscriminate violence used 
against civilians during the decade-long conflict in Nepal (1996-2006) and provides 
an important perspective on what occurred during the conflict.  
 
 
This chapter began with a description of the methods used to bring existing data 
together with other relevant sources through the process tracing analysis to understand 
how embeddedness operated, functioned, and was implemented during the Nepalese 
conflict. In the second section, I examined the design and administration of field 
surveys to 517 respondents in 16 districts of Nepal, to capture the views of a sample 
of Nepal’s diverse population on the conflict. I examined the issue of bias and the 
steps I had taken to reduce this issue. In the final section, I discussed the design and 
implementation of interviews, with 38 Nepalese elites and the process of pre-coding 
and coding the interviews to develop a deeper understanding of embeddedness, the 
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movement of actors, and the use of indiscriminate violence in the conflict. And 
examined the use tool of triangulation and how it can assist this research to 
understand the use and movement of indiscriminate violence from the various sources 
used in this thesis.  
 
In the next chapter, I explore the results of the process tracing analysis with the 
combined datasets. This chapter provides an in-depth understanding of the conflict in 
Nepal. I explore the use of indiscriminate violence through embeddedness during the 
different periods of the conflict and summarise the initial findings of the analysis. The 
chapter reveals that indiscriminate violence occurred during the conflict, and 
temporarily-deployed actors on the side of the state used higher levels of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians in the zones in which rebel actors were 
embedded.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CASE OF NEPAL 
 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
In this chapter, I apply a process tracing method to show how embeddedness 
influences the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians during the decade-long 
Nepalese conflict (1996-2006). The chapter uses three distinct datasets69 in 
conjunction with an in-depth analysis of various sources, including newspapers, 
articles, online journals, reports, UN documents, and institutional documentation, to 
understand the use of indiscriminate violence during the conflict. The process tracing 
analysis presented in this chapter supports the understanding of the movement of 
indiscriminate violence with actors from zone to zone in the conflict, the strategic 
position which actors adopt, the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians by 
various actors, and the triggers of indiscriminate violence and why it was used.  
 
The chapter is composed of three parts. In the first part (Section 5.2), I briefly review 
the concept of embeddedness, the study hypothesis, and the potential of process 
tracing analysis to detect embeddedness. In the second part (Sections 5.4-5.10), I 
examine the conflict in Nepal and evaluate how indiscriminate violence unfolded. I 
explore how the Maoist actors embedded themselves amongst the civilian population 
before the conflict began. I also demonstrate that various actors, assuming different 
strategic positions (embedded, temporarily deployed, or fixed), used indiscriminate 
violence. In the final section (5.11), I summarise the findings, highlight the actors 
most implicated with using indiscriminate violence, and attempt to explain why it was 
                                                 
69 See Chapter Four for a detailed breakdown of the datasets used for this analysis. 
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used against civilians. The final section also provides initial findings on what triggers 
the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians.  
 
5.2 Piggy in the Middle: The Concept of Embeddedness 
In Chapter Three, I developed a theoretical framework to explain why civilians 
experience indiscriminate violence during conflicts. I argue that actors in a conflict 
(i.e., internal parties, including combatants, defectors, rebels, army, police, spoiler 
groups, local militia, and perpetrators) can assume three strategic positions 
(embeddedness, temporarily-deployed, and fixed) that contribute to the use of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians. I further argue that the strategic positions 
actors assume render civilians “piggies in the middle” (between temporarily-deployed 
or fixed actors and embedded actors). The strategic position of embeddedness is 
briefly defined as the position and time when an actor is deeply rooted in a 
surrounding population of civilians during the conflict. Temporarily-deployed is 
defined as the position and time when an actor is sent to a zone to either assist their 
allies or to combat warring actors who may be embedded or fixed in these zones. 
Finally, fixed is defined as the position and time when an actor is recruited locally or 
stationed in zones for intermediate or extended periods of time (see Chapter 3 for an 
in-depth discussion and definition of the terms). 
 
In Chapter Three, I focused on the strategic position of embeddedness and proposed 
that the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians through the practice of 
embeddedness occurs under two conditions: when an embedded actors resorts to 
using indiscriminate violence to gain control over the civilian population and when 
fixed, but largely temporarily-deployed actors use indiscriminate violence against 
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civilians because they are unable to differentiate between embedded actors and 
civilians. A key distinction is made between embedded actors and the targets of 
indiscriminate violence. In Chapter Three, I presented the following hypothesis on the 
two conditions under which indiscriminate violence occurs through embeddedness:  
 
H1: Is there a relationship between embeddedness and the 
manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of 
temporarily-deployed actors?  
 
H2: Is there a relationship between embedded actors using 
indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of a conflict to 
gain control over civilian populations?  
 
In Chapter 5, I explore this hypothesis in the context of the Nepalese conflict through 
process tracing analysis. I focus on understanding whether actors assume one of the 
three strategic positions, and whether the strategic position of embeddedness triggers 
the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Above all, I seek to understand 
whether the embedding of actors increases the likelihood that temporarily-deployed 
actors will use indiscriminate violence against civilians.  
 
5.3 Process Tracing of the Nepalese Conflict  
To understand what occurred during the different stages of the Nepalese conflict, I 
divided the conflict into four periods. This division facilitates the assessment of 
various actors’ activities and behaviours and how they impact the use of 
indiscriminate violence. The four periods also allow me to identify the events, 
positions, and strategies used by actors during each period. This provides the 
opportunity to identify changes in the actors’ strategic positions and their use of 
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indiscriminate violence and brings me closer to understanding whether embedded 
actors triggered its use on civilians. For process tracing analysis, I have identified the 
following four periods in the Nepalese conflict: 
 
• Period 1: The onset or initial phase of the conflict (1996-1999). 
• Period 2: The halfway mark in battle-related deaths, changes in leadership, or 
the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians (2000-2002). 
• Period 3: The peak in the number of battle-related deaths until the decline of 
the conflict, and a peak in recorded incidences of indiscriminate violence 
(2003-2004). 
• Period 4: The decline of the number of deaths, a peace agreement, and the end 
of the conflict (2005-2006). 
 
These periods guide the exploration of the relationship between the use of 
indiscriminate violence by actors and the condition of embeddedness, and why 
embeddedness increases the potential for temporarily-deployed actors to use 
indiscriminate violence against civilians.  
 
5.4 Overview of the Nepalese Conflict (1996-2006) 
On February 13, 1996, the Maoist insurgents of Nepal launched an attack on the state, 
declaring a “People’s War.” Prior to this, on February 4, 1996, Dr Baburam Bhattarai, 
one of the leaders of the Maoist party, submitted a 40-point petition to Prime Minister 
(PM) Sher Bahadur Deuba, demanding that all points be met by February 17, 1996 
(Marsh, 2007). However, PM Deuba instead travelled to India. The Maoists, viewing 
this as an insult, ignored the deadline and attacked police posts in Rolpha, Rukum, 
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Jajarkot, Gorkha, and Sindhuli (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003, p. 85). The conflict 
intensified at a rapid pace that took the government by surprise. It would later spread 
to 68 of Nepal’s 75 districts;70 while 32 districts71 are believed to have been the 
hardest hit72 (see Figure 5.0 for a map of Nepal and its districts). 
 
 
Figure 5.0: Map of Nepal and the Nepalese districts 
 
By the time the conflict was over in 2006, it had claimed the lives of 15,000–18,000 
people, with 1,000 missing.  
 
 
5.5 The Embedding of Maoist Actors in the Conflict 
The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or UCP-M is a Nepalese political 
party. It was founded in 1994 and was led by Chairman Pushpa Kamal 
                                                 
70 According to the Maoists actors in the CPN-M party.  
71 According to the government’s own figures. 
72 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper187 (accessed on 10/02/2014). 
 182 
Dahal (commonly known as Prachanda).73 The Maoist belief is based on the teachings 
of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao. Maoists draw much of their inspiration from other 
rural insurgencies, such as the conflict involving the Sendero Luminoso or “Shining 
Path” group in Peru. The Maoists were well-organised in Nepal and exercised 
authority through a United People’s Committee (UPC). The UPC had four levels of 
authority: sub-regional, district, village, and ward. The Village United People’s 
committee functioned as the main agency of the rebel government. A Village 
Committee usually consisted of three wards. Ward Committees generally had five to 
seven members, including two members of the proletarian class, two or three 
members representing poor peasants, and one or two members of the petit bourgeois 
class. Committees were formed by “general consensus of the masses,” and were 
organised into three zones and 27 districts (Crane, 2002).  
 
The Maoist actors avoided detection by embedding themselves amongst the civilian 
population (in Rolpha and Rukum) before the conflict began. Maoist actors set up 
base areas in remote, isolated, and mountainous districts of Nepal (the mid-western 
regions) and embedded themselves amongst the civilian population (Karki & Seddon 
2003, p. 13). Their intention was to surround cities, create guerrilla zones (in small 
teams), and establish deep roots amongst the civilian population (Li-Onesto, 2006). 
According to an interview with a Maoist strategist, this occurred as early as 1994.  
 
Before the conflict, the Maoists built a support base with the civilian population and 
launched a “hearts and minds” campaign to encourage them to join their cause.74 The 
Maoist actors organised several community events and launched several campaigns to 
                                                 
73 https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nepal1004/2.htm (accessed on 19/8/2017). 
74 http://www.hoover.org/research/hearts-and-minds-counting-costs 
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embed their actors amongst the civilian population (Pyakuryal, et al., 2007, p. 77). 
Campaigns, such as “Sija,” helped organise a centralised Maoist force that was then 
deployed in small groups to civilian areas to become embedded. These groups were 
largely composed of party members, insurgents, and leaders who had initially focused 
on the Rolpha and Rukum districts. The Maoist actors organised the people, 
propagated the party line, and held study sessions on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism 
(Thapa, 2003, p. 155). The Maoists embedded themselves in the following areas: 
Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot, Salyan, Pyuthan, and Kalikot, as Figure 5.1 illustrates.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Initial conflict areas 1996-2002.75 
 
According to Hunt (2004), these districts were the epicentre of the Maoist movement, 
as Maoist presence was stronger there than the state’s presence. According to Hunt’s 
analysis, the district of Rolpha provides a good example of the Maoists’ strength and 
                                                 
75 Sources: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272185543_The_Strategic_Revolutionary_Phases_of_the_Maoist_Insur
gency_in_Nepal 
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the embedding of Maoist actors. In 1998, the number of police posts in Rolpha 
decreased from a total of 39 to two. Rukum’s police force decreased from 1998, from 
23 posts to two. The Maoist rebels selected these districts because they were in 
remote areas, with little state presence; however, the districts were underdeveloped 
and lacked basic infrastructure for locals (Hunt, 2004, pp. 43-44). The Maoist actors 
became like common civilians; they dressed like civilians and integrated with the 
civilian population. When state actors sought the Maoists actors out, it had become 
difficult to differentiate between them and the civilian population.  
 
Prior to the Maoists’ launch of the “People’s War” in February 1996, the government 
had begun efforts to root-out its most radical critics. The government launched a 
police campaign entitled, “Operation Romeo,” in the Rolpa district. Officially, the 
aim of Operation Romeo was to control a rise in criminal activities in Rolpha, but the 
operation focused on defeating the Maoist actors who were embedded amongst the 
civilian population in Rolpha (Amnesty International, 1997).76 Operation Romeo 
involved temporarily deploying 1,500 police officers, including specially-trained 
commando forces from Kathmandu and local police units, to villages to kill the 
Maoist actors. Many of the police actors were assured of promotion for killing 
Maoists by whatever means possible (Chautari, 2003, pp. ix-xiii; Karki & Seddon 
2003, p. 58; Lohani-Chase, 2008, Thapa, 2003). This resulted in severe violations of 
human rights, arbitrary arrests, detentions, rapes, executions, and “disappearances.” 
Amnesty International (1997) stated that this violence drove many of the 
impoverished rural population to support the Maoist actors. The embedded Maoists 
actors gained considerable support from the local population, many of whom joined 
                                                 
76 See Amnesty International’s, “Human rights violations in the context of a Maoist peoples’ war” (December 
1997), for a detailed discussion of the human rights abuses committed during Operation Romeo. 
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the Maoists and helped launch the “People’s War,” with homemade bombs and 
farming tools used as weapons.  
 
The first point of the Maoists six-point plan had already been initiated77 before the 
“People’s War,” allowing the Maoists to move to the second point and increase their 
attacks when the conflict began (Pyakuryal & Sainju, 2007). As the conflict 
progressed, the fighting encompassed several districts in Nepal, as Figure 5.2 
illustrates in the number of casualties across the districts. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Map of Nepal with 100 or more causality from 2004.78 
 
5.6 The Maoist Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-M): Philosophy and Aims  
The Maoist Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-M) aimed to implement the Maoist 
philosophy using a “protracted armed struggle” to gain the support of the people and 
                                                 
77 http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/09/2008410145059976243.html (accessed on 13/4/2015) 
78 Source: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/272185543_fig3_Figure-7-The-Geographic-Scope-of-the-War-in-
2004 
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decimate the state. According to Mao, a “protracted armed struggle” occurs in three 
phases: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate or equilibrium, and strategic offensive. 
In the strategic defensive phase in Nepal, people began fighting the “reactionary 
state;” they were lightly armed and fought under the leadership of the CPN-M party. 
“Grievance guerrillas,” who were politically and ideologically equipped with 
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, seized weapons from the security forces and led the 
guerrilla fighters to build a People Liberation Army (PLA) in 2002. The PLA aimed 
to reach political and military strength to lead the war and create a centre for the 
revolution and people’s political power.  
The central aim of the CPN-M armed struggle was to capture state power and 
establish a “new people's democracy” (naulo janbad). The concept of “new 
democracy” was taken from Mao Zedong’s doctrine, which in turn was built on the 
views of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin. The “new democratic revolution” marks the 
transition from the classical Marxist stages of bourgeois hegemony (“old democracy”) 
to proletarian hegemony (“new democracy”).  
 
The Maoists allied with other factions in the communist party and leveraged the 
grievances of different groups, not all of whom were communist. Ethnic, regional, 
and tribal groups, as well as those concerned with educational and class issues, 
mobilised under the CPN-M. Prior to initiating People’s War, the CPN-M disbanded 
the United People’s Front79 and replaced it with a “revolutionary united front.” In a 
1998 issue of The Worker, Prachanda pronounced that through the People’s War, 
“oppressed nationalities,” such as the Magars, Gurungs, Tamangs, Newars, Tharus, 
                                                 
79 The United People’s Front of Nepal was the mass front of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre) or the 
CPN. They participated in the 1991 election, but did not win more than a handful of seats. The party would later be 
spilt along hardliners and moderates (In Indian Foreign Policy in Transition: Relations with South Asia) 
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Rais, Limbus, and Madhesis were fighting for their own rights. He also championed 
the rebellion of the Dalits against the “feudal state of high caste Hindus.” In this 
respect, the Maoist insurgency took on a populist tone, through the united front, based 
on diverse socio-cultural interests. The grievances of these groups fitted well with the 
aims of the communists. The common enemy was a self-serving state apparatus that 
had perpetuated an unjust caste system and had failed to bring development or 
freedom to the population.   
 
5.7 The Conflict, Period 1 (1996-1999)  
The behaviour of the state police actors at the start of the conflict was a contributing 
factor in the Maoists’ success during the first period. During this period, the Maoists 
grew in numbers and established three divisions, nine brigades, and 29 battalions 
(Pyakuryal & Sainju, 2007), largely by recruiting locals and embedding Maoist actors 
amongst civilian populations. On February 27, 1996, six people were killed, and a 
young girl (aged 14) was raped by police actors deployed to defeat the Maoists in a 
village (INSEC data, 1996, p. 434, Nepali Version). On the night of April 11, 1996, 
during a search operation by temporarily-deployed police actors, Vice Chairman 
Tikaram Budha (aged 38) was arrested and taken to Madichaur, because he refused to 
oppose the “People’s War” and reveal where the Maoists were hiding (Kattel, 2000, 
p. 34). Consequently, the police actors cut off his nose and ears and later shot and 
killed him (Kattel, 2000, p. 34).  
 
In 1998, the government launched “Operation Kilo Sierra II,” which lasted for two 
months between mid-June and August. The operation involved the temporary 
deployment of police actors from Kathmandu and neighbouring districts to the heart 
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of the Maoist zones. Operation Kilo Sierra II caused an estimated 200 deaths (15 in 
Rolpa, 20 in Rukum, over 50 in Jajarkot, and the remainder in areas surrounding the 
Maoist zones) (Li Onesto, 2006, p. 159). The Maoist actors retaliated with “hit-and-
run” and “hide-and-seek” attacks in small units, with civilians at the frontlines, later 
returning to their zones and re-embedding themselves amongst the civilian 
population. In the game of hide-and-seek, having a limited and mutually agreed upon 
physical space in which both the hider and the seeker participate is essential. 
However, in a conflict situation the opposite is required. When authorities or armies – 
be they domestic or international – “hunt” for suspects, they deduce a territory where 
the suspect may be found – often based on information or troop movement. In 
complex cases, the area may be vast, complicating efforts to detain the wanted suspect 
but the complexity of the situation itself is considered. In short, while I would not 
expect a warlord or an international criminal to make it known where they are hiding, 
the actors “hunting” them down should have an idea of where they could be. As 
importantly, we wouldn’t expect them to ignore a potential hiding location they know 
could be used – especially if it has been used before. However, a key problem 
plaguing any chance of success is the fact that CPN-M leaders may not be in any of 
the places that state temporarily-deployed actors had access to or assumed Maoist 
actors where hiding.  
 
In the case of Nepal this made it exceedingly difficult for the police actors to 
differentiate between the Maoist actors and the civilians, which led to the use of 
indiscriminate violence (Karki & Seddon, 2003. P. 429). The police also used 
techniques, such as “search marches” in uncontested (later switching to contested 
when state actor entered) Maoist zones, which often led to indiscriminate violence, 
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particularly killings, against the local population (Karki & Seddon 2003, p. 430). 
Search marches involved large convoys of police officers searching from home-to-
home for Maoist actors in civilian areas.  
 
The movement of actors on both sides within the conflict zones contributed to the use 
of indiscriminate violence. During this period, many of the police actors resorted to 
sporadic acts of violent actions, especially when the Maoists attacked police posts and 
fled to re-embed themselves amongst the civilian population.80 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Nepalese conflict with battle-related deaths, and one-sided killing.81 
Period 1 was recorded as one of the least violent periods in the conflict. Figure 5.3 
shows that by 1999, almost 1,000 people had been killed by state actors82 (Khimlal 
Devkota, 2012, p. 152; Stevenson, 2001). In early 1997, as the Informal Sector 
                                                 
80 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/sa/8234.htm (accessed on 10/3/2017). 
81 Sources: UCDP: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP; Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC): Violence 
against civilians: http://www.inseconline.org. 
82 This only included the police and security forces during this period. 
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Service Centre (INSEC) and UCDP datasets reveal, the levels of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians perpetrated by both parties increased. However, 
indiscriminate violence by state actors was higher than any other actors. 
 
In response to the Maoists’ campaign, the state launched counter attacks, including 
“Operation Kilo Sierra II” and “Operation Shoot to kill.” Police actors were 
temporarily deployed on missions to Maoist zones to root out and kill embedded 
Maoists actors. Operations “Jungle Search” and “Search and Destroy” were designed 
to seek out and suppress embedded Maoist actors; however, many of the state’s 
temporarily-deployed actors used indiscriminate violence against civilians, because 
they could not differentiate between the embedded Maoist and civilian population 
during combat.83 A series of minor failings on the side of the state contributed to the 
use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. These included an ill-equipped police 
force, with no prior experience in counterinsurgency, and a significant lack of security 
intelligence.84 
 
The harsh behaviour of the police actors resulted in greater support for the Maoists, 
which provided the Maoist actors with early-warning intelligence systems through the 
civilian populations and new recruits. “Operations “Romeo” (1995) and “Kilo Sierra 
II” (1998) drove approximately 10,000 civilians into the jungle to escape police 
violence. Many of them joined the Maoists and returned as embedded or fixed actors 
(INSEC, 2002, p. 45). The remaining Maoist actors went on missions from village to 
village (Thapa, 2003, p. 101).  
 
                                                 
83 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper199 (accessed 25/08/2014). 
84 http://www.scribd.com/doc/105969888/Internal-Conflicts-in-Nepal-Transnational-Consequences (accessed 
25/08/2014). 
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The Maoist actors had initially formed fighting groups of 3–4 embedded actors. 
During the second point of the six-point plan (1998), the Maoist actors increased the 
size of their embedded units to 7–9 members; and during the third point, group 
numbers increased to 30–32 actors in each area or zone (Baldev, 2014; Li Onesto, 
2003, p. 157; Thapa, 2003). State operations, such as “Kilo Sierra II” (1998), allowed 
the Maoists to increase the size of their embedded units to 40 actors and to focus on 
expansion into other districts. Established base areas, such as Rolpa (uncontested 
territory), made it difficult for the state’s temporarily-deployed actors to distinguish 
between the rebels and the civilians.85  
 
5.8 The Conflict, Period 2 (2000-2002) 
In the second period, the conflict continued to escalate, while changes in state 
leadership and inconsistent policies contributed to the further embedding of Maoist 
actors and the use indiscriminate violence against civilians. This period was one of 
the most eventful and included an intervention by the King on October 4, 2002; the 
appointment of four successive prime ministers; a royal massacre on June 1, 2002; 
and the formation and deployment of the Armed Police Force (APF) to combat 
terrorism in 2002.  
 
On April 2001, Police Inspector Dhruba Kumar Dulal was killed during a Maoist 
attack, which later resulted in major disagreements between police chiefs and 
government officials. In response to the attack, temporarily-deployed police actors 
used indiscriminate violence against civilians in the contested zones. Many civilians 
reported that state actors’ behaviour had become more violent and erratic during this 
                                                 
85 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper187 (accessed 28/04/2014). 
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period (INSEC, 2002; Sushil Pokharel, 2014).86 The Maoists changed their strategy as 
well. In one instance, Maoists rebels, who were wandering between villages as they 
fled from state actors, came across a Unified Marxist–Leninist (UML) member, 
named Nim Lai Rokka, from Jhenam-Rolpa. They beat him to death because he 
refused to provide them with food. Many locals recalled that the Maoist actors 
appeared frustrated during the increased attacks by state actors (Karki & Seddon, 
2003, p. 561). On June 8, 2001, 12 policemen and seven civilians, including a three-
year-old, were killed when Maoists attacked a police post in Panchkatiya village. The 
police post had been newly installed, and there were repeated demands for its 
removal. Many villagers claimed that the “post was used to confuse the Maoists” 
(Karki & Seddon, 2003, p. 52) because it was based near civilian area. Embedded 
Maoist actors also increased the use of indiscriminate violence87 against civilians in 
their areas to regain the control they had lost.  
 
On July 26, 2001, after five years away, Sheur Deuba became Prime Minister again 
and appealed for dialogue and a ceasefire. On August 3, 2001, the first round of peace 
talks was initiated. After several rounds of talks, Deuba agreed to release arrested 
Maoists actors.88 Nevertheless, on November 23, 2001, Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal 
Daha (known as Supremo Prachanda) issued a statement asserting that the 
government had rejected the main demands of his party, which marked an end to the 
ceasefire. The Maoists then simultaneously launched a major attack on police and 
army posts in 42 districts, killing 186 Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and police 
                                                 
86 http://www.insec.org.np/ (accessed on 12/03/2017). 
87 The use of violence, disappearances, and killing as a method. 
88 (http://www.ekantipur.com/tkp/ (accessed 23/06/2014). 
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personnel.89 In one instance, on November 22, 2001, in the Ghorahi of Dang District, 
an army base was attacked killing 14 soldiers, and trucks loaded with hundreds of 
weapons were stolen (Marsh, 2007, p. 60). Overnight, the army was unleashed against 
the insurgents, mobilising both tanks and artillery to respond only to the Maoist 
attacks. 
 
On November 26, 2001, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba declared a nationwide 
state of emergency and suspended parts of the constitution.90 State actors were 
temporarily deployed to engage in battle with the Maoists. In early 2002,91 the RNA 
was deployed under operation “Unified Command.” Operation “Unified Command” 
was launched after attacks on army posts in Doramba village in central Nepal, 
consisted of 4,000 police actors,92a unit of 15,000 paramilitary combatants, and the 
Armed Police Force (APF), who later assisted the RNA actors. The APF was newly 
formed by an RNA chief and included many former police and RNA officers who had 
left their positions due to Maoist attacks during the early years of the conflict.93 The 
state also established Terrorist and Disruptive Ordinance (TADO) laws, which 
provided state actors with broader powers to arrest people for suspected terrorist 
activity (Karki & Seddon, 2003, p. 35). TADO allowed the RNA to detain suspects 
without trial for up to a year, fostering an atmosphere of license among state actors.  
 
During operation “Unified Command,” state actors were temporarily deployed to 
Maoist-held regions and civilian areas. This often included sending state actors on 
                                                 
89 See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/18/nepal and http://www.gurkhabde.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/Kukri_2011.pdf (accessed on 05/7/2016). 
90 Sub clauses (a), (b) and (d) of Article 12, Clause 1 of Article 13 and Articles 15, 16, 17, 22 and 23. 
91 http://www.scribd.com/doc/105969888/Internal-Conflicts-in-Nepal-Transnational-Consequences (accessed 
24/08/2014). 
92 http://www.telegraphindia.com/1060704/asp/foreign/story_6434825.asp (accessed 23/07/2014). 
93 https://www.scribd.com/doc/105969888/Internal-Conflicts-in-Nepal-Transnational-Consequences (accessed 
03/08/2014). 
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temporary-deployment to infiltrate the Maoists zones; but the actors were unable to 
distinguish between embedded Maoist actors and civilians, which led to 
indiscriminate violence. The RNA also used armed helicopters to fire on suspected 
Maoist zones. On November 30, 2001, in Meldhara, Rolpha district, RNA actors fired 
from an army helicopter, reportedly killing five civilians who were observing Baraha 
Pooja, a religious festival (Thapa, 2003, p. 268). From this period onward, many of 
the state operations to target Maoist actors became significantly more militarised in 
nature.94 When RNA actors caught Maoist actors, they also killed innocent civilians 
because it was extremely difficult to differentiate between the embedded Maoist 
actors and civilians. In the districts of Nepalgunj, Pyuthun, Raraodi, Jajrakot, 
Lamjung, Gulmi, Surhkhet, and Dunai,95state actors struggled to differentiate between 
civilians and embedded actors. This resulted in civilians being “piggies-in-the-
middle” between Maoist embedded actors; this led many of the civilians in these areas 
to experience indiscriminate violence.  
 
On January 21, 2002, the Maoists declared a central People’s Government with 
Barburam Bhattarai as its head. However, operation “Unified Command” led to the 
capture and killing of several embedded Maoists. To increase their numbers and 
respond to these attacks, the Maoists chose to implement forced recruitment of 
civilians on a “one-child-per-home” basis. Many of the newly recruited actors were 
under-aged, according to United Nations Integration and Rehabilitation Programme 
(UNIPR),96 at the time. Those who refused to join were often killed as a display of 
                                                 
94 http://www.scribd.com/doc/105969888/Internal-Conflicts-in-Nepal-Transnational-Consequences (accessed 
18/05/2014). 
95 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1801813.stm (accessed 07/07/14). 
96 See http://www.unirp.org.np/Home.aspx (accessed on 10/3/2017). See also Interview no: 005 conducted on 
15/07/2014. 
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strength and to regain control in the zones in which they were based. Prior to this 
period, Maoist actors were not commonly known to forcefully recruit civilians. 
 
According to INSEC data, in 2000, there was an increase in the number of civilians 
killed by the Maoist and state actors. In 2001, the total number of civilians killed by 
the state accounted for approximately three quarters of the overall deaths, almost 4.5 
times higher than the number of civilians killed by Maoist actors. INSEC data also 
shows an increase in the number of killings by the state (over 3,000 recorded deaths) 
between 2002 and 2003. The number of battle-related deaths between actors and non-
civilians progressively rose during this period.  
 
The level of indiscriminate violence experienced during Period 2 reflects the 
involvement of new state actors97 in the conflict and their “take-no-prisoners” 
approach towards the Maoists (Thapa, 2003, p. 306). This weakened the legitimacy of 
the state, led King Gyanendra to dismiss the Deuba Government and assume 
executive power on October 4, 2002.98 Changes in leadership during this period (four 
prime ministers in total) contributed to the confusion and frustration of state actors, 
allowing Maoist actors to expand and increase their use of “hit-and-run” and “hide-
and-seek” tactics. Maoist actors also regarded the government as weak and aimed to 
exploit this position. Counterinsurgency efforts by the APF and RNA, contributed to 
the increase in indiscriminate violence by state actors. In an interview with a police 
officer from Dang, he remarked: 
 
 
                                                 
97 The inclusion of the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and the Armed Police Forced (APF). 
98 http://www.nepaldemocracy.org/conflict_resolution/KBNepal2005.pdf (accessed 15/08/2014). 
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Soldiers are taught to engage the enemy differently than the 
police, the police live amongst the communities and are 
selective, even when we shoot to kill; while RNA, on the 
other hand, will shoot first and ask questions later.99  
 
 
The Maoists’ strategy of embeddedness made it increasingly difficult for APF and 
RNA actors to distinguish between Maoists and civilians. Once the APF and RNA 
were activated, state actors were temporarily deployed to Maoist areas. This strategy 
failed and caused many of the state actors to use indiscriminate violence against 
civilians. State actors found it especially difficult to distinguish between Maoist actors 
and civilians, because the Maoists had been allowed to spread throughout the country. 
Techniques, such as shooting from helicopters and ongoing “search and destroy” 
operations added to the increase in indiscriminate violence cases (Thapa, 2003, p. 
308).  
 
The Maoists intensified their efforts by expanding fixed and deployed missions to 
increase their control in contested and uncontested zones. This included expanded 
operations and attacks on RNA, police, and government infrastructure in the eastern 
and western regions. An increase in “hide-and-seek” attacks frustrated fixed and 
temporarily-deployed, RNA and APF actors. The Maoists also launched other tactics, 
such as sending women and cows (considered gods in Hindu culture) ahead before 
they attacked state actors. Increased state pressure and attacks under “Unified 
Command” caused the “cat and mouse” situation to continue.  
 
                                                 
99 http://www.ucmo.edu/cjinst/issue3.pdf (accessed 15/05/2014). 
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5.9 The Conflict, Period 3 (2003-2004) 
The violence continued during the third period. The King dismissed the political 
parties in 2003 and there was an increase in military spending to defeat the Maoists 
(Kumar, 2003). The suspension of some fundamental human rights during the earlier 
period appears to have led to an escalation in indiscriminate violence by state actors 
under TADO. Districts, such as Panchthar, Tehrathum, Sunsari, Morang, and Jhapa, 
also witnessed the deployment of newly-recruited and poorly-trained APF actors to 
Maoist uncontested zones.100 Maoist tactics included evening ambushes on APF and 
RNA bases. State actors often searched for temporarily-deployed Maoist actors but 
were unable of differentiate between them and civilians. As a result, RNA and APF 
actors used indiscriminate violence against civilians.  
 
In August 2003, in Doramba Ramechhap District (under Maoist control), a platoon of 
RNA actors entered the village and forcibly moved unarmed Maoist activists to 
Dandakateri (a contested area). That month, the RNA and APF also attacked and 
illegally shot and killed 19 unarmed, suspected Maoist actors and civilians in 
Doramba village, Ramechhap District.101 As a result, scheduled talks between the 
state and the Maoists were cancelled.102 Indiscriminate violence increased during this 
period, creating uncertainty and hostility when state actors entered villages on 
operations.103  
 
A small decline in the number of battle-related deaths between actors occurred during 
this period. At the same time, there was an increase in the use of indiscriminate 
                                                 
100 http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/485a63912.pdf (accessed 03/06/2014). 
101 http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/nepal-new-report-says-illegal-killings-increasing-security-forces-
hiding-evidence (accessed on 10/3/2017). 
102 http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2012/08/16/oped/remember-doramba/238475.html (accessed 
03/06/2014). 
103 http://old.himalmag.com/himal-feed/53/1658-the-royal-nepal-army.html (accessed 03/06/2014).  
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violence against civilians. While the combined datasets show a small decline in the 
number of indiscriminate violence incidents perpetrated by state actors, the state is 
indicated as the highest perpetrator of violence during this period. Indiscriminate 
violence was also used by Maoist actors in 2004. This seems to have been the result 
of Maoist actors’ response to increased state operations under “Unified Command,” 
which contributed to an increase in their use of indiscriminate violence.  
 
The deployment of more than 4,000 APF actors to uncontested Maoist zones may 
have contributed to the number of civilians killed. The RNA also changed its tactics, 
including firing from helicopters, retaliating against attacks, and increasing 
temporarily-deployed operations in contested and uncontested zones. Under operation 
“Unified Command,” several camps were set up within and outside Maoist-controlled 
zones, and state forces patrolled in and around civilian communities during the day. 
“Unified Command” placed increased pressure on the embedded Maoist actors who 
became progressively frustrated with the conflict. The death of fellow Maoist actors 
and the new tactics used by RNA and APF actors required the Maoists to recruit and 
resupply by any means possible to address the changes in their security (Marks, 
2003). Throughout this period, the Maoists actors continued to use “hit-and-run” and 
“hide-and-seek” tactics. Maoist’s actors also became more violent and began using 
methods, such as “disappearance” and forced recruitment of locals to fight in the 
conflict (Paudel, 2014).  
 
5.10 The Conflict, Period 4 (2005-2006) 
In late 2005, King Gyanendra declared martial law, causing the political parties and 
the Maoists to unite in protest against the King’s rule in Nepal. Political protests were 
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staged in the capital against the monarchy’s consolidation of power. On the evening 
of April 4, 2005, hundreds of Maoist actors attacked a police outpost in Yadukuwa, 
Jadukhola, killing 13 policemen and wounding seven, with 35 listed as missing. 
Witnesses claimed between 400-500 Maoist actors attacked the police post and began 
firing assault rifles and rockets; the fighting lasted over two hours, before they 
dispersed back to civilian areas.104  
 
On the evening of August 7, 2005, 1,200 Maoist actors were deployed to attack the 
Pili army base in an uncontested zone, set up for the construction of the Surkhet-
Jumla part of the Karnali Highway, at Pakha village, Kalikot District.105 It was a 
direct attack on a major, fortified RNA base. The Pili base was established near the 
village of Pakha, close to the headquarters of Kalikot District in the valley of the Tila, 
a branch of the Karnali River in the western hills of Nepal. Establishing the base was 
an RNA advance into liberated territory and was part of a strategy to increase the 
RNA’s mobility. They aimed to create a military corridor, along the lines separating 
the heart of the revolutionary zone, between the two RNA-controlled and fortified 
airstrips of Surkhet and Jumla.  
 
On January 14, 2006, the Maoists launched coordinated attacks on five military and 
parliamentary bases in the Kathmandu valley. This was their first successful attack on 
the capital and resulted in the introduction of curfews. The attack demonstrated that 
the Maoists’ operations had extended beyond their controlled zones. In April 2006, 
the newly-appointed Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala called for a ceasefire and a 
                                                 
104 (Rebels storm police post, kill nine officers" Gulfnews (accessed on 06/04/2014). 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/nepal/1385259/Maoists-kill-more-than-120-in-Nepal.html 
(accessed on 12/04/2014). 
105 http://nepalitimes.com/article/nation/Jumla-gets-nearer,3358 (accessed on 10/11/2017). 
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new round of negotiations began. On April 27, 2006, the Maoists agreed to unilateral 
talks after several weeks of protests and strike action in the capital. These talks led to 
the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on November 21, 2006. 
 
According INSEC data, the number of attacks on civilians during this period declined 
and the levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians throughout the country 
decreased significantly (See Figure 5.3). The UDCP data revealed that the number of 
battle-related deaths among the Maoists were lowest; while the state was indicated in 
the highest levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians. The number of battle-
related deaths among the Maoist actors eventually rose above the number of civilians 
killed by the state. This suggests that the state’s efforts to defeat the Maoists were 
effective, since the number of battle-related deaths between actors was, for the most 
part, lower than the instances of indiscriminate violence used against civilians.  
 
This period marked several changes in state behaviour and the strategies used by the 
King. These directives added to the confusion and frustration of state actors and 
resulted in the further embedding of Maoist actors amongst civilians. The complexity 
of indiscriminate violence used against civilians grew during this period, as 
temporarily-deployed state actors were often confused when attempting to identify the 
Maoist actors. Pressure by the security forces may have caused the Maoists to force 
recruit civilians as part of their new offensive strategy. Maoist actors continued their 
strategy of embeddedness, while attacking state posts and infrastructure. The Maoists 
also intensified their attacks on the state by trying to take over the capital and 
launching rallies and strikes (Bandha) that crippled the country’s financial hub. 
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Outside the capital, “hit-and-run” and “hide-and-seek” tactics continued to be used, 
and many state bases experienced increased attacks. 
 
5.11 Summary of Findings 
This chapter described some of the events and behaviours that shaped the use of 
indiscriminate violence by actors in the conflict. Both state and Maoist actors used 
indiscriminate violence against civilians during the different periods. Embedded 
actors on the rebel’s side often used indiscriminate violence when they were losing 
control of their zones, but also when the APF and RNA increased their efforts. On the 
state side, police actors used indiscriminate violence to overpower the Maoist actors 
and civilians who wanted or attempted to join the insurgency. The use of 
indiscriminate violence by police actors appeared to occur during the first period of 
the conflict. The findings reinforce arguments made in Chapters Two and Three, that 
while information was important, it was not the only crucial element triggering the 
use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. In fact, what this chapter has 
illustrated is the peaks in indiscriminate violence against civilians during the initial 
period by state police; appear to be linked to the state’s strategic and operational 
response to deal with Maoist rebels. The patterns in the state’s response and Maoist 
behaviour show traits to those observed during the first few years of the Peruvian 
conflict by state police, and later the army. The state Peruvian police incurred 
problems with differentiating between civilians and the SP. Despite the presence of 
the police amongst the civilian populations and their access to information as 
suggested (Kalyvas, 2006), Nepal’s state actors should have had little incentive to use 
indiscriminate violence.  
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However, the analysis in this chapter demonstrates a different outcome. I found the 
police were involved in operations to extinguish the Maoist. Operations such as 
“Operation Romeo” only led to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians as 
a last resort, which seems to match Valentino et al., (2004), argument that 
indiscriminate violence appears to be an instrument of last resort. Valentino, et al., 
(2004) analysis is correct to suggest that indiscriminate violence is costly. However, 
what remains unanswered is when this moment of last resort occurs, and whether each 
actor assuming a different strategic position will use indiscriminate violence as a last 
resort, or whether this will be observed from embedded actors only. The analysis in 
this chapter implies while information plays a role, there are other impinging factors 
at hand – strategic movement and positions of actors – which a lack of information 
does not account for or help, explain in the case of Nepal. Indiscriminate violence in 
Nepal often occurred when the Maoist hit state police posts, even though they were 
centrally-located within civilian areas.  
At the end of the second period, the APF was formed and commenced operations and 
the RNA would later join the conflict. The APF continued the use of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians initially perpetrated by the police. The APF would later be 
indicated in high levels of indiscriminate violence, while the RNA may have used a 
more systematic approach.  
 
Overall, the results indicate that state actors collectively used indiscriminate violence 
against civilians more frequently than their Maoist counterparts. The process tracing 
analysis also reveals that the Maoist actors resorted to the use of indiscriminate 
violence in the latter periods of the conflict. Towards the end of Period 3, the Maoist 
actors used indiscriminate violence against civilians when the RNA increased its 
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attacks on Maoist positions. However, the process tracing analysis did not reveal 
whether embedded Maoist actors used indiscriminate violence at the start of the 
conflict.  
 
Table 5.0 below summarises the study hypothesis and the results from each of the 
four periods. 
 
 
Table 5.0 Summary of the hypothesis and findings for Nepal’s periods of conflict 
Hypotheses H1: Is there a relationship 
between embeddedness and 
the manifestation of 
indiscriminate violence used 
by of temporarily-deployed 
actors? 
H2: Is there a relationship 
between embedded actors 
using indiscriminate 
violence at the initial stages 
of a conflict to gain control 
over civilian populations? 
Period One Yes No 
Period Two Yes No 
Period Three Yes Yes 
Period Four Yes Yes 
 
 
Table 5.0 shows that the first condition in the hypothesis was observed during all four 
periods. The second condition was observed only during Periods 3–4 and not in 
Periods 1 or 2. It may be that the impact of embeddedness and the use of 
indiscriminate violence were undetectable in the early periods due to limitations in the 
process tracing method. 
 
The analysis in this chapter provides insight into the difficulties state actors 
encountered in rooting-out rebel actors in the civilian areas. The operations they were 
involved in placed pressure on the state actors and caused several to use 
indiscriminate violence against civilians. The analysis further reveals that the strategic 
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position of embeddedness triggered the use of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians in the areas and zones in which rebel actors were embedded. In several areas, 
embeddedness resulted in the death of many civilians, because state actors were 
unable to differentiate between the civilians and the embedded actors. The use of 
indiscriminate violence was significantly higher during the period when operations, 
such as "Kilo Sierra II,” "Jungle Search," "Search and Destroy,” and “Unified 
Command” occurred. “Operation Romeo,” in 1995, for example, caused many 
civilians to take up arms and support the rebel actors (Marks, 2003).  
 
The strategic position and tactics the Maoists rebels employed made it exceedingly 
difficult for state actors to distinguish between rebel actors and civilians; mainly 
because, like the strategies of Mao Zedong, they involved embedding actors amongst 
civilians. The Maoist went out of their way to embed themselves amongst the civilian 
populations, before, and during the conflict. A similar strategy was detected in 
Chapter Three during the Peruvian and the second Sudanese conflicts. The Maoist 
also put in place a recruitment system which required recruiting locals as fixed actors 
to support their local activities and operations against the state. The Maoists rebels not 
only embedded themselves amongst the civilian population, but also used civilians as 
covers for their tactics. During the day, they worked as civilians in their local 
communities, and at night they became rebel actors and attacked security forces 
(Interview no: 007, Lily Thapa, 2014). According to a Maoist strategic planner, 30 per 
cent of the Maoist actors hid in the jungle and moved from village to village every 
five or six days on temporarily-deployed patrols; while the remaining 70 per cent 
were embedded amongst civilian populations. This would often change depending on 
the zones and strategic needs (Interview no: 005, Baldev, 2014). At the start of the 
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conflict the police were under-resourced and deployed to previously unknown 
battlefields after just six weeks of training.106 Many of the state actors, deployed to 
embedded Maoist zones, aimed to survive by any means necessary. The Maoists 
would later expand their areas of control and embed themselves in rural areas, 
because the government had lost its support-base and withdrew its personnel from the 
districts.107  
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate that embeddedness occurred during 
the Nepalese conflict and may have occurred before it began (possibly as early as 
1994). Employing several sources, historical accounts, and articles, I attempt to 
shown that the strategic positions actors assumed, and the embedding of actors 
triggered the use indiscriminate violence. Additional statistical research is required to 
examine the hypothesis further and determine whether other factors may have played 
a significant role. Throughout the conflict, temporarily-deployed state actors who 
experienced tactics, such as “hit-and-run,” appear to have been the most impacted. 
These attacks seem to have had a profound effect on all three state actors, but more so 
the APF and RNA.  
 
In the next chapter, I attempt to explore and understand these findings further. I 
further explore the findings of the process tracing analysis by examining the data from 
517 completed surveys. The 517 survey respondents were sampled from 16 of 
Nepal’s 75 districts to better understand what occurred during the conflict. In Chapter 
Six, I continue to explore how and under what conditions indiscriminate violence was 
used against civilians in the Nepalese conflict. 
                                                 
106 Nepal Police Web Site: “An overview of terrorist activities in Nepal” 22 Feb 2002. 
107 http://www.berghof- foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Other_Resources/ 
NEP_Local_Conflict_Resolution_Mechanisms.pdf (accessed on 10/3/2017). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EMBEDDEDNESS AND THE USE OF INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE 
 
6.1 Chapter Overview 
In Chapter Five, I used process tracing to evaluate the hypothesis presented in 
Chapter Three. The purpose of the process tracing analysis was to determine whether 
the predictions and other exploratory questions derived from the hypothesis were 
supported. I further investigated how the identified actors distributed and used 
indiscriminate violence throughout the conflict. Results of the process tracing analysis 
support the first hypothesis: Is there a relationship between embeddedness and the 
manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors? This 
was detected throughout the conflict periods and, thus, demonstrates support for this 
hypothesis. Partial support was also found for the second hypothesis: Is there a 
relationship between embedded actors using indiscriminate violence at the initial 
stages of a conflict to gain control over civilian populations.However, this was only 
detected during the third and fourth periods of the conflict (2003-2004 and 2006-
2006). No evidence was found to support this hypothesis during the first and second 
periods. As a result, I am unable to reject the null hypothesis and will further test its 
veracity in Chapter Six.  
 
In Chapter Six, I present the results of several cross-tabulation trials using the data 
collected from 517 surveys. To further test the study hypothesis, I examine the 
strength of association between selected variables, which provide a further test of the 
hypothesis outlined in Chapter Three. I start the chapter by conducting cross-
tabulation to test the study hypothesis. This offers me an opportunity to add new 
evidence and further account for the use of indiscriminate violence. I later conduct 
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inferential statistical analysis using logistic regression analysis to examine the 
findings and the cross-tabulation results. The survey analysis helps to contribute to 
understanding the use, trends, and distribution of indiscriminate violence. Assessing 
the study hypothesis, using different methodological approaches, provides the thesis 
with statistical and evidence-based conclusions. Since there are advantages and 
disadvantages to both quantitative and qualitative research methods, by employing a 
mixed-methods approach, I can provide additional evidence and support for the 
overall study findings. By using an original dataset that captures the accounts of 517 
respondents (civilians) who experienced indiscriminate violence during the Nepalese 
conflict (1996-2006), this chapter furthers the findings presented in Chapter Five. 
Later in Chapter 8, I examine the combined results from the survey (Chapter 6), the 
process tracing analysis (Chapter 5), and the elite interviewees (Chapter 7) to further 
understand the use of indiscriminate violence. 
 
The chapter is composed of three parts. In the first part (Section 6.2), I outline the 
field research methods used to implement the survey in Nepal.108I present the study 
objectives and describe the theoretical expectations in this chapter, following the 
findings presented in Chapter Five. In the second part (Sections 6.2–6.5), I explain the 
dependent and independent variables used to test the study hypothesis, and why they 
are best-suited for the cross-tabulation. I then explain the use of cross-tabulation to 
study the survey data. Then, I conduct logistic regression analysis using logit models 
(Sections 6.6), which further investigates the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables selected for the analysis. Logitic regression is used in this 
chapter to model and determine the causal effect or relationship between the 
                                                 
108See Chapter Four for a detailed description of the methods used to conduct the survey in Nepal during 2014.  
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variables. In the final part (Sections 6.7), I present the survey findings in relation to 
the study hypothesis and explore whether the results of the different trials and regress 
analysis modelling support the hypothesis. I then provide a summary of the results 
from the overall analysis. 
 
6.2 Field Research  
The field research was conducted in Nepal over a one-year period in 2014. A 
tendency in the literature on violence is to privilege the centre over the periphery 
when conducting analysis on the use of violence. This of course, will never provide a 
researcher with a deep understanding of what occurred and the various dynamics at 
hand. This urban bias does more than simply ignore the periphery; it assumes that 
what goes on inside the capital is the same as what goes on outside - that politics 
outside of the centre will mirror or mimic politics in the centre. As numerous 
ethnographic and micro-level studies have shown, violence rarely flows from the 
centre (Kalyvas, 2006, Chap. 2; Migdal, 1988). As a work-around to this concern, 
survey distribution reached 16 districts and 517 respondents, with 20–60 respondents 
per district all outside of the centre of the capital. To distribute the survey, I used 
three methods: random, systematic, and snowball sampling. The districts sampled 
included: Banke, Bardiya, Bajhang, Doti, Dadeldhura, Dang, Dolpa, Jumla, Kailali, 
Kailkot, Kanchanpur, Kathmandu, Panchihar, Rolpa, Rukum, and Rupenidehi. The 
survey was conducted using a traditional pen-and-paper response to interact with 
respondents and provided the opportunity for respondents to complete the survey 
independently from the researcher.  
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6.3 Theoretical Expectations 
In the analysis of the survey responses, I demonstrate how the embeddedness as a 
strategy in the accounts of civilians who were present and surveyed during the 
conflict accounts for some use of indiscriminate violence. I reveal the consequences 
of this strategic position and test whether the presence of embedded actors increased 
the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in those areas or zones. I 
determine whether actors used embeddedness to control civilians, to further confuse 
the enemy or cause differentiating issues and whether embeddedness caused 
temporarily-deployed actors to use indiscriminate violence against civilians. I show 
that all actors used indiscriminate violence and that most respondents confirmed the 
existence of embeddedness by rebel actors. I expect to find that embeddedness 
increases the likelihood of temporarily-deployed actors using indiscriminate violence 
against civilians, largely because of challenges in distinguishing between actors and 
civilians and due to the strategic positions, which interact with one another.  
 
Results in Chapter Five confirm the existence of embedded actors during the decade-
long conflict and show that actors on the rebel side continually assumed the strategic 
position of embeddedness. In addition, temporarily-deployed actors on the state 
side109 often used violence against communities because it was difficult for the 
government forces to distinguish between rebels and civilians. This supports the 
theoretical hypothesis presented in Chapter Three (see Table 6.0). In this chapter, I 
further examine the theoretical hypothesis using the survey data collected in Nepal. 
 
                                                 
109 State actors were the Nepalese Royal Army, Police, and the Armed Police Force. 
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6.4 Survey Analysis Methods  
To analyse the survey responses and test the hypothesis outlined in Chapter Three, I 
assess the respondents’ perspectives about what occurred during the conflict. I also 
explore whether embeddedness contributed to the use of indiscriminate violence 
against civilians by actors in the conflict. I divide the conflict into four periods, to 
explore and understand the use and transformation of indiscriminate violence 
throughout the conflict (see Table 6.1): The first period covers the first six months of 
the conflict (0–6 months); the second period from 6 months–3rd year of the conflict; 
the third period from the 3rd–8th year; and the fourth period from the 8th year–the 
end of the conflict. Dividing the conflict into four periods overcame the challenge to 
require every civilian to recall the year and month of each incident of indiscriminate 
violence which they encountered. This is not to say that all civilians surveyed had 
difficulty remembering. However, there is no way of guaranteeing that the same data 
could be collected across the different types and categories of respondents, given the 
time that had lapsed since the conflict commenced. I was aware that by asking 
civilians to recall every incident of indiscriminate violence, I might be asking a tall 
order. This would have skewed the results and created an opportunity for bias to filter 
through to the analysis. To avoid this, I focus the questions in the survey on capturing 
each respondent’s first interaction with the various actors, the length of time they 
experienced indiscriminate violence and what caused the occurrence of indiscriminate 
violence. Thus, the analysis in this chapter only assesses the onset of indiscriminate 
violence, its traits for those surveyed, when it occurred, how long for, who used it, 
how frequently it was used, and what the causes were for each respondent.  
Since each individual respondent’s interaction with the conflict occurs at different 
times during the length of the conflict, the analysis conducted in this chapter only 
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provides an overall average time of when indiscriminate violence interacted with 
individual civilian’s entrance into the conflict. This gives an indication of the time 
each respondent felt indiscriminate violence occurred for them. The analysis in 
Chapter Five has already provided me with an understanding of the trends and 
patterns of when indiscriminate violence occurred from the different sources. 
Therefore, this chapter is designed to take the analysis in Chapter Five a step further 
by exploring the links with the strategic positions and the use of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians, from the perspective of the respondents only and not the 
overall conflict.  
 
 
Table 6.1: Breakdown of the Decade-long Conflict in Nepal 
Period Time Frame Key Events 
Period One 0–6 months 
(1996) 
The launch of the Maoists’ “People’s War.”  
Period Two 6 months–3 years 
(1996-1999) 
The launch of state operations, such as “Kilo 
Sierra II” and “Shoot to Kill,” in response to 
the Maoists’ campaign.   
Period 
Three 
3 years–8 years 
(1999-2004) 
Mid-way through the conflict; the launch of 
the state operation “Unified Command;” the 
formation of the APF; and the introduction of 
the RNA to the conflict. 
Period Four 8 years–the end of 
the conflict (2004-
2006) 
The spread of the Maoist-controlled zones; 
King Gyanendra declares martial law; and the 
end of the conflict.  
 
 
This division differs from the four periods employed in Chapter Five and assists in 
understanding the use of violence during the initial and latter periods of the conflict 
and testing the studies hypothesis. When assessing the initial data results of 
respondents, I find strength for the use of indiscriminate violence during the first 6 
weeks of the respondent’s interaction with the conflict; I conduct further analysis to 
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understand this dynamic. Dividing the first period into shorter time periods allows me 
to capture the use of violence at the initial stages of the respondent’s interaction with 
the conflict and clarify indiscriminate violence distribution and use by both embedded 
and temporarily-deployed actors. The first period helps to test the second hypothesis 
on the impact of embeddedness in the initial period of the conflict. Table 6.1 presents 
the time periods and key events that transpired during these periods. These events 
were identified as significant in the analysis presented in Chapter Five.  
While the respondents were impacted at different times throughout the conflict, as the 
conflict moved and spread across Nepal, I was unable to capture the entire conflict in 
this analysis. Mapping the data onto the varying details of the conflict was not 
feasible in the timeframe of the study, and I believe, would be confusing to the reader. 
Instead, I provide a glimpse of when the respondents interacted with the conflict. The 
process tracing in Chapter Five provides a more detailed view of what took place 
during the conflict and can be used in reference with the analysis presented in this 
chapter. 
 
6.4.1 Cross-Tabulation 
To analyse the data collected in the survey, which reached 517 respondents from 16 
of Nepal’s 75 districts, I employed the method of cross-tabulation. Cross-tabulation 
analysis is used to examine categorical (nominal measurement scale) data, and the 
relationships between the dependent and independent variables selected for the 
examination. Using two (or more) dimensional tables, which record the number of 
respondents and explore the relationships between the selected variables, cross-
tabulation allows the comparison of one or more variables with another. This enables 
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the researcher to explore relationships within the data that may not be apparent 
otherwise and to examine hidden trends within the data. 
 
To test the study hypothesis, I operationalize various dependent and independent 
variables. All questions selected for the cross-tabulation analysis are derived from the 
survey questions. The questions can be operationalized into measureable variables 
using the respondents’ collective answers to the questions. The questions within the 
survey are grouped into sections that link the key concepts I was aiming to measure in 
this research project, with an understanding of the respondent’s interactions with the 
conflict. For example, each part of the survey was divided into sections with a 
heading. Each section of the survey (which had dedicated questions) was labelled 
according to the definitions used in this thesis. If I wanted to understand the use of 
indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors during the conflict, once the 
respondent arrived at the section of the survey “collective violence against civilians 
by actors on short mission”, the respondent was provided with a set of questions to 
provide an understanding of what indiscriminate violence under this actor entailed. 
This section of the survey refers to the use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-
deployed actors only. The process for understanding the survey was delivered by me, 
after going through the consent form, and before the respondent started the survey. 
Thus, when testing the relationship between variables using the selected questions as 
indicators, I can select a variation of best fit questions that relate to violence because 
this section is designed to understand the violence and actions of temporarily-
deployed actors only. In this section of the survey, there are 18 questions dedicated to 
the use of indiscriminate violence, it’s time frame, frequency of violence, and types of 
attacks by these actors. To simplify the survey for respondents and not to complicate 
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each respondent, the title heading “short-term mission” was used instead of the term 
“temporarily-deployed.” When conducting the field test survey respondents noted it 
was difficult to remember this term. I found replacing the term “temporarily-
deployed” for “short-term mission” helped respondents to separate the actors. This 
assisted the respondents to make clear distinctions between the different positions and 
the actors that can assume any of these positions.  
The section of the survey dedicated for understanding indiscriminate violence by 
embedded actors, length of embeddedness, types of violence used, who was 
embedded the longest etc., did not require this amendment. Most respondents during 
the test survey found the concept of embeddedness/embedded easy to understand. I 
continued to use and label the question and title with “embedded combatants/actors.” 
The sections of the survey featured 13 questions devoted to the various aspects of 
indiscriminate violence by embedded actors, embeddedness length, time frames, and 
what the consequences of embeddedness were on the civilian population. Just as 
featured in the section designated for temporarily-deployed actors, owing to the 
segregation in the survey, I can operationalize suitable questions to provide an 
understanding of the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors or understand 
how long embedded actors were embedded amongst civilians. 
Survey questions are designed to evolve from one question to another; providing 
supplementary understanding each time a new question is asked and added. 
Therefore, if the first question asks “How long were combatants living amongst your 
community?” the next question would probe further and ask, “Did combatants stay 
behind once the main group left?” The preceding question goes on to ask, “If so, how 
long did they stay for?” Respondents are given the option to choose between 17 
different multiple-choice options, from under a month to 10 years and over. This 
 215 
assists me in pinpointing the behaviour of actors and when embeddedness was likely 
to trigger their use of indiscriminate violence.  
 
6.4.2 Hypothesis One: Dependent and Independent Variables 
The variables used to test the first hypothesis were measured by the responses to two 
survey questions. These questions appear in a section of the survey on the use of 
indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors sent on short missions to the 
respondents’ communities. The section aims to decide whether temporarily-deployed 
actors used indiscriminate violence collectively or individually, and whether there 
was a link between its use and embeddedness. The answers provide understanding 
into the experiences of 517 respondents’ views on temporarily-deployed actors’ use of 
indiscriminate violence only.  
The first selected question, “Were members of your community targeted using 
violence?” refers to the use of violence by temporarily-deployed actors when they 
arrived in the respondent’s community. The selected question appears in the fifth 
section titled (“Collective violence against civilians by actors on short mission”) and 
is aimed at understanding the violence against civilians by actors on a short mission. 
The question in the survey is followed by the proceeding question: “If yes, why do 
you think this was so?” This question is designed to follow earlier questions intended 
to understand respondents’ experience of violence. Since respondents would have 
indicated when starting the survey: a) the job they did during the conflict; b) what 
their conflict experience was; c) their personal experience of the conflict; and, d) 
which groups of actors they (respondent) personally disliked, the selected question is 
a follow up of earlier questions that inquire into actors’ behaviour. When answering 
the question “Were members of your community targeted using violence?” the 
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respondent was given five multiple choice options to select from which included: a) 
yes; b) no; c) maybe; d) unknown; or e) refused to answer? The results omit the 
answers for options c, d and e - maybe, unknown or refused to answer - The omission 
is done for two reasons: first, to better capture the direct responses; and second, I did 
not conduct further qualitative assessment on the same surveyed individuals which 
would have provided me with richer context into the answers provided.  
 
The second question, “Did actors use violence against civilians because they could 
not differentiate between actors and civilians when they entered your community?” is 
designed to understand whether temporarily-deployed actors used violence against 
civilians because of their inability to distinguish between combatants and civilians. 
The question is selected from the fourth section of the survey, designed to understand 
“violence and frustration by an actor on a short mission”. This question follows a 
series of four questions on the behaviour of actors. The question is seeking to 
understand whether actors used violence because of differentiation issues and is 
directed at capturing the experience of indiscriminate violence through the eyes of the 
respondents, relative to temporarily-deployed actors. Because different questions are 
asked of respondents at the start of the section linked to their experience of violence 
the question is not designed to establish the use of indiscriminate violence, but 
whether there was a differentiating issue (between civilians and embedded actors) for 
actors on short missions. The preceding question is intended for respondents to 
identify which actor specifically used this violence because of differentiating issues. 
For me to decipher whether differentiating was an issue, this question was established 
as a leading question. While this brings a level of bias that I cannot remove from the 
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results, this had to be done so that when translated into Nepalese, respondents would 
understand the context in which the question was being asked.  
The independent variable “embeddedness”110 and the dependent variables 
“indiscriminate violence,”111 and “inability to differentiate actors,”112are selected to 
identify the association of embeddedness with the use of indiscriminate violence that 
civilians experience and were perpetrated by temporarily-deployed actors.  
 
The independent variable “embeddedness” is further expanded to include the periods 
in the conflict pertaining to embeddedness within a community and is measured using 
the responses to the survey question “How long were combatants living amongst your 
community?” The question appears in a section dedicated to the embedding of actors 
and refers to the length of time embedded actors lived amongst the respondents’ 
communities. This variable helps to understand whether there is a link between the 
length of embeddedness (measured in conflict periods) and the use of indiscriminate 
violence by temporarily-deployed actors. When examining the second hypothesis, this 
variable enables the researcher to pinpoint when embedded actors were likely to use 
indiscriminate violence. Table 6.2 summarises the variables selected to test 
hypothesis one across two trials. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
110 Variable name combtntembd_Q2 
111 Variable name violagnstcvln_Q1 
112 Variable name catcombtntfrstn_Q5 
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Table 6.2: Summary of hypothesis one and selected dependent and independent variables. 
Hypothesis 
One 
Is there a relationship between embeddedness and the manifestation of 
indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors?  
Dependent Variables Independent Variables 
Trial 1 Temporarily-deployed actors and 
the use of indiscriminate 
violence113 
Embeddedness and conflict periods 
in a community114 
Trial 2 Temporarily-deployed actors, 
inability to differentiate actors, 
and the use of indiscriminate 
violence115 
Embeddedness and conflict periods 
in a community116 
 
 
To test the second hypothesis, I use variables that capture the embedding of actors and 
the use of indiscriminate violence experienced by embedded actors. The selected 
variables are presented in the next section. 
 
6.4.3 Hypothesis Two: Dependent and Independent Variables 
The dependent variable used to test the second hypothesis was measured by the 
responses to two survey questions. These questions appear in a section of the survey 
on the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors. The first question, “Did 
combatants117 use violence against anyone in your community?” The question was 
designed to determine whether embedded actors (i.e., Maoist rebels or combatants) 
used indiscriminate violence against members of the respondents’ communities.  
The question is selected from the third section of the survey designed to understand 
the behaviour of embedded actors, the length of embeddedness, types of violence 
used by embedded actors, and whether embeddedness led to violence against 
                                                 
113 Variable name violagnstcvln _Q1- Were members of your community targeted using violence? 
114 Variable name combtntembd_Q2- How long were combatants living amongst your community? 
115 Variable name catcombtntfrstn _Q5- Did actors use violence against civilians because they could not 
differentiate between actors and civilians when they entered your community?  
116 Variable name combtntembd_Q2- How long were combatants living amongst your community? 
117 The term combatant is historically associated with the Maoist rebels was used by the Maoists, the state, and 
civil society in Nepal to describe the rebel actors. It was also the official word used by the UN to identify rebels 
(See for example, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/08/nepalese-child-soldier-un-threatened; 
https://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/nepal-un-chief-calls-early-integration-former-rebel-combatants (accessed on 
10/03/2017) 
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civilians. The section “embedded combatants/actors” has 13 questions, of which the 
selected question above is number six and intended to focus on embedded actors only. 
Respondents were given five multiple-choice options to select from: yes, no, maybe, 
unknown, and refused to answer. This specific question is intended to understand 
violence in the community that may have been used at the start; continuously or 
sporadically used by embedded actors only. This question is linked to indiscriminate 
violence because it tries to understand the condition under which it can or is used by 
embedded actors only. 
The dependent variable, “use of indiscriminate violence,”118 is, in this case, specific to 
the use of violence by embedded actors. This variable helps to understand whether 
there is a trend in the use of indiscriminate violence by actors who are embedded 
amongst civilians. The second question, “Did combatants use forceful violence 
against you or any members of your family?” aims to understand whether embedded 
actors used violence to gain control. The term “forceful” was used to replace the term 
“gain control,” since “gain control”119 has a different meaning in Nepalese (i.e., to 
defeat) than the one intended in this research question.  
The selected question is linked to the section of the survey titled “embedded 
combatants/actors”. The question allows respondents to select from a range of four 
multiple-choice options. The preceding question explores how long actors were 
embedded amongst civilians. Thus, allowing the selected question to understand if 
embedded actors (during the period shown in question five of this section) used 
forceful violence against the respondents or any members of the respondent’s family. 
This provides me with an opportunity to understand embeddedness from respondents’ 
perspective because the questions are geared toward the embedded actor’s overall 
                                                 
118 Variable name combtntembd_Q6- Did combatants use violence against anyone in your community? 
119 Variable name combtntembd_Q5- Did combatants use forceful violence against you or any members of your 
family? 
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behaviour. Therefore, the selected question supports me to capture forceful violence 
that may be linked to controlling civilians over time.  
The dependent variables “to gain control” and “use of indiscriminate violence” are 
used to determine the association between embedded actors and their use of 
indiscriminate violence, and whether the use of indiscriminate violence is linked to 
the need/wish to gain control.  
 
The independent variable, “embeddedness,”120 is used again to test the second 
hypothesis. This question measures how long embedded actors lived amongst the 
civilian community in terms of their presence during different periods of the conflict. 
The variable attempts to understand whether the use of indiscriminate violence by 
embedded actors was specifically linked to embeddedness. The variable enables the 
researcher to pinpoint whether embedded actors were likely to use indiscriminate 
violence to gain control at the start of the conflict. Table 6.3 summarises the selected 
variables and the two trials conducted to test the second hypothesis. 
 
Table 6.3: Summary of hypothesis two and the dependent and independent variables 
Hypothesis 
Two 
Is there a relationship between embedded actors using 
indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of a conflict to gain 
control over civilian populations?  
Dependent Variables Independent Variables 
Trial 1 Use of indiscriminate violence121 Embeddedness and conflict 
periods in the community122  
Trial 2 Use of indiscriminate violence to 
gain control123 
Embeddedness and conflict 
periods in the community124  
 
 
                                                 
120 Variable name combtntembd_Q2- How long were combatants living amongst your community? 
121 Variable name combtntembd_Q6- Did combatants use violence against anyone in your community? 
122 Variable name combtntembd_Q2- How long were combatants living amongst your community? 
123 Variable name combtntembd_Q5 - Did combatants use forceful violence against you or any members of your 
family?  
124 Variable name combtntembd_Q2- How long were combatants living amongst your community? 
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6.5 Survey Analysis Results 
6.5.1 Bivariate Analysis: Hypothesis One, Trial One 
The results of the first trial of the first hypothesis, on the use of indiscriminate 
violence by temporarily-deployed actors, are presented in Table 6.4. Results show 
that 233 of the 342 respondents to the question, “Were members of your community 
targeted using violence?” with “how long were combatants living in your community” 
answered “Yes;” while 109 of the respondents answered “No.” Of the respondents 
who answered “Yes,” 83 per cent indicated that in the last period of the conflict (the 
longest period for an actor to be embedded in the community) the relationship 
between the use of indiscriminate violence and temporarily-deployed actors was the 
most significant. 64 per cent of respondents indicated Period One, with a slight 
decrease in Period Two (60 per cent), and an increase during Period Three (75 per 
cent). Among the respondents who answered “No” (i.e., that members of the 
community were not targeted using violence); 39 per cent indicated that Period Two 
was the most significant when it came to no relationship between violence and 
temporarily-deployed actors, followed by 35 per cent in Period One, 24 per cent in 
Period Three, and 17 per cent in Period Four.  
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Table 6.4: Results of hypothesis one, trial one 
Use of 
indiscriminate 
violence by 
temporarily-
deployed 
actors125 
 
Embeddedness during conflict periods in the community126 
Period One 
(0–6 months) 
Period Two 
(6 months–3 
years 
Period Three 
(3–8 years) 
Period Four 
(8 years –end 
of conflict) 
Total (N= 
respondent
s) 
Yes 127 
0.645 
31 
0.608 
31 
0.756 
44 
0.830 
233 
 
No 70 
0.355 
20 
0.392 
10 
0.244 
9 
0.170 
109 
Total  197 
0.576 
51 
0.149 
41 
0.120 
53 
0.155 
342 
 
Pearson chi2 = 8.951999  Pr = 0.02993595 
 
The results from the first trial are statistically significant (95 per cent confidence 
level; p=0.03) and partially confirm the first hypothesis. The results demonstrate a 
possible relationship between the dependent and independent variables: 
Embeddedness was linked to the use of violence against civilians by temporarily-
deployed actors. Furthermore, as embeddedness continued throughout the conflict, the 
likelihood of violence being used by temporarily-deployed actors increased. Period 
Four (8 years to the end of the conflict) was indicted by respondents as the most 
significant, at 83 per cent. The results suggest that the longer embeddedness occurred, 
the more likely it was for the community to be targeted with violence. As the conflict 
continued, the violence increased. Based on the analysis in Chapter Five, this 
occurred because of increases in embedded Maoist and their control of zones and the 
joint tactics of the APF and the RNA under operation Unified Command.  
 
However, it should be noted that the conflict affected only some of the respondents’ 
communities throughout different periods of the conflict, while others were not 
directly affected. In addition, specific actors were not necessarily embedded in the 
                                                 
125 Variable name combtntembd_Q1- Were members of your community targeted using violence? 
126 Variable name combtntembd_Q5- How long were combatants living amongst your community? 
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same community throughout the conflict. This may be due, in part, to the arrival of 
rebels in some communities during later periods, or the death or movement of actors 
who were replaced by new actors.  
 
6.5.2 Bivariate Analysis: Hypotheses One, Trial Two 
The results of the second trial of the first hypothesis, on the use of violence against 
civilians by temporarily-deployed actors due to their inability to differentiate 
embedded actors, are presented in Table 6.5. Results show that 206 respondents 
answered the question, “Did actors use violence against civilians because they could 
not differentiate between actors and civilians when they entered your community?” 
with “how long were combatants living in your community” and answered “Yes;” 
while 66 answered “No.” Those who answered “Yes,” indicated that Period One was 
the most important. As can be seen by the frequencies cross-tabulation, 88 per cent of 
respondents indicated there is a significant relationship between violence and the 
inability of temporarily-deployed actors to differentiate between embedded actors and 
civilians, because of the presence of embeddedness during the first period. 
This decreased to 51 per cent in Period Two and decreased further in Period Three to 
32 per cent. The proportion rises again in Period Four to 70 per cent. A distinct 
difference is found in the results of the respondents who answered “No.” In the First 
Period, 11 per cent of respondents indicated no relationship between violence and the 
inability to differentiate between actors and civilians. This proportion increases in 
Period Two to 49 per cent, and further in Period Three to 68 per cent. In the final 
period of the conflict, it decreases to 29 per cent.  
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Table 6.5: Results of hypothesis one, trial two 
Use of  
indiscriminate 
violence by 
temporarily-deployed 
actors, unable to 
differentiate actors127 
Embeddedness during conflict periods in the community128 
Period One 
(0–6 months) 
Period Two 
(6 months–3 
years) 
Period Three 
(3–8 years) 
Period Four  
(8 years –
end of 
conflict) 
Total (N= 
respondents) 
Yes 162 
0.885 
24 
0.511 
8 
0.320 
12 
0.706 
206 
 
No 21 
0.115 
23 
0.489 
17 
0.680 
5 
0.294 
66 
 
Total  183 
0.673 
47 
0.173 
25 
0.092 
17 
0.062 
272 
 
Pearson chi2 = 58.12194   Pr = 1.480402e-12 
 
 
Results of this trial are statistically significant (99 per cent confidence level; 
p=1.480402e-12), and we can reject the null hypothesis. The results demonstrate a 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Trial 2 further 
confirms the relationship between the use of violence against civilians and 
embeddedness, and the length of time actors lived amongst the civilian community. 
As can be seen by the frequencies cross-tabulation, this indicates there is a 
relationship between the use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed 
actors, who are unable to differentiate actors and between embedded actors. 
The highest number of respondents indicated Period One (0-6 months) as the most 
important; with 88 per cent of respondents indicating that there is a significant 
relationship between violence and the inability of temporarily-deployed actors, 
followed by Period Four.  
 
Trials 1 and 2 confirm the presence of embeddedness and that the embedding of 
actors maybe associated with temporarily-deployed actors’ use of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians, due to their inability to differentiate between actors and 
                                                 
127 Variable name combtntembd_Q1 and Variable name combtntembd_Q2 
128 Variable name combtntembd_Q5 
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civilians. The tests found that the first six-months of a respondents’ interaction with 
the conflict were important, as were the latter years of the conflict. The results show 
that embeddedness may have an impact on the likelihood of temporarily-deployed 
actors using indiscriminate violence against civilians, due to differentiation issues. 
 
6.5.3 Bivariate Analysis: Hypothesis Two, Trial One 
In trials 1 and 2, I try to determine the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded 
actors at the start of the conflict and whether they used indiscriminate violence to gain 
control. Results of the first trial of the second hypothesis on the use of indiscriminate 
violence by embedded actors are presented in Table 6.6. Results show that 218 
respondents replied to the question, “Did combatants use violence against anyone in 
your community?” with “how long were combatants living in your community” 
answered “Yes;” 129 answered “No;” and 61 “Maybe.” The results show a 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 40 per cent of 
respondents indicated that the relationship between the use of indiscriminate violence 
and embedded actors was the least important during the First Period. The proportion 
increased in Period Two to 50 per cent and 70 per cent in Period Three; later 
decreasing to 56 per cent in Period Four. Among those who answered “No,” 33 per 
cent indicated that Period One was meaningful. This was followed by Period Two at 
26 per cent, Period Four at 25 per cent and Period Three at 10 per cent. Respondents 
who answered “Maybe,” demonstrated a dissimilar pattern. Those respondents 
indicated that Period Two was the most important, at 16 per cent. Period One 
followed with 14 per cent, Period Three at 6 per cent, and Period Four at 11 per cent.  
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Table 6.6: Results of hypothesis two, trial one 
Use of 
indiscriminate 
violence by 
embedded 
actors129 
 
Embeddedness during conflict periods in the community130 
Period One 
(0–6 months) 
Period Two 
(6 months–3 
years) 
Period Three 
(3–8 years) 
Period Four 
(8 years–end 
of conflict) 
Total (N= 
Respondents) 
Yes 103 
0.402 
34 
0.507 
41 
0.706 
40 
0.563 
218  
No 87 
0.339 
18 
0.268 
6 
0.103 
18 
0.253 
129  
Maybe 36 
0.140 
11 
0.164 
6 
0.103 
8 
0.112 
61  
Unknown 30 
0.117 
4 
0.597 
5 
0.862 
5 
0.070 
44  
Total (N= 
Respondents) 
256  67  58  71  452  
Pearson chi2 (9) = 24.0068 Pr = 0.004 
 
The results of this trial are statistically significant (99 per cent confidence level; 
p=0.004), and we can reject the null hypothesis. However, while the number of 
respondents indicating “Yes” was higher during Period One, the importance of the 
relationship appeared during Period Three. The use of violence by embedded actors in 
the first period is explored further in the second trial. Results suggest that embedded 
actors did use violence against civilians, but it is not significant during the initial 
periods as estimated by this thesis, but violence rises over the periods of the conflict. 
Results here support the analysis in Chapter Five, which found Period Three to be the 
most active.  
 
6.5.4 Bivariate Analysis: Hypotheses Two, Trial Two 
In the second trial, I test whether embedded actors used violence against the 
respondents or the respondents’ families in the First Period to gain control. The 
results of the analysis are presented in Table 6.7. Results show that 191 respondents 
                                                 
129 Variable name combtntembd_Q1- Did combatants use violence against anyone in your community? 
130 Variable name combtntembd_Q5- How long were combatants living amongst your community? 
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to the question, “Did combatants use forceful violence against you or any members of 
your family?” with “how long were combatants living in your community” answered 
“Yes;” while 182 answered “No.” Period Three was the most significant period with 
57 per cent indicating this as the most important. This was followed by 47 per cent 
during Period Two, 43 per cent during Period Four, and 37 per cent during Period 
One. The results for those who answered “No” reveal that the last period was the most 
significant for respondents, at 44 per cent. This is followed by Period One at 42 per 
cent, Period Two at 38 per cent and Period Three at 26 per cent. In Period Four, the 
results show an increase to 44 per cent. Among those who answered “No,” the highest 
number of respondents appeared in Period One.  
 
Table 6.7: Results of hypothesis two, trial two 
Use of indiscriminate 
violence by 
embedded actors to 
gain control 131 
 Embeddedness during conflict periods in the community132 
Period One 
(0–6 months) 
Period Two 
(6 months–3 
years) 
Period 
Three (3–8 
years) 
Period Four 
(8 years–end 
of conflict) 
Total (N= 
Respondents) 
Yes 95 
0.374  
32 
0.470 
33 
0.578 
31 
0.430 
191  
No 109 
0.429 
26 
0.382 
15 
0.263 
32 
0.444 
182  
Total (N= 
Respondents) 
204  58  48  63  373  
Pearson chi2 (12) = 14.0776 Pr =0.296 
 
 
The results of this analysis demonstrate that there is no link between embedded 
actors’ use of violence against civilians and their need to gain control in the initial 
periods of the conflict. However, results show a link between violence and the need to 
gain control in the latter periods of the conflict. While the results demonstrate 
curvilinear in the data; the t-test results are not significant and show no links. Having 
obtained chi-squared 14.0776, this yields a p-value of 0.029; thus, I am unable to 
                                                 
131 Variable name combtntembd_Q6 and Variable name combtntembd_Q1 
132 Variable name combtntembd_Q5 
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reject the null hypothesis. The results show that indiscriminate violence by embedded 
actors was not likely to occur during the initial or first period of the conflict to gain 
control.  
 
6.6 Logistic Regression Analysis  
In the previous section, I discussed the importance of the results from the cross-
tabulation analysis using survey data. I found strength for hypothesis one in both trials 
and a relationship between the process of embeddedness and the occurrence of 
violence used by temporarily-deployed actors. For hypothesis two, I only find partial 
support for the second trial but not during the first. As a result, I accept the null 
hypothesis.  
In this section, I further the survey data analysis using logit models to examine 
whether there is a causal relationship between one dependent binary variable and 
selected one or more nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio variables. The section is 
organised into three subsections; Firstly, I briefly provide a description of additional 
dependent (DV), independent (IV) variables used to conduct the logit model in the 
main section. Secondly, I present the results of the logit models using additional 
variables— selected DV and IV using a control variable for fixed effect—in the 
model(s) to understand if there is a causal effect. The results for hypotheses one and 
two show no statistical significance and I accept the null hypothesis. Finally, I briefly 
conclude and describe some of the shortfalls of the data. 
 
6.6.1 Dependent variables 
To answer the main research question and to test the hypotheses I select the 
dependent variable "violence used against civilians by actors." This variable was 
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previously used during the cross-tabulation trials. The use of violence against 
civilians133— asks respondents whether indiscriminate violence was used against 
members of the community. Respondents were given the option to select from "yes, 
no, maybe or unknown." I select the categorical response of "yes"—creating a dummy 
variable—as an indication of the presence of violence. The number of respondents 
who indicated yes was 249.  
Supplementing this variable I use the variable violence against civilians by 
temporarily deployed actors134— which explores the use of indiscriminate violence 
explicitly used by temporarily deployed actors. The question asks' respondents 
whether frustrated actors entered the community and used indiscriminate violence 
against civilians. The categorical variable provides respondents with "yes, no, maybe 
or unknown." options. Using respondents' options of "yes" as an indicator of the 
presence of indiscriminate violence by temporarily deployed actors I can create a 
dummy variable for modelling the presence of violence. There are 213 observations 
obtained from this new variable. 
 
6.6.2 Independent variables 
Within the survey analysis, there are several independent variables that I can select. 
This is largely due to the way I asked similar questions within the survey. The first 
independent variable is a categorical variable that derives from how long embedded 
actors were living amongst civilians.135 I create a dummy variable using the 
respondents indicated periods of embeddedness and create 0 to the first 6 months136 
by clustering respondents' selections for periods 0 to the first 6 months. The variable 
                                                 
133 Variable named dum1 
134 Variable named catcomfr1 
135 Variable named as catcombtembd_Q2 
136 Variable named as catcomem4 
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allows me to assess whether embedded actors during the initial periods of the 
respondents' interaction with the conflict led to the use of indiscriminate violence 
against civilians. The number of respondents who selected this option was 74 
respondents.  
The second independent variable —6 months-3 year measure of embeddedness137—is 
categorical variable and derives from the same question how long were embedded 
actors were living with the civilians.138 The variable is used as a dummy variable and 
taken from the part of the survey that examines the time length of embeddedness by 
an actor. However, with this variable, I cluster the results of actors being embedded 
for 6 months to 3 years providing me with a total of 231 observations. 
 
6.6.3 Fixed effect (Control variable) 
To complement the analysis within the model, I include a control variable which is 
used as a fixed effect to ensure that the relation between the presence of violence and 
embeddedness which is not spurious. To regulate for this effect, I use the categorical 
variable region139—the location identified by the respondent—where violence was 
experienced to apply a fixed effect. By clustering the districts into a variable covering 
the far western regions of Nepal, I can use this variable as a fixed effect. The 
clustered districts under the new dummy variable—highest districts with 
violence140—were indicated by the UN, UCDP and INSEC as the highest locations for 
the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. By controlling for the variation in 
                                                 
137 Variable named catcomemQ42  
138 Variable named catcomembed_Q2 
139 Variable indicates all 16 districts surveyed as part of this field research.  
140 The variable is named regi5 
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the location of violence I can reduce some of the bias but further focus the analysis. 
Highest districts with violence—have 325 observations. In the next section, I present 
the findings of the logit models for each hypothesis.  
 
Table 6.8: List of dependent and independent variables for logit models 
 
Hypotheses Dependent Variable Independent Variable 
Hypothesis one: Is there a relationship 
between embeddedness and the manifestation 
of indiscriminate violence used by of 
temporarily-deployed actors? 
Violence against civilians 
by temporarily deployed 
actors141 
How long embedded 
actors were living 
amongst civilians.142 
Hypothesis two: Is there a relationship 
between embedded actors using 
indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of 
a conflict to gain control over civilian 
populations? 
The use of violence 
against civilians143 
0-6 month measure of 
embeddedness144 
 
6 months- 3 year 
measure of 
embeddedness145 
 
 
6.6.4 Findings 
6.6.4.1 Logistic Regression Analysis: Hypothesis Two 
 
In this section, I present the result of the logit models to further the examination 
conducted earlier in this chapter. I present three models to test hypothesis one: Is 
there a relationship between embeddedness and the use of indiscriminate violence 
used by of temporarily-deployed actors? The statistical output from the logit models 
suggests that there is no relationship between the presence of embeddedness and the 
use of violence against civilians by temporarily deployed actors. I regulate for the 
possible effect by using —highest districts with violence— as a fixed effect variable 
in my logit model. Model 6.1.1 in table 6.9 demonstrates that there is no relationship 
between embedded actors and the use of violence against civilians by temporarily 
                                                 
141 Variable named catcomfr1 
142 Variable named as catcomem4 
143 Variable named dum1 
144 Variable named catcomemQ41 
145 Variable named catcomemQ42  
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deployed actors. Despite having 431 observations in model 6.1.1, the r-squared results 
come in at 0.0146 which is not significant.  
 
 
Table 6.9: The use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily because of embeddedness 
    
Variables Model 6.1.1 Model 6.1.2 Model 6.1.3 
 
    
The use of violence against civilians 0.477* 0.451  
 (0.272) (0.296)  
Violence against civilians by temporarily 
deployed actors 
 -1.608*** 1.847*** 
  (0.351) (0.221) 
Highest regions with violence -0.412 -0.365 0.361 
 (0.267) (0.288) (0.225) 
Constant -1.687*** -1.197*** -0.790*** 
 (0.262) (0.291) (0.196) 
    
Observations 
R-squared 
431 
0.0146 
404 
0.0936 
428 
0.1445 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Model 6.1.2 in table 6.9 uses the variable that examines whether frustrated actors used 
violence against civilians because of the attacks they received. I continue to use the 
variable the use of violence to explore whether this also has an impact on temporarily 
deployed actors using violence against civilians. The results from model 6.1.2 show a 
negative relationship between the variable selected for the logit model.  
Model 6.1.3 in table 6.9 drops the variable the presence of violence because of the 
negative effect in model 6.1.2. Model 6.1.3, shows improvement in the negative 
correlation from model 6.1.2, but the results are not significant. Model 6.1.3 shows 
that there is not strong in the relationship between the variables but the results are 
better in this model than model 6.1.1 and 6.1.2. The r-square results are 0.1445 and 
are not significant. All three logit models show that there is a relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables according to the logit models. In essence, the 
embedding of actors did not have an effect on the use of violence against civilians 
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during the Nepalese conflict. The same applies to the interaction between the presence 
of embeddedness and the frustration by temporarily deployed actors and their use 
of146 violence. Thus, I accept the null hypothesis because of the results models 6.1.1-
6.1.3 in table 6.9.  
 
6.6.4.2 Logistic Regression Analysis: Hypothesis Two 
 
In this subsection, I present three models to test hypothesis two in table 6.10, which 
examines Is there a relationship between embedded actors using indiscriminate 
violence at the initial stages of conflict to gain control over civilian populations. The 
results in table 6.10 overall show no significance between the selected variables and 
the expected outcome. For model 6.2.1, I use a categorical variable which measures 
the time that an embedded actor was embedded with civilians. The variable captures 
the respondent's first interaction with the conflict up until their first 6 months with the 
conflict. This variable is run against the presence of violence in the respondent's 
community. In model 6.2.1, I regulate for bias by using the variable highest districts 
with violence147—as a fixed effect for the logit models for hypothesis two. The r-
squared in table 6.10 comes in at 0.0112 and there is no relationship between the 
variables selected. For model 6.2.2 I use the first period of embeddedness —0-6 
months—of respondent's interaction with the conflict to understand whether this has a 
relationship with the use of violence by embedded actors. The results in model 6.2.2 
do not show any relationship between the dependent and independent variables and 
the r squared results are further away in model 6.2.3 then in model 6.2.1. This means 
there is actually a negative relationship. Despite the fixed effect being present the 
                                                 
 
147 Variable named regi5 
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result shows no causality.  
 
Table 6.10: Violence against civilian by embedded actors at the initial stage 
    
Variables Model 6.2.3 Model 6.2.3 Model 6.2.3 
    
The use of violence against civilians -0.166 0.0884 -0.328* 
 (0.197) (0.189) (0.189) 
Highest districts with violence 0.490** 0.216 0.517*** 
 (0.202) (0.196) (0.198) 
Constant 0.0395 -0.556*** -0.433** 
 (0.192) (0.188) (0.187) 
    
Observations 
R-squared 
431 
0.0112 
468 
0.0022 
468 
0.0157 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Finally, I select the variable 6 months-3 year measure of embeddedness148 with the 
use of violence against civilians. Model 6.2.3 shows no relationship between the 
selected variables. Despite using the variable 6 months- 3 year measure of 
embeddedness with the use of violence against civilians to see if there was any 
residual effect the model shows no relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. The r-squared results come in at 0.00157 and the number of 
observations is 468.  
 
6.7 Summary 
In this section, I have attempted to use logit models to understand whether there is a 
relationship between the select dependent variables and independent variables. The 
logit models were largely unable to understand whether embeddedness impacted the 
use of indiscriminate violence against civilians during the Nepalese conflict. For 
hypothesis one, there was not much difference between combatants that were 
                                                 
148 Variable named catcomemQ42  
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embedded for a relatively short period (the baseline) and those that were there longer. 
Only those in model 6.1.1 appear somewhat less prone to use violence. Model 6.1.2 
and 6.1.3 seem to have led to more (not less) violence, but the differences are not 
significant. For both hypotheses the results seem to indicate that it is quite likely that 
as combatants spend a longer period in a village the likelihood that violence rises. 
However, the probability of using violence in any given day may stay the same or 
even go down, but as more time passes it becomes more likely that violence was 
committed during the whole period. Even if actors stayed in a village for a long time 
or at some point only recently arrived and maybe committed violence during this 
period rather than later on. The data does not allow me to distinguish between these 
possibilities. It is important to note, that I do not try and state this as something that 
the results fully support in both hypotheses. The results of all models show no 
relationship with any of the IV and DV for hypotheses one and two. As a result, I 
have to accept the null hypothesis for both hypotheses. One of the weaknesses of the 
logit models above is that my data does not have good controls or fixed effect 
variables which would have been more meaningful for the logit models above. 
Fundamentally, variables like socio-economic status, ethnic minority and the general 
levels of violence in the region would have provided me with a more interesting 
analysis. Finally, an inherent fault with my data is my ability to select different 
variables with similar meaning does not provide a good measure for further analysis. 
 
 
6.8 Summary of Findings  
The cross-tabulation analyses presented in this chapter were used to explore and test 
the study hypothesis. Using a new and extensive dataset collected during my field 
work in Nepal, I have brought the investigation a step further in understanding the use 
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of indiscriminate violence during the decade-long conflict in Nepal. The results 
confirm hypothesis one. The p-values for the two trials of the first hypothesis reject 
the null hypothesis and shows strong support for the intended outcomes. However, the 
trials to test the second hypothesis show varying results. The first trial shows strong 
support for the hypothesis, but the second demonstrates no support.  
 
The analyses found significant support for the hypothesis that actors were embedded 
and the presence of embedded actors may have increased the likelihood of 
temporarily-deployed actors using indiscriminate violence. The findings demonstrate 
that temporarily-deployed actors were more likely and may have responded to 
embedded actors with the use of significant levels of indiscriminate violence during 
the conflict. The results show that during the early periods of fighting, the use of 
indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors was high, and this correlates 
with the periods actors were embedded amongst civilians. At the same time, the 
results suggest that actors, who were embedded for longer periods, may have 
triggered the use of violence against civilians by temporarily-deployed actors. Period 
Four was the most significant period for respondents when they interacted with the 
conflict. This appears to be due to temporarily-deployed actors’ retaliation to attacks 
by embedded actors. While it is not unequivocal, it is a strong possibility. In the next 
chapter, I explore this proposition further.  
The logit models were largely unable to understand whether embeddedness impacted 
the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians during the Nepalese conflict. For 
hypothesis one, there was not much difference between combatants that were 
embedded for a relatively short period (the baseline) and those that were there longer. 
Only those in model 6.1.1 appear somewhat less prone to use violence. Model 6.1.2 
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and 6.1.3 seem to have led to more (not less) violence, but the differences are not 
significant. 
 
Although Maoist actors were more likely to be embedded, and government actors 
were more likely to be temporarily-deployed, I was unable to determine which actors 
used higher levels of indiscriminate violence during the conflict. This issue is 
explored further in the next chapter. Furthermore, I was unable to confirm the second 
hypothesis in this analysis. Trial 1 results support the relationship between 
embeddedness and the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors; but trial 2 
results do not support the link between the use of violence in the initial period of the 
conflict to gain control. Nor is the second hypothesis supported in the results of the 
process tracing analysis (Chapter 5), for the first two periods of the conflict. In the 
next chapter (Chapter Seven), I explore the second hypothesis further. In Chapter 
Seven, I analyse the data collected from the interviews conducted with 38 elite 
interviewees in Nepal. The chapter further investigates the two hypotheses and tries to 
further understand the findings presented in Chapters Five and Six. Based on the 
analysis in next chapter, I determine whether these findings indicate systematic or 
sporadic behaviour by all actors. In the final chapter, I provide conclusive results for 
the overall investigation. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE 
 
7.1 Chapter Overview  
In the previous chapter, I presented the analysis of 517 completed surveys that I 
collected in Nepal. Results revealed that a process of embeddedness had occurred 
during the Nepalese conflict, and that embeddedness may have increased the use of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians by temporarily-deployed actors. The results 
partially confirmed hypothesis one, is there a relationship between embeddedness and 
the manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors 
but provide evidence for the concept of embeddedness underlying this process. There 
appears to be a relationship between the strategic position of embedded actors and the 
use of indiscriminate violence against civilians by temporarily-deployed actors. The 
findings suggest a causal link that will need to be tested further in this chapter. The 
findings presented in Chapter Six suggest that the Maoist actors where often the most 
embedded and this increased the opportunity for temporarily-deployed state actors to 
use indiscriminate violence against civilians. The findings did not provide strong 
support for hypothesis two, is there a relationship between embedded actors using 
indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of a conflict to gain control over civilian 
populations. The results demonstrate that Maoist embedded actors used 
indiscriminate violence throughout the conflict. Embedded actors also used 
indiscriminate violence during the early periods of the conflict; but, according to the 
results, this was not significant. Indiscriminate violence was commonly used during 
Period Three (3–8 years) of the interviewee’s interaction with the conflict. Chapter 
Six furthered the analysis presented in Chapter Five and confirmed the key 
characteristics of the concept of embeddedness.  
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In this chapter, I explore the in-depth, face-to-face interviews that I conducted with 38 
elite members of Nepal civil society. The perspectives of decision makers and 
observers provide insight into the strategies that led to the use of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians. This included interviews with Maoist leaders who openly 
and candidly spoke about killing and giving orders to kill civilians. The interview 
primarily gave me information on actors’ strategic positions and how this triggered 
the use of indiscriminate violence but also leader’s deployment decisions. I use 
content and narrative analysis to better understand the interviewees’ accounts. Results 
of the analysis presented in this chapter show that the Maoist rebels embedded their 
actors amongst civilians as a tactic before, during, and after attacks. The embedding 
of Maoist actors often led state actors on temporary-deployed missions to use 
indiscriminate violence against civilians due to their inability to differentiate between 
actors and civilians. The results show strong support for hypothesis one and partial 
support for hypothesis two. The results reveal that indiscriminate violence was used 
by embedded actors throughout the conflict to gain control. However, this was only 
significantly used during the latter periods of the conflict.  
 
The chapter is composed of three parts. In the first part, I summarise the methods used 
to conduct the face-to-face interviews with 38 elite members of Nepalese civil society 
(Section 7.2) and review the methods used to analyse the interviews (content and 
narrative analysis) (Section 7.3). In the second part, I present the results of the content 
analysis and the themes that emerged in the narrative analysis (Section 7.4). In the 
final part (Section 7.5), I provide a summary of the key findings from the interviews.  
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7.2 Interview Methods 
In this section, I explore the face-to-face interview methods used to collect interviews 
with elites and explore how questions were selected as part of the interview process. 
As detailed in Chapter Four, I conducted all 38 interviews myself. To align the 
interviews with the study hypothesis, I ensured the interview questions contained 
similar thematic questions to those used during the survey. To this end, I extracted 
questions from the survey. This ensured that the questions I asked interviewees and 
the answers they provided could be used to evaluate the hypothesis and offer new 
insights. Thus, the interviews could further my understanding of the strategic 
positions, the use of embeddedness, and allow me to delve deeper, solidify pervious 
results, and clarify conflicting perspectives. Above all, the interviews can clarify 
conflicting perspectives that arose in the previous analyses and allow me to draw 
inferences linked to the study hypothesis.  
 
The interview questions were open-ended, and there were no restrictions on 
interviewees’ potential answers. The open-ended questions allowed the interviewees 
to express their views on the subject matter freely and without filters or restrictions. 
The interviewees determined the locations and times of all interviews, further 
enabling them to be open. To fully understand the use of indiscriminate violence, it 
was important for me to collect as much information as possible from the 
interviewees. The open-ended questions allowed the interviewees to elaborate on their 
feelings, attitudes, and understanding of the subject. This allowed me to obtain 
answers to the complex issues under investigation and understand the interviewees’ 
accounts. The subject areas covered during the interviews included, personal accounts 
of the conflict, and duration of the conflict, the embedding of actors, the behaviour of 
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temporarily-deployed actors on short missions and fixed actors, and indiscriminate 
violence against civilians and its use.  
 
The face-to-face interviews allowed me to capture the interviewees’ verbal and non-
verbal cues, including body language, which can indicate a level of discomfort with 
some questions. This allowed me to maintain the interviewees’ focus on the subject 
matter and control the interview. Capturing their behaviours and emotions allowed me 
to understand the interviewees’ responses more deeply.  
 
7.2.1 The Sample 
The aim of the interviews with elites was to collect perspectives from a variety of 
civilians who reflected a high level of knowledge, themes, and understanding. This 
required me to collect information from well-informed and credible Nepalese 
observers, writers and academics, who understood the issues I was seeking to explore. 
The individuals I interviewed included, among others: the president of a media group; 
the president of a women’s network; a legal officer; the president of the Truth, Justice 
and Reconciliation charity; the founder of a charity; a unit manager at UN Women 
Nepal; the head of the UNIRP; a general; Nepal’s chief negotiator; a former head of 
parliament; a former home secretary; a journalist; and several Nepalese members of 
congress.149  
 
                                                 
149 For a detailed list of elite interviewees please see Appendix B.  
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7.3 Analysis Methods 
In this section, I present the content and narrative analysis methods selected to 
analyse the interviews. The content analysis was conducted using MAXQDA,150 
which converted the audio recordings of interviewees into quantitative data for 
analysis. Content analysis enables researchers to sift through large volumes of data 
with relative ease in a systematic fashion. It is a useful technique to discover and 
describe the focus of individual, group, institutional, or social attention (Weber, 
1990). Furthermore, it allows inferences to be made that can then be corroborated 
using other methods. Content analysis offers an empirical basis for monitoring shifts 
in views of the elite interviewees. The method was selected because it allowed me to 
explore the elite interviews and examine patterns in the interviewees’ responses. 
Finally, the method allowed me to code the different responses and examine the 
overall results of the codes.  
 
Following the content analysis, I used narrative inquiry to understand the ways in 
which people make and use stories to interpret what occurred during the conflict (see 
Burr, 2004, p. 46-62). Narrative inquiry is an umbrella term that captures the study of 
personal and human dimensions of experiences over time and accounts for the 
relationship between individual experiences and cultural context (Clandinin and 
Connelly, 2000). In this thesis, narrative inquiry is used to understand the stories of 
groups and individuals that are linked to events in which embedded and temporarily-
deployed actors used indiscriminate violence. This approach permits me to provide a 
rich and detailed account of the interviewee's experiences. Narrative inquiry also 
allows me to combine different narratives and provide a more coherent understanding 
                                                 
150 https://www.maxqda.com/what-does-maxqda-do (accessed 23/02/2017). 
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of the overall story and the themes that emerge. This helps to capture the everyday 
activities of actors that can be used to analyse the context of the conflict. A downside 
to this method is that the researcher is limited to the interpretations of the 
interviewees. While interviews may provide additional information or multiple story- 
lines on the subject under investigations, the researcher discovers information only as 
the interviewee perceives it. This can be restrictive depending on the person or victim 
interviewed. In the next section, I present the results of the content and narrative 
inquiry of the interviews conducted with the 38 elites in Nepal.  
 
 
7.4 Interview Analysis Results 
7.4.1 Content Analysis  
To assess the first hypothesis, is there a relationship between embeddedness and the 
manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors, I 
asked interviewees to describe what they thought the embedding of actors amongst 
civilian’s population led to. Interviewees were given the options to list as many 
effects as they deemed necessary. The results of interviewees’ answers are presented 
in Figure 7.0. It is important to note that interviewees could give more than one effect 
and multiple answers if they felt necessary. This option was given for each respondent 
with no limitations on how they responded to the question. 
 
 244 
  
Figure 7.0: Interviewee responses to “What did embeddedness lead to?” 
 
58 per cent of the interviewees’ responses indicated that embeddedness led to attacks 
on civilians by state actors. 20 per cent of the responses mentioned that embeddedness 
led to the control of fighting zones, while 12 per cent of the responses said it led to 
torture. The term “attacks” here refers to the use of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians during the period indicated by the interviewee. As Figure 7.0 demonstrates, 
an overwhelming number of the interviewee responses indicated that embeddedness 
increased the chances of an actor using indiscriminate violence against civilians. This 
shows that the elites perceived that the embedding of actors led to the use of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians. Furthermore, 20 per cent of interviewee 
responses indicated that the act of embeddedness led to the control of fighting zones. 
The findings show that there may be some evidence to support hypothesis one. 
 
To further understand why embeddedness occurred, I asked interviewees for their 
perspectives on why rebel actors were embedded. Results are presented in Figure 7.1. 
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A large majority of interviewee responses (66 per cent) indicated that embeddedness 
was used by the rebel actors to hide amongst the civilian populations.  
 
 
 Figure 7.1: Interviewee responses to “Why were rebel actors embedded?” 
 
18 per cent of interviewee responses indicated that the need to ascertain information 
was the reason for actors being embedded amongst civilians. The findings support the 
concept of embeddedness and demonstrate how complex it would have been for 
temporarily-deployed state actors to distinguish between the embedded rebel actors 
and civilians. Interviewees were further asked to share their thoughts on why 
indiscriminate violence was used by temporarily-deployed actors against the civilian 
populations. Results show that many interviewee responses (51 per cent) indicated 
that indiscriminate violence occurred because temporarily-deployed actors were 
unable to differentiate between actors and civilians. 42 per cent of responses claimed 
that violence occurred because of attacks against them; while only 6 per cent stated 
that it was because of confusion (See Figure 7.2). The term “to hide amongst 
civilians” means that actors are concealing themselves within the civilian population 
and often carry out operations during this period. This often revolved around using 
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civilians as human shields when the army entered a city or zones. According to 
interviewees, this involved the tactic of moving undetected through the ranks of 
civilian populations. They hide in plain sight by wearing civilian clothes rather than 
uniforms or distinctive emblems. They may be farmers by day and fighters by night as 
was observed in Chapter 5. Violence will often encompass periods where civilians are 
wedged in the middle of the different actors and killed. 
For example, ISIS is known to have used civilians as human shields, and to have shot 
and killed Iraqi residents trying to flee. In one three-day period in June 2018, the U.N. 
reported that ISIS killed at least 204 civilians trying desperately to get out of the city. 
The total number of their victims is unknown.151 The protection or shelter indicated in 
the results mean that civilians may offer food and shelter to enemy soldiers and 
during this process civilians are insinuated to be linked to the enemy. This can also be 
done when civilians who are being used as a shield to protect combatants. 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Interviewee responses to why temporarily-deployed actors used violence 
 
                                                 
151 https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/battle-against-isis-syria-iraq-civilians-suffer-most-n779656 
[access on 12/07/2018] 
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Results show that interviewees perceived that the use of indiscriminate violence was 
often linked to embeddedness and its effects on temporarily-deployed state actors. 
Results show that interviewees perceived two main reasons for the use of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians by temporarily-deployed actors: first, 
temporarily-deployed actors’ inability to differentiate between embedded actors and 
civilians; and second, attacks against temporarily-deployed actors by embedded 
actors.  
The term confusion describes the disorientation of an actor during the time when this 
actor may experience a violent attack upon his/her unit or group of actors from where 
the actor is serving. The confusion comes when the actors do not know who attacked 
them or the reason why the attack occurred. Opposing actors might see these attacks 
as unfair and may feel actors do not respect the rule of engagement or the laws of 
armed conflict. This attack may lead to some form of a reaction towards those in the 
vicinity. In the case of Nepal, interviewees often claimed this confusion was 
experienced directly after the Maoist rebel laid an unexpected attack on state actors.  
 
Finally, I asked interviewees to describe the forms of indiscriminate violence most 
widely-used by temporarily-deployed actors. Figure 7.3 illustrates the various forms 
of violent acts used by temporarily-deployed state actors during the conflict.  
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Figure 7.3: Interviewee responses on forms of violence used by temporarily-deployed actors 
 
Results show that 40 per cent of interviewee responses identified killings as the most 
widely-used form of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors during 
the conflict. This was followed by kidnapping at 21 per cent, rape and physical abuse 
at 13 per cent, verbal abuse at 6 per cent, and sexual abuse at 5 per cent.  
 
To assess the second hypothesis, is there a relationship between embedded actors 
using indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of a conflict to gain control over 
civilian populations, I asked the interviewees several questions. As Figure 7.0 
demonstrates, some interviewees' responses indicated that embeddedness led to the 
control of fighting zones. To further assess the second hypothesis, I asked 
interviewees, “Which actors lived amongst civilians the longest?” Results show the 
Maoist rebels, more than all other actors, embedded their fighters amongst the 
civilians the longest. The findings presented in Figure 7.4 suggest the reason 
temporarily-deployed actors may have resorted to attacking civilians during the 
conflict. When attacked by embedded rebel actors, temporarily-deployed state actors 
sought the rebel actors amongst the civilian population. 
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Figure 7.4: Interviewee responses to “Which actors lived amongst civilians the longest?” 
 
Results show that embedded actors were significantly embedded during the first 
month of the conflict. Figure 7.5 presents the results of interviewee responses to the 
questions “How long were rebel actors embedded (from the beginning of the 
conflict)?” According to the results, 48 per cent of interviewee responses showed that 
actors were embedded for under a month. 31 per cent of responses indicated that 
actors were embedded for the entire length of the conflict, and 18 per cent for over a 
month; while 4 per cent indicated a 2–4-year period. The findings here correspond to 
the survey findings presented in Chapter 6.  
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Figure 7.5: Interviewee responses to “How long were rebel actors embedded?”  
 
The results presented in Figure 7.5 establish that, according to interviewees, rebel 
actors were more frequently embedded with civilians for a period of under a one-
month.  
Combining the results presented in Figure 7.5 with those presented in Figure 7.0 
suggests that embedded actors may have used indiscriminate violence to control 
civilian populations and this may have been more significant during the initial periods 
of the conflict. However, only 20 per cent of interviewee responses indicated that 
embeddedness led to control of fighting zones (See Figure 7.0). As such, it is only 
possible to say that embeddedness may be associated with the need to gain control of 
a zone and the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors, but I cannot 
conclusively state that this occurred during the initial periods of the conflict.  
 
The findings from the content analysis in this chapter support (to a degree) the 
findings presented in Chapters Five and Six concerning hypothesis one. However, 
while I establish that embeddedness occurred and led to an inability to differentiate 
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between embedded actors and civilian on the side of temporarily-deployed actors, I 
cannot claim that indiscriminate violence was fully used by embedded actors to 
control the civilian populations during the initial periods of the conflict, because there 
was insufficient evidence from interviewees on this matter. However, there was some 
partial evidence that embeddedness was often used to control fighting zones. 
Nevertheless, I note that embeddedness involves some level of control, according to 
the findings presented in Figure 7.0. 
 
In the next section of this chapter, I present the results of the narrative analysis and 
describe what occurred during the conflict according to the elites interviewed. 
Narrative analysis tries to explain what has occurred. The analysis process explores 
why things are, or have become, the way they are. The narrative analysis provides a 
view of how interviewees, as individuals, experienced certain events and their 
subjective perspective of these experiences. The analysis also provides insight into the 
narrative means (or devices) used to make sense of the interviewees accounts.  
 
7.4.2 Narrative Analysis  
Narrative analysis is used exclusively with verbal material, typically stories and 
accounts of personal experiences. The method studies individuals, groups, cultures, or 
historical periods by means of either qualitative or quantitative data. The method 
primarily involves examining the interviewees’ comments and responses to certain 
questions posed during interviews. Narrative analysis not only has constructive and 
predictive validity, but it is also the best available method to understand what 
emerged from the data collected in all the interviews. The excerpts from the 
interviews presented in this section provide a portrait of what occurred in Nepal from 
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the perspective of elites interviewed. Protecting the anonymity of the interviewees is 
essential to this research project. Therefore, the interview excerpts presented in this 
chapter are identified by unique codes with the following prefix, C7RN.152  
 
To set the stage for this analysis, I begin with the following comments, taken from 
interviews with two actors from opposing sides of the conflict: 
  
When we [the Maoists] established courts in these areas, we 
had to be amongst the civilian population to be able to give 
out the justice that the people required. Civilians became 
combatants, and there was no difference between civilians 
and combatants (C7RN008). 
 
Straight after an ambush, those people who are in uniform 
are defined as your friends; those people who are not in 
uniform are generally defined as your foes (C7RN014). 
 
Both interviewees were actively involved in the conflict and held senior positions, one 
within the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and Armed Police Force (APF) and the other 
within the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The interviewees describe two 
different experiences of the conflict, and it is experiences such as these that I aim to 
explore in this analysis.  
 
Interviewee accounts establish that the process of embeddedness occurred during the 
conflict in Nepal and led to problems in differentiating between civilians and 
embedded actors by temporarily-deployed actors. The following interview excerpts 
demonstrate the interviewees’ views of embeddedness and its impact on other actors 
                                                 
152 See Appendix B for a detailed list of anonymised interviews. 
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and civilians during the conflict. A former rebel commander, who provided 
intelligence to the Maoist forces on the ground, stated, “Since the beginning of the 
war, we were always amongst the people and as it started getting bigger, we even had 
over 3,000 people living in one village, living amongst civilians.” (C7RN004) A 
member of an NGO, who worked in the rural areas of Nepal, confirmed this.  
 
The first tactical strategy was hide-and-seek. They [the 
Maoists] would attack one place and remain silent for a 
while. The second tactic that they used was to remain and 
live with the villagers, so whenever the army or police 
started searching, they could not differentiate between 
civilians and Maoist (C7RN015). 
 
This account confirms that rebel actors were known to live with civilians and used 
different tactics to confuse their enemy. This made differentiating between embedded 
actors and civilians difficult for temporarily-deployed state actors.  
 
They [the Maoists] were highly mobile and used guerrilla 
tactics to confuse and distract the security force. They would 
attack different places at the same time. This would cause 
nothing but confusion for the security forces (C7RN0023).  
 
We (Maoist) would often attack the police post by splitting 
into two groups. The first group would lay the bombs down 
and the second group would enter the compound and 
demand weapons… if the police did not surrender then we 
would kill them…we were also instructed to capture these 
zones within 45 minutes (C7RN0026). 
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These citations reveal the tactics that the Maoist used against the state. The first 
quote, shows how efficient the Maoist were at attempting to not only defeat the RNA 
and other actors, but also how these tactics may have provoked state forces. The 
interviewee demonstrates that the Maoist constantly used hit-and-run tactics and this 
strategy confused many of the security force and contributed to the use of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians. The findings also show that the Maoist 
actors in the field were implicit in using violence against the state forces and civilians. 
On many instances, Maoist actors killed civilians assumed to be informers and state 
actors to achieve their objectives.  
 
In another account, the interviewee describes a situation where the Maoist appears to 
be infiltrated amongst the civilian populations everywhere. The interviewee goes on 
to describe how difficult it was for anyone who was on the state side to comprehend 
where the attack was going to occur or whom by. 
 
The police would not know where their enemy was because 
they were all around them, they were living in communities 
and patrolling the community knowing that there are people 
within that community who could be Maoists, who could 
attack them, and were watching their movement…there was 
constant fear (C7RN001). 
 
The extract above demonstrates how difficult it would have been for any of the actors 
to differentiate between the different actors which the state was facing. It also shows 
how Maoist actors made it their strategy to live amongst the civilian populations. 
According to a Maoist rebel’s account, embeddedness was not only a strategy; it was 
Maoist policy to embed their actors amongst the civilian populations.  
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Embedding actors in civilian areas was our tactic; this was 
because we did not have a barrack or anywhere to stay, and 
so we had to stay with the people. Living amongst civilians 
was our [the Maoists] base and our home (C7RN004). 
 
Interviewee accounts further confirm that embeddedness led to the use of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians. The extract describes what a strategy for the 
Maoist side was; key to this was the ability to position actors within civilian 
populations as a community. The SP used this strategic position throughout the two-
decade Peruvian conflict. The same interviewee claimed how the Maoist would 
eventually increase their combatant size in civilian or village areas by increasing their 
scope to infiltrate civilians and cause further confusion for the state actors: 
 
Since the beginning of the war, we were always amongst the 
people and as it started getting bigger. We even had over 
3,000 people living in one village, living amongst civilians 
(C7RN004). 
 
The evidence above describes how the Maoist would embed actors amongst the 
civilian population as a strategy. The embedding of actors within civilian populated 
areas appears to have been used as a policy to hide Maoist actors from the state’s 
temporarily-deployed actors.  
The following is a passage from an interview with a senior government official, 
 
The combatants [the Maoists] were mixed up with members 
of societies. It was often difficult to know who was who. 
The government security forces were so desperate, so they 
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had to do something to react to the attacks. So, they would 
attack anyone in their vicinity (C7RN003). 
 
According to this interviewee, state actors were left with no other choice but to use 
indiscriminate violence against civilians. The account demonstrates that 
embeddedness led to indiscriminate violence. The account here draws similarities 
to the testimony of General Luis Cisneros in 1983, who described the Peruvian 
government’s strategy as one of havoc and retaliation. The accounts also reveal 
how the mixing of actors [the Maoist] and civilians contribute to differentiating 
issues which resulted in civilians in the vicinity experiencing indiscriminate 
violence. Two interviewees further verify the account of embeddedness below. The 
first account describes how embeddedness manifested itself with the civilian 
populations and how the partnership between the civilians and the Maoist actors 
was key to the Maoist survival; the second account proves how the Maoists’ 
fundamental strategy relied on the support of the civilian populations.  
 
There was no difference between civilians and the Maoist at 
the local level. We were there side-by side working for the 
people and for whatever the people needed (C7RN007). 
 
We [Maoist] were never in the jungle. We were always 
amongst the civilians. The people always sheltered us…we 
had no money only 500 rupees a month for expenses and it 
was not enough, so the local people used to help us with 
food. It was not forcefully but people willing helped us 
(C7RN005). 
 
Other interviewees, on the side of the state, noted a similar causal effect on state 
actors.  
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There were definitely times when the Maoists were hidden 
amongst the civilian populations, and this would lead to 
attacks on the civilian populations. Many of the people who 
were killed were not affiliated with the Maoist, but they 
were still taken and missing (C7RN006).  
 
We [the RNA] did not even know who the leader was or 
what he looked like. The security force was fighting a 
reactive battle. They would counter attack only when they 
were attacked, so the power was exclusively in the hands of 
the rebels (C7RN002). 
 
These accounts confirm the impact of the process of embeddedness on the civilian 
populations. The embedding of actors within areas populated by civilians appears 
to have been used as a strategy to hide Maoist actors from temporarily-deployed 
state actors. The evidence also reveals the complexity of differentiating embedded 
Maoist actors from civilians. The comments presented show the existence of 
embeddedness and reveal Maoist actors’ dependency on civilians, which was 
necessary for the Maoist actors to continue to fight the state. 
This is further confirmed by a senior civil society member who claims the Maoists 
would blend themselves amongst the civilian populations and the embedding of 
actors would later lead to attacks on the civilian populations.  
 
They [Maoist] are in the society without uniform and they 
can hide themselves in society and camouflage themselves. 
This provides them with safety and makes it very hard for 
the security forces to find them immediately after an attack 
(C7RN014). 
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These testimonies demonstrate that civilians became “piggies in the middle,” caught 
in the cross-fire. Due to embeddedness, civilians experienced attacks, although they 
may not have been affiliated with the embedded Maoist actors. Embeddedness, 
according to the interviewees, generated, facilitated, and increased the opportunity for 
temporarily-deployed state actors to use indiscriminate violence against civilians 
because they were unable to differentiate between embedded actors and civilians. One 
interviewee goes further to say, “Many of them (army) were frustrated and killed so 
many civilians because of not being able to find the Maoist after an attack on their 
battalion” (C7RN015). 
 
In several cases, they (Maoist) would live in these places for 
months and in some cases years amongst the civilian 
population. One third would be the security force for the 
community, while others would roam the towns and secure 
the areas where they were based. The rest of the two thirds 
would be helping the local communities cooking, cleaning, 
farming, and undertaking cultural shows (C7RN0028).  
 
The citation reaffirms the earlier evidence above and shows that embeddedness 
occurred, but there was dependency by the Maoist actors on civilians. Due to 
embeddedness, civilians did experience attacks, despite having no affiliations to the 
embedded Maoist actors. One participant even noted how the Maoist rebel actors 
would split actors in fighting zones amongst civilians. “One third would provide 
security… while two thirds would be helping local communities”.  
A Maoist strategist further confirms the Maoist strategic positon and their overall 
strategy of winning civilian hearts and minds. This also includes a layer of 
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governing locals by creating a governance system designed to compete with the 
states. 
 
When we [Maoist] established courts in these areas we had 
to be fixed amongst the civilian populations to be able to 
give out the justice that the people required. Civilians 
became combatants and there was no difference between 
civilians and combatants (C7RN008).  
 
As an interviewee from the APF commented, 
 
Immediately after the ambush on our vehicle…five people 
were approaching the ambush site, and my people [APF 
actors] were about to kill them, and I stopped them. I said to 
them, “No” because those people who ambushed us have 
already left. These people are unknown civilians; they are 
not the insurgents, and they did not lay the ambush on us 
(C7RN014).  
 
This account shows how difficult the situation was after an ambush, and how it could 
have led APF actors to use indiscriminate violence against passers-by. According to 
one interviewee, a civil society member, “When they were unable to find the 
Maoists…they started killing local villagers…. Around 15–16 people were killed on 
that day” (C7RN004). Civilians, who were near embedded Maoist actors, were killed 
because temporarily-deployed state actors could not find the Maoist actors after an 
attack. The interviewee further claimed that, “Straight after an ambush, those people 
who are in uniforms are defined as your friends; those people who are not in uniform 
are generally defined as your foes” (C7RN014). This account describes how state 
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actors may have viewed civilians after an attack and reveals the complexities of what 
temporarily-deployed APF actors underwent when their battalion was attacked. Some 
interviewees regarded the RNA as more aggressive, heavy-handed, and violent in 
their behaviour toward civilians. Some accused the RNA of being the worst 
perpetrator of violence against civilians amongst all the actors. The collection of 
testimonies presented above strengthens the results of the content analysis and 
confirms hypothesis one. The interviewee goes on to say that,  
 
The first thing is they will operate from such a place so that 
after the incident they can run away and have a clear-cut gap 
between the security forces and themselves. Secondly, they 
will pick a place where they can blend in with society. A 
place where it is difficult for them to be identified…This 
provides them with safety and makes it very hard for 
security forces to find them immediately after an attack 
(C7RN014). 
 
This account shows how exasperating the situation would have been for any 
temporarily-deployed actors on the states side. The example reveals the complexities 
and dilemmas surrounding temporarily-deployed actors and indicates the difficulties 
faced in differentiating between civilians and embedded actors, predominantly 
because embedded Maoist actors did not wear uniforms during battles. 
In response to questions about embedded actors’ use of indiscriminate violence 
against civilians, interviewees confirmed that it occurred and was used in some cases 
to gain control of the civilian population. According to a Maoist interviewee, “If we 
[the Maoists] found out that people were informers after an attack or once we arrived, 
we would either kick them out of the village or in some cases kill them” (C7RN005). 
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This account demonstrates that the embedded Maoist rebels followed an active policy 
to not only remove civilians whom they felt posed an issue or could potentially disrupt 
their position or overall strategy. Many civilians may have experienced attacks from 
the Maoist because they were a threat to the strategic position and objective. 
This is confirmed from an interviewee on the state side, who claims:  
Most of the times because of the attacks that were put on the 
security forces it often led to people [security forces] 
attacking innocent people…some were raped, abused, and 
other brutally murdered (C7RN0016). 
 The above citation shows that states actors were triggered about how to differentiate 
between civilians and embedded actors after an attack. Participants also suggested 
that this frustration and confusion with attempting to differentiate did lead to civilians 
experiencing indiscriminate violence. 
 
When you [The Royal Nepalese Army] are fighting a 
symmetry war where the security forces are completely 
melted into the population, the population mostly because of 
intimidation are reluctant to share information. This means 
your information network is not there. This information 
supports the opportunity to understand the strategy that the 
enemy is using. This would have led to violence and 
frustration towards civilians (C7RN002).  
 
 
According to the above interviewee, civilians were also forced to support the Maoist 
actors. C7RN002 also suggests that conditions like embeddedness and a lack of 
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information from the host community would have inevitably led to violence against 
civilians. The citations reveal the states state actors were frustrated by the conditions 
of embeddedness and the act of embedding actors by the Maoist did contribute to the 
use of indiscriminate violence against civilians within the zones that TDA where sent 
to. 
This account confirms that embedded rebel actors used indiscriminate violence 
against civilians, often to stop civilians from sharing information or because they 
suspected them of sharing information after an attack. It also implies the Maoist actors 
believed it was important to keep information within their zones, and any threat to that 
needed to be contained. It further suggests that keeping information secure was also a 
way of controlling or gaining control after an attack and shows this in collaboration 
with the strategic position on Maoist were two crucial strategies. The next account 
demonstrates the experiences of civilians who did not comply with Maoist actors’ 
requests.  
 
Once they [Maoist actors] first appeared, they were very 
forceful towards locals who did not join their parades or 
efforts to win the hearts and minds of civilians. Those who 
usually did not comply were often beaten or forced to flee 
(C7RN004).  
 
This testimony shows the Maoist actors’ use of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians to control them. The Maoist actors appeared to not have harmed those who 
complied but used violence against civilians who did not obey. Another interviewee 
further said that:  
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The Maoist violence against civilians was reactive to what 
the security force did to them, and they would often blame 
the local population for this as revenge, especially when 
they were losing or trying to gain control (C7RN001).  
 
This testimony demonstrates that there may also have been reactive violence against 
civilians, perpetrated by Maoist actors because of state attacks against Maoist actors 
or because of their losses to state actors. This suggests that the Maoist actors were as 
reactive as the state actors to attacks during the Nepalese conflict. This reactive 
violence appears to be linked to attacks they experienced when losing or when trying 
to (re)gain control of an area. The attacks on civilians by the Maoist, seems to be 
linked to the state’s awareness of the Maoist location and their counterinsurgency 
efforts which followed.  
  
The situation was so tense that often people would act 
without using their brains…I said to my combatants that we 
had to use our brains before we acted. I told them that those 
who had attacked us would run away as this is a basic 
minimum tactic. This was one of the real reasons for human 
rights abuses during the conflict (C7RN034). 
 
The citation shows if this senior officer did not control temporarily-deployed actors, 
the potential for them to use indiscriminate violence against civilians after an attack 
would be imminent. The respondent goes as far to suggest that if actors do not think 
after an ambush, then it would be inevitable that indiscriminate violence would be 
used against civilians. The participant also notes this as a causal explanation for why 
human rights abuses occurred during the conflict.  
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In many cases, they [Royal Nepalese Army] would go back 
to their barracks, try, and resettle but in some cases, they 
would get into arguments with locals and completely loose it 
with the locals (C7RN006).   
 
Our tactics [The Maoist] made the police and RNA 
frustrated. Sometimes when they were defeated, they would 
create excessive violence against the civilian population… 
Sometimes what they did was to burn people’s houses and 
villages and fire indiscriminately against people. This was 
because the Maoist would just blend amongst the people 
(C7RN007). 
 
Sometimes it would happen where the army would get 
frustrated because the army was unsure about who was 
who…this later lead to a catch and kill policy where anyone 
assumed to be associated was killed by the army 
(C7RN009). 
The citations show that embeddedness contributed to the use of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians. Many participants revealed how state actors often appeared 
to be triggered by the attacks and how the attacks contribute to actors using violence 
against civilians because they were unable to differentiate between embedded actors 
and civilians during the fighting. What also materialises from the narratives is that as 
differentiating between civilians and actors became harder, it became easy to simply 
resort to violence against the nearest civilian cluster. 
 
However, for one interviewee, violence against civilians was not an official Maoist 
strategy, 
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For the Maoist targeting the civilian population was against 
their war tactics, they were careful about the crimes they 
committed and always wanted to give some form of political 
justification for their crimes (C7RN013).  
 
The following account reveals the extent of the Maoist actors’ use of indiscriminate 
violence, from perspective of a member of civil society,  
 
The Maoists were by far the most violent for us. They were 
more in numbers, they were living amongst us, and their 
ambushes were brutal throughout the conflict…They had a 
more violent front and used violence throughout the conflict. 
They always created an environment of fear and were very 
aggressive (C7RN010).  
 
This account demonstrates the behaviour of embedded Maoist actors who were 
violent and aggressive towards civilians. The testimony also recounts that the Maoist 
actors created an atmosphere of fear. Despite higher levels of indiscriminate violence 
used by temporarily-deployed state actors (See Chapter 5), embedded Maoist actors 
were also shown to use indiscriminate violence against civilians. The accounts show 
that the Maoist actors, to some degree, created an atmosphere of fear amongst the 
civilian populations. Fear may have been one of the ways Maoists actors used to gain 
control over the civilians. Maoist actors also used indiscriminate violence as a way of 
controlling the civilian populations amongst whom they were embedded.  
The testimonies below examine actors and their behaviour during the conflict, and 
what the analysis continues to show is that Maoist actors did use indiscriminate 
violence against civilians. 
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The Maoist violence against civilians was reactive to what 
the security force did to them and they would often blame 
the local population for this as revenge (C7RN001). 
 
When the Maoist were sure that they were meeting the 
police, they would place civilians at the front. This is also 
how some civilians died (C7RN010). 
 
They (Maoist) would place the civilians in front and use 
them as human shields. So that the police were confused, as 
to how they would handle the situation (C7RN012). 
 
The Maoist would also use the civilians as porters and made 
them carry things at the front when they were charging 
against the security forces. This led to an increase in the 
number of civilians killed (C7RN007).  
 
The violence experience and seen by participants concerning Maoist actors who were 
fixed and embedded appears to be more forceful in nature and used when the Maoist 
actors needed certain objectives to be fulfilled by the civilians they populated. This 
included using civilians as human shields and being forced to give food and shelter. 
The behaviour of Maoist actors was vastly different to that seen by participants on the 
state side. State actors tended to use violence in a reactive manner. One participant 
remarks this was because the RNA was “scared” of the Maoist and unsure of whom 
they were. This reactive behaviour appears to have provoked and tipped over the 
security forces to use indiscriminate violence against civilians and may have 
contributed to the Maoist successful recruitment of civilians.  
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The findings from this analysis cannot confirm the hypothesis that is there a 
relationship between embedded actors using indiscriminate violence at the initial 
stages of a conflict to gain control over civilian populations. The interviews confirm 
the Maoist actors were known to use violence to control civilians, but there is no 
evidence that this occurred during the initial periods of the conflict. In fact, most 
interviewees claimed that embedded actors used indiscriminate violence throughout 
the conflict, and not during specific periods. The indiscriminate violence perpetrated 
by Maoist actors and witnessed by interviewees was forceful in nature. The analysis 
further revealed that both state and Maoist actors used indiscriminate violence against 
civilians in a reactive manner.  
 
7.5 Summary of Findings  
In this chapter, I furthered the investigation by analysing the interviews I conducted 
with 38 elites in Nepal. The results of the content and narrative analysis of the 
interviews provide an account of the use of indiscriminate violence in the conflict in 
Nepal. The results presented in this chapter support hypothesis one and the concept of 
embeddedness and contribute to understanding why temporarily-deployed state actors 
used indiscriminate violence against civilians in the conflict. Most interviewees 
confirmed that state actors were unable to distinguish between embedded actors and 
civilians when on deployed missions. The effects of embeddedness were often 
experienced by state actors (RNA actors) who reacted to their losses by attacking 
civilians.  
 
The results offer minor support for hypothesis two. According to interviewee 
accounts, actors used indiscriminate violence to gain control over zones or for 
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retaliation purposes. Results show that the use of indiscriminate violence by 
embedded actors was associated with trying to gain control of civilian populations, 
often after an attack. Interviewees said that when Maoist actors were attacked or 
under siege by state actors, they often assumed that certain civilians were linked to the 
state or were state informants. This often resulted in indiscriminate violence against 
civilians. As the fighting continued, Maoist actors continued to use embeddedness as 
a strategy to confuse the state actors. Finally, the findings confirm that the use of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians through embeddedness occurs under two 
conditions: first, when an embedded actor resorts to using indiscriminate violence to 
gain control over civilian populations; second, when temporarily-deployed actors use 
indiscriminate violence against civilians because they are unable to differentiate 
between embedded actors and civilians.  
 
In the final chapter (Chapter 8), I summarise the results presented in Chapters Five, 
Six, and Seven to offer a more holistic understanding to the two hypotheses. In 
Chapter Eight, I use the method of triangulation to bring the results together and give 
an overall understanding of the investigation. I then provide recommendations for 
policymakers who specialise in the protection of civilians and the prevention of 
indiscriminate violence in conflicts.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Chapter Overview  
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to existing knowledge developed by researchers 
in conflict studies and by peacekeepers, field practitioners, and policymakers who 
have examined the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in conflict. To 
explore this problem, I focused on the single case study of the Nepalese decade-long 
conflict (1996-2006) and employed different methods to understand how and why 
indiscriminate violence was used. In Chapter Three, I argued that the concept of 
embeddedness is a useful concept to advance understanding in the field of conflict 
studies. Exploring the impact of the embedding of actors in a conflict zone has proven 
helpful to understanding the use of and trends in the use of indiscriminate violence 
during the decade-long conflict in Nepal (1996-2006). The concept presented in 
Chapter Three aims to explain how certain conditions can drive actors to use 
indiscriminate violence against civilians. In Chapters Five, Six and Seven, I explored 
the validity of this concept in the context of the Nepalese conflict, using different 
methods to provide supportive evidence. 
 
In Chapter Seven, I presented the results of the interviews conducted with 38 
Nepalese elites, which provide further support for the hypothesis is there a 
relationship between embeddedness and the manifestation of indiscriminate violence 
used by of temporarily-deployed actors. Interviewee accounts indicated that the 
Maoist rebels embedded their actors amongst civilians as a tactic. This often-
provoked state actors' (i.e., the Royal Nepalese Army, Armed Police Force, and State 
Police) on temporary-deployment to use indiscriminate violence against civilians. 
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Chapter Seven demonstrated that indiscriminate violence was regularly used by 
temporarily-deployed state actors who were unable to differentiate between embedded 
actors and civilians. The provocative attacks of the Maoist actors against state actors 
also increased the likelihood of indiscriminate violence. Finally, the results presented 
in Chapter Seven provide partial support for the hypothesis on the use of 
indiscriminate violence by embedded actors. Results show that embedded actors are 
likely to use indiscriminate violence as a means of gaining control. However, I did not 
find evidence for the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors to gain 
control exclusively during the–intial–periods when respondents first interacted with 
the conflict. Results show that indiscriminate violence was used by embedded actors 
throughout the conflict for this purpose.  
 
In the final chapter of this thesis, I summarise and verify the results of the analyses 
presented in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven using the method of triangulation. 
Triangulation is a way of ensuring the accuracy of the various results of the study. In 
this thesis, I use triangulation to bring together the findings presented in Chapters 
Five, Six, and Seven and collectively verify them. Triangulation further helps me to 
understand the overall use of and trends in indiscriminate violence in the Nepalese 
conflict and to consider whether embeddedness contributed to its use.  
 
This chapter is composed of three parts. In the first part (Sections 8.2-8.3); I present 
the results of the triangulation of the study findings. I discuss the accuracy of the 
findings and the validity of the study hypothesis (one and two). In the final part 
(Sections 8.4-8.5), I summarise the study findings and provide concluding remarks 
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and recommendations for policymakers, field practitioners and researchers who focus 
on the protection of civilians in conflicts and peacekeeping missions. 
 
8.2 Triangulation Results, Hypothesis One 
In this section, I triangulate the study results and provide a unified explanation and 
answer for hypothesis one, Is there a relationship between embeddedness and the 
manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors The 
results of the process tracing analysis presented in Chapter Five support the 
hypothesis. Results show that temporarily-deployed actors used indiscriminate 
violence because they were unable to differentiate between civilians and embedded 
actors. This occurred when the Royal Nepalese Army assumed command of 
operations under Operation Unified Command in 2002 and, in the early years of the 
conflict, when the police were in control of operations. Temporarily-deployed actors 
often used indiscriminate violence in response to attacks by embedded Maoist actors, 
but they were unable to differentiate between civilians and the embedded actors. The 
results suggest that the longer Maoist actors were embedded, the harder it became for 
the temporarily-deployed state actors to differentiate between them and civilians.  
 
The survey results presented in Chapter Six reveal that the first period of the conflict 
(0–6 months) was the most significant for the use of indiscriminate violence by 
temporarily-deployed actors and that the embedding of Maoist actors increased the 
likelihood of its use (64%, p=0.03). Survey results further show that embeddedness 
correlated with an increased use of indiscriminate violence against civilians by 
temporarily-deployed actors because they were unable to differentiate between 
embedded actors and civilians. Results show that Period One (0–6 months) was the 
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most significant in the use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed state 
actors due to differentiating issues (88%, p=0.00). This was followed, in descending 
order, by Periods Four (8 years–end of the conflict), Two (6 months–3 years) and 
Three (3–8 years). However, the logistic regression analysis should no support for the 
hypothesis result in the acceptance of the null hypothesis. There was no relationship 
detected during the three model conducted during this analysis, 
 
The results of the interviews presented in Chapter Seven, show that embeddedness 
occurred and contributed to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. 
According to the results, temporarily-deployed state actors (e.g., the Royal Nepalese 
Army) tended to use indiscriminate violence in response to attacks by Maoist 
embedded actors. The attacks drove state actors to search for Maoist embedded 
actors; and, as it became difficult to differentiate between civilians and Maoist 
embedded actors, this led to the use indiscriminate violence against civilians. The 
interviewees often said that the violence was due to the inability of state actors to 
differentiate between embedded rebel actors and civilians. 
 
The findings in this study partial support the concept of embeddedness and the 
hypothesis is there a relationship between embeddedness and the manifestation of 
indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors. The findings show 
that embeddedness contributed to confusion on the ground, which, in turn, led to 
indiscriminate violence against civilians. Results reveal that this occurred, 
predominantly, when embedded Maoist actors attacked state actors and then 
embedded themselves among civilians. However, as pointed out in the logit models 
there was no significance in the results of the modelss. Temporarily-deployed state 
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actors used indiscriminate violence most frequently. Based on these findings, I reject 
the null hypothesis and accept the expectations set out in hypothesis one. 
 
8.3 Triangulation Results, Hypothesis Two  
In this section, I triangulate the study results to provide a unified explanation and 
answer for hypothesis two, Embeddedness increases the likelihood of embedded 
actors using indiscriminate violence at the initial stages as a means of gaining 
control. The results of the process tracing analysis presented in Chapter Five provide 
partial support for hypothesis two. Results show that during the latter period of the 
conflict, after being embedded amongst civilians for a length of time, embedded 
actors used indiscriminate violence as a means of gaining control. This was 
particularly apparent during Operation Unified Command (2002–the end of the 
conflict). The losses incurred because of Operation Unified Command triggered the 
adoption of a violent approach towards civilians by the embedded Maoist actors. 
However, the use of violence to gain control was not detected during the initial 
periods of the conflict as anticipated. The results show some indiscriminate violence 
during the first two periods, but at very low levels. As such, it is not possible, based 
on these results, to determine whether indiscriminate violence was used as a means of 
gaining control throughout the conflict.  
 
The results of cross-tabulation analysis, presented in Chapter Six, were varied. 
Results show that while embedded actors were likely to use indiscriminate violence 
during the initial stages of the conflict, they were more likely to do so during the latter 
years. There is significant evidence (0.01 confidence level) that embedded actors used 
indiscriminate violence as a way of gaining control during the first months (up to six 
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months) of the fighting; however, the strength of the relationship between the two 
variables (embeddedness and the use of violence to gain control) was lowest then. 
During Period Three (3–8 years), the strength of the relationship between the 
variables was the highest, with a small decrease in Period Four (8 years–end of the 
conflict). The findings suggest that the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded 
actors to gain control was not confined to the initial period of the conflict as expected, 
but occurred throughout. However, the logistic regression analysis should no support 
for the hypothesis result in the acceptance of the null hypothesis.  
Furthermore, while indiscriminate violence was used against civilians as a means of 
gaining control, it may not have been a systematic strategy. However, the results of 
thr logit models show no significance for hypothesis two and I accept the null 
hypothesis.  
For both hypotheses the results seem to indicate that it is quite likely that as 
combatants spend a longer period in a village the likelihood that violence rises. 
However, the probability of using violence in any given day may stay the same or 
even go down, but as more time passes it becomes more likely that violence was 
committed during the whole period. Even if actors stayed in a village for a long time 
or at some point only recently arrived and maybe committed violence during this 
period rather than later on. The data does not allow me to distinguish between these 
possibilities. It is important to note, that I do not try and state this as something that 
the results fully support in both hypotheses. The results of all models show no 
relationship with any of the IV and DV for hypotheses one and two. As a result, I 
have to accept the null hypothesis for both hypotheses. 
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The results of the interviews presented in Chapter Seven, confirm that the use of 
indiscriminate violence by embedded actors occurred throughout the conflict. 
Interviewees corroborated that Maoist actors were embedded among civilians for the 
longest periods during the conflict. Results show that embeddedness often led to 
attacks on the civilian population (58 per cent of responses). The Maoist embedded 
actors were more likely to use violence against civilians after a battle with 
temporarily-deployed state actors. They often assumed that civilians were affiliated 
with the state authorities or were state informers. However, the reported number of 
incidences of indiscriminate violence perpetrated by embedded actors was lower than 
the number perpetrated by state actors. This may be due to the dependence of the 
Maoist embedded actors on the civilian population, and their need to survive amongst 
them. Frequent use of indiscriminate violence may not have been conducive to the 
Maoist actor’s overall aims. While the interview results support the occurrence of 
indiscriminate violence perpetrated by embedded actors to control civilians, it did not 
occur predominately in the initial periods of the conflict.  
 
Overall, the study results confirm that when embedded Maoist actors lost control of a 
zone, they often resorted to using indiscriminate violence against civilians. However, 
this occurred throughout the conflict. The results show some support for hypothesis 
two, but indiscriminate violence to gain control was not confined to the initial periods 
of the conflict. Furthermore, both embedded and temporarily-deployed actors used 
indiscriminate violence to gain control during the conflict. Therefore, I am unable to 
reject the null hypothesis and accept the expectations set out in hypothesis two. 
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8.4 Summary 
Through the process of triangulation, I have tried to bring together the study findings 
presented in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven. I conclude that the findings’ support for 
hypothesis one was accurate, as was the lack of confirmation for hypothesis two. 
Throughout the results, I found that embeddedness indeed occurred during the 
conflict, and that actors on both sides of the conflict used indiscriminate violence. 
This largely occurred at the initial stages of the conflict but also throughout its 
different periods. The thesis findings offer evidence that the Maoist rebels embedded 
their actors as a strategy to confuse state actors. Embeddedness agitated state actors, 
especially when the Maoist attacked and then concealed themselves amongst 
civilians. The results show that the process and act of embeddedness increased the 
opportunity for temporarily-deployed state actors to use indiscriminate violence 
against civilians. This occurred because they were unable to differentiate between 
civilians and embedded actors. In areas where the police and state security forces had 
fled their posts, in the initial period of the conflict, Maoists were able to take control 
and embed their actors amongst the civilian population. The longer they remained in 
these zones, the further embedded they became, and the harder it was for the 
temporarily-deployed state actors to differentiate between civilians and embedded 
actors. During combat, this caused confusion and led, in some cases, to the 
indiscriminate killing of civilians. The challenge of differentiation occurred 
frequently during Operation Romeo (1995) and later under Operation Unified 
Command (2002).  
 
The study findings reveal that Maoist actors were likely to use indiscriminate violence 
when they were embedded among civilians. However, its continued use against the 
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same civilians or community was not observed. There is strong evidence that the use 
of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors was more likely to occur when 
temporarily-deployed actors were also deployed to the same zones. This was evident 
in the latter periods of the conflict, during Operation Unified Command. The state 
operation resulted in the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians by embedded 
actors as a means of regaining control. While occasional use of indiscriminate 
violence occurred throughout the conflict by Maoist actors, it was most common in 
the latter periods.  
 
Incidences of indiscriminate violence found in this study included, killing, physical 
abuse, forced recruitment, and disappearances. Indiscriminate violence used by 
temporarily-deployed actors was recorded as significantly high in the initial periods of 
the conflict and under Operation Unified Command, when state actors collectively 
engaged with the Maoist rebels. By 2002, the Maoist actors were firmly embedded 
among the civilian population, making differentiation between civilians and 
embedded actors difficult.  
 
While only partially confirming the study hypothesis (accepting hypothesis one and 
rejecting hypothesis two), based on study the results, I can confirm that that the use of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians through the practice of embeddedness occurs 
under two conditions: (i) when an embedded actor resorts to using indiscriminate 
violence to gain control over the civilian population; (ii) when temporarily-deployed 
actors use indiscriminate violence against civilians because they are unable to 
differentiate between embedded actors and civilians.  
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8.5 Conclusion and Recommendations  
This thesis has tried to shed light on the use of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians during the decade-long, Nepalese conflict (1996-2006). Throughout this 
thesis, I have attempted to clarify how indiscriminate violence was used during the 
Nepalese conflict. I have tried to demonstrate how indiscriminate violence influenced 
the everyday lives of Nepalese civilians. I have demonstrated that indiscriminate 
violence was used during the different stages of the conflict, and was most frequently 
used by temporarily-deployed actors. The use of indiscriminate violence was also 
detected when actors were unable to differentiate between civilians and embedded 
actors. Similar findings were observed during the Peruvian and the second South 
Sudanese conflict. I have also tried to draw on examples from the conflict in Syria to 
further highlight this same pattern of indiscriminate violence through the different 
strategic positions which actors can assume. In both the Peruvian and South Sudanese 
conflicts, incidences of actors embedding themselves amongst civilian populations 
were recorded. This later led to the use of indiscriminate violence. During the second 
South Sudanese conflict, in 1993, the Sudan Council of Churches (located in the south 
of Sudan) issued a letter asking the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
(SPLA), John Garang, and the SPLA soldiers, “To move their rebels out of populated 
civilian areas, toward the front lines, and to make sure those rebels were visible and 
under strict discipline.”153 The use of indiscriminate violence through embeddedness 
has also been detected in more recent conflicts, such as the 2013 South Sudanese 
conflict where I served as a United Nations Civil Affairs Officer. According to a 
United Nations spokesperson in South Sudan, the reason why violence against 
                                                 
153 Church Leaders of Southern Sudan Appeal, “Letter of Appeal to the SPLA/M Leaders”, Nairobi, Kenya.  
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civilians continued in parts of South Sudan was that “It is impossible to tell the 
difference between a rebel and a civilian.”154  
 
This thesis provides important insights for the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations, policy advisors, and field practitioners. The UN peacekeeping missions 
have greatly expanded over the past decade and are playing an increasing role in the 
protection of civilians. Pressure has grown for the military, which are part of the 
peacekeeping units, to develop capacities and approaches to respond to the ever-
changing nature, location, and scope of conflicts. This is particularly pressing, since 
there has been an increase in the number of internal conflicts worldwide that are 
fought by irregular armed groups. Recent conflicts in Syria and South Sudan have 
revealed that actors do not abide by international war conventions, nor do they follow 
treaties put in place to govern them. As a result, many civilians continue to suffer 
severe conditions due to the conflicts in their countries of origin.  
 
As I have tried to demonstrate in this thesis, indiscriminate violence is used during the 
initial periods of the conflict by temporarily-deployed actors. As such, the UN and the 
UN Security Council must be aware when deploying troops to conflict affected areas 
because this I believe will be the pattern of violence in future conflicts. Peacekeeping 
troops should be ready to be deployed as soon as possible, particularly in situations 
where there is an active UN mandate which has a combat mission attached to it. The 
readiness of the UN in moments when violence is or can be set to rise is crucial, as 
this thesis has demonstrated. This could greatly reduce the use of indiscriminate 
violence against innocent civilians by temporarily-deployed actors. This will need the 
                                                 
154 Source: http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/civilians-targeted-southern-soldiers-militias-south-sudan-fighting; 
(accessed on 12/03/2016). 
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UN to move from a position of reaction to a position of troop readiness. Practically, 
this would involve nation states agreeing to deploy troops with the necessary combat 
skills to deter civilian violence. If violence is to be deterred, it will need states who 
contribute to peacekeeping missions having troops on standby in case the situation 
deteriorates. Strategically, this will require regional peacekeepers from bordering 
countries to be trained and ready to be deployed once authorisation has been given by 
the Security Council. Overall, it will require the UN to revisit its approach on troop 
deployment through neighbouring partners or organisation like Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS). Finally, it will take collective action from 
regional states to not sit by and allow mass atrocities to take place across borders.  
 
More needs to be done by the international community to prevent national 
governments, fighting rebels or militant groups, from fighting within established 
civilian areas. This increases the chances of actors being embedded and the chance 
that troops will be placed in conditions that facilitate the use of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians. This could be done by supporting regional blocks like 
ECOWAS. Drawing on the skills of peacekeepers from these countries could help 
mitigate violence against civilians. These states often have the legitimacy and links 
with neighbouring states to support a peaceful transition. It is also important that 
peacekeepers are sent to areas populated by civilian to protect civilians and prevent 
actors from becoming embedded amongst them.  
It is also important that UN peacekeepers are utilised to not only show a presence on 
the ground, but to strengthen existing buffer zones between civilians and warring 
parties. This can help reduce the process of embeddedness and the use of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians. In addition, UN peacekeeping missions 
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should implement stronger protections for civilian mandates and mechanisms, as part 
of their overall directives, to prevent actors from embedding themselves among 
civilians and creating conditions for the use indiscriminate violence. This could be 
achieved by setting up well-facilitated protection of civilian (PoC) sites around, not 
within, UN compounds.  
 
The UN mission in South Sudan has set up several PoC sites within UN bases. These 
PoC sites were designed to shelter civilians fleeing fighting and provide them with 
protection. There have been several challenges at these sites, including an SPLA 
attack on the UN camp in Malakal Upper Nile155 and other UN bases. Such sites may 
also increase the potential for differentiating issues when unarmed actors flee from 
fighting into UN PoC sites. While these sites may serve as one of the quickest ways of 
preventing atrocities and genocide the best option continues to be the deployment 
peacekeepers to civilian areas to create buffer zones between civilians and actors who 
may attack civilians. This will reduce the numbers of civilian causalities witnessed 
during the initial stages of a conflict. Rapidly deploying peacekeeping troops will also 
decrease the opportunity for the process of embeddedness to occur and reduce the 
potential for actors to use civilians as human shields. The UN also must be aware of 
the use of indiscriminate violence be temporarily-deployed actors and ensure they are 
also held to account. Another suggestion is to reinforce the Chapter VII mandate 
which will give peacekeepers the opportunities to use necessary force without having 
to worry whether they will be pulled in front of the International Criminal Court in 
The Hague.  
 
                                                 
155 http://www.turkishweekly.net/2016/03/03/op-ed/as-bleak-as-hell-the-political-dynamics-of-south-sudan-s-
upper-nile-state/ (accessed on 16/07/2016). 
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While this research project has touched the surface of how the strategic positions 
which actors adopt can impact the use of indiscriminate violence, there are several 
shortcomings that I faced throughout. First, funding was a limitation; although this 
project was self-funded, with more funding the project could have reached more 
actors and victims, and tried to capture the context of embeddedness and other 
positions in more current conflicts. This would have helped me to provide further 
evidence of how the strategic positions impact the use of indiscriminate violence. The 
scale of the research project was something I underestimated. Coupled with this issue 
were the time constraints that were placed on me which meant there were restrictions 
on what I could do and how much this project focus could cover. While further 
funding would have helped, research assistance could have assisted with other aspects 
like reaching out to more survey respondents. Second, while the mixed method 
approach was rich in data collection, the very nature of triangulation from different 
sources of data was difficult since the perspective I received from different collection 
points varied. It often became difficult to follow up nuances that emerged from the 
research. For example, the information that I received from elites provided me with a 
wealth of understanding. However, the method I used to collect data from civilians 
did not enable me to further examine civilians selected. This meant I only understood 
the selected answers and not the context that derived from the answers selected. 
While the two methods are rich and enable me to understand what occurred within a 
framework for quantitative analysis, it is still limited in its ability to capture 
respondent narrative and the context of that narrative. Finally, the mixed method 
approach can be an effective tool to use but only if the researcher is well versed in 
both quantitative and qualitative research methods and knows how to avoid the major 
challenges of the design (e.g., collinearity). For a researcher to be able to understand 
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all these different methods and approaches it would become very time-consuming and 
expensive, which discouraged me on several occasions.  
 
 
When it came to conducting field research in South Sudan, I was unable to conduct 
similar field research (as in Nepal) with respondents due to the on-going fighting and 
the literacy levels of civilians. This carries restrictions on this thesis that I must 
acknowledge. First, I was unable to generalize the findings at the different levels of 
analysis from similar sources. Second, this, in turn, restricts the inferences and claims 
I can make across the cases I have selected as part of this study. While I do highlight 
examples from Peru and the second Sudanese conflicts, I am unable to make these 
inferences at the different levels of analysis as I do with Nepal. For example, surveys 
in Nepal with surveys in South Sudan and Peru. A third shortfall in my research was 
the ability to capture other controlling effects as part of my overall data collection 
process. Capturing for other controlling variables would have given me cause to make 
stronger inferences from my research findings in Chapter Six. This is partially 
because many of the civilians that I surveyed in Nepal had not been surveyed or 
spoken to since the end of the conflict. Many had never had their stories heard and 
were longing to add clarification and understanding to this research project. It is also 
the case that INSEC data does not cover a wider range of aspects like geographic 
locations of incidents of killings or the levels of violence at the location which could 
be used as controls when conducting further analysis. As a result, I was not able to 
make the statistical inferences and answer all the arguments I set out to do at the start 
of this project. Finally, while there are numerous civilians surveyed in this thesis. All 
of whom contributed immensely, there is still not enough data collected to make the 
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strong inferences which I expected to make when I first started this project. 
Considering over 19,000 civilians were killed and disappeared during the Nepalese 
conflict, the number of those surveyed only amounts to 2.72 per cent of the total 
number of civilians killed and disappeared. Thus, while there are patterns in this 
thesis that future researchers should consider, these results should be taken with the 
aim of conducting further analysis. I do believe that some of the mechanisms seen in 
this thesis are generalizable to other conflicts that we see today. This includes the 
strategic positions assumed by actors and the cost of these interactions on the lives of 
civilians during conflict.  
 
Future research will need to further examine the strategy of embeddedness deployed 
in conflicts (specifically in urban cities) and explore what the potential impact of this 
strategy will be for future conflicts. Future avenues for research should try to first, 
better understand whether the strategy of embedding actors in urban cities, during a 
conflict, impacts on the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians living in 
populated urban areas (cities). The world’s population is predicted to flock to urban 
areas,156 and megacities in large numbers, with 70 per cent of the world's population 
expected to live in cities by 2045, across Africa and Asia. The predicted fluctuation of 
civilians to urbans areas suggests the nature of future conflicts may be fought 
differently. When states go to war, the enemies they now encounter are irregular 
actors (combatants), not troops organised into armies but often freedom fighters, 
guerrillas, splinter groups and terrorists (actors). Some are easily grouped by common 
purpose as they are disbanded. Others engage in wars with no end in sight. Irregular 
actors (combatants) are at their most effective in cities (Sassen, 2017). They draw the 
                                                 
156 http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/population/world-urbanization-prospects-2014.html 
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enemy into cities, and undermine the key advantage of today’s major powers, whose 
mechanised weapons are of little use in dense and narrow urban spaces. This will 
impact the nature of future conflicts and the level of violence that civilians will 
experience during conflicts. And, it is likely that much of the fighting in future 
conflicts is likely to take place in and around urban cities, further impacting the 
dynamics of a conflict and the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in 
urban areas. Second, researchers should examine how the strategy of embedding 
actors will impact the approaches of peacekeeping missions carried out by the 
UNDPKO, ECOWAS and AU. Given the nature of irregular conflicts on the rise in 
today’s societies, the predicted rise of civilian populations to urban cities means the 
way the peacekeeping missions respond to conflicts will need to change. If we do see 
a rise in urbanization then peacekeepers will need to enter these urban areas to create 
buffer zones between civilian and urban fighters. Third, researchers should explore 
whether embedded actors, irregular fighting forces, and urban warfare will impact on 
the protection of the civilian mandate at the UNSC.157 
 
In a world where conflicts are increasingly localised, an ever-increasing number of 
actors can play a role in the use and movement of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians. The significance of understanding the makeup of actors, who splinter into 
smaller militia groups or work as sponsored contractors, is essential to understanding 
the use and movement of indiscriminate violence. As the conflicts in Syria, Yemen, 
Libya, and South Sudan have all shown, when fighting continues over time, there is 
increasing potential for groups to break away from the main opposition group or the 
state to hire militias who use indiscriminate violence against the civilian 
                                                 
157 For e.g. will this require Chapters 6 and 7 of the United Nations Charter to be adjusted or will new mechanisms 
be needed in the future to protect civilians in armed conflicts? 
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population.158 Thus, it is important for the UN Security Council to be aware of the 
potential of deploying robust and rapid response peacekeeping units to protect 
civilians from the use of indiscriminate violence. Without this protection, innocent 
civilians, particularly women and children, will continue to experience the harshest 
impacts of conflicts. While the recommendations presented in this chapter will not 
solve all the issues of the protection of civilians, future research will need to consider 
this dynamic which will change the way in which indiscriminate violence is 
distributed towards civilian populations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
158 https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-crisis-deepens-as-main-rebel-groups-fragment-and-realign-76240 
(accessed on 10/3/2017) 
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APPENDIX A 
Survey Research Questions 
 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
1. Q: What is your age? _____ 
• Don’t know 
• Refused 
 
2. Q: How many years of school have you had? ____ Years 
• Don’t know 
• Refused 
• None 
• Unsure 
 
3. Q: What is your current family situation? 
• Married (have a husband or wife) 
• Single 
• Live together with someone (in a permanent relationship) 
• Divorced (or separated) 
• Spouse of missing person 
• Widow(er) 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
4. Q: Do you have children? If Yes how many? 
• No children 
• Yes ___ children 
• I did but they passed 
• Unsure 
 
5. Q: What is your job now or are you not working? 
• Farmer 
• Manual worker 
• Skilled worker 
• Self-employed 
• Housewife / home care 
• Soldier (combatant) 
• Government employee 
• Private sector employee 
• Teacher / professor / intellectual 
• Pensioner / retired 
• Unemployed (but looking for work) 
• Unemployed (not looking for work) 
• Student 
• Other [SPECIFY] 
• Don’t know / refused 
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PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONFLICT 
 
1. Q: What job did you do during the conflict? 
• Farmer 
• Manual worker 
• Skilled worker 
• Self-employed 
• Housewife / home care 
• Soldier (combatant) 
• Rebel fighter 
• Government employee 
• Private sector employee 
• Teacher / professor / intellectual 
• Pensioner / retired 
• Unemployed (but looking for work) 
• Unemployed (not looking for work) 
• Student 
• Other [SPECIFY] 
• Don’t know / refused 
 
2. Q: What is your conflict experience? 
• War took place where they lived 
• Lost contact with close relative 
• Forced to leave home and live elsewhere 
• Serious damage to property  
• House was looted 
• Was a combatant 
• Combatants took food away 
• Tortured 
• Knew somebody well who was raped by combatants 
• Wounded by fighting 
• Knew somebody who was imprisoned 
• Sexually assaulted 
• Kidnapped or taken hostage 
• Family member killed 
• A member of the rebel group 
• A member of the army 
 
3. Q: Which two of these words best describe the conflict for you personally? 
• Horrible 
• Hateful 
• Disruptive 
• Humiliating 
• Confusing 
• Uncertainty 
• Powerless 
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• Challenging 
• Exciting 
• Remote 
• Hopeful 
• Don’t know 
 
4. Q: When combatants attack to weaken the enemy, should they… 
• Attack enemy combatants and civilians 
• Attack enemy combatants and avoid civilians as much as possible 
• Attack only enemy combatants and leave civilians alone 
• Don't know / refused 
 
5. Q: Which of the following group do you personally dislike the most? 
• Government army 
• Soldiers 
• Rebel group 
• Militia members 
• Bandits / criminals 
• Neighbour(s) 
• Households / member(s) 
• Do not know / stranger 
• Foreigners 
• Other(s) 
• None of the following 
• Nobody 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
    
TIME /DURATION OF THE CONFLICT 
 
Q1: Which of the following people do you remember the most from the conflict? 
• Government army 
• Soldiers 
• Rebel group 
• Militia members 
• Bandits / criminals 
• Neighbour(s) 
• Households / member(s) 
• Do not know / stranger 
• Foreigners 
• Other(s) 
• None of the following 
• Nobody 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
Q2: How many times do you remember seeing the following people during the 
conflict? 
 290 
• Government army 
• Soldiers 
• Rebel group 
• Militia members 
• Bandits / criminals 
• Neighbour(s) 
• Households / member(s) 
• Do not know / stranger 
• Foreigners 
• Other(s) 
• None of the following 
• Nobody 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
• Repeatedly 
 
EMBEDDED COMBATANTS/ACTORS 
 
1. Q: When did the combatants first arrive? What did they do once they arrived?  
 
2. Q: How long were combatants living amongst your community? 
• Under a month 
• Over a month 
• 2-3 months 
• 3-6 months 
• 6-9 months 
• 9-12 months 
• 1-2 years 
• 2-3 years 
• 3-4 years 
• 4-5 years 
• 5-6 years 
• 6-7 years 
• 7-8 years 
• 8-9 years 
• 9-10 years 
• 10 years and over  
• Repeatedly 
 
3. Q: Did any of the combatants stay behind once the main group had left?  
• Yes 
• No  
• Maybe 
• Unknown 
 
4. If so how long, did they stay for? 
• Under a month 
• Over a month 
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• 2-3 months 
• 3-6 months 
• 6-9 months 
• 9-12 months 
• 1-2 years 
• 2-3 years 
• 3-4 years 
• 4-5 years 
• 5-6 years 
• 6-7 years 
• 7-8 years 
• 8-9 years 
• 9-10 years 
• 10 years and over  
• Repeatedly 
 
5. Q: Did combatants use forceful violence against you or any members of your family? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unknown 
 
6. Q: Did combatants use violence against anyone in your community?  
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unknown 
If so what sort of violence did they use?  
 
7. Q: Did combatants continue to violate you, your family and community members 
after the first incident of violence? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unknown 
 
8. Q: Did combatants who were amongst you seem to be tired from the conflict? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unknown  
• Q: If yes when did you notice this?  
 
9. Q: Were combatants frustrated with civilians and with the conflict? 
• With civilians 
• With the conflict 
• With each other 
• With the government 
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• With rebels only 
• With the women only 
• With men only 
 
10. Q: Did combatants ever return to your community to violate the same people in your 
community? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unsure 
 
11. Q: Which of the following were in your community the longest? 
• Government army 
• Soldiers 
• Rebel group 
• Militia members 
• Bandits / criminals 
• Neighbour(s) 
• Households / member(s) 
• Do not know / stranger 
• Foreigners 
• Other(s) 
• None of the following 
• Nobody 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
12. Q: Do you recall the location of combatants? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unsure 
 
If yes, can you state where they were located on the map? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unsure 
 
13. Q: Please specify the number or the district on the map.  
 
VIOLENCE AND FRUSTRATION BY ACTORS ON SHORT MISSION 
1. Q: What was the behaviour of actors like? 
• Perfect 
• Very good 
• Good 
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• Bad 
• Very bad 
• Extremely bad 
 
2. Q: Did actors seem frustrated and angry when they came into you community? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unsure 
 
3. Q: Did actors appear to be tired or frustrated? If so, did they use violence against 
civilians? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unsure 
 
4. Q: If [YES] what forms of violence did actors use?  
• Rape 
• Killing  
• Verbal abuse 
• Physical abuse 
• Kidnapping 
• Torture  
• Psychological abuse 
• Sexual abuse 
• Other [SPECIFY] 
 
5. Q: Did actors use violence against civilians because they could not differentiate 
between actors and civilians when they entered your community? 
• Code 1: Yes                                                     
• Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Unknown 
 
6. Q: What other things did you notice about the behaviour of actors? [SPECIFY] 
 
7. Q: Which of the following TWO were the most frustrated and fatigued during the 
conflict? 
• Government army 
• Soldiers 
• Rebel group 
• Militia members 
• Bandits / criminals 
• Neighbour(s) 
• Households / member(s) 
• Do not know / stranger 
• Foreigners 
 294 
• Other(s) 
• None of the following 
• Nobody 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
8. Q: If combatants were angry or upset which groups of people were targeted. Please 
state two. 
• Women  
• Men  
• Children  
• Elderly  
• Teenagers  
• Ethnic groups 
• Poor people 
• Rich people 
• Middle class 
 
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS BY ACTORS ON SHORT 
MISSION 
 
1. Q: Were members of your community targeted? 
• Yes 
• No  
• Maybe 
• Unknown 
• Refused to answer 
 
2. Q: If yes, why do you think this was so?  
 
3. Q: If members of your community were attacked was this at the initial periods of the 
conflict? 
• Yes 
• No  
• Maybe 
• Unknown 
• Refused to answer 
 
4. Q: Which community or ethnic groups were targeted on?  
 
5. Q: How long did the targeting and random attacks last for? 
• Under a month 
• Over a month 
• 2-3 months 
• 3-6 months 
• 6-9 months 
• 9-12 months 
• 1-2 years 
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• 2-3 years 
• 3-4 years 
• 4-5 years 
• 5-6 years 
• 6-7 years 
• 7-8 years 
• 8-9 years 
• 9-10 years 
• 10 years and over  
 
6. Q: Were these attacks done by individual members or by a collective of people? 
• Individual 
• Groups 
• The whole group 
• Unknown 
• Collective of people 
 
7. Q: Did actors continue to use violence against civilians after the first incidence of 
violence against residents?  
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unknown 
• Refused to answer 
 
If [YES] how long did this last for? 
• Under a month 
• Over a month 
• 2-3 months 
• 3-6 months 
• 6-9 months 
• 9-12 months 
• 1-2 years 
• 2-3 years 
• 3-4 years 
• 4-5 years 
• 5-6 years 
• 6-7 years 
• 7-8 years 
• 8-9 years 
• 9-10 years 
• 10 years and over  
 
8. Q: Did actors start attacking members before or after armed fighting ceased in your 
area? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
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• Unknown 
• Refused to answer 
 
9. Q: If yes how long was this for? 
• Under a month 
• Over a month 
• 2-3 months 
• 3-6 months 
• 6-9 months 
• 9-12 months 
• 1-2 years 
• 2-3 years 
• 3-4 years 
• 4-5 years 
• 5-6 years 
• 6-7 years 
• 7-8 years 
• 8-9 years 
• 9-10 years 
• 10 years and over  
 
10. How many times did these repeated attacks take place?  
 
11. How long did this last for? 
• Under a month 
• Over a month 
• 2-3 months 
• 3-6 months 
• 6-9 months 
• 9-12 months 
• 1-2 years 
• 2-3 years 
• 3-4 years 
• 4-5 years 
• 5-6 years 
• 6-7 years 
• 7-8 years 
• 8-9 years 
• 9-10 years 
• 10 years and over  
 
12. Q: Attacking the enemy in populated villages or towns knowing many 
civilians/women and children will be killed is… 
• Okay 
• Not okay 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
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13. Q: Which of the following best describes the consequences of the conflict? 
• Produces too much hate and division 
• Causes too much psychological damage 
• Produces too much destruction 
• Causes too much physical suffering 
• People have too much hate inside 
• Other [SPECIFY] 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
Please answer the following scenarios. 
14. Q: Version 1: Attacking civilians who voluntarily gave food and shelter to enemy 
combatants. Would it be okay or not okay to attack them to weaken the enemy?  
• Okay 
• Not okay 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
15. Q: Version 2: Attacking civilians who were forced to give food and shelter to enemy 
combatants. Would it be okay or not okay to attack them to weaken the enemy? 
• Okay 
• Not okay 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
16. Q: Do you consider rape a violent abuse? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unknown 
• Refused to answer 
 
17. Q: Which one of the following best describes the use of rape? 
• Physical abuse 
• Verbal abuse 
• Psychological abuse 
• Sexual abuse 
• Refused to answer 
 
18. Q: Do you consider rape a…. 
• Physical abuse 
• Verbal abuse 
• Psychological abuse 
• Sexual abuse 
• Unknown 
• Refused to answer 
 
19. Do you consider rape to be? 
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• Right 
• Wrong 
• Unknown 
• Refused to answer 
 
20. Q: When you say, “its wrong,” is it primarily wrong because it is...? 
• Against human rights 
• Against your religion 
• Against the law 
• Against personal code 
• Against your culture 
• Against people’s beliefs 
• Don’t know 
• Other 
 
Please answer the following scenarios. 
21. Q: Version 1: Attacking civilians who voluntarily transported ammunition for enemy 
combatants defending their town. Would it be okay or not okay to attack them to 
weaken the enemy? 
• Okay 
• Not okay 
• Wrong 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
22. Q: Version 2: Attacking civilians who were forced to transport ammunition for enemy 
combatants defending their town. Would it be okay or not okay to attack them to 
weaken the enemy? 
• Okay 
• Not okay 
• Wrong 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
23. If a man forces himself onto a woman is that wrong? 
• Okay 
• Not okay 
• Wrong 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
24. Q: When you say, “it is wrong.” is it primarily wrong because it is...? 
• Against human rights 
• Against your religion 
• Against the law 
• Against personal code 
• Against your culture 
• Against people’s beliefs 
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• Other [SPECIFY] 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
Please answer the following scenarios. 
25. Q: Attacking civilians who voluntarily gave food and shelter to enemy combatants. 
Would it be okay or not okay to attack them to weaken the enemy? 
• Okay 
• Not okay 
• Maybe depends 
• Refused to answer 
 
26. Q: What about depriving the civilian population of food, medicine, or water to 
weaken the enemy. Is that wrong? 
• Okay 
• Not okay 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
Or just part of war? 
• Wrong  
• Right 
• Part of the War 
• Expected 
 
Please answer the following scenarios. 
27. Q: When attacking enemy combatants and avoiding civilians as much as possible, is 
it… 
• Okay to attack civilians who voluntarily give food and shelter to enemy combatants 
• Part of war to deprive civilian populations of food, medicine or water 
• Part of war to attack populated villages or towns knowing that many women and 
children would be killed 
• Okay to plant landmines even though civilians may step on them accidentally 
 
28. Q: When attacking only enemy combatants and leaving civilians alone, is it… 
• Okay to attack civilians who voluntarily give food and shelter to enemy combatants 
• Part of war to deprive civilian populations of food, medicine or water 
• Part of war to attack populated villages or towns knowing that many women and 
children would be killed 
• Okay to plant landmines even though civilians may step on them accidentally 
 
29. Q: Which three of the following reasons best explain why combatants attack or hurt 
civilians; even though many people say it is not okay or may be against the law? 
• Win at any cost 
• Don’t care about laws 
• Tired of the conflict 
• Frustrated with the conflict 
• Hate the other side 
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• Fatigued with the conflict 
• Are told to do so 
• Been amongst civilians for too long 
• Lose all sense 
• Alcohol / drugs 
• Don’t know the laws 
• No discipline amongst fighting 
• Combatants were amongst civilians for long periods 
• Other side doing same 
• Are too young 
• Are scared 
• Committed to cause 
• Abuse of power 
 
30. Q: Did individual members conduct violence against people within your community?  
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unsure 
 
If yes which warring side were they a part of? 
• Government army 
• Soldiers. 
• Rebel group 
• Militia members 
• Bandits / criminals. 
• Neighbour(s) 
• Households / member(s) 
• Do not know / stranger 
• Foreigners 
• Other(s) 
• None of the following 
• Nobody 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
31. Were you ever forced to kill a family member or friend 
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unsure 
 
32. Were you forced to betray a family member or friend? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unsure 
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33. Q: Did your household experience severe losses of income since the onset of the 
conflict? 
• Yes  
• No 
• Do not know 
• Refused to answer 
 
34. Q: When exactly did you experience it for the first time?  
 
35. Q: When exactly did this occur?  
 
36. Q: What was the overall value of the item at the time that it was lost? (SPECIFY 
CURRENCY)  
 
37. Q: Who was responsible for the destruction or theft?  
• Government army 
• Soldiers 
• Rebel group 
• Militia members 
• Bandits / criminals 
• Neighbours(s) 
• Household member(s) 
• Do not know / stranger 
• Foreigners 
• Other(s) 
• None of the following 
• Nobody 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
38. Q: Have you or your household members changed your economic activities because 
of violence?  
• Yes 
• No 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
39. Q: Were any of the following assets considerably destroyed, lost, or robbed because 
of the violence or displacement? 
• Dwelling / Mattress 
• Bicycle Motorcycle/car 
• Radio / TV  
• Clothes 
• Documents / certificates 
• Jewellery 
• Cell phone  
• Blankets 
• Rifle / machete 
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• Cultivation tools such as hoe, plough, etc.  
• Tractor 
• Torch / flashlight 
• Equipment for education 
• Shelter material 
• Clothes  
• Computer 
• Others 
 
40. Q: Who was responsible for the destruction or theft?  
• Government army 
• Soldiers 
• Rebel group 
• Militia members 
• Bandits / criminals 
• Neighbours(s) 
• Household member(s) 
• Do not know / stranger 
• Foreigners 
• Other(s) 
• None of the following 
• Nobody 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
41. Q: Have you or people in your household experienced any of the following?  
• No  
• Was verbally threatened 
• Was verbally insulted, but not threatened  
• Was threatened with knife, gun or other type of weapon 
• Was attacked with knife, gun or other type of weapon  
• Was beaten / assaulted / kicked 
• Was strangled or burned  
• Was injured or killed in gun shootings  
• Was injured by a landmine / UXO  
• Was physically forced to have sexual intercourse  
• Was forced to perform other sexual acts that the person did not want to do 
• Lost body parts  
• Was forced to labour  
• Was robbed  
• Was kidnapped / abducted 
• Was extorted for money or other goods  
• Don’t know others 
 
42. Q: Who was the person experiencing the harm?  
• You 
• Mother 
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• Father  
• Sister  
• Brother 
• Cousin 
• Grandmother 
• Grandfather 
• Aunty  
• Uncle 
• Step-brother  
• Step-sister 
• Step-mother 
• Step-father 
• Husband 
• Wife 
 
43. Q: Where did the incident occur?   
• On the battlefield/in a combat operation  
• At home 
• In a refugee camp 
• In the neighbourhood 
• In your community 
• At work (if other than home and not military service) 
• While combatants were amongst the community 
• During transit (e.g. migration) 
• Other location  
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
44. Q: Has the person suffered from any physical or psychological illness of prolonged 
nature or death, or any afflictions due to the experiences described? 
• Yes, illness of prolonged nature 
• Yes, injury  
• Yes, handicap 
• Yes, psychological distress 
• Yes, immediate death 
• Yes, death at scene of incident 
• Yes, disappeared 
• Yes, tortured 
• Yes, death in hospital 
• Yes, death after discharge from hospital 
• Yes, other 
• No, don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
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COMBATANT/ACTORS GROUP AND ATTACKS 
 
1. Q: Which groups do you think committed the worst violence against community 
members? 
• Government army 
• Soldiers 
• Rebel group 
• Militia members 
• Bandits / criminals 
• Neighbour(s) 
• Households / family member(s) 
• Do not know / stranger 
• Foreigners 
• Other(s) 
• None of the following 
• Nobody 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
2. Q: Were groups targeted and used as weapons of warfare? 
• Yes  
• No  
• Maybe 
• Unknown 
• Refused to answer 
 
3. Q: Why were these groups targeted? 
• Bored 
• For resources 
• Poorest people 
• Because the combatants were sent to the area 
• Combatants were frustrated 
• Because they were protecting the enemy 
• Because they were helping the enemy 
• Associated to the enemy 
• Because of their ethnic origins 
• Because of their cultural background 
• Because of religious beliefs 
 
4. Q: Did security forces use groups as human shields during the conflict?  
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unknown 
 
If so were these areas in opposition strong holds? 
• Yes 
• No 
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• Maybe 
• Unknown 
 
5. Q: Which of the following were used the most by combatants? 
• Rape 
• Harassment 
• Sexual Violence 
• Abuse 
• Discrimination 
• Torture 
• Killing 
 
6. Q: Which groups experienced violence the most [SPECIFY]:  
 
7. Q: Why do you think this is? 
• Because of their association 
• Because of where they lived 
• Because of the length of the conflict 
• Unknown 
• Refused to answer 
 
8. Q: How often did they experience this violence? 
• 0-5 times 
• 5-10 
• 10-15 
• 15-20 
• 20-30 
• 30-40 
• 40-50 
• Repeatedly 
 
9. Q: How long did this violence last for? 
• 1-2 weeks 
• 2-3 weeks 
• 3-4 weeks 
• Over a month 
• 1-3 months 
• 3-6 months 
• 6-9 months 
• 9-2 months 
• 1 year and over 
 
10.  Q: Was there a difference in the violence that occurred on different groups? 
• Yes  
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unknown 
• Refused to answer 
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11. What were the differences? 
• Some were harmed more than others 
• Violence was the same 
• Violence depended on your gender 
• Violence depended on your income 
• Violence depended on how long combatants were in the community 
 
 
COMBATANT/ACTOR BEHAVIOUR 
 
I: I will now describe some situations that may happen during a [conflict/armed 
conflict]. For each situation, I would like you to imagine that you are part of that 
situation. Tell me how you think you would behave if the decisions were completely 
up to you. Here comes the first imaginary situation. 
 
1. Q: Would you save the life of a surrendering enemy combatant who killed a person 
close to you? 
• Would save 
• Would not save 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
2. Q: Would you help a wounded enemy combatant who killed a person close to you? 
• Would help 
• Would not help 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
3. Q: Did enemy combatants imprison you or were you living in an area that came under 
enemy control? 
• Imprisoned 
• Imprisoned but free to move 
• Lived under enemy control but restricted 
• Lived under enemy control but free to move 
• Did not come under enemy control 
 
4. Q: What about taking civilians hostages to get something in exchange? Is that wrong 
or just part of conflict? 
• Wrong 
• Part of war 
• Both [Volunteered response] 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
5. Q: Please tell me whether any of the following happened while you were under 
enemy control: 
• You were personally mistreated 
• You were physically injured 
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• You had contact with a representative from an independent organization to check on 
your well-being 
 
6. Q: Would you help a wounded enemy combatant / save the life of a surrendering 
enemy combatant who killed a person close to you? 
• Yes  
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unknown 
• Refused to answer 
• Would help a wounded combatant 
• Would save a surrendering combatant 
 
7. Q: Are there rules or laws that are so important that, if broken during war, the person 
who broke them should be punished? 
• Yes  
• No 
• Maybe 
• Do not know 
 
(IF YES) What are these laws based on? 
• Country’s laws 
• International law 
• Religious principles 
• The values people hold 
• Other 
• Don’t know 
 
8. Q: When the conflict is over, should people who have broken these rules...? 
• Be put on trial 
• Be exposed to the public but not put on trial 
• Be victimised themselves 
• Be granted amnesty 
• Be forgiven after the war 
• Be forgotten when the war is over 
• Don’t know 
 
9. Q: Who should punish wrongdoers? 
• International criminal court 
• Own government 
• Own courts 
• Victims of violence 
• The military itself 
• Own political leaders 
• The civilian population 
• Other 
• Don’t know 
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10. Q: Who should be responsible for punishment? 
• International criminal court 
• Own government 
• Own courts 
• The military itself 
• Own political leaders 
• The civilian population 
• Other 
• Don’t know 
 
11. Q: Are international organisations making it better or worse, or is it not making any 
difference? 
• Better 
• Worse 
• No difference 
• Don’t know 
 
12. Q: In the future, would you like to see intervention from the international community 
to deal with these kinds of issues (civilian areas attacked or cut off from food, water, 
medical supplies and electricity)? 
• Want more intervention 
• Want less intervention 
• Unknown 
 
13. Q: Let me ask what can be done if during the war civilian areas are attacked, towns, 
or villages are cut off from food, water, medical supplies, and electricity? To whom 
would you turn to get help or be protected? 
• Government 
• UN organizations (e.g. UNHCR) 
• Humanitarian organizations 
• No one 
• Religious leaders 
• International organizations 
• Local government leaders 
• Other 
• God / church 
• Army / military 
• The people 
• Don’t know / refused to answer 
 
14. Q: When the conflict is over, should people who have broken these rules...? 
• Be put on trial 
• Be forgiven / forgotten after the war 
• Be exposed to the public but not put on trial 
• Be granted amnesty  
• Don’t know 
 
15. Q: When thinking about favouring one side in a war, which is more important to you, 
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the reasons each side is fighting or how each side acts during the war? 
• What each side is fighting for 
• How each side acts during war 
• Both 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
16. Q: Do you think victims of the conflict have the right to revenge? 
• Yes  
• No 
• Maybe 
• Don’t know 
• Refused to answer 
 
17. Q: What if they were forced to kill a family member or friend? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unsure 
• Refused to answer 
 
18. Q: What if they were you forced to betray a family member or friend? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe 
• Unsure 
• Refused to answer 
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APPENDIX B 
List of Interviewed Elites 
 
Name Position Organisation Interview 
type 
Babita Basnet  President  Media Advocacy 
Group (MAG) 
Open 
interview 
Swechchha  President Shantimalika/ 
National Network 
for Women, Peace 
and Security 
Open 
interview 
Advocate 
Prativa Khanal 
Legal Officer Transitional Justice 
Resource Centre 
(TJRC)  
Open 
interview 
 
Nava Raj 
Adhikari  
President  TJRC Open 
interview 
Radha Paudel Founder/President Action Works Nepal Open 
interview 
Sama Shrestha Unit Manager 
(Peace and 
Security) 
UN Women Nepal Open 
interview 
Sharu Joshi 
Shrestha 
Programme 
Specialist 
UN Women Nepal Open 
interview 
Lily Thapa Founder Women for Human 
Rights, single 
women group 
(WHR) / 
Organization in 
Special Consultative 
Status with the 
Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) 
Open 
interview 
Indira Ale Regional Dialogue 
coordinator 
UNDP Conflict 
Prevention 
Programme 
Open 
interview 
Dr. Abdul 
Hameed Omar 
Head of UNIRP 
programme 
UNDP Integration 
rehabilitation 
programme 
Open 
interview 
Shobha 
Guatam 
President  Institute of Human 
Rights 
Communication 
Nepal 
Open 
interview 
Janak Raut Opted not to 
provide this 
information 
Opted not to provide 
this information 
Open 
interview 
Suman 
Adhikari 
Opted not to 
provide this 
information 
Opted not to provide 
this information 
Open 
interview 
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Manjima 
Dhakal 
Opted not to 
provide this 
information 
Opted not to provide 
this information 
Open 
interview 
Ram Bhandari Opted not to 
provide this 
information 
Opted not to provide 
this information 
Open 
interview 
Bijay Karna Political analyst 
and associate 
professor of 
political science at 
the Tribhuvan 
University 
Tribhuvan 
University 
Open 
interview 
Dinesh Tripathi Advocate Supreme 
Court, Nepal 
Supreme Court 
Nepal 
Open 
interview 
Mr Bhola 
Mauhat 
Opted not to 
provide this 
information 
Opted not to provide 
this information 
Open 
interview 
Telephone 
Dhan Bahadur 
Tharu 
Supervisor of 
UNIRP 
UNIRP and Former 
training police 
officer 
Open 
interview 
Subindra 
Bogati 
Chief Executive Nepal Peacebuilding 
Initiative 
Open 
interview 
Dipendra 
Tamang 
President Alliance for Peace Open 
interview 
Kapil Kafle Executive Director Institute of Human 
Rights 
Communication 
Nepal 
Open 
interview 
Sushil Pyakurel Consultant Former 
Commissioner. 
National Human 
Rights Commission, 
Nepal 
Open 
interview 
Meena Sharma Project Manager -  
Women Peace and 
Security 
Search for Common 
Ground 
Open 
interview 
Mr Padma 
Ratna Tuladhar 
Chief Negotiator 
between the 
Government and 
Maoist -CPA. 
UNDP SF Open 
interview 
Mr Daman 
Nath Dhungana 
Former head of 
Parliament of CA 
UNDP SF Open 
interview 
Mr Bhojraj 
Pokharel 
Former Head of 
election 
Commission and 
Home Secretary 
UNDP SF/ 
Government Advisor 
Open 
interview 
Mr 
Chandrakishore 
Jha 
Journalist UNDP SF Open 
interview 
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Ms Durga Sob Women’s Activists UNDP SF Open 
interview 
Mr Vijaya Kant 
Karna 
Political Scientist Tribhuvan 
University/ UNDP 
SF 
Open 
interview 
Subodh 
Pyakurel 
Chairman INSEC Open 
interview 
Shivaram 
Pradhan 
Maj General 
(retired) 
Nepal Army Open 
interview 
Balananda 
Sharma 
Lt General (Now 
retired) Co-
ordinator of 
Technical 
Committee on 
Supervision, 
Integration, 
Rehabilitation of 
Maoist Combatants 
Nepal Army Open 
interview 
Mumaram 
Khanal/ Muma 
Ram Khana 
Political Analysis Former Maoists Open 
interview 
Navaraj Dhakal Former AIG Nepal Police Open 
interview 
Rajan Bhattarai UML CA Member Open 
interview 
Khimlal 
Devkota 
Maoist CA Member Open 
interview 
Tulanarayan 
Sah/ Tula 
Narayan Shah 
Nepal Madhesh 
Foundation 
Executive Director Open 
interview 
Sanat Kumar 
Basnet 
IGP (Former) Armed Police Force Open 
interview 
Pradip Pariyar Youth Activist and 
Maoist candidate 
for CA 
Pasa Yard Open 
interview 
Chiran Khanal 
(AKA Baldev) 
Deputy 
Commander 
Maoist Open 
interview 
Telephone 
Ajit Thapa Colonel Nepal Army Open 
interview 
Suresh Ale 
Magar 
Senior member CPN-Maoist Open 
interview 
Kamal Prasad 
Pageni 
Nepali Congress CA Member/ Nepali 
Congress Syangia 
Open 
interview 
Janardan 
Sharma 
(AKA Prabhakar) 
Deputy 
Commander of the 
Maoist PLA 
CA Member of the 
Maoist and Former 
Peace Minister 
Open 
interview 
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Suresh 
Dhungana 
Former Police 
Sargent 
Nepal Police/ Casino 
Star Hotel Hyatt 
Regency 
Open 
interview 
Dr. Indrajeet Jit 
Rai 
Member of 
National Interest 
Preservation 
Committee/ 
Constituent 
Assembly Member 
Maoist/ Head 
British Gorak 
College 
CA Member/ Maoist 
Integration Official 
working with UN 
Open 
Interview 
Rajendra 
Bahadin Singh 
Former Police 
Chief in Banke and 
Bhiratnaglha/ Chief 
Executive Office 
Norvic 
International 
Hospital 
Former Police 
Inspector 
Open 
Interview  
Dhan Bahadur 
Maski 
Former Division 
commander Maoist 
Local Political leader 
Rolpha 
Open 
Interview  
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Data introduced in this codebook was collected and quantified from the field research 
and documentation collected by the main researcher in 16 districts over a period of 11 
months. Specific information on victims, actors, and elites interviewed is archived at 
the University of Essex, United Kingdom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. RegionCode 
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Region code: A national code given to Nepal’s five development regions by the 
United Nations. 
Code 1: Mid-Western 
Code 2: Far Western  
Code 3: Central 
Code 4: Eastern                                               
Code 5: Western                                                     
 
2. Region 
Region: Nepal is divided into 5 Development Regions, 14 Administrative Zones, and 
75 Districts: 
 
Eastern Development Region, Central Development Region, Western Development 
Region, Far Western Development Region, and Mid-Western Development Region 
 
3. DistrName 
District Name: There are seventy-five districts in Nepal. Some districts are district 
headquarters. 
1 MANANG 
2 JHAPA 
3 ILAM 
4 PANCHATHAR 
5 TAPLEJUNG 
6 MORANG 
7 SUNSARI 
8 DHANKUTA 
9 TERHA THUM 
10 BHOJPUR 
11 
SANKHUW 
ASABHA 
12 SAPTARI 
13 SIRAHA 
14 UDAYPUR 
15 KHOTANG 
16 OKHALDHUNGA 
17 SOLUKHUMBU 
18 DHANUSHA 
19 MAHOTTARI 
20 SARLAHI 
21 SINDHULI 
22 RAMECHHAP 
23 DOLAKHA 
24 RAUTAHAT 
25 BARA 
26 PARSA 
27 CHITAWAN 
28 MAKAWANPUR 
29 LALITPUR 
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30 BHAKTAPUR 
31 KATHMANDU 
32 KA VRE 
33 DHADING 
34 SINDHUPALCHOWK 
35 NUW AKOT 
36 RASUW A 
37 TANAHU 
38 GORAKHA 
39 LAMJUNG 
40 SY ANGJA 
41 KASKI 
42 NAWALPARASI 
43 RUPANDEHI 
44 PALPA 
45 KAPILVASTU 
46 ARGHAKHANCHI 
47 GULMI 
48 BAGLUNG 
49 PARVAT 
50 MY AGDI 
51 DANG 
52 PYUTHAN 
53 ROLPA 
54 SALYAN 
55 RUKUM 
56 BANKE 
57 BARDIY A 
58 SURKHET 
59 JAJARKOT 
60 DAILEKH 
61 DOLPA 
62 JUMLA 
63 KALIKOT 
64 MUGU 
65 HUMLA 
66 KAILALI 
67 ACHHAM 
68 DOTI 
69 BAJURA 
70 BAJHANG 
71 KANCHANPUR 
72 DADELDHURA 
73 BAITADI 
74 DARCHULA 
75 MUSTANG 
4. IndiSurvCode 
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Individual Survey Code: A unique number given to each respondent. This number 
pertains to a code given to all respondents together and is not the same number given 
from the field. 
 
5. IndRespDistrCode 
Individual Respondent District Code: Respondent location was abbreviated and the 
researcher used this abbreviation plus a rolling number to collect and code 
information while in the field. 
 
6. Gender 
Gender: Gender is the range of characteristics pertaining to, and differentiating 
between, masculinity and femininity. Depending on the context, these characteristics 
may include biological sex (i.e., the state of being male, female). 
Code 0: Female                                                        
Code 1: Male 
 
7. personal_Q1 
Personal Question One: The respondent’s age 
Code 1: Don’t know                                                    
Code 2: Refused to answer  
 
8. personal_Q2 
Personal Question Two: The number of years the respondent attended school 
Code 1: Don’t know 
Code 2: Refused to answer 
Code 3: None 
Code 4: Unsure  
Code 5: Number of years_ 
 
9. personal_Q2A 
Since personal_Q2 only reports that the respondent refused, did not know, or was 
unsure of the years in education, personal_Q2A is the variable we use to measure the 
education level. 
 
10. personal_Q3 
Personal Question Three: Marital Status  
Code 1: Married (have a husband or wife)  
Code 2: Single 
Code 3: Live together with someone (in a permanent relationship) 
Code 4: Divorced (or separated) 
Code 5: Spouse of missing person 
Code 6: Widow(er) 
Code 7: Do not know  
Code 8: Refused to answer 
 
11. personal_Q4 
Personal Question Four: Family Status 
Code 1: No children                                                         
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Code 2: Yes ___ children  
Code 3: I did but they passed away  
Code 4: Unsure  
 
12. personal_Q5 
Personal Question Five: The respondent’s current working position. 
Code 1: Farmer 
Code 2: Manual worker 
Code 3: Skilled worker  
Code 4: Self-employed 
Code 5: Housewife / home care 
Code 6: Soldier (combatant)  
Code 7: Government employee  
Code 8: Private sector employee  
Code 9: Teacher / professor / intellectual 
Code 10: Pensioner / retired  
Code 11: Unemployed (but looking for work)  
Code 12: Unemployed (not looking for work)  
Code 13: Student  
Code 14: Other [SPECIFY]  
Code 15: Don’t know / refused to answer 
 
13. indvconfexp_Q1 
Conflict experience: Working position during the conflict. 
Code 1: Farmer 
Code 2: Manual worker 
Code 3: Skilled worker  
Code 4: Self-employed 
Code 5: Housewife / home care 
Code 6: Soldier (combatant)  
Code 7: Government employee  
Code 8: Private sector employee  
Code 9: Teacher / professor / intellectual 
Code 10: Pensioner / retired  
Code 11: Unemployed (but looking for work)  
Code 12: Unemployed (not looking for work)  
Code 13: Student  
Code 14: Other [SPECIFY]  
Code 15: Don’t know / refused to answer 
 
14. indvconfexp_Q1 and indvconfexp_Q1A 
Since indvconfexp_Q1A has only 10 observations, we can use indvconfexp_Q1 as 
one variable to represent both in telling the job status of respondents during the 
conflict period. indvconfexp_Q1A is used to observe any secondary roles. 
 
15. Status 
Personal Question One: The status of the respondent during the conflict (Written 
option).  
 
16. indvconfexp_Q2 
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Individual Conflict Experience Question Two: The individual conflict experience of 
the respondent during the conflict.  
Code 1: War took place where they lived 
Code 2: Lost contact with close relatives 
Code 3: Forced to leave home and live elsewhere 
Code 4: Serious damage to property  
Code 5: House was looted 
Code 6: Was a combatant 
Code 7: Combatants took food away 
Code 8: Tortured 
Code 9: Knew somebody well who was raped by combatants 
Code 10: Wounded by fighting 
Code 11: Knew somebody who was killed 
Code 12: Imprisoned 
Code 13: Sexually assaulted 
Code 14: Kidnapped or taken hostage 
Code 15: Family member killed 
Code 16: A member of the rebel group 
Code 17: A member of the army 
 
17. indvconfexp_Q2 A-Q: Dummy variables created to reflect each individual 
variable listed and the distribution 
The research created dummy variables for each option available for respondents to 
choose for this question. It is still fine to use indvconfexp_Q2 as our variable for this 
question, but for detailed information the dummy variables below are useful here. 
 
New (dummy) Variables Created:  
18. indvexp_warinarea- War took place where they lived 
19. indvexp_lostcontact- Lost contact with close relatives 
20. indvexp_leavehome- Forced to leave home and live elsewhere 
21. indvexp_damageproperty- Serious damage to property 
22. indvexp_lootedhouse- House was looted 
23. indvexp_combatant- Was a combatant 
24. indvexp_foodtaken- Combatants took food away 
25. indvexp_torture- Tortured 
26. indvexp_someoneraped- Knew somebody well who was raped by combatants 
27. indvexp_wounded- Wounded by fighting 
28. indvexp_someone- Knew somebody who was killed 
29. indvexp_imprisoned- Imprisoned 
30. indvexp_sexassault- Sexually assaulted 
31. indvexp_kidnap- Kidnapped or taken hostage 
32. indvexp_familykilled- Family member killed 
33. indvexp_wasrebel- A member of the rebel group 
34. indvexp_wasarmy- A member of the army 
 
35. indvconfexp_Q3 
Individual Conflict Experience Question Three: The individual conflict experience of 
the respondent during the conflict.  
Code 1: Horrible 
Code 2: Hateful  
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Code 3: Disruptive  
Code 4: Humiliating  
Code 5: Confusing  
Code 6: Uncertainty 
Code 7: Powerless  
Code 8: Challenging 
Code 9: Exciting                                                 
Code 10: Remote  
Code 11: Hopeful  
Code 12: Don’t know  
 
indvconfexp_Q3 and indvconfexp_Q3A  
The research created dummy variables for each option available for respondents to 
choose for this question. It is fine to use indvconfexp_Q3 as our variable for this 
question but for detailed information dummy variables are useful here. 
 
New (dummy) Variables Created:  
35. indvexp_hateful 
36. indvexp_horrible 
37. indvexp_disruptive 
38. indvexp_humiliating 
39. indvexp_confusing 
40. indvexp_uncertainty 
41. indvexp_powerless 
42. indvexp_challenging 
43. indvexp_exciting 
44. indvexp_remote 
45. indvexp_hopeful 
 
46. indvconfexp_Q4 
Individual Conflict Experience Question Four: The individual conflict experience of 
the respondent during the conflict. Dummy variable 
Code 1: Attack enemy combatants and civilians                                                               
Code 2: Attack enemy combatants and avoid civilians as much as possible  
Code 3: Attack only enemy combatants and leave civilians alone  
Code 4: Do not know / refused to answer 
 
47. indvconfexp_Q4 and indvconfexp_Q4A:  
Q: When combatants attack to weaken the enemy, should they…? 
Attack enemy combatants and civilians 
Attack enemy combatants and avoid civilians as much as possible 
Attack only enemy combatants and leave civilians alone 
Do not know / refused to answer 
As you can see indvconfexp_Q4A has only 10 observations, so we can use 
indvconfexp_Q4 as variable for the given question.  
 
48. New Variable created: lawofwar_indvexpQ4 
 
49. indvconfexp_Q5 
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Individual Conflict Experience Question Five: The individual conflict experience of 
the respondent during the conflict. - 
Code 1: Government army 
Code 2: Soldiers                                                
Code 3: Rebel group 
Code 4: Militia members 
Code 5: Bandits / criminals 
Code 6: Neighbour(s) 
Code 7: Households / member(s)                     
Code 8: Do not know / stranger 
Code 9: Foreigners                                            
Code 10: Other(s) 
Code 11: None of the following                   
Code 12: Nobody  
Code 13: Do not know  
Code 14: Refused to answer  
 
50. conflictdur_Q1 
Conflict Duration Question One: Who were the most frequent people/groups you 
interacted with during the conflict? 
Code 1: Government army 
Code 2: Soldiers                                                
Code 3: Rebel group 
Code 4: Militia members 
Code 5: Bandits / criminals 
Code 6: Neighbour(s) 
Code 7: Households / member(s)                     
Code 8: Do not know / stranger 
Code 9: Foreigners                                            
Code 10: Other(s) 
Code 11: None of the following              
Code 12: Nobody  
Code 13: Do not know  
Code 14: Refused to answer  
 
51. conflictdur_Q2 
Conflict Duration Question Two: Who do you recall interacting with the most during 
the conflict?  
Code 1: Government army 
Code 2: Soldiers                                                
Code 3: Rebel group 
Code 4: Militia members 
Code 5: Bandits / criminals 
Code 6: Neighbour(s) 
Code 7: Households / member(s)                     
Code 8: Do not know / stranger 
Code 9: Foreigners                                            
Code 10: Other(s) 
Code 11: None of the following                   
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Code 12: Nobody  
Code 13: Do not know  
Code 14: Refused to answer  
 
52. combtntembd_Q1 
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question One: When did the actors 
arrive in your district? Dummy variable 
 
53. combtntembd_Q2 
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Two: How long did the 
actor selected live amongst your community? 
Code 1: Under a month  
Code 2: Over a month                                     
Code 3: 2-3 months 
Code 4: 3-6 months                                           
Code 5: 6-9 months  
Code 6: 9-12 months 
Code 7: 1-2 years                                                   
Code 8: 2-3 years 
Code 9: 3-4 years 
Code 10: 4-5 years 
Code 11: 5-6 years                                                  
Code 12: 6-7 years 
Code 13: 7-8 years 
Code 14: 8-9 years 
Code 15: 9-10 years  
Code 16: 10 years and over 
 
54. catcombtntembd_Q2 
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Two: How long did the 
actor selected live amongst your community? 
This is a categorical dummy variable created from the variable combtntembd_Q2 
above.  
Code 1: 0-6 months 
Code 2: 6 months-3 years 
Code 3: 3 years- 8 years 
Code 4: 8 years to the end of the conflict 
 
55. combtntembd_Q3 
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Three: Did actors stay 
behind once a battle had occurred?  
Code 1: Yes                                                        
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Unknown 
 
56. combtntembd_Q4 
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Four: How long did the 
actor identified stay amongst the civilian population where they were located during 
the conflict?  
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Code 1: Under a month  
Code 2: Over a month                                     
Code 3: 2-3 months 
Code 4: 3-6 months                                           
Code 5: 6-9 months  
Code 6: 9-12 months 
Code 7: 1-2 years                                                   
Code 8: 2-3 years 
Code 9: 3-4 years 
Code 10: 4-5 years 
Code 11: 5-6 years                                                  
Code 12: 6-7 years 
Code 13: 7-8 years 
Code 14: 8-9 years 
Code 15: 9-10 years  
Code 16: 10 years and over 
 
57. combtntembd_Q5 
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Five: Did you notice 
forceful violence being used against you or your family where you were based? 
Code 1: Yes                                                        
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Unknown 
 
58. combtntembd_Q6 
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Six: Did actors or 
observed actors embedded amongst the community use violence against other 
members of the community? 
Code 1: Yes                                                        
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Unknown 
 
59. combtntembd_Q7 
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Seven: Whether violence 
was a one-off act or a continuous act toward community members.  
Code 1: Yes                                                        
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Unknown 
 
60. combtntembd_Q8 
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Eight: Was the nature of 
combatant’s behaviour-fatigue or tired?  
Code 1: Yes                                                       
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Unknown Q: If yes when did you notice this? 
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61. combtntembd_Q9 
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Nine: Actors ability to 
embed themselves amongst civilians and whether the use of violence is linked to 
being amongst civilians or with the conflict.  
Code 1: With civilians  
Code 2: With the conflict  
Code 3: With each other 
Code 4: With the government 
Code 5: With rebels only 
Code 6: With the women only  
Code 7: With men only 
 
62. combtntembd_Q10 
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Ten: Whether 
combatants remained embedded amongst civilians or whether they returned to violate 
the same people?  
Code 1: Yes                                                        
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Unknown 
 
63. combtntembd_Q11 
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Eleven: Which one of the 
following choices of actors lived amongst the civilian population the longest? 
Code 1: Government army 
Code 2: Soldiers                                                
Code 3: Rebel group 
Code 4: Militia members 
Code 5: Bandits / criminals 
Code 6: Neighbour(s) 
Code 7: Households / member(s)                     
Code 8: Do not know / stranger 
Code 9: Foreigners                                            
Code 10: Other(s) 
Code 11: None of the following                   
Code 12: Nobody  
Code 13: Do not know  
Code 14: Refused to answer  
 
64. combtntembd_Q11, combtntembd_Q11A-B  
The examination observes that the second and third response is very low, so for the 
purposes of this examination the research will use combtntembd_Q11 as variable for 
this question.  
Q: Which of the following were in your community the longest? 
Code 1: Government army 
Code 2: Soldiers                                                
Code 3: Rebel group 
Code 4: Militia members 
Code 5: Bandits / criminals 
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Code 6: Neighbour(s) 
Code 7: Households / member(s)                     
Code 8: Do not know / stranger 
Code 9: Foreigners                                            
Code 10: Other(s) 
Code 11: None of the following                   
Code 12: Nobody  
Code 13: Do not know  
Code 14: Refused to answer  
 
65. combtntembd_Q12 
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Twelve:  
Do you know where the actors identified in question 11 were located? 
Code 1: Yes                                                        
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Unknown 
 
66. combtntembd_Q13 
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Thirteen: Where did the 
violence occur? (Respondent demonstrates on a map)  
 
67. combtntfrstn_Q1 
Combatant’s frustration Question One: How would you describe the actors’ behaviour 
that you observed during the conflict? Choose one of these options: 
Code 1: Perfect 
Code 2: Very good 
Code 3: Good                                                 
Code 4: Bad 
Code 5: Very bad                                                     
Code 6: Extremely bad 
 
68. combtntfrstn_Q2 
Combatant’s frustration Question Two: Were combatants frustrated and angry when 
they entered your community?  
Code 1: Yes                                                      
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Unknown 
 
69. combtntfrstn_Q3 
Combatant’s frustration Question Three: Did the actors you observed appear to be 
tired and fatigued? 
Code 1: Yes                                                        
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Unknown 
70. combtntfrstn_Q4 
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Combatant’s frustration Question Four: What forms of violence did you observe 
during the conflict? 
Code 1: Rape                                                  
Code 2: Killing 
Code 3: Verbal abuse 
Code 4: Physical abuse 
Code 5: Kidnapping 
Code 6: Torture 
Code 7: Psychological abuse  
Code 8: Sexual abuse 
Code 9: Other [SPECIFY]  
combtntfrstn_Q4, combtntfrstn_Q4A-F  
Dummy variables were created for each option available for respondents to choose for 
this question. It is fine to use combtntfrstn_Q4 as our variable for this question but 
as previously explained, for detailed information dummy variables are useful here. 
 
New (dummy) Variables Created: 
71. rapebycombatant- Rape 
72. killingbycombatant- Killing 
73. vabusebycombatant- Verbal abuse 
74. pabusebycombatant- Physical abuse 
75. kidnapbycombatant- Kidnapping 
76. torturebycombatant- Torture 
77. psyabusebycombatant- Psychological abuse 
78. sexabusebycombatant- Sexual abuse 
 
79. combtntfrstn_Q5 
Combatant’s frustration Question Five: Did actors use violence against civilians 
because they could not differentiate between actors and civilians when they entered 
your community?  
Code 1: Yes                                                      
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Unknown 
 
80. combtntfrstn_Q6 
Combatant’s frustration Question Six: Describe what other types of behaviour you 
observed the conflict actor exhibiting. 
 
81. combtntfrstn_Q7 
Combatant’s frustration Question Seven: The respondent is asked to choose two 
actors whom they observed to be fatigued and frustrated with civilians.  
Code 1: Government army 
Code 2: Soldiers                                                
Code 3: Rebel group 
Code 4: Militia members 
Code 5: Bandits / criminals 
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Code 6: Neighbour(s) 
Code 7: Households / member(s)                     
Code 8: Do not know / stranger 
Code 9: Foreigners                                            
Code 10: Other(s) 
Code 11: None of the following                     
Code 12: Nobody  
Code 13: Do not know  
Code 14: Refused to answer  
 
82. combtntfrstn_Q8 
Combatant’s frustration Question Eight: The respondent is asked to select which two 
people they felt were targeted because of the actor’s frustration.  
Code 1: Women  
Code 2: Men  
Code 3: Children  
Code 4: Elderly 
Code 5: Teenagers  
Code 6: Ethnic groups 
Code 7: Poor people  
Code 8: Rich people  
Code 9: Middle class  
 
combtntfrstn_Q8 and combtntfrstn_Q8A 
Dummy variables were created for each option available for respondents to choose for 
this question. The research still used the variable 
targetofcombatant_combtntfrstnQ8 (which is the same as combtntfrstn_Q8) as 
our variable for this question. However, for detailed analysis dummy variables are 
useful here. 
 
New (dummy) Variables Created:  
83. womentargetted- Women 
84. mentargetted- Men 
85. childrentargetted- Children 
86. elderlytargetted- Elderly 
87. teenagerstargetted- Teenagers 
88. ethnicgrptargetted- Ethnic groups 
89. poortargetted- Poor people 
90. richtargetted- Rich people 
91. midclasstargetted- Middle class 
 
92. violagnstcvln_Q1 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question One: The respondent is asked again to 
identify whether members of their community were targeted. 
Code 1: Yes 
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Do not know  
Code 5: Refused to answer 
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93. violagnstcvln_Q2 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Two: Respondent is asked to identify 
why they feel this occurred.  
 
94. violagnstcvln_Q3 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Three: Was the violence in your 
community observed during the initial periods of the conflict? 
Code 1: Yes 
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Do not know  
Code 5: Refused to answer 
 
95: violagnstcvln_Q4 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Four: Which ethnic groups were 
targeted during the conflict? 
 
96: violagnstcvln_Q5 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Five: The respondent is asked to 
identify how long this targeting of civilians did occur? 
Code 1: Under a month  
Code 2: Over a month                                     
Code 3: 2-3 months 
Code 4: 3-6 months                                           
Code 5: 6-9 months  
Code 6: 9-12 months 
Code 7: 1-2 years                                                   
Code 8: 2-3 years 
Code 9: 3-4 years 
Code 10: 4-5 years 
Code 11: 5-6 years                                                  
Code 12: 6-7 years 
Code 13: 7-8 years 
Code 14: 8-9 years 
Code 15: 9-10 years  
Code 16: 10 years and over 
 
97: violagnstcvln_Q6 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Six: The respondent is asked to 
identify whether actors use violence individually or collectively?  
Code 1: Individually  
Code 2: Groups 
Code 3: The whole group 
Code 4: Unknown  
Code 5: Collective of people 
 
violagnstcvln_Q6 and violagnstcvln_Q6A: Respondents were given the option to 
select more than one option violagnstcvln_Q6 refers to their first option while and 
violagnstcvln_Q6A refers to their second option. Dummy variable 
Q: Were these attacks done by individual members or by a collective of people? 
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Code 1: Individually  
Code 2: Groups 
Code 3: The whole group 
Code 4: Unknown  
Code 5: Collective of people 
Due to small number of responses in violagnstcvln_Q6A, the researcher decided to 
keep only violagnstcvln_Q6,  
 
98. New Variable indvcollectviol_violagnstcvlnQ6 
Please see the above comments for the used variable. 
 
99: violagnstcvln_Q7 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Seven: The respondent is asked to 
identify whether violence was a one-off occurrence or continuously used. 
Code 1: Yes 
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Do not know  
Code 5: Refused to answer 
 
100: violagnstcvln_Q7A 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Seven A: The respondent is asked to 
identify how long this form of violence continued to occur. 
Code 1: Under a month  
Code 2: Over a month                                             
Code 3: 2-3 months 
Code 4: 3-6 months                                                
Code 5: 6-9 months  
Code 6: 9-12 months 
Code 7: 1-2 years                                                   
Code 8: 2-3 years 
Code 9: 3-4 years 
Code 10: 4-5 years 
Code 11: 5-6 years                                                  
Code 12: 6-7 years 
Code 13: 7-8 years 
Code 14: 8-9 years 
Code 15: 9-10 years  
Code 16: 10 years and over 
 
101. violagnstcvln_Q8 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Eight: The respondent is asked did 
actors start attacking civilians before or after the fighting ceased in their area. 
Code 1: Yes 
Code 2: No  
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Do not know  
Code 5: Refused to answer 
 
102. violagnstcvln_Q9 
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Violence against civilians in conflict Question Nine: The respondent is asked to 
identify how long did this form of violence last for?  
Code 1: Under a month  
Code 2: Over a month                                     
Code 3: 2-3 months 
Code 4: 3-6 months                                           
Code 5: 6-9 months  
Code 6: 9-12 months 
Code 7: 1-2 years                                                   
Code 8: 2-3 years 
Code 9: 3-4 years 
Code 10: 4-5 years 
Code 11: 5-6 years                                                  
Code 12: 6-7 years 
Code 13: 7-8 years 
Code 14: 8-9 years 
Code 15: 9-10 years  
Code 16: 10 years and over 
 
103. catviolagnstcvln_Q9 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Nine: The respondent is asked to 
identify how long this form of violence lasted for. The variable is a categorical 
dummy variable created from the variable violagnstcvln_Q9 
Code 1: Under a month to 6 months                                           
Code 2: 3-6-years                                      
Code 3: 6-8 years 
Code 4: 8 years to end of the conflict 
 
104. violagnstcvln_Q10 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Ten: The respondent is asked to 
identify how frequently the repeated attacks on civilians happened? 
 
105. violagnstcvln_Q11 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Eleven: The respondent is asked to 
identify how long these repeated attacks on civilians continued for.  
Code 1: Under a month  
Code 2: Over a month                                     
Code 3: 2-3 months 
Code 4: 3-6 months                                           
Code 5: 6-9 months  
Code 6: 9-12 months 
Code 7: 1-2 years                                                   
Code 8: 2-3 years 
Code 9: 3-4 years 
Code 10: 4-5 years 
Code 11: 5-6 years                                                  
Code 12: 6-7 years 
Code 13: 7-8 years 
Code 14: 8-9 years 
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Code 15: 9-10 years  
Code 16: 10 years and over 
 
106. violagnstcvln_Q12 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twelve: The respondent is asked 
whether attacking civilians in populated areas is justified. Who is doing the attacking? 
Code 1: Okay 
Code 2: Not okay 
Code 3: Do not know  
Code 4: Refused to answer  
 
107. violagnstcvln_Q13 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirteen: The respondent is asked to 
select an option that best describes their views on the effects of the conflict.  
Code 1: Produces too much hate and division 
Code 2: Causes too much psychological damage  
Code 3: Produces too much destruction 
Code 4: Causes too much physical suffering  
Code 5: People have too much hate inside  
Code 6: Other [SPECIFY]  
Code 7: Do not know  
Code 8: Refused to answer 
 
108. violagnstcvln_Q14 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Fourteen: The respondent is given a 
scenario and asked to respond.  
Code 1: Okay                                                  
Code 2: Not okay  
Code 3: Do not know 
Code 4: Refused to answer 
 
109. violagnstcvln_Q15 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Fifteen: The respondent is given a 
scenario about attacking a civilian who provided food and shelter to the supposed 
enemy and asked to respond by selecting an option. 
Code 1: Okay                                                  
Code 2: Not okay  
Code 3: Do not know 
Code 4: Refused to answer 
 
110. violagnstcvln_Q16 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Sixteen: The respondent is asked their 
views on rape.  
Code 1: Yes 
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Do not know  
Code 5: Refused to answer 
 
111. violagnstcvln_Q17 
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Violence against civilians in conflict Question Seventeen: The respondent is asked to 
state which of the following describes the use of rape.  
Code 1: Physical abuse  
Code 2: Verbal abuse  
Code 3: Psychological abuse                          
Code 4: Sexual abuse                                    
Code 5: Refused to answer  
 
112. violagnstcvln_Q18 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Eighteen: The respondent is asked to 
respond to how they view rape. 
Code 1: Physical abuse  
Code 2: Verbal abuse  
Code 3: Psychological abuse                          
Code 4: Sexual abuse                                    
Code 5: Refused to answer  
 
113. violagnstcvln_Q19 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Nineteen: The respondent is asked to 
respond to how they view rape.  
Code 1: Right 
Code 2: Wrong 
Code 3: Unknown 
Code 4: Refused to answer 
 
114. violagnstcvln_Q20 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty: The respondent is asked to 
respond to why they feel rape is wrong.  
Code 1: Against human rights 
Code 2: Against their religion 
Code 3: Against the law 
Code 4: Against personal code 
Code 5: Against their culture                                      
Code 6: Against people’s beliefs  
Code 7: Do not know  
Code 8: Other 
 
115. violagnstcvln_Q21 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-One: The respondent is asked 
to respond to a scenario. 
Code 1: Okay 
Code 2: Not okay 
Code 3: Wrong 
Code 4: Do not know 
Code 5: Refused to answer 
 
116: violagnstcvln_Q22 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-Two: The respondent is asked 
to respond to a scenario. 
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Code 1: Okay 
Code 2: Not okay 
Code 3: Wrong 
Code 4: Do not know 
Code 5: Refused to answer 
 
117. violagnstcvln_Q23 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-Three: The respondent is 
asked to respond to a scenario. 
Code 1: Okay 
Code 2: Not okay 
Code 3: Wrong 
Code 4: Do not know 
Code 5: Refused to answer 
 
118. violagnstcvln_Q24 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-Four: The respondent is asked 
to respond to a scenario. 
Code 1: Against human rights 
Code 2: Against their religion  
Code 3: Against the law 
Code 4: Against personal code 
Code 5: Against their culture 
Code 6: Against people’s beliefs 
Code 7: Do not know 
Code 8: Other  
 
119. violagnstcvln_Q25 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-Five: The respondent is asked 
to respond to a scenario. 
Code 1: Okay 
Code 2: Not okay 
Code 3: Do not know  
Code 4: Refused to answer 
 
120. violagnstcvln_Q26 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-Six: The respondent is asked 
to respond to a scenario. 
Code 1: Okay 
Code 2: Not okay 
Code 3: Do not know  
Code 4: Refused to answer 
 
121.violagnstcvln_Q27 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-Seven: The respondent is 
asked to respond to a scenario about actors attacking civilians.  
Code 1: Okay to attack civilians who voluntarily give food and shelter to enemy 
combatants. 
Code 2: Part of war to deprive civilian populations of food, medicine, or water. 
Code 3: Part of war to attack populated villages or towns knowing that many women 
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and children would be killed. 
Code 4: Okay to plant landmines even though civilians may step on them 
accidentally. 
 
122. violagnstcvln_Q28 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-Eight: The respondent is asked 
to respond to a scenario about actors attacking civilians.  
Code 1: Okay to attack civilians who voluntarily give food and shelter to enemy 
combatants. 
Code 2: Part of war to deprive civilian populations of food, medicine, or water. 
Code 3: Part of war to attack populated villages or towns knowing that many women 
and children would be killed. 
Code 4: Okay to plant landmines even though civilians may step on them 
accidentally. 
 
123. violagnstcvln_Q29 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-Nine: The respondent is asked 
to explain why they feel civilians are attacked. 
Code 1: Win at any cost                                 
Code 2: Don’t care about laws 
Code 3: Tired of the conflict                            
Code 4: Frustrated with the conflict               
Code 5: Hate the other side                                                    
Code 6: Fatigued with the conflict 
Code 7: Are told to do so 
Code 8: Been amongst civilians for too long  
Code 9: Lose all sense                                   
Code 10: Alcohol / drugs 
Code 11: Do not know the laws  
Code 12: No discipline amongst fighters 
Code 13: Combatants were amongst civilians for too long  
Code 14: Other side doing same  
Code 15: Are to young  
Code 16: Are scared  
Code 17: Committed to cause  
Code 18: Abuse of power  
 
violagnstcvln_Q29, violagnstcvln_Q29A-C:  
Dummy variables were created for each option available for respondents to choose for 
this question.  
 
124. reasonstoatk_violagnstcvlnQ29 (Which is the same as violagnstcvln_Q29) as 
our variable for this question for detailed information dummy variables are useful 
here. 
 
New (dummy) variables created:  
125. towin_violagnstcvln- Win at any cost                                 
126. neglectlaw_violagnstcvln- Does not care about laws  
127. tired_violagnstcvln- Tired of the conflict                            
128. hate_violagnstcvln- Hate the other side                                                    
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129. frustration_violagnstcvln- Frustrated with the conflict               
130. fatigue_violagnstcvln- Fatigued with the conflict 
131. order_violagnstcvln- Are told to do so 
132. longembed_violagnstcvln- Been amongst civilians for too long 
133. losesense_violagnstcvln- Lose all sense  
134. drugs_violagnstcvln- Alcohol / drugs 
135. notknowinglaw_violagnstcvln- Does not know the laws 
136. lackdiscipline_violagnstcvln- No discipline amongst fighters 
137. tooyoung_violagnstcvln- Are too young 
138. copyotherside_violagnstcvln- Other side doing same 
140. amongstcvln_violagnstcvln- Living amongst civilians 
141. scared_violagnstcvln- Are scared 
142. cause_violagnstcvln- Committed to cause 
143. abusepower_violagnstcvln- Abuse of power 
 
144. violagnstcvln_Q30 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty: The respondent is asked were 
individuals known to use violence against civilians in your community.  
Code 1: Yes 
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Unsure  
 
145.  violagnstcvln_Q30A 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty A: The respondent is asked to 
identify which actors did they notice using violence?  
Code 1: Government army 
Code 2: Soldiers                                                
Code 3: Rebel group 
Code 4: Militia members 
Code 5: Bandits / criminals 
Code 6: Neighbour(s) 
Code 7: Households / member(s)                     
Code 8: Do not know / stranger 
Code 9: Foreigners                                            
Code 10: Other(s) 
Code 11: None of the following                     
Code 12: Nobody  
Code 13: Do not know  
Code 14: Refused to answer  
 
146: violagnstcvln_Q31 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-One: The respondent is asked 
whether they were forced to kill a friend or a family member.  
Code 1: Yes 
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Unsure  
 
147. violagnstcvln_Q32 
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Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-Two: The respondent is asked 
whether they betrayed a friend or a family member.  
Code 1: Yes 
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Unsure  
 
148. violagnstcvln_Q33 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-Three: The respondent is asked 
whether they lost any of their income since the conflict.  
Code 1: Yes  
Code 2: No  
Code 3: Do not know  
Code 4: Refused to answer 
 
149. violagnstcvln_Q34 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-Four: The respondent is asked 
to state at what point they lost their income.  
 
150. violagnstcvln_Q35 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-Five: The respondent is asked to 
state the exact date.   
 
151. violagnstcvln_Q36 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-Six: The respondent is asked to 
state the overall value of the item.  
 
152. violagnstcvln_Q37 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-Seven: The respondent is asked 
to identify who the actors are. 
Code 1: Government army 
Code 2: Soldiers                                                
Code 3: Rebel group 
Code 4: Militia members 
Code 5: Bandits / criminals 
Code 6: Neighbour(s) 
Code 7: Households / member(s)                     
Code 8: Do not know / stranger 
Code 9: Foreigners                                            
Code 10: Other(s) 
Code 11: None of the following                     
Code 12: Nobody  
Code 13: Do not know  
Code 14: Refused to answer  
 
153. violagnstcvln_Q38 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-Eight: The respondent is asked 
to state whether their economic status has changed because of the conflict. 
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Code 1: Yes  
Code 2: No  
Code 3: Do not know  
Code 4: Refused to answer 
 
154. violagnstcvln_Q39 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-Nine: The respondent is asked 
to state which of the following items were taken during the conflict.   
Code 1: Dwelling/Mattress 
Code 2: Bicycle Motorcycle/car 
Code 3: Radio / TV  
Code 4: Clothes 
Code 5: Documents / certificates  
Code 6: Jewellery  
Code 7: Cell phone  
Code 8: Blankets  
Code 9: Rifle / machete 
Code 10: Cultivation tools such as hoe, plough, etc. 
Code 11: Tractor  
Code 12: Torch / flashlight 
Code 13: Equipment for education 
Code 14: Shelter material                              
Code 15: Clothes  
Code 16: Computer  
Code 17: Others  
 
155. violagnstcvln_Q40 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Forty: The respondent is asked to 
identify who was responsible for the damage.  
Code 1: Government army 
Code 2: Soldiers                                                
Code 3: Rebel group 
Code 4: Militia members 
Code 5: Bandits / criminals 
Code 6: Neighbour(s) 
Code 7: Households / member(s)                     
Code 8: Do not know / stranger 
Code 9: Foreigners                                            
Code 10: Other(s) 
Code 11: None of the following                     
Code 12: Nobody  
Code 13: Do not know  
Code 14: Refused to answer  
 
156: violagnstcvln_Q40A 
The response from violagnstcvln_Q40A was extremely low, as a result the 
examination only focused on the responses from the first variable.   
 
157.violagnstcvln_Q41 
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Violence against civilians in conflict Question Forty: The respondent was given a list 
of options and was asked if anyone in their household experienced these scenarios 
first hand. 
Code 1: No  
Code 2: Was verbally threatened 
Code 3: Was verbally insulted, but not threatened  
Code 4: Was threatened with knife, gun or other type of weapon 
Code 5: Other type of weapon  
Code 6: Was attacked with knife, gun or other type of weapon  
Code 7: Was beaten / assaulted/kicked  
Code 8: Was strangled or burned  
Code 9: Was injured or killed in gun shootings  
Code10: Was injured by a landmine / UXO  
Code 11: Was physically forced to have sexual intercourse  
Code 12: Was forced to perform other sexual acts that the person did not want to do 
Code 13: Lost body parts  
Code 14: Was forced to labour  
Code 15: Was robbed  
Code 16: Was kidnapped / abducted  
Code 17: Was extorted for money or other goods  
Code 18: Don’t know/ others 
 
To have a detailed understanding of the results, dummy variables were created for 
each option available for respondents to choose for this question. It is fine to use  
 
158.famexp_violagnstcvlnQ41 (same as violagnstcvln_Q41) Dummy variable 
as our variable for this question but as previously noted, for detailed information 
dummy variables are useful here. 
 
New (dummy) variables created: 
160.no_violagnstcvln_Q41- No 
161.vthreat_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was verbally threatened 
162.vinsulted_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was verbally insulted, but not threatened 
163.knifegun_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was threatened with knife, gun or other type of 
weapon 
164.oweapon_violagnstcvln_Q41- Other type of weapon  
165.attack_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was attacked with knife, gun or other type of 
weapon 
166.beat_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was beaten / assaulted/kicked 
167.strangled_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was strangled or burned 
168.guninjury_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was injured or killed in gun shootings 
169.mineinjury_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was injured by a landmine / UXO 
170.rape_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was physically forced to have sexual intercourse 
171.sexabuse_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was forced to perform other sexual acts that the 
person did not want to do 
172.lostlimb_violagnstcvln_Q41- Lost body parts 
173.forcedlabour_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was forced to labour 
174.robbed_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was robbed 
175.kidnap_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was kidnapped / abducted 
176.extortion_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was extorted for money or other goods 
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178. violagnstcvln_Q42 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Forty-Two: The respondent is asked to 
state the identified person receiving the harm they witnessed. 
Code 1: You                                                    
Code 2: Mother  
Code 3: Father 
Code 4: Sister                                                
Code 5: Brother 
Code 6: Cousin  
Code 7: Grandmother 
Code 8: Grandfather 
Code 9: Aunty  
Code 10: Uncle 
Code 11: Step-brother  
Code 12: Step-sister  
Code 13: Step-mother 
Code 14: Step-father  
 
violagnstcvln_Q42, violagnstcvln_Q42A-G The research has also created dummy 
variables out of the following variables: 
179.self_violagnstcvln_Q42- You   
180.mother_violagnstcvln_Q42- Mother 
181.father_violagnstcvln_Q42- Father 
182.sister_violagnstcvln_Q42- Sister    
183.brother_violagnstcvln_Q42- Brother 
184.cousin_violagnstcvln_Q42- Cousin 
185.gmother_violagnstcvln_Q42- Grandmother 
186.gfather_violagnstcvln_Q42- Grandfather 
187.aunt_violagnstcvln_Q42- Aunty 
188.uncle_violagnstcvln_Q42- Uncle 
189.stepbr_violagnstcvln_Q42- Step-brother 
190.stepsis_violagnstcvln_Q42- Step-sister 
191.stepm_violagnstcvln_Q42- Step-mother 
192.stepf_violagnstcvln_Q42- Step-father 
 
193.violagnstcvln_Q43 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Forty-Three: The respondent is asked 
to identify where the incident occurred. 
Code 1: On the battlefield/in a combat operation  
Code 2: At home                                                
Code 3: In a refugee camp 
Code 4: In the neighbourhood  
Code 5: In your community  
Code 6: At work (if other than home and not military service)  
Code 7: While combatants were amongst the community 
Code 8: During transit (e.g. migration) 
Code 9: Other location 
Code 10: Don’t know  
Code 11: Refused to answer 
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194.violagnstcvln_Q44 
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Forty-Four: The respondent is asked if 
the person identified has suffered from any physical or psychological illness of 
prolonged nature or death, or any afflictions due to the experiences described. 
Code 1: Yes, illness of prolonged nature 
Code 2: Yes, injury  
Code 3: Yes, handicap  
Code 4: Yes, psychological distress 
Code 5: Yes, immediate death 
Code 6: Yes, death at scene of incident 
Code 7: Yes, disappeared                              
Code 8: Yes, tortured  
Code 9: Yes, death in hospital  
Code 10: Yes, death after discharge from hospital                                                           
Code 11: Yes, other  
Code 12: No, don’t know  
Code 13: Refused to answer  
 
195.cgrpatck_Q1 
Actors and group attacks Question One: The respondent is asked to identify who they 
felt was the worst violator.  
Code 1: Government army 
Code 2: Soldiers                                                
Code 3: Rebel group 
Code 4: Militia members 
Code 5: Bandits / criminals 
Code 6: Neighbour(s) 
Code 7: Households / member(s)                     
Code 8: Do not know / stranger 
Code 9: Foreigners                                            
Code 10: Other(s) 
Code 11: None of the following                     
Code 12: Nobody  
Code 13: Do not know  
Code 14: Refused to answer  
 
cgrpatck_Q1 and cgrpatck_Q1A:  
196. New variable created worstviol_cgrpatckQ1 (same as cgrpatck_Q1) for our 
analysis in this research we have created dummy variables for detailed information  
 
New (dummy) variables created: 
197.govarmy_cgrpatck_Q1- Government army 
198.sol_cgrpatck_Q1- Soldiers   
199.reb_cgrpatck_Q1- Rebel group 
200.militia_cgrpatck_Q1- Militia members 
201.criminal_cgrpatck_Q1- Bandits / criminals 
202.neighbor_cgrpatck_Q1- Neighbour(s) 
203.family_cgrpatck_Q1- Households / member(s)                     
204.stranger_cgrpatck_Q1- Do not know / stranger 
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205.oreigner_cgrpatck_Q1- Foreigners 
 
206.cgrpatck_Q2 
Actors and group attacks Question Two: The respondent is asked to identify whether 
groups were targeted as weapons of warfare. 
Code 1: Yes 
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Do not know  
Code 5: Refused to answer 
 
207.cgrpatck_Q3 
Actors and group attacks Question Three: The respondent is asked to state why they 
feel civilians experienced this form of violence.  
Code 1: Bored 
Code 2: For resources                                    
Code 3: Poorest people  
Code 4: Because the combatants were sent to the area  
Code 5: Combatants were frustrated 
Code 6: Because they were protecting the enemy  
Code 7: Because they were helping the enemy  
Code 8: Associated to the enemy  
Code 9: Because of their ethnic origins 
Code 10: Because of their cultural background 
Code 11: Because of their religious beliefs 
 
 
cgrpatck_Q3 and cgrpatck_Q3A-C:  
208. Here the research uses worstviol_cgrpatckQ1 (same as cgrpatck_Q1) for our 
analysis and for detailed information dummy variables are useful here. 
 
New (dummy) variables created: 
209.bored_cgrpatck_Q3- Bored 
210.resource_cgrpatck_Q3- For resources                                    
211.beingpoor_cgrpatck_Q3- Poorest people  
212.combatantinarea_cgrpatck_Q3- Because the combatants were sent to the area 
213.frustration_cgrpatck_Q3- Combatants were frustrated 
214.forprotectenmy_cgrpatck_Q3- Because they were protecting the enemy 
215.forhelpenmy_cgrpatck_Q3- Because they were helping the enemy 
216.forascnenmy_cgrpatck_Q3- Associated to the enemy 
217.ethnct_cgrpatck_Q3- Because of their ethnic origins 
218.culture_cgrpatck_Q3- Because of their cultural background 
219.relblf_cgrpatck_Q3- Because of their religious beliefs 
 
220.cgrpatck_Q4 
Actors and group attacks Question Four: The respondent is asked to state whether 
security forces used civilians as human shields. 
Code 1: Yes  
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe                                              
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Code 4: Unknown  
 
221. cgrpatck_Q4A 
Actors and group attacks Question Four: The respondent is asked to identify were 
these areas in opposition strong hold. 
Code 1: Yes  
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe                                               
Code 4: Unknown  
 
222. cgrpatck_Q5 
Actors and group attacks Question Five: The respondent is asked to identify the most 
used form of violence used by an actor. 
Code 1: Rape 
Code 2: Harassment  
Code 3: Sexual Violence  
Code 4: Abuse 
Code 5: Discrimination 
Code 6: Torture                                              
Code 7: Killing 
 
 
233. cgrpatck_Q7 
Actors and group attacks Question Seven: The respondent is asked to give a reason 
why they felt this was the case.   
Code 1: Because of their association 
Code 2: Because of where they lived  
Code 3: Because of the length of the conflict 
Code 4: Unknown                                       
Code 5: Refused to answer 
 
234. The research also created a dummy variable called reason_cgrpatck_Q7 (same 
as cgrpatck_Q7) as our variable here is capturing the first response only. I create a 
dummy variables:  
 
New dummy variables 
235. association_cgrpatck_Q7- Because of their association 
236. livingarea_cgrpatck_Q7- Because of where they lived 
237. conflictlength_cgrpatck_Q7- Because of the length of the conflict 
 
238. cgrpatck_Q8 
Actors and group attacks Question Eight: The respondent is asked to identify how 
often this occurred. 
Code 1: 0-5 times  
Code 2: 5-10 times 
Code 3: 10-15 times 
Code 4: 15-20 times                                              
Code 5: 20-30 times 
Code 6: 30-40 times 
Code 7: 40-50 times 
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239. cgrpatck_Q9 
Actors and group attacks Question Nine: The respondent is asked to identify how long 
the violence they witnessed by the actor lasted for. 
Code 1: 1-2 weeks 
Code 2: 2-3 weeks  
Code 3: 3-4 weeks  
Code 4: Over a month  
Code 5: 1-3 months 
Code 6: 3-6 months  
Code 7: 6-9 months  
Code 8: 9-12 months  
Code 9: 1 year and over 
 
240. cgrpatck_Q10  
Actors and group attacks Question Ten: The respondent is asked to differentiate 
between the different types of violence that civilians experienced.  
Code 1: Yes   
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Do not know  
Code 4: Refused to answer  
 
241. cgrpatck_Q11 
Actors and group attacks Question Eleven: The respondent was asked to identify why 
they thought the group experienced violence. 
Code 1: Some were harmed more than others 
Code 2: Violence was the same  
Code 3: Violence depended on your gender  
Code 4: Violence depended on your income 
Code 5: Violence depended on how long combatants were in the community 
 
cgrpatck_Q11 and cgrpatck_Q11A 
Owing to the low second response rate, we will include only first response in our 
variable for this question.  
 
242. New variable difinviol_cgrpatck_Q11 created that includes only first response, 
as second response is quite low. 
 
243. cmbtntbhvr_Q1 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question One: The respondent is asked 
whether they would assist an enemy.  
Code 1: Would assist  
Code 2: Would not assist 
Code 3: Do not know  
Code 4: Refused to answer  
 
244. cmbtntbhvr_Q2 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Two: The respondent is asked if 
they would help a wounded person who killed somebody close to them.  
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Code 1: Would save  
Code 2: Would not save  
Code 3: Do not know  
Code 4: Refused to answer  
 
245.cmbtntbhvr_Q3 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Three: The respondent is asked if 
actors imprisoned them where they are based. 
 
Code 1: Imprisoned                                        
Code 2: Imprisoned but free to move 
Code 3: Lived under enemy control but restricted  
Code 4: Lived under enemy control but free to move                                                                
Code 5: Did not come under enemy control  
 
246.cmbtntbhvr_Q4 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Four: The respondent is asked to 
respond to a scenario question. 
Code 1: Wrong 
Code 2: Part of war  
Code 3: Both [Volunteered response]  
Code 4: Do not know  
Code 5: Refused to answer 
 
247.cmbtntbhvr_Q5 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Five: The respondent is asked to 
respond to a scenario question. 
Code 1: You were personally mistreated  
Code 2: You were physically injured  
Code 3: You had contact with a representative from an independent organization to 
check on your wellbeing. 
 
248. New variable treatmentincapture_cmbtntbhvr_Q5 is created. 
cmbtntbhvr_Q5 and cmbtntbhvr_Q5A: As observed in the previous question only 
the first responses are used because of low observations in second response.  
  
249. cmbtntbhvr_Q6 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Six: The respondent is asked to 
respond to a scenario question. 
Code 1: Yes 
Code 2: No  
Code 3: Maybe 
Code 4: Unknown                                           
Code 5: Refused to answer  
Code 6: Would help a wounded combatant  
Code 7: Would save a surrendering combatant  
 
250. cmbtntbhvr_Q7 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Seven: The respondent is asked 
to respond to a scenario question. 
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Code 1: Yes  
Code 2: No  
Code 3: Do not know  
Code 4: Refused to answer  
 
251. cmbtntbhvr_Q7A 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Seven A: The respondent is 
asked to respond to a scenario question. 
Code 1: Country’s laws  
Code 2: International law 
Code 3: Religious principles  
Code 4: The values people hold  
Code 5: Other  
Code 6: Don’t know  
 
252. cmbtntbhvr_Q8 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Eight: The respondent is asked 
what should be done to people who break the rules during the conflict? 
Code 1: Be put on trial  
Code 2: Be exposed to the public but not put on trial  
Code 3: Be victimised themselves  
Code 4: Granted amnesty  
Code 5: Be forgiven after the war  
Code 6: Be forgotten when the war is over  
Code 7: Don’t know 
 
253. cmbtntbhvr_Q9 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Nine: The respondent is asked 
who should punish wrongdoers? 
Code 1: International criminal court  
Code 2: Own government  
Code 3: Own courts  
Code 4: Victims of violence 
Code 5: The military itself  
Code 6: Own political leaders  
Code 7: The civilian population  
Code 8: Other 
Code 9: Don’t know  
  
254. cmbtntbhvr_Q10 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Ten:  The respondent is asked 
whom they feel should be responsible for the punishment given to actors. 
 
Code 1: International criminal court                 
Code 2: Own government  
Code 3: Own courts 
Code 4: The military itself 
Code 5: Own political leaders  
Code 6: The civilian population  
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Code 7: Other  
Code 8: Don’t know 
 
255. cmbtntbhvr_Q11 
The behaviour of actors during battles and conflicts Question Eleven: The respondent 
is asked to describe the nature of international works. 
Code 1: Better 
Code 2: Worse  
Code 3: No difference 
Code 4: Don’t know  
 
256. cmbtntbhvr_Q12 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Twelve: The respondent is asked 
to respond to a scenario question. 
Code 1: Want more intervention  
Code 2: Want less intervention                     
Code 3: Unknown 
 
257. cmbtntbhvr_Q13 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Thirteen: The respondent is 
asked to respond to a scenario question. 
Code 1: Government  
Code 2: UN organizations (e.g. UNHCR)  
Code 3: Humanitarian organizations                            
Code 4: No one  
Code 5: Religious leaders  
Code 6: International organizations  
Code 7: Local government leaders  
Code 8: Other 
Code 9: God / church 
Code 10: Army / military  
Code 11: The people  
Code 12: Do not know / refused to answer 
 
258. cmbtntbhvr_Q14 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Fourteen: The respondent is 
asked to respond to a scenario question. 
 
Code 1: Be put on trial  
Code 2: Be forgiven / forgotten after the war  
Code 3: Be exposed to the public but not put on trial  
Code 4: Be granted amnesty  
Code 5: Do not know  
 
259. cmbtntbhvr_Q15 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Fifteen: The respondent is asked 
to respond to a scenario question. 
Code 1: What each side is fighting for  
Code 2: How each side acts during war  
Code 3: Both  
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Code 4: Do not know  
Code 5: Refused to answer  
 
260. cmbtntbhvr_Q16 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Sixteen: The respondent is asked 
to respond to a scenario question. 
Code 1: Yes 
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Do not know  
Code 5: Refused to answer 
 
261. cmbtntbhvr_Q17 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Seventeen: The respondent is 
asked to respond to a scenario question. 
Code 1: Yes 
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Do not know  
Code 5: Refused to answer 
 
262. cmbtntbhvr_Q18 
Combatant’s behaviour during the conflict Question Eighteen: The respondent is 
asked to respond to a scenario question. 
Code 1: Yes 
Code 2: No 
Code 3: Maybe  
Code 4: Do not know  
Code 5: Refused to answer 
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APPENDIX D 
Translated Survey from English to Nepalese 
द्वन्दको विन्याविकरण : पीडक, पीवडत र मानि अविकार हनन ्ििेक्षण 
 
शोि प्रश्न 
पत्र दुई : द्वन्दको क्रममा कुन नागरीकहरुले सामुहहक लहित हहिंसाको अनुभव गरे ? र, के उनीहरु समानरुपमा द्वन्दबाट पीहित हिए ? 
 
पत्र तीन : द्वन्दको/हहिंसाको अनुभव गरेपहिको अबस्िामा के हनशाना बनाइएका नागरीकहरुले फरक फरक समुहलाई हनशाना बनाउने 
सम्भाबना रहला ? 
 
िामान्य िूचना 
१. प्र: तपाइको उमेर कहत हो ? _______ वर्ष  
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
२. प्र: हशिामा कहत वर्ष हबताउनु भयो ? _______ वर्ष  
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
• कहत्त पहन नाई 
• हनहित िैन 
३. प्र: तपाईको वतषमान पाररवारीक अवस्िा ? 
• हववाहहत (पहत वा पत्नी भएको) 
• एकल 
• स्िायी सम्बन्धमा (सँगै बस्ने गरेको) 
• सम्बन्ध-हवच्िेद भएको 
• वेपत्ता व्यहिको पहत/पत्नी 
• हवधुवा/हवदुर 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
४. प्र: तपाईको िोरािोरी िन् ? भए कहत ? 
• िैन 
• ि, ________ जना िोरा-िोरी 
• हनहित िैन 
 
५. तपाईको वतषमान काम (जाहगर) के हो ? के तपाई काम/जाहगर गनुषहुन्ि ? 
• हकसान 
• ज्यालादारी काम गने अिवा मजदुर 
• सीपयुि कामदार 
• स्वरोजगार भएको 
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• गहृहणी अिवा घरायसी काम गने 
• सैहनक (लिाकु) 
• सरकारी जाहगरे 
• नीजी िेत्रको जाहगरे  
• हशिक / प्राध्यापक / वुहिजीवी  
• पेन्सन भएको / अवकाश प्राप्त 
• बेरोजगार (कामको खोजीमा) 
• बेरोजगार (काम नखोजेको) 
• हवद्यािी 
• अन्य (खुलाउनुहोस) 
• िाहा िैन (उत्तर हदन अहस्वकार) 
द्वन्दको व्यविगत िणणन 
१. प्र: द्वन्दको बेला तपाइँ कुन काम गनुषहुन््यो ? 
• हकसान 
• ज्यालादारी काम गने अिवा मजदुर 
• सीपयुि कामदार 
• स्वरोजगार भएको 
• गहृहणी अिवा घरायसी काम गने 
• सैहनक (लिाकु) 
• सरकारी जाहगरे 
• हनहज िेत्रको जाहगरे  
• हशिक / प्राध्यापक / वुहिजीवी  
• पेन्सन भएको / अवकास प्राप्त 
• वेरोजगार (कामको खोजीमा) 
• बेरोजगार (काम नखोजेको) 
• हवद्यािी 
• अन्य (खुलाउनुहोस) 
• िाहा िैन (उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार) 
२. प्र: तपाइको द्वन्दको अनुभब के हो ? 
• आफू बसोबास गरेको िेत्रमा युि भयो / हभिन्त भएको 
• नहजकको आफन्तसँग सम्पकष -हवच्िेद भएको 
• घर िोिेर बस्न बाध्य भएको  
• नीहज सम्पहत्तको अन्यत्र गम्भीर िहत भयो 
• घर लुहटयो 
• लिाकु हिए 
• लिाकुहरुले खानेकुरा लगेको 
• यातना पाएको 
 350 
• लिाकुले राम्ररी हिनेको मान्िेलाई बलात्कार गरेको 
• लिाइको क्रममा घाइते भएको 
• हिनेको मान्िे घाइते भएको 
• यौन हहिंसाको हसकार भएको 
• अपहरणमा परेको / बन्धक बनाएको 
• पररवारको सदस्यको मतृ्यु भएको 
• हवद्रोही समुहको सदस्य भएको 
• सैहनक भएको 
३. प्र: तलका मध्य कुन दुई शब्दहरुले तपाइको व्यहिगत द्वन्दको भोगाईलाई उहित वणषन गिषन? 
• हघन लाग्दो/ िर लाग्दो 
• घणृाजनक 
• हविहललत 
• अपमानजनक  
• अष्पस्ट 
• अहनहितता  
• हनरीह 
• िुनौतीपूणष 
• उत्साहजनक 
• दुगषम 
• आशावादी 
• िाहा िैन 
४. प्र: जब लिाकुले दुश्मनलाई कमजोर बनाउन आक्रमण गिषन, के हतनीहरुले ...... 
• दुस्मन लिाकु र नागरीक दुबैलाई आक्रमण गनुषपि्ष । 
• दुस्मन लिाकुलाई आक्रमण गने र नागरीकलाइ जोगाउन भरपुर कोहसस गनुषपिष | 
• नागरीकलाई िोिेर दुस्मन लिाकुलाईमात्र आक्रमण गनुषपिष । 
• िाहा िैन / उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार  
५. प्र: तलका मध्ये कुन समूहलाई तपाई व्यहिगत रुपमा सबैभन्दा कम रुिाउनुहुन्ि ? 
• सरकारी सेना 
• सैहनक 
• हवद्रोही समुह 
• सैन्य ताहलम प्राप्त सदस्यहरु/ हमहलहसया 
• लुटेरा/ अपराधी 
• हिमेकी (हरु) 
• घरका सदस्यहरु 
• िाहा िैन/ अपररहित व्यहि 
• हवदेशीहरु 
• अन्य 
• हदइएको मध्य कोही पहन नाई 
• कोही पहन नाई 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
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िमय/ द्वन्दको अिवि 
१. तलका मध्य द्वन्दको समयबाट कसलाई सबभदा बढी सम्झनु हुन्ि ? 
• सरकारी सेना 
• सैहनक 
• सैन्य ताहलम प्राप्त सदस्यहरु/ हमहलहसया  
• लुटेरा/ अपराधीहरु  
• हिमेकी (हरु) 
• घरका सदस्यहरु 
• िाहा िैन/ अपररहित 
• हवदेशीहरु 
• अन्य 
• हदइएका मध्ये कोहह होइन 
• कोही पहन नाई 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
२. प्र: तल हदइएका व्यहि मध्ये द्वन्दको समयबाट कसलाइ कहत पटक देखेको सम्झनुहुन्ि ? 
• सरकारी सेना 
• सैन्य ताहलम प्राप्त सदस्यहरु/ हमहलहसया 
• लुटेरा/ अपराधीहरु 
• हिमेकी (हरु) 
• घरका सदस्यहरु 
• िाहा िैन/ अपररहित 
• हवदेशीहरु 
• अन्य 
• हदइएका मध्य कोहह होइन 
• कोहह पहन नाई 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अहस्वकार 
िवममवित िडाकुहरु 
१. प्र: लिाकुहरु सवषप्रिम कहहल ेआए ? आएपहि हतनीहरुले के के गरे ? 
२. प्र: तपाइको समुदायमा लिाकुहरु कहत समय बसे ? 
• एक महहना भन्दा कम 
• एक महहना भन्दा बढी 
• २-३ महहना 
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• ३-६ महहना 
• ६-९ महहना 
• ९-१२ महहना 
• १-२ वर्ष 
• २-३ वर्ष 
• ३-४ वर्ष 
• ४-५ वर्ष 
• ५-६ वर्ष 
• ६-७ वर्ष 
• ७-८ वर्ष 
• ८-९ वर्ष 
• ९-१० वर्ष 
• १० वर्ष र त्यो भन्दा बढी 
३. के कुनै लिाकुहरु मूख्य समूह गइसकेपहि पहन यिावत बसे ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• िाहा िैन 
४.  यहद हो भने कहत समय बसे त ? 
• एक महहना भन्दा कम 
• एक महहना भन्दा बढी 
• २-३ महहना 
• ३-६ महहना 
• ६-९ महहना 
• ९-१२ महहना 
• १-२ वर्ष 
• २-३ वर्ष 
• ३-४ वर्ष 
• ४-५ वर्ष 
• ५-६ वर्ष 
• ६-७ वर्ष 
• ७-८ वर्ष 
• ८-९ वर्ष 
• ९-१० वर्ष 
• १० वर्ष र त्यो भन्दा बढी 
५. प्र: के लिाकुहरुले तपाइँ वा तपाईको पररवारको कुनै सदस्य माहि बल प्रयोग गरे ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• िाहा भएन 
६. प्र: के लिाकुहरुले तपाइको समुदायमा कसैमाहि हहिंसाको प्रयोग गरे ? 
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• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• िाहा भएन 
७. प्र: के पहहलो हहिंसाको घटनापहि पहन लिाकुले तपाई, पररवार वा समुदायका सदस्यहरु उपर हहिंसा जारी राखे ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• िाहा भएन 
८. प्र: के तपाईसामु भएका लिाकाहरू द्वन्दबाट िहकत दहेखन्िे ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• िाहा भएन 
• प्र: यहद हो भने कहहल ेपत्ता लगाउनु भयो ? 
९. प्र: लिाकुहरू को सँग हदक्क भएका देहखन्िे , जनता वा द्वन्द ? 
• नागरीक/ जनता सँग 
• द्वन्दसँग 
• एक-अकाष सँग 
• सरकारसँग 
• हवद्रोहीसँग मात्र  
• आइमाईसँग/ महहलासगँ मात्र 
• पुरुर्सँग मात्र 
१०. प्र: के लिाकाहरू कहहल ैतपाइको समुदायमा समुदायका उही व्यहि उपर हहिंसा गनष फहकष ए त ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• हनहित िैन 
११. प्र: तलका मध्ये को तपाइको समुदायमा सबैभन्दा लामो समयसम्म रह े? 
• सरकारी सेना 
• सैहनकहरु 
• हवद्रोही समुह 
• सैन्य ताहलम प्राप्त सदस्यहरु/ हमहलहसया 
• हिमेकी(हरु) 
• लुटेरा/अपराधीहरु 
• घरका सदस्यहरु 
• हवदेशीहरु 
• अन्य 
• हदइएका मध्ये कोहह होइनन् 
• कोहह पहन नाई 
• िाहा िैन 
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• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
१२. प्र: के तपाइले लिाकाहरुको अवहस्िहत बताउन सक्नुहुन्ि ? 
• सक्िु/ हो 
• सक्दैन/ होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• अहनहित 
यहद सक्नुहुन्ि भने, तपाईले नक्सामा हतनीहरु रहकेो स्िान बताउन सक्नुहुन्ि ? 
• सक्िु/ हो 
• सक्दैन/ होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• अहनहित 
१३. प्र: कृपया नक्सामा हजलला अिवा नम्बर हकटान गनुषहोस् | 
िडाकाहरुको वनराशा 
१. प्र: लिाकाहरूको व्यवहार कस्तो हकहसमको हियो ? 
• सवोत्कृष्ट 
• धेरै राम्रो 
• राम्रो 
• खराब 
• धेरै खराब 
• िरम/ अती खराब 
२. प्र: के लिाकाहरू समुदायमा आउदा हनराशापूणष/ हदक्क लाग्दा तिा ररसाएका जस्ता देहखन्िे ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• अहनहित 
३. प्र: के लिाकाहरू िहकत जस्ता देहखन्िे ? यहद हो भने के हतनीहरुले नागरीक हवरुि हहिंसा प्रयोग गरे ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• अहनहित 
४. प्र: यहद हो भने लड़ाकाले कस्ता प्रकारको हहिंसा प्रयोग गरे ? 
• बलात्कार 
• हत्या 
• मौहखक दुव्यषबहार 
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• शारीररक दुव्यषबहार 
• अपहरण 
• यातना 
• मनोवैज्ञाहनक यातना  
• यौन दुव्यषबहार 
• अन्य [खुलाउनुहोस] 
५. प्र: समुदाय सदस्य हवरूिको हहिंसा कहत समय सम्म रह्यो ? 
• एक महहना भन्दा कम 
• एक महहना भन्दा बढी 
• २-३ महहना 
• ३-६ महहना 
• ६-९ महहना 
• ९-१२ महहना 
• १-२ वर्ष 
• २-३ वर्ष 
• ३-४ वर्ष 
• ४-५ वर्ष 
• ५-६ वर्ष 
• ६-७ वर्ष 
• ७-८ वर्ष 
• ८-९ वर्ष 
• ९-१० वर्ष 
• १० वर्ष र त्यो भन्दा बढी 
६. प्र: लिाकुहरुको व्यवहारको सम्बन्धमा अन्य के कुराहरु तपाइले भेटाउने भयो ? [खुलाउनुहोस] 
७. प्र: द्वन्दको समयमा तलका मध्य कुन दुइ व्याहिहरु सबै भन्दा हनराश र िहकत हिए ? 
• सरकारी सेना 
• सैहनकहरु 
• हवद्रोही समुह 
• सैन्य ताहलम प्राप्त सदस्यहरु/ हमहलहसया 
• हिमेकी(हरु) 
• लुटेरा/अपराधीहरु 
• घरका सदस्यहरु 
• हवदेशीहरु 
• अन्य 
• हदइएका मध्य कोहह होइनन 
• कोहह पहन नाई 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
८. प्र: यहद लिाकाहरू ररसाएका र उदास भएका भए कुन समुहका व्यहिहरु हनशाना बनाइएका हिए ? कृपया दुईवटा बताउनुहोस | 
• महहला 
• पुरुर् 
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• बालबाहलका 
• विृविृा  
• हकशोर-हकशोरीहरु 
• जाहतय समुह 
• धनी वगषको व्यहि 
• मध्यम वगीय व्यहि 
नागरीक विरुद्धको िामुवहक वनशाना नबनाइएको वहिंिा 
१. प्र: के तपाइको समुदायका सदस्यहरु हनशाना बनाइएका हिए ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
२. प्र: यहद हो भने यसो हकन भयो होला ? 
३. प्र: यहद तपाईको समुदायका सदस्य आक्रमण गररएका हिए भने के यो द्वन्दको शुरुवाती िणमा भएको हियो ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• िाहा भएन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
४. प्र: कुन समुदाय अिवा जनजातीय समुह हनशाना बनाइएका हिए ? 
५. प्र: कहत समयसम्म हनशाना बनाउने र जिाभाबी आक्रमणको क्रम िहलरह्यो ? 
• एक महहना भन्दा कम 
• एक महहना भन्दा बढी 
• २-३ महहना 
• ३-६ महहना 
• ६-९ महहना 
• ९-१२ महहना 
• १-२ वर्ष 
• २-३ वर्ष 
• ३-४ वर्ष 
• ४-५ वर्ष 
• ५-६ वर्ष 
• ६-७ वर्ष 
• ७-८ वर्ष 
• ८-९ वर्ष 
• ९-१० वर्ष 
• १० वर्ष र त्यो भन्दा बढी 
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६. प्र: के यी आक्रमण व्यहिगत सदस्यले गरेका हिए अिवा समुहगत रुपमा ? 
• व्यहिगत 
• समुहहरुले 
• सम्पूणष समूहले 
• िाहा भएन  
• सामुहहक रुपमा व्यहिले  
७. प्र: के लिाकुहरुले आक्रमणको पहहलो घटना-पिात पहन बाहसन्दाको हवरुिमा हहिंसा जारी राखे ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• िाहा भएन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार  
यहद हो भने कहत समय सम्म जारे रह्यो ? 
• एक महहना भन्दा कम 
• एक महहना भन्दा बढी 
• २-३ महहना 
• ३-६ महहना 
• ६-९ महहना 
• ९-१२ महहना 
• १-२ वर्ष 
• २-३ वर्ष 
• ३-४ वर्ष 
• ४-५ वर्ष 
• ५-६ वर्ष 
• ६-७ वर्ष 
• ७-८ वर्ष 
• ८-९ वर्ष 
• ९-१० वर्ष 
• १० वर्ष र त्यो भन्दा बढी 
८. प्र: के लिाकुहरुले तपाईको िेत्रको सदस्यहरुलाई सशस्त्र हभिन्त अहघ अिवा पहि पहन आक्रमण गनष शुरु गरे ? 
• हो 
• होइन हुनसक्ि  
• िाहा भएन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार  
९. प्र: यहद हो भने यो कहत लामो अवहधसम्म रह्यो ? 
• एक महहना भन्दा कम 
• एक महहना भन्दा बढी 
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• २-३ महहना 
• ३-६ महहना 
• ६-९ महहना 
• ९-१२ महहना 
• १-२ वर्ष 
• २-३ वर्ष 
• ३-४ वर्ष 
• ४-५ वर्ष 
• ५-६ वर्ष 
• ६-७ वर्ष 
• ७-८ वर्ष 
• ८-९ वर्ष 
• ९-१० वर्ष 
• १० वर्ष र त्यो भन्दा बढी 
१०. प्र: कहत पलट यी आक्रमण भए ? 
११. प्र: कहत समय सम्म यो िहलरह्यो ? 
• एक महहना भन्दा कम 
• एक महहना भन्दा बढी 
• २-३ महहना 
• ३-६ महहना 
• ६-९ महहना 
• ९-१२ महहना 
• १-२ वर्ष 
• २-३ वर्ष 
• ३-४ वर्ष 
• ४-५ वर्ष 
• ५-६ वर्ष 
• ६-७ वर्ष 
• ७-८ वर्ष 
• ८-९ वर्ष 
• ९-१० वर्ष 
• १० वर्ष र त्यो भन्दा बढी 
१२. प्र: गाउँ तिा नगरमा दशु्मनलाई आक्रमण गनुष धेरै नागरीक/ महहला र बालबाहलका मनेिन् भन्ने जानीकन गाउँ तिा नगरमा दुश्मनलाई 
आक्रमण गनुष ............ 
• ठीक हो 
• ठीक होइन 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
१३.  प्र: तलका मध्य कसल ेद्वन्दको पररणामलाइ सबै भन्दा बढी वणषन गिष ? 
• घणृा र हवभाजन पैदा गिष 
• धेरै मनोवैज्ञाहनक हाहन गिष 
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• धेरै हवध्विंश गिष 
• धेरै शारीररक पीिा हसजषना गिष 
• जनमानसमा धेरै घणृा हसजषना हुन्ि 
• अन्य (खुलाउनुहोस) 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
 
कृपया तल हदइएको पररहस्िहतको जवाफ हदनुहोस् | 
१४. प्र: सिंस्करण १: स्वेहच्िक रुपमा दुश्मनलाई खानेकुरा र शरण हदने नागरीक माहिको आक्रमण: के उनीहरु माहि दुश्मनलाई कमजोर 
बनाउन गररने आक्रमण ठीक वा बेहठक होला ? 
• ठीक हो 
• ठीक होईन 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
१५. प्र: सिंस्करण २: जवजषस्ती बाध्य भएर दुश्मन लिाकुलाई खानेकुरा र शरण हदने नागरीक माहिको आक्रमण: के उनीहरु माहिको 
आक्रमण शत्रुलाई कमजोर बनाउनको लाहग गनुष हठक वा बहेठक हो? 
• ठीक हो 
• ठीक होईन 
• िाहा िैन  
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
१६. प्र: के तपाई बलात्कारलाई हहिंसात्मक दुव्यषवहार ठान्नुहुन्ि ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• िाहािैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
१७. प्र: तलका मध्ये कुनले बलात्कारलाई सबभन्दा राम्ररी वणषन गिष ? 
• शारीररक दुव्यषवहार 
• मौहखक दुव्यषवहार 
• मनोवैज्ञाहनक दुव्यषवहार 
• यौनजन्य दुव्यषवहार 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
१८. प्र: तपाइले बलात्कारलाई के ठान्नुहुन्ि ? 
• शारीररक दुव्यषवहार 
• मौहखक दुव्यषवहार 
• मनोवैज्ञाहनक दुव्यषवहार 
• यौनजन्य दुव्यषवहार 
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• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
१९. प्र: तपाइले बलात्कारलाई के भन्नुहुन्ि ? 
• सही 
• गलत 
• िाहा भएन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
२०. प्र: जब तपाइले यसलाई ‘गलत’ भन्नुहुन्ि, यो गलत हो हकनकी यो .............. 
• मानव अहधकारको हवरुिमा ि 
• तपाइको धमष हवपरीत ि 
• कानुन हवपरीत ि 
• व्यहिगत मयाषदा/ आिारसिंहहता हवपरीत ि 
• तपाइको सिंस्कृहत हवपरीत ि 
• जनहवश्वास/ भावना हवपरीत ि  
• िाहा िैन 
• अन्य 
कृपया हदइएको हस्िहतहरुको उत्तर हदनुहोस् .... 
२१. प्र: सस्करण १: नागरीकहरु माहिको आक्रमण जसले स्वेहच्िक रुपमा आफ्नो नगरको रिाको लाहग दशु्मन लिाकुको गोला बारुद र 
सैन्य सामग्री ओसारपसार गरे: दुश्मनलाई कमजोर बनाउनको लाहग उनीहरु माहि (नागरीक) को आक्रमण ठीक वा बेहठक हो ? 
• ठीक हो 
• ठीक होइन 
• गलत 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
२२. प्र: सिंस्करण २:  नागरीकहरु माहिको आक्रमण जसले बलपूबषक वा दबाबमा परेर आफ्नो नगरको रिाको लाहग दशु्मन लिाकुको गोला 
बारुद र सैन्य सामाग्री ओसार-पसार गरे: दुश्मनलाई कमजोर बनाउनको लाहग उनीहरु माहि (नागरीक माहि) को आक्रमण ठीक वा 
बेहठक के हो ? 
• ठीक हो 
• ठीक होइन 
• गलत 
• िाहा िैन  
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
२३. प्र: यदी एउटा पुरुर्ले एउटा महहला माहि जबजषहस्त गिष भने के त्यो गलत हो ? 
• ठीक हो  
• ठीक होइन 
• गलत 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
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२४. प्र: यदी तपाइले 'गलत' भन्नु भयो भने, यो प्रिमत: गलत हो हकनभने ..... 
• मानव अहधकारको हवरुिमा ि 
• तपाइको धमष हवपरीत ि 
• कानुन हवपरीत ि 
• व्यहिगत मयाषदा/ आिार सिंहहता हवरुि ि 
• तपाइको सिंस्कृहत हवपरीत ि 
• जनहवश्वास/ भावना हवपरीत ि  
• अन्य (खुलाउनुहोस) 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
 
कृपया तलका पररहस्िहतहरुको उत्तर हदनुहोस | 
२५. प्र: नागरीक माहिको आक्रमण जसले दुश्मन लिाकुलाई खाने कुरा र शरण हदए/ उनीहरू माहिको आक्रमण दुश्मनलाई कमजोर 
बनाउनको लाही ठीक वा बेहठक के हो ? 
• ठीक 
• बेठीक 
• हुन सक्ि तर अन्य कुरामा भर पिष 
• उत्तर हदन अहस्वकार 
२६.  प्र: दुश्मनलाई कमजोर पानष आम जनतालाई खाद्यान्न, और्धी, अिवा खानेपानी बाट बहन्ित गनुष/ के त्यो गलत हो ? 
• हठक 
• ठीक होईन 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
 
अिवा त्यसो गनुष युिको एउटा अिंश हो ? 
• गलत 
• सही 
• युिको अिंश हो 
• आशा गरे अनुसार  
कृपया तलका पररहस्िहतको जवाफ हदनुहोस् | 
२७. प्र: दुश्मन लड़कुहरुमिी आक्रमण गदाष र नागरीकहरुलाई जहत सक्दो जोगाउने कोहशस गदाष के यो..... 
• स्वेहच्िकरुपमा खानेकुरा र शरण दुश्मनलाई हदने नागरीक माहि आक्रमण गनुष ठीक हो ? 
• आमजनतालाई खाद्यान्न, और्हध अिवा खानेपानीबाट बहन्ित गनुष युिको अिंश हो | 
• महहला र बालबाहलका माररन्िन भन्ने िाहा भईकन गाउँ सहरको बस्तीउपर आक्रमण गनुष युिको अिंश हो | 
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• नागरीकहरु दुघषटनावश पनषसक्िन भन्ने िाहा भईकन पहन लयाण्िमाइन (बम) हबच्िाउनु ठीक हो | 
२८. प्र: जनतालाई िािेर दुश्मन लिाकुलाई मात्र आक्रमण गदाष...  
• दुश्मनलाई स्वेहिकरूपमा रुपमा खानेकुरा र शरण हदने नागरीक माहि आक्रमण गनुष ठीक हो | 
• आमजनतालाई खाद्यान्न, और्हध तिा खानेपानीबाट बहन्ित गनुष युिको अिंश हो | 
• महहला र बालबाहलका माररन्िन भन्ने िाहा भईकन पहन गाउँ-सहरको बस्तीउपर  आक्रमण गनुष युिको अिंश हो | 
• नागरीकहरु दुघषटनाबश लयाण्िमाइन (बम) कुलिन सक्िन भन्ने िाहा भईकन पहन लयाण्िमाइन हबच्िाउनु ठीक हो | 
२९. प्र: धेरै नागरीकले कानुनको हवरुि हो र ठीक होइन भन्दाभन्दै पहन लिाकुहरुले नागररकलाई आक्रमण गनुष र घाइते बनाउनुमा तलका 
मध्ये कुन तीन कारणले उहित रुपमा प्रष््टयाउिन् ? 
• कुनैपहन मूलयमा हवजय प्राप्त गनुष 
• कानुनको बेवास्ता गनुष 
• युिबाट िहकत हुनु 
• युिबाट हदक्क मानु 
• अको पिलाई घणृा गनुष 
• युिबाट आहजत हुनु  
• आदेश प्राप्त भएर 
• नागरीकसामु लामो समय सम्म भएकाले 
• सम्पूणष सिंवदेना गुमाएर 
• मादक/ लागुपदािष 
• कानुन िाहा नभएर 
• युिको क्रममा अनुशासन नहुनु 
• लिाकुहरु नगरीक बीि लामो समयसम्म रहनु 
• अको पिल ेपहन त्यस्तै गरेको हुनाले 
• धेरै जवान/ सानो भएकोल े
• िराएकोले 
• कुनै उद्दशे्यउपर प्रहतबि भएकोल े
• शहि दुरुपयोग 
३०. प्र: के कुनै व्यहिगत सदस्यले तपाइको समुदायमा नागरीक हवरुि हहिंसा गरेका हिए ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुन सक्ि 
• हनहित िैन 
यहद हो भने कुन लिाकु-पिका हतमीहरु सदस्य हिए ? 
• सरकारी सेना 
• सैहनक 
• सैन्य ताहलम प्राप्त सदस्यहरु/ हमहलहसया 
• हवद्रोही समूह 
• लुटेरा/ अपराधीहरु 
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• हिमेकी(हरु) 
• घरका सदस्य (हरु) 
• हवदेशीहरु 
• अन्य 
• हदइएका मध्ये कोहह पहन होइनन् 
• कोहह पहन नाई 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
३१. प्र: के तपाई कहहले पररवारका सदस्य वा सािीलाई मानष बाध्य पाररनुभएको हियो ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• अहनहित 
३२.  प्र: के तपाइँ पररवारको सदस्य वा सािीलाई धोका हदन बाध्य पाररनु भएको हियो ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• अहनहित 
३३. प्र: के तपाईको घर पररवारले युि शुरु भए देहख आयमा गम्भीर िहत व्यहोनुषपयो ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
३४. प्र: तपाइले हनहितरुपमा सवषप्रिम यसको अनुभव कहहले गनुषभयो ? 
३५. प्र: यो हनहितरुपमा कहहल ेभयो ? 
३६. प्र: यो गुमेको समय यसको कूल मूलय कहत हियो ? [मुद्रा खुलाउनुहोस्] 
३७. प्र: यसको िोरी तिा नोक्सानीमा को हजम्मेवार हियो ? 
• सरकारी सेना 
• सैहनक 
• हवद्रोही समुह 
• सैन्य ताहलम प्राप्त सदस्यहरु/ हमहलहसयहरु 
• लुटेरा/ अपराधीहरु 
• हिमेकी (हरु) 
• घर पररवारका सदस्यहरु 
• िाहा िैन/ अपररहित 
• हवदेशीहरु 
• अन्य 
• हदइएका मध्ये कोहह पहन होइनन् 
• कोहह पहन नाई 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
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३८. प्र: के तपाइँ वा तपाइको पररवारको सदस्यल ेआफ्नो आहिषक गहतहवहधहरु हहिंसाको कारणले पररवतषन गनुषभयो ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
३९. प्र: के हहिंसा तिा हवस्िापनको कारणले तल हदइएका मध्ये कुनै सम्पहत्त उललेख्यरुपमा गुमे/लुहटए वा नष्ट भए ? 
• िसना 
• रेहियो/ हटभी 
• कपिाहरु 
• कागजात प्रमाणपत्रहरु 
• गहना 
• सेलफोन 
• कम्बलहरु 
• राइफल/ खाँि 
• कृहर्जन्य साधन जस्तो हलो, कोदालो, इत्यादी 
• ट्रयाक्टर 
• टिषलाइट/ फ्लयासलाइट 
• हशिा सामाग्री 
• आश्रयका सामाग्री 
• कम््युटर 
• अन्य 
४०. प्र: िोरी र हवध्विंशको लाहग को हजम्मेवार हियो ? 
• सरकारी सेना 
• सैहनक 
• हवद्रोही समुह 
• सैन्य ताहलम प्राप्त सदस्यहरु/ हमहलहसयहरु 
• लुटेरा/ अपराधीहरु 
• हिमेकी (हरु) 
• घर पररवारका सदस्यहरु 
• िाहा िैन/ अपररहित 
• हवदेशीहरु 
• अन्य 
• हदइएका मध्ये कोहह पहन होइनन् 
• कोहह पहन नाई 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
४१. प्र: तपाइँ अिवा तपाइको पररवारको सदस्यल ेहदइएको मध्ये कुनै अनुभब गनुष भएको ि ? 
• नाई/ िैन 
• मौहखक रुपमा धम्की पाएको 
• मौहखक रुपमा वेइज्जत गररएको तर धम्की नपाएको 
• िक्कु, बन्दुक अिवा अन्य हहतयारले धम्क्याइएको  
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• हपहटएको/ आक्रमण गररएको/ लात्तीले हाहनएको 
• घाटी अठ्याइएको अिवा जलाइएको  
• घाइते भएको अिवा गोहल प्रहारको क्रममा माररएको 
• जहमन मुहन हबिाइएको बम (माइनमा) परर घाइते भएको  
• व्यहिले निाहदा पहन यौनहक्रया गनष शारररीक रुपमा बाध्य पाररएको 
• व्यहिले निाहदा पहन अन्य यौनजन्य हक्रयाकलाप गनष बाध्य पाररएको 
• अिंगभिंग भएको  
• श्रम गनष बाध्य पाररएको 
• लुहटएको 
• पैसा तिा अन्य बस्तु जबजषस्ती असुल गररएको  
• अपहरणमा पररएको 
• िाहा िैन/ अन्य 
४२. प्र: यो हाहन/ िहत व्यहोने व्यहि को हियो ? 
• तपाई 
• आमा 
• बुबा 
• हदहद-बहहनी 
• दाजु-भाई 
• काका वा मामाका िोरािोरी  
• हजुरआमा  
• हजुरबुवा 
• काकी 
• काका 
• सौतेलो दाजुभाई 
• सौतेलो हददीबहहनी 
• सौतेनी आमा 
• सौतेलो बवुा 
४३. प्र: घटना कहा घट्यो ? 
• युि मैदानमा/ लिाइको क्रममा 
• घरमा 
• शरणािी हशहवरमा 
• हिमेकमा 
• तपाइको समुदायमा 
• कायषस्िलमा (घर र हमहलटरी सेवा बाहके) 
• जब लिाकुहरु समुदाय बीि भएको अवस्िामा  
• ओसारपसारको क्रममा (उदाहरणको लाहग बसाइसराइ) 
• अन्य िेत्र  
• िाहा िैन  
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
४४. प्र: उि व्यहि सो अनुभवको कारणले कुनै हकहसमको दुरगामी र शारररीक अिवा मनोरोग, मतृ्यु वा अन्य कष्ट भोग्नु परेको ि ? 
• हो, दीघषकाहलन प्रकृहतको रोग 
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• हो, घाउ 
• हो, अपाङ्गता 
• हो, मनोवैज्ञाहनक तनाव/ हरैानी 
• हो, तत्काहलन मतृ्यु 
• हो, घटनास्िलमै मतृ्यु 
• हो, बेपत्ता गररएको 
• हो, यातना हदइएको  
• हो, अस्पतालमा मतृ्यु 
• हो, अस्पतालबाट हिस्िाजष भए पहि मतृ्यु 
• हो, अन्य 
• होइन, िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
िडाकु दस्ता र आक्रमण 
१. प्र: तपाइको हविारमा कुन समुहले समुदायका सदस्यको हवरुिमा सबभन्दा नराम्रो हहिंसा गरेको हियो ? 
• सरकारी सेना 
• सैहनकहरु 
• हवद्रोही समूह  
• लुटेरा/ अपराधीहरु 
• िाहा िैन/ अपररहित 
• हवदेशीहरु 
• अन्य 
• हदइएको मध्ये कोहह पहन होइनन् 
• कोहह पहन नाई 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
२. प्र: के समुहहरु हनशाना बनाइएका हिए र युिको हहतयारको रुपमा प्रयोग गररएका हिए ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• िाहा भएन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
३. प्र: यी समुहहरु हकन हनशाना गररएका हिए ? 
• हदक्क भएर 
• स्रोतको लाहग 
• सबभन्दा गररब भएर  
• लिाकुहरु त्यस िेत्रमा पठाईएको हुनाले 
• लिाकुहरु हनराश भएर 
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• हतनीहरुले दुश्मनलाई सिंरिण हदएकोले  
• हतनीहरुले दुश्मनलाई सहयोग गरेकोल े
• दुश्मनसँग सम्बहन्धत भएकाल े
• हतनीहरुको जातीय मूलको कारणल े
• हतनीहरुको सािंस्कृहतक पषृ्ठभूमीको कारणल े
• धाहमषक आस्िाको कारणले 
४. प्र: के सुरिा फौजले समुहहरुलाई मानव ढालको रुपमा द्वन्दको अवहधमा प्रायोग गरे ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• िाहा भएन 
यहद हो भने के यो िेत्र हवपिीको बहलयो पकि भएको िेत्र हियो ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• िाहा भएन 
५. प्र: तलका मध्य कुन लिाकुहरुले बढी गरे ? 
• बलात्कार 
• सन्ताप हदनु 
• यौन हहिंसा 
• दुव्यषवहार 
• भेदभाव 
• यातना 
• हत्या 
६. प्र: कुन समुहले हहिंसाको सबभन्दा बढी अनुभव गयो ? [खुलाउनुहोस] 
७. प्र: यसो हकन भयो होला ? 
• उनीहरुको सिंगठनको कारणल े
• उनीहरुको बसोबास स्िलको कारणले  
• युिको लम्बाइको कारणल े
• िाहा भएन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
८. प्र: उनीहरुले यो हहिंसा कहत्तको अनुभब गरे ? 
• ०-५ पटक 
• ५-१० पटक 
• १०-१५ पटक 
• १५-२० पटक 
• २०-३० पटक 
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• ३०-४० पटक 
• ४०-५० पटक 
९. प्र: यो हहिंसा कहत समयसम्म िली रह्यो ? 
• १-२ हप्ता 
• २-३ हप्ता 
• ३-४ हप्ता 
• एक महहना भन्दा बढी 
• १-३ महहना 
• ३-६ महहना 
• ६-९ महहना 
• ९-१२ महहना 
• १ वर्ष र बढी 
१०. प्र: के हभन्न हभन्नै समूहमाहि भएको हहिंसामा हभन्नता हियो ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• िाहा भएन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
११. प्र:  हभन्नता के के हिए ? 
• कुनैले अरु भन्दा बढी िती व्यहोरे 
• हहिंसा एउटै हियो  
• हहिंसा हलिंगमा आधाररत हियो 
• हहिंसा आयमा आधाररत हियो 
• हहिंसा लिाकुहरु समुदायमा रहकेो अबहधमा आधाररत हियो  
िडाकुहरु र व्यिहार 
म अब द्वन्द वा सशस्त्र द्वन्दको क्रममा हुनसक्ने केहह पररहस्िहतहरुको वणषन गनेिु | प्रत्येक पररहस्िहतको लाहग  म हजुरलाई त्यस 
पररहस्िहतको भागीदार भएको कलपना गनष आग्रह गदषिु | यदी हनणषयहरु तपाईउपर हनभषर रहकेो खण्िमा तपाइले कसरी व्यवहार 
गनुषहुन््यो होला | यहा पहहलो कालपहनक पररहस्िहत हदइएको ि : 
१. प्रA: के तपाइले आत्मसमपषण गरेको दुश्मन लिाकु, जसल ेतपाइको नहजकको व्यहिलाई मायो, लाइ जोगाउनु हुन््यो ? 
• जोगाउिे  
• जोगाउने हिएन 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
२. प्रB: के तपाइले घाइते भएको दुश्मन लिाकु, जसले तपाइको नहजकको व्यहि मायो, लाइ सहायता गनुषहुन््यो ? 
• सहायता गिे 
• सहायता गने हिएन 
• िाहा िैन 
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• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
३. प्र: के दुश्मन लिाकुले तपाईलाई कैद गरे अिवा तपाइ रहकेो िेत्र दुश्मनको हनयन्त्रणमा आयो ? 
• कैद गररएको हियो 
• कैद गररएको िीयो तर जान स्वतन्त्र हियो 
• दुश्मनको हनयन्त्रणमा बहसयो तर हसहमतता हियो 
• दुश्मनको हनयन्त्रणमा बहसयो तर जान स्वतन्त्र हियो 
• दुश्मनको हनयन्त्रणमा आइएन 
४. प्र: नागररक बन्धकमा राखेर बदलामा केहह हलने हवर्य हन ? के यो गलत हो या युि को अिंश हो ? 
• गलत 
• युिको अिंश 
• दुवै (स्वेच्िाको प्रहतहक्रया) 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
५. प्र: कृपया तपाइँ दुश्मनको हनयन्त्रणमा तलका मध्य केहह कुरा घकेो भए बताउनुहोस: 
• तपाईलाई व्यहिगत रुपमा गलत व्यवहार गररयो 
• तपाइ शारररीक रुपमा घाइते हुनुभयो  
• तपाइलाई तपाइको तन्दुरुस्ती/सु-स्वास््यको परीिणको लाहग तटस्ि सिंस्िाका प्रहतहनहध सँग सम्पकष  भयो | 
६. प्र: के तपाई आत्मसमपषण गरेको घाइते लिाकुलाई सहायता गनुषहुन््यो/ जीवन बिाउनुहुन््यो जबहक आत्मसमपषण गरेको दुश्मन लिाकु 
जसल ेतपाइको नहजकको व्यहिलाई मायो ? 
• गिे 
• गने हिएन 
• गनष सक्िे होला 
• िाहा भएन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
• घाइते भएको लिाकुलाई सहायता गिे 
• आत्मसमपषण गरेको लिाकुलाई जोगाउिे 
७. प्र: के हनयम कानुनहरु त्यहत महत्वपूणष िन् हक यदी युिको क्रममा तोहिएमा, तोि्ने व्यहिलाई कारवाही गररयोस् ? 
• हो 
• होइन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• िाहा भएन 
यदी हो भने, यी हनयमहरु/कानुनहरु के मा आधररत िन् ? 
• देशको कानुन 
• अन्तराषहष्ट्रय कानुन 
• धाहमषक हसिान्तहरु 
• जनमूलय मान्यताहरु 
• अन्य 
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• िाह िैन 
८. प्र: युि समाहप्त पिात, व्यहि जसले यी कानुन तोि्यो .... ? 
• मुद्दा िलाउनु पिष 
• जनसमि सावषजहनक गनुष पिष, तर मुद्दा िलाउनुहुन्न 
• हतनीहरुद्वारा आफै पीहित हुनुपिष 
• िमादान गररनु पिष/ आम माफी हदनुपिष 
• युि पिात माफी हदइनुपिष 
• युि समाहप्त पिात हबहसषनुपिष 
• िाहा िैन 
९. प्र: गलत काम गनेलाइ कसल ेदहण्ित गनुषपिष ? 
• अन्तराषहष्ट्रय न्यायालयल े
• आफ्नै सरकारले 
• आफ्नै न्यायालयले 
• हहिंसाको पीहितल े
• सैहनक आफैले 
• आफ्नै राजनैहतक नेताले 
• नागररक जनसिंख्याले 
• अन्य 
• िाहा िैन 
१०. प्र: दण्िको लाहग हजम्मेवार को हुनुपिष ? 
• अन्तराषहष्ट्रय न्यायालय 
• आफ्नै सरकार 
• आफ्नै न्यायालय 
• सैहनक आफै 
• आफ्नै राजनैहतक नेता 
• नागररक जनसिंख्या 
• अन्य 
• िाहा िैन 
११. प्र: के अन्तराषहष्ट्रय सिंघसिंस्िाहरुले यसलाई सहजलो अिवा अफ्ठ्यारो बनाएका िन्, अिवा कुनै हभन्नता आएको िैन ? 
• राम्रो भएको ि 
• नराम्रो भएको ि 
• कुनै अन्तर िैन 
• िाहा िैन 
१२. प्र: भहवष्यमा यस्ता प्रकारका हवर्यहरु सम्बोधन गदाष, के तपाइले अन्तराषहष्ट्रय समुदायबाट कम या बढी हस्तिेप िाहनुहुन्ि (नागररक 
िेत्र आक्रमण गररएको वा खानेकुरा, खानेपानी, और्हध आपूहतष र हबजुलीबाट बहन्ित गररएको ि) ? 
• अझ बढी हस्तिेप िाहन्िु 
• कम हस्तिेप िाहन्िु 
• िाहा भएन 
१३. प्र: मलाई प्रश्न गनष हदनुहोस् हक यदी द्वन्दको बेला नागरीक िेत्र आक्रमण गररयो अिवा गाउँ नगर खानेकुरा, खानेपानी, और्हध आपूहतष 
र हबजुलीबाट बहन्ित पररयो भने के गनष साहकएला ? सहायता र सुरिाको लाहग को तफष  जानुहोला ? 
• सरकार 
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• युएन् सिंस्िाहरु (उदाहरणको लाहग UNHCR) 
• मानवीय सिंस्िाहरु 
• कुनै पहन नाई 
• धाहमषक नेताहरु 
• अन्तराषहष्ट्रय सिंस्िाहरु 
• स्िानीय सरकारी नेताहरु 
• अन्य 
• भगवान (महन्दर/ििष) 
• आमी/ हमहलटरी 
• जनता 
• िाहा िैन/ अस्वीकार 
१४. प्र: युि समाहप्तपिात् हनयम तोिेको व्यहिलाई .............. ? 
• मुद्दा िलाउनुपिष 
• माफी हदनुपिष/ युिपिात् हबहसषनुपिष 
• जनतासामु सावषजहनक गररनु पिष तर मुद्दा िलाउनु हुन्न 
• आममाफी हदइनुपिष 
• िाहा िैन 
१५. प्र: द्वन्दको क्रममा कुनै एक पिको साि हदने सोच्नु पदाष, कुन कुरा तपाइलाई महत्वपूणष लाग्ि, एक-अकाषको युि लि्नुको कारण 
अिवा युिको क्रममा कुनै पिल ेगने व्यवहार ? 
• कुन पि केका लाहग लिेको ि 
• कुन पि युिको दौरान कसरी व्यवहार गिष 
• दुव ै
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
१६. प्र: के तपाइलाई युिका पीहितहरुलाई प्रहतशोध हलने अहधकार ि जस्तो लाग्ि ? 
• ि 
• िैन 
• हुनसक्ि 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
१७. प्र: यदी उनीहरु पररवारको सदस्य वा सािीलाई मानष बाध्य बनाइएको भए ? 
• ि 
• िैन 
• हुन सक्ि 
• िाहा िैन 
• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
१८. प्र: यहद उनीहरु पररवारका सदस्य वा सािीहरुलाई धोका हदन बाध्य बनाईएको भए ? 
• ि 
• िैन 
• हुन सक्ि 
• िाहा िैन 
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• उत्तर हदन अस्वीकार 
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